中國與南越淪陷：越戰的最後一個重大秘密
喬治·J·維斯寫道，中華人民共和國作為北越的長期盟友，可能試圖在 1975 年建立一個中立的南越，從而阻止河內取得其長期以來夢寐以求的勝利。
中華人民共和國作為北越的長期盟友，可能試圖在 1975 年建立一個中立的南越，從而阻止河內取得其長期以來夢寐以求的勝利。
這項發現源自於我在阮春峰於 2017 年 7 月去世前與他進行的十多年的訪談和電子郵件交流。阮春峰於 1968 年至 1975 年擔任越南共和國駐巴黎談判小組的副組長，他聲稱曾與中國方面接觸，以拯救南越。
三十多年來，馮從未向任何人透露過他最後一次秘密執行拯救祖國的任務。雖然目前尚未公佈直接的文獻證據來證實馮的說法，但大量的間接證據似乎支持他的說法。如果屬實，這個引人入勝的故事將徹底顛覆人們對戰爭最後階段的既有認知。
1971年7月，亨利·基辛格歷史性地訪問北京前不久，馮應邀出席了緬甸駐巴黎大使館舉辦的招待會。會上，馮被介紹給周恩來辦公室的一位中國官員，這位官員希望與馮會面。談話結束時，這位官員問道：“阮文紹總統知道誰是他的真朋友，誰是他的真敵人嗎？”
據馮先生稱，中國方面曾多次向他傳遞訊息，試圖與阮文紹建立對話，但南越總統沒有回應。
1975年3月，北越發動新一輪攻勢，迅速擊潰了南越的防線。到4月下旬，共產黨軍隊已逼近西貢，阮文紹辭職，由副總統陳文香繼任。
法國政府強烈建議香辭職，讓位給楊文明，這位前將軍曾在1963年領導政變推翻吳廷琰。法國提議，與楊文明領導的臨時革命政府（南越共產黨的外圍組織）組成聯合政府，以阻止河內的攻擊。馮和香是老朋友，香召馮到西貢，討論這項提議是否屬實。
馮飛抵西貢時，聲稱隨身攜帶了一份來自中國的秘密訊息。他抵達後立即去見了香。由於他與這位病重的總統相識多年，便確認只要他還在任，談判就毫無希望。第二天，香召集國民議會，啟動向明移交權力的程序。馮沒有提及他所攜帶的訊息，因為他知道，這項提議的觸發條件是明接任總統並接受與人民進步聯盟（PRG）的聯合執政。
幾天后，馮與明的密友、前將軍陳文敦以及人民進步黨的一名代表會面，討論組成聯合政府的可能性。秘密共產黨特工陳玉良作為明的代表也出席了會議。馮在這次會議中委婉地告訴人民進步黨官員，法國和其他國家將幫助新政府，但他故意含糊其辭，沒有說明具體含義。這是馮唯一一次試圖傳遞他那爆炸性的訊息。
Phong究竟想傳達什麼訊息？
他說，中國人迫切希望人民革命政府能依照法國的模式，與明氏結盟，從而阻止北越奪權。聯盟組成後，明氏會發出求援呼籲。法國則會回應，派遣一支國際部隊進入南越保護新政府。正如馮所言，最初的「武力」將是「兩個中國空降師進駐邊和」。北京方面請求四天時間集結部隊並將其運送至空軍基地。馮解釋了他們的想法：
「北京無法直接介入這項工作，但他們讓外界知道，他們……讓法國來做這件事！由於國際政治的緣故……北京無法公然對南越進行軍事幹預。法國需要呼籲一些國家參與組建一支『國際部隊』（法國作為先鋒），才能讓北京得以介入。[i]
中國為何會出兵幹預以阻止北越取得勝利，尤其是在多年來一直支持河內的情況下？
中國希望南越保持中立，以避免被潛在的莫斯科-河內條約包圍。備受尊敬的《遠東經濟評論》記者納揚·錢達詳細闡述了中國對越南統一的擔憂。他寫道，北京「一貫奉行不擇手段維護印度支那分裂狀態的政策，使其不受大國影響。這些手段包括低調的外交、經濟勸說，當然還有動用軍事力量。」[ii]
如果馮是唯一攜帶此訊息的信使，他或許很容易被忽略。但事實並非如此。退休的法國師級將領保羅·瓦努克塞姆也攜帶著與馮類似的消息。瓦努克塞姆自第一次印度支那戰爭以來就認識阮文紹和其他越南高級軍官。多年來，他曾多次拜訪阮文紹，並在南越政權垮台前夕以法國週刊《家樂福》記者的身份重返越南。
1976年，瓦努克森出版了一本篇幅不長的書，詳細描述了戰爭的最後幾天。他提到，4月30日他去了獨立宮與明會面。雖然他在書中提到了這次會面，並表示“所有人都被恐懼麻痺了，無法接受當時提出的、本可以挽救一切的提議”，但他省略了關鍵的細節。[iii]
有許多親歷者證實，瓦努克森曾與明交談，並傳達了與馮類似的訊息。雖然這些人對談話內容的描述略有不同，但他們當時都在房間裡，其中幾人還是秘密的共產黨特工。南越陸軍準將阮友行於1981年在PBS系列紀錄片《越南：一部電視史》的錄音採訪中首次披露了此事。阮友行是明召回的退休特工，他長期從事共產黨滲透工作。 4月30日，他與明在獨立宮。阮友行回憶說：
「瓦努克森說的第一句話就是他剛從巴黎回來。來之前，他會見了許多人，包括北京大使館的成員。他建議明宣布脫離美國，倒向中國。他認為，如果我們這樣做，中國就會向河內施壓，要求在越南南部停火。明考慮之後拒絕了這個提議。瓦努克森懇求再發24小時，請問我們也拒絕了。
南越經濟部長阮文迭（Nguyen Van Diep）也是地下間諜，當時也在場。他證實：「萬克森（Vanuxem）來見明（Minh）是為了鼓勵他，並說服他局勢尚未完全絕望。萬克森是在明將軍錄完投降聲明後不久到達的。」明告訴他局勢已經絕望後，萬克森回答說：「並非絕望。我已經在巴黎安排好了。我請求你請求C（中國）請求你拒絕了三天。[v]
明任命的新聞部長李貴忠證實：
瓦努克森說，他想給明一個方案，以挽救西貢政權岌岌可危的局面。瓦努克森說，明應該公開呼籲一個強國幹預，如果南越政府發出正式請求，這個強國就會立即介入。明苦笑一聲，說：「謝謝你的好意，但我這輩子已經給法國人當過走狗，又給美國人當過走狗了。夠了，我不想再當走狗了。」[vi]
瓦努克塞姆有可能獨自策劃了此事嗎？瓦努克塞姆的家人不相信法國政府會利用他傳遞訊息。他們認為，他參與了1961年4月法國軍隊發動的未遂政變，這使得他成為法國政府的眼中釘。假設瓦努克塞姆在法國政府眼中仍然是個棄兒，那麼他不太可能是法國政府派人傳遞訊息，尤其是在法國在西貢設有大使的情況下。
更有可能的是，中國人除了馮之外，還尋找了另一位使者。馮是一位文職外交官，而瓦努克森與南越軍隊將領關係密切，並且長期以來一直支持南越共和國。他是說服反共的南越將領接受中法援助的理想人選，尤其是在面對如此大膽的提議時。此外，作為一名單獨行動的信使，必要時他也可以否認自己的身分。
由於河內安插了間諜參與與明的會面，河內得知了瓦努克森的提議。在西貢淪陷十週年之際，河內最終承認了中國的干預企圖。一位官員表示：
「中國當局醞釀了一個極其險惡的計劃。正如傀儡政權最後一任總統楊文明所揭露的那樣：1975年4月30日上午，通過中間人萬克森……中國要求楊文明至少再戰鬥24小時，以便有足夠的時間宣布與美國斷絕關係並與中國結盟。之後，中國將施加壓力，包括向越南派遣軍隊，以結束敵對越南行動，從而結束對抗越南行動。
據稱，中國人也曾接觸過南越前副主席阮高棋。 1975年9月，阮高棋在接受威廉·巴克利主持的《火力線》節目採訪時聲稱，1972年末的某個時候，中國特工來到他在西貢的家中。阮高棋說，他們要求他推翻阮文紹，並「宣布南越保持中立，不與蘇聯或美國結盟」。如果他這樣做，「中國人會支持你，因為我們在北部邊境已經與蘇聯存在問題。我們不希望看到我們的南部被蘇聯的衛星國佔領。」[viii]
棋在 1975 年 12 月於美國的一次演講中重述了這個故事，聲稱“一群中國特工來到他的家中……提議發動一場由中國支持的政變來推翻阮文紹。” [ix]然而，棋在他的兩本書中都沒有提及此事，這令人費解。
瓦努克森發表此番言論似乎無可爭議。但他的訊息或馮的訊息是否真正代表了中國的真正意圖，目前尚無定論。這會不會是另一次外交障眼法？在阮文紹執政末期組成聯合政府以推翻他，無疑是河內的策略。阮文紹的親信黃德雅也認同此一觀點。他證實，法國大使曾向他表示，為了說服黃德雅出任新總理，法國大使曾說「中國人將調集一些部隊來阻止北越」。黃德雅懷疑這是中國為了說服他們組成聯合政府而耍的伎倆。[x]考慮到為推翻阮文紹所採取的種種外交手段，這種可能性不容忽視。
瓦努克森於1979年去世，他的行為未受調查，而馮也從未提及自己可能被利用。此外，儘管河內方面似乎接受了瓦努克森的說法，但如果沒有書面證據或中國或法國政府的官方承認，這一說法無法得到證實。中國和法國是否出於各自的國家利益而串通起來，促成一個中立的南越，從而阻止河內取得其夢寐以求的勝利，這仍然是一個引人入勝的可能性，但就目前而言，這仍然是越南戰爭中最後一個重大秘密。
[i] 2006 年 11 月 30 日對 Nguyen Xuan Phong 的採訪，以及 2008 年 11 月 22 日 Phong 的電子郵件。
[ii] Nayan Chanda，《兄弟之敵：戰後之戰》（紐約：Collier Books，1986 年），第 127 頁。
[iii] Paul Vanuxem，La Mort du Vietnam [越南之死]（巴黎：Nouvelle Aurore 版，1975 年）, 22, 61
[iv]阮友行訪談，1981 年 3 月 16 日，http://www.youtube.com/watch? v= HU-eWGEGvL0，7:55 至 9:45，2016 年 5 月 5 日瀏覽。
[v] Ha Binh Nhuong，Vo bọc nhiem mau [神奇的封面]（河內：人民公安出版社，2005）。
[vi] Ly Qui Chung ，《無題回憶錄》，403。
[vii] “回顧中華人民共和國‘敵對政策’的歷史”，FBIS 亞洲和太平洋，1985 年 5 月 8 日，K4。
[viii] “我們為什麼輸掉了南越戰爭”，PBS《火力線》節目文字稿，1975 年 10 月 4 日，第 8 頁。
[ix] “肯揚稱中國提議發動政變”，《巴爾的摩太陽報》 ，1975 年 12 月 6 日，A2 版。
[x] Nha 採訪，弗吉尼亞州福爾斯徹奇，2009 年 6 月 4 日。
A blog of the History and Public Policy Program
China and the Fall of South Vietnam: The Last Great Secret of the Vietnam War
The People’s Republic of China, a long-time ally of North Vietnam, may have sought to create a neutral South Vietnam in 1975 and deny Hanoi its long-sought victory, writes George J. Veith.
The People’s Republic of China, a long-time ally of North Vietnam, may have sought to create a neutral South Vietnam in 1975 and deny Hanoi its long-sought victory.
This revelation was drawn out from over a decade of interviews and email exchanges that I conducted with Nguyen Xuan Phong before his death in July 2017. Phong served as the deputy for the Republic of Vietnam negotiating team in Paris from 1968 until 1975, and he claimed to have been in contact with the Chinese in order to save South Vietnam.
For over 30 years, Phong told no one of his last clandestine mission to save his country. Although no direct documentary proof has been released to substantiate Phong’s claims, considerable tertiary evidence does seem to substantiate his account. If true, this fascinating story upends the accepted history of the war’s final days.
Shortly before Henry Kissinger’s historic trip to Peking in July 1971, Phong had been invited to attend a reception at the Burmese embassy in Paris. There Phong was introduced to a Chinese official from Zhou Enlai’s office who wished to meet with Phong. The man ended their discussion by remarking, “Does President Thieu know who his real friends and foes are?”
According to Phong, various messages from the Chinese were passed to him seeking to establish a dialogue with Thieu, but the South Vietnamese president did not respond.
North Vietnam launched another offensive in March 1975 and quickly shattered South Vietnam’s defenses. By late April, Communist troops were pressing against Saigon, and Thieu had resigned in favor of his vice president, Tran Van Huong.
The French government was strongly recommending that Huong resign in favor of Duong Van Minh, the former general who had led the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. The French proposed that a coalition government with the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), the Communist front organization in South Vietnam, and headed by Minh would halt Hanoi’s attack. Phong and Huong were old friends, and Huong summoned Phong to Saigon to discuss whether this offer was genuine.
When Phong flew to Saigon, he claims to have carried with him a secret message from the Chinese. When Phong arrived, he immediately went to see Huong. Because he had known the ailing president for years, he confirmed there was no hope for negotiations while he was still in office. The next day, Huong summoned the assembly to begin the process of transferring power to Minh. Phong did not mention the message he was carrying, since he knew that the triggering event for the proposal was for Minh to assume power and accept a coalition with the PRG.
Several days later, Phong met with Minh’s close friend, former general Tran Van Don, and a representative from the PRG to discuss the possible coalition government. Tran Ngoc Lieng, a secret Communist agent, was present as Minh’s representative. Phong subtly informed the PRG official at this meeting that France and other countries would help the new government, but he was deliberately vague about what this meant. This was Phong’s only attempt to pass on his explosive missive.
What message was Phong carrying?
The Chinese, he said, desperately wanted the PRG to assume power via the French formula of a coalition with Minh to prevent a North Vietnamese takeover. After a coalition was formed, Minh would issue an appeal for help. The French would respond that an international force would enter South Vietnam to protect the new government. The initial “muscle,” as Phong termed it, would be “two Chinese Airborne divisions into Bien Hoa.” Beijing asked for four days to marshal their troops and shuttle them to the air base. Phong explains their thinking:
"Beijing could not come forward and do this work directly, but they let people know that they were … letting the French do this work! Because of international politics … Beijing could not blatantly intervene militarily in South Vietnam. France would need to appeal to a few nations to participate in an ‘international force’ (with France serving as the spearhead) in order to allow Beijing to intervene. A number of problems faced Beijing at that time: What number of Chinese military forces should be employed, and how long would they have to stay in South Vietnam to contain and suppress North Vietnam’s army? They promised that they would stay as long as the situation required, but they thought that between three and six months would be the maximum length of time they could participate … because they did not want to be accused of militarily occupying South Vietnam."[i]
Why would China militarily intercede to thwart a North Vietnamese victory, especially after years of supporting Hanoi?
China wanted a neutral South Vietnam to prevent being surrounded by a potential Moscow-Hanoi pact. Nayan Chanda, the highly respected correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, extensively detailed the Chinese dread of a unified Vietnam. He wrote that Beijing has “consistently followed the policy of maintaining by all the means at its disposal a fragmented Indochina free of the major powers. These means included quiet diplomacy, economic persuasion, and, of course, use of its military might.”[ii]
If Phong was the only courier bearing this message, he might be easily dismissed. He was not. Retired French Général de Division Paul Vanuxem was carrying a message similar to Phong’s. Vanuxem had known Thieu and other senior Vietnamese military officers since the First Indochina War. He had visited Thieu occasionally over the years and had returned to Vietnam in the last days of South Vietnam as a correspondent for the French weekly magazine Carrefour.
Vanuxem published a slim book in 1976 detailing the final days of the war. He notes that he went to Independence Palace on April 30 to speak with Minh. While he alluded to his meeting in his book, stating that “all the minds were paralyzed with fear and incapable of receiving the overtures which were then being made and which could have saved everything,” he left out the critical details.[iii]
There are numerous firsthand witnesses confirming that Vanuxem spoke to Minh and relayed a message similar to Phong’s. While these men relate slightly different versions of the conversation, all were in the room, and several were secret Communist agents. ARVN Brigadier General Nguyen Huu Hanh provided the first revelation in 1981 in a recorded interview for the PBS series Vietnam: A Television History. Hanh, whom Minh had called out of retirement, was a long-time Communist penetration agent. He was with Minh in Independence Palace on April 30. Hanh recounted that
"the very first thing Vanuxem said was that he had just come from Paris. Before he came, he met with many personalities, including members of the [Beijing] embassy. He suggested that Minh announce that he would leave the Americans and would come to the side of China. According to him, if we did that China would put pressure on Hanoi to have a ceasefire in the southern part of Vietnam. After having thought it over, Minh rejected the proposal. And when Vanuxem pleaded with Minh to prolong the whole thing for another twenty-four hours, the latter also rejected the idea. After Vanuxem left, we announced the transfer of power."[iv]
Nguyen Van Diep, the South Vietnamese economic minister and who was also an underground mole and at the meeting, agrees that “Vanuxem had come to see Minh to try and encourage Minh and to persuade him that the situation was not yet hopeless. Vanuxem arrived just after General Minh finished tape-recording his surrender statement.” After Minh told him the situation was hopeless, Vanuxem replied that “It is not hopeless. I have already arranged for this in Paris. I request that you publicly ask for Nation C [China] to protect you.” Vanuxem asked Minh to hold out for three days, but Minh refused.[v]
Ly Qui Chung, whom Minh had appointed minister of information, confirms that:
"Vanuxem said that he wanted to offer a plan to Minh to save the hopeless situation that the Saigon regime faced. Vanuxem said that Minh should speak out to appeal for a powerful country to intervene, and that if the South Vietnamese government issued an official request this powerful country would intervene immediately. Minh gave a bitter laugh and said, I thank you for your good intentions, but during my life I have already served as a lackey for the French and then as a lackey for the Americans. That is enough. I do not want to be a lackey again."[vi]
Could Vanuxem have conjured this effort on his own? Vanuxem’s family does not believe that the French government would use him as a messenger. They contend that his involvement in the failed French army coup of April 1961 made him a pariah to the French government. Assuming that Vanuxem’s pariah status with the French government remained intact, it is doubtful he was carrying a message from the French government, especially since it had its own ambassador in Saigon.
What seems more likely is that the Chinese sought another emissary besides Phong. Phong was a civilian diplomat, while Vanuxem had close ties to the ARVN generals, and he had a long history of supporting the republic. He would be the perfect envoy to convince anti-communist ARVN generals to accept Chinese and French help, especially such a bold offer as this. Moreover, as a lone courier, he was also deniable if necessary.
Given its spies at the meeting with Minh, Hanoi learned of Vanuxem’s proposal. On the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon, Hanoi finally acknowledged China’s attempted intervention. An official stated that:
"the Chinese authorities nursed an extremely sinister scheme. As Duong Van Minh, the puppet regime’s last president revealed: On the morning of 30 April 1975, through the intermediary of Vanuxem … China requested that Minh carry on the fighting for at least another 24 hours so as to have enough time to announce a disassociation from the U.S. and an alliance with China. China would then bring pressure to bear, including introduction of troops into Vietnam to end the hostilities to China’s advantage."[vii]
The Chinese also allegedly approached former South Vietnamese vice president Nguyen Cao Ky. In an interview with William Buckley on Firing Line in September 1975, Ky claimed that sometime in late 1972, Chinese agents had come to his house in Saigon. Ky said they asked him to overthrow Thieu and “declare South Vietnam neutral, not siding with the Russians or the Americans.” If he did that, “the Chinese will support you because we already have trouble on our northern border with the Russians. We do not want to see our south flank occupied by a Russian satellite.”[viii]
Ky repeated this story in a speech in December 1975 in the US, claiming that “a group of Chinese agents came to his home … and proposed a Chinese-supported coup to overthrow Thieu.”[ix] Why Ky never mentions this incident in either of his books, however, is troubling.
That Vanuxem made the statement seems indisputable. Whether his or Phong’s information was actually China’s true intent is unresolved. Could this have been another diplomatic smokescreen? Forging a coalition government to remove Thieu during the last days was certainly Hanoi’s ploy. Thieu’s close assistant, Hoang Duc Nha, believes that it was. He confirms that the French ambassador had told him, as part of a plea for Nha to become the new prime minister, that “the Chinese are going to bring in some divisions to stop the North Vietnamese.” Nha suspected this was a Chinese trick to sell them on a coalition government.[x] Given all the diplomatic maneuvers to remove Thieu, the idea cannot be discounted.
Vanuxem died in 1979, leaving his actions unexamined, while Phong never discussed the possibility that he was being used. Moreover, while Hanoi has apparently accepted the Vanuxem story, it cannot be confirmed without documentary evidence or an official Chinese or French government admission. Whether China and France, each for its own national interests, had colluded to create a neutral South Vietnam and deny Hanoi its long-sought victory remains an intriguing possibility, but one that, for now, remains the last great secret of the Vietnam War.
[i] Interview with Nguyen Xuan Phong, November 30, 2006, and email from Phong, November 22, 2008.
[ii] Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War (New York: Collier Books, 1986), 127.
[iii] Paul Vanuxem, La Mort du Vietnam [The Death of Vietnam] (Paris: Editions Nouvelle Aurore, 1975), 22, 61
[iv] Interview of Nguyen Huu Hanh, March 16, 1981, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HU-eWGEGvL0, from 7:55 to 9:45, accessed May 5, 2016.
[v] Ha Binh Nhuong, Vo bọc nhiem mau [The Miraculous Cover] (Hanoi: People’s Public Security Publishing House, 2005).
[vi] Ly Qui Chung, Untitled Memoirs, 403.
[vii] “History of PRC’s ‘Hostile Policy’ Reviewed,” FBIS Asia and Pacific, May 8, 1985, K4.
[viii] “Why We Lost the War in South Vietnam,” transcript of PBS Firing Line, October 4, 1975, 8.
[ix] “China Proposed Coup, Said Ky,” Baltimore Sun, December 6, 1975, A2.
[x] Nha interview, Falls Church, VA, June 4, 2009.
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