著眼當下：基於合作而非聯盟的地緣政治未來前景光明 作者： Ooi Kee Beng / The Edge Malaysia

 著眼當下：基於合作而非聯盟的地緣政治未來前景光明

美國治下的和平,全球霸權,冷戰,兩極時代,非殖民化,殖民化,加入聯合國,民族獨立,國家建設,遊擊運動,族群衝突,民族歷史,領土,世界大戰,

本文原刊於《The Edge Malaysia Weekly》的論壇版，日期為2026年4月27日至5月3日。

非殖民化是一個複雜的過程。儘管20世紀後期對此有大量著述，但近二十年來，學者們對此主題的關注卻大大減少。這可能表明人們普遍接受了以下觀點：
（i）大多數國家加入聯合國並獲得民族獨立後，非殖民化就結束了；
（ii）人們對前殖民文化和歷史的深入了解已經達到頂峰；或者
（iii）非殖民化作為一個分析術語的重要性隨著1991年冷戰的結束而消失。

誠然，殖民化對全世界的影響如此深遠，以至於無論你如何定義去殖民化，都不能真正將其拋諸腦後。
首先，我們必須捫心自問：
殖民化作為一個歷史進程是否已經結束？
如果答案是否定的，那麼去殖民化就意味著一場與殖民化（其影響仍在持續）的負面影響的持續鬥爭。

這場鬥爭發生在我們可以稱之為後殖民時代的時期。
這並非意味著殖民主義已經結束，而是承認其影響仍在持續，無論這種影響是正面的還是負面的。

在我看來，後殖民主義最好被定義為經典黑格爾認知辯證法中的綜合階段：
從正題到反題再到合題：
從殖民主義到非殖民化再到後殖民主義。
前者發生，隨之而來的是對其的反對，之後進入重新概念化的階段，最終試圖成為新的正題。

在此背景下，上文第三點值得特別注意。
非殖民化發生在冷戰的地緣政治框架內，也就是我們通常所說的兩極時代。
這種關聯由來已久，且易於理解。
然而，蘇聯解體並未終結全球非殖民化的必要性。事實上，悖論在於，冷戰的勝利者恰恰是我們如今所稱的西方列強組成的殖民網絡；
因此，以共產主義計劃為代表的非殖民化進程不可能就此結束。
相反，我們需要一個新的術語來取代「殖民權力」。
將冷戰後的時期稱為單極時期——地緣經濟學中的新自由主義時期——強化了世界正在形成統一的觀念，暗示著「美國治下的和平」（Pax Americana）已經吞噬並壓制了世界各地湧動的非殖民化熱情。
而描述這現象的恰當術語，其實是「全球霸權」。

鑑於西方對中國全社會崛起的應對方式，這種霸權的支柱在於供應鏈。
誰控制了這些供應鏈，特別是能源和其他稀缺關鍵商品、教育和資訊、武器和支付，誰就控制了世界。

國家準獨立

自1945年以來，對大多數前殖民地而言，民族獨立已成為定義「非殖民化」的便捷、連續且方便的事件，彷彿它是日曆上一個確定的事件，如同生日一般。在馬來西亞，「獨立」（Merdeka）的呼喊聲響徹雲霄，將殖民主義的終結深深烙印在馬來西亞人的心中。
非殖民化已經完成，無論之後發生什麼，我們都開始關注另一個進程：
「國家建設」。
這種新的關注點，在遊擊運動和族群衝突的推動下，使馬來西亞對非殖民化的理解脫離了地理界限。內部緊張局勢成為未來幾十年的主要問題。鄰國擺脫外國控制這一事實本應促進它們之間的合作，不僅是為了各自的國家主權，也是為了區域發展。

東協已經認識到這種需求，但沒有認識到其緊迫性以及它在非殖民化過程中發揮的關鍵作用。

民族歷史必然與領土相關，然而，在大多數情況下，確定那些後來成為民族國家的殖民地的邊界是一個偶然的過程。東南亞的海洋特性也表明，這種政治模式的有效性有限。

殖民化是一個複雜的過程，不僅涉及殖民地的建立和控制，也涉及殖民者之間的鬥爭，包括日本。
這最終導致了所謂的世界大戰，給殖民列強帶來了毀滅性的打擊。
由此催生了基於貿易和互聯互通的區域主義理念。在東南亞，殖民主義的終點被視為主權民族國家的誕生。
對於這些尚不明朗的政府而言，設想任何超越1967年成立的謹慎的東協的區域抱負都是不可想像的。

此外，所有這些國家都必須立即在美俄兩大戰勝國之間選邊站隊。
在西方，這些國家分別組成了北約和華沙條約組織。

儘管發生了韓戰、越戰以及其他各大洲的衝突，冷戰最不穩定的前線仍在歐洲，交戰雙方分別得到華盛頓或莫斯科的支持。
在亞洲大陸的另一側，步履蹣跚的國家主要致力於他們所認為的後殖民時代國家重建。

後殖民主義的區域化

過去三十年間，
隨著中國在各領域崛起，並吸引整個地區的經濟和其他連結向其靠攏，我們看到西方聯盟內部開始出現裂痕。
英國脫歐、川普一世和二世相繼上台。
無論其根本原因是什麼——無論是美國與其盟友（現在有人稱之為附庸國）之間長期存在的權力不對稱、歐盟的過度擴張，還是跨大陸、跨文明移民帶來的社會緊張局勢——中國的崛起​​以及隨之而來的幾乎是自發形成的強勁區域貿易主義都發揮了重要作用。有些人甚至認為，這起到了觸發作用。

這種新的地緣政治和地緣經濟狀況讓美國感到面臨嚴峻挑戰，並對盟友乃至所有國家都失去了耐心。
它對關鍵供應鏈的控制正在喪失。
它手中僅剩一張王牌，那就是它是大多數全球供應鏈的最終目的地。
因此，像川普二世那樣，揮舞高額關稅這把“利劍”，在戰略上確實有意義。
即便只是對於一個走投無路、黔驢技窮的對手而言。

那我們該何去何從？
正如加拿大總理馬克‧卡尼所言，
中等強國是時候停止對美國的依賴，開始進行政府間對話，建立新的聯繫，達成多邊協議了。
它們在不受大國控制的情況下開展合作本身就是一種優勢，大國必須認真對待。

在亞洲方面，東亞的海洋遺產對各國間關係有重要的借鏡意義。
正如卡尼所設想的那樣，亞洲國家實際上並不需要像兩極格局所暗示的那樣「對沖」。
只要認識到合作是多維度、多層次的，就能以多元化的方式發展富有成效的關係，而不是屈從於某個由專制教父掌控的「幫派」。

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拿督黃啟明博士是檳城研究院執行院長、《檳城月刊》創刊編輯、喬治市文學節總監，以及尤索夫伊薩克東南亞研究院高級訪問學者。他的著作包括獲獎作品《不情願的政治家：敦伊斯邁博士及其時代》、《以意識形態為名：吳慶瑞的知識分子傳記》以及《歐亞大陸核心及其邊緣：與王贗武探討世界歷史的對話》。

訂閱我們的紙本和/或電子版，即可節省費用。

This article first appeared in Forum, The Edge Malaysia Weekly on April 27, 2026 - May 3, 2026

Decolonisation is a complicated process. While a lot was written about it in the late 20th century, much less attention has been paid by scholars to that subject over the last two decades. This might suggest a popular acceptance: (i) that it ended with national independence for most countries when they joined the United Nations; (ii) that the quest for deeper awareness of pre-colonial culture and history has been achieved; or (iii) that its salience as an analytical term ended with the Cold War in 1991.

To be sure, the impact that colonisation had on the whole world was so strong and deep that decolonisation, whichever way you wish to define that process, cannot really be thrown aside. First of all, we have to ask if colonisation as a historical process is over. If it is not, then decolonisation denotes a constant struggle against negative effects of (variedly continuing) colonisation.

That struggle happens in what we could call the Post-Colonial Era. This does not say that colonialism is over as much as it recognises the continuing effects of it, whether seen positively or negatively.

To my mind, post-colonialism is best identified as the synthesising stage in classic Hegelian cognitive dialectics: thesis to antithesis to synthesis: colonialism to decolonisation to post-colonialism. The first happens, leading to opposition to it, and then follows a new phase of reconceptualisation, which in time seeks to function as a new thesis.

In that context, point 3 above is worth a special note. Decolonisation occurred within the geopolitical framework of the Cold War, within what we nonchalantly call the Bipolar Era. That association has been a profound and popularly understandable one. The fall of the Soviet Union did not end the need for global decolonisation, though. In fact, the paradox here is that the victors in the Cold War were exactly the network of colonisers we have come to call the Western powers; thus, decolonisation as exemplified in the communist project cannot have ended. Instead, a new term had to come into use to replace colonial power. Calling the aftermath of the Cold War the unipolar period — the neoliberal period in geoeconomics — propounds the idea of emergent unity in the world, suggesting that Pax Americana had subsumed and triumphed over much of the decolonising passions seething in much of the world. The appropriate term to describe this is really global hegemony.

What the pillars of this hegemony, in light of how the West has been responding to China’s whole-of-society rise, are the supply chains. Whoever controls these, especially energy and other rare and key commodities, education and information, and weapons and payments, controls the world.

National quasi-independence

National independence for most former colonies since 1945 has been an easy, serial and convenient occurrence for defining when “decolonisation” happened, as if it were a definite event on the calendar, like a birthday. In Malaysia, the shout of “Merdeka” (independence) echoed and etched into the minds of Malaysians the ending of colonialism. Decolonisation had taken place, and whatever followed, we learnt to consider another process: “nation building”. This new focus, encouraged by the guerilla movement and inter-ethnic tensions, deregionalised Malaysia’s understandings of decolonisation. Internal tensions took over as the problem of the coming decades. The fact that neighbouring countries were emerging out of foreign control should have eased collaboration between them, not only towards each their own national sovereignty, but towards regional development.

Asean has been a recognition of this need, but not of its urgency and the essential role that holds in the decolonising process.

National history is necessarily territorial, and yet the determining of the boundary of the former colonies that became nation states was a contingent process in most cases. The maritime nature of Southeast Asia speaks against the efficacy of such a political format.

Colonisation was a complicated affair that not only involved the creating and controlling of colonies, but also struggles between colonisers, including Japan. This led to the so-called World Wars that devastated the colonial powers. Out of that came the idea of regionalism based on trade and connectivity. In Southeast Asia, the ending of colonialism was equated with the coming into being of sovereign nation states. For these uncertain governments to imagine any regional ambitions beyond the cautious Asean founded in 1967 was not imaginable.

Furthermore, all these countries had to immediately pick a side between the two victorious powers — the US and Russia. In the West, these took the form of Nato and the Warsaw Pact.

Notwithstanding the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and the conflicts on all other continents, the Cold War’s uneasy frontline was in Europe, each side backed either by Washington or Moscow. On the Asian side of the continental landmass, stumbling nations were mainly involved in what they saw as post-colonial nation building.

Regionalising post-colonialism

As China rose on all fronts over the last three decades, drawing economic and other connectivities towards itself from the whole region, we saw the cracks emerging in Western alliances. Brexit happened, and then Trump 1, and then Trump 2. Whatever the underlying reasons for this — be it the power asymmetry between the US and its allies (some now say vassal states) having gone on for too long, the overly hasty growth of the European Union, or social tensions resulting from cross-continental and cross-civilisational immigration, the rise of China and the almost spontaneous but strong trade regionalism that followed played a big part in it. Some would say a triggering role even.

This new geopolitical and geoeconomic situation saw the US feeling deeply challenged, and losing its patience with its allies — and everyone else for that matter. Its control over the key supply chains was being lost. It had one trump card to play, and that was the fact that it is the final destination on most global supply chains. And so, wielding high tariffs as a mighty sword, as Trump 2 then did, does make strategic sense. If only as a cornered combatant who had run out of ideas.

Where does this leave us? As Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney so eloquently said, it is time for the middle powers to stop feeling beholden to the US, and start engaging in inter-government discussions to build new ties and reach new agreements that are plurilateral. Their collaboration outside of big power control is a strength in itself that the big guys have to take seriously.

On the Asian side, much can be learnt from East Asia’s maritime legacy for inter-polity relations. Somewhat reflecting what Carney is imagining, Asian countries do not really need “to hedge” in the sense extrapolated by bipolarity. Understanding that collaborations are multi-dimensional and multi-layered, fruitful relations can be developed in multitudinal fashion, and not through cowed membership in some gang run by a punitive godfather.

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Datuk Dr Ooi Kee Beng is the executive director of Penang Institute, founding editor of Penang Monthly, festival director of the George Town Literary Festival, and senior visiting fellow at ISEAS — Yusof Ishak Institute. His books include the award-winning The Reluctant Politician: Tun Dr Ismail and His Time, In Lieu of Ideology: An Intellectual Biography of Goh Keng Swee and The Eurasian Core and Its Edges: Dialogues with Wang Gungwu on the History of the World.

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