中東政治的悲劇
以下是四個重點的結構化整理；每一點都配上三個補充說明，力求抓住全文的核心論證脈絡，而不是流水帳式摘要。
重點一：中東陷入「地區強權政治的悲劇」，卻無國能建立新秩序
核心論旨：美國霸權退場後，中東進入多國競逐卻無人能主導的權力真空期，導致結構性不穩定。
補充說明：
美國影響力下降與干預意志減弱，製造了權力真空，但區域內沒有任何一國（包括以色列、伊朗、土耳其或沙烏地）強大到足以建立並維持區域秩序。
各國一方面測試自身實力、擴張影響力，另一方面又集體抗拒任何競爭對手成為霸權，形成「人人反霸、人人逐霸」的矛盾局面。
以色列在加薩戰爭後自視為區域霸主，但缺乏合法性與被承認性，反而引發海灣國家、土耳其與伊朗更強烈的安全疑慮與反制。
重點二：「美國治下的和平」未能穩定中東，其終結反而加劇競爭
核心論旨：Pax Americana 本身並非穩定來源，而其瓦解加速了區域權力爭奪。
補充說明：
美國主導的秩序長期遭遇伊朗、敘利亞等國的抵抗，加上中東內部宗派、民族與制度脆弱性，使外來霸權難以強加穩定。
美國在以巴問題上喪失可信仲裁者地位，既無法解決衝突，也削弱其在阿拉伯世界的道德與政治權威。
政策反覆（紅線失信、伊核協議退出、對盟友安全承諾不足）與多極化趨勢（中國、俄羅斯因素）共同削弱美國單邊塑造秩序的能力，而《亞伯拉罕協議》未能成為替代性區域架構。
重點三：可能浮現的是「反革命式」的保守秩序，而非自由轉型
核心論旨：區域穩定若出現，將更像1815年後的歐洲——以權力平衡與反革命為核心。
補充說明：
阿拉伯之春後，海灣國家與多數威權政權致力於終結革命浪潮，將起義與跨國意識形態視為對生存的根本威脅。
新秩序的核心條件之一是去意識形態化：壓制政治伊斯蘭、削弱跨國運動，轉向民族主義、技術官僚治理與國家主導發展。
然而，這種秩序能否持久，取決於兩個硬條件：最低限度的經濟安全，以及巴勒斯坦問題的實質進展；否則威權合法性將持續流失。
重點四：伊朗走向與勢力範圍協調，將決定中東能否避免長期動盪
核心論旨：中東未來取決於伊朗的戰略轉向，以及主要強權是否能就勢力範圍達成共識。
補充說明：
加薩戰爭與後續衝突暴露伊朗「抵抗軸心」的極限，代理人網絡受挫，使德黑蘭面臨是否轉向國家利益與內部修復的關鍵抉擇。
後哈梅內伊時代，伊朗若走向民族主義、降溫對抗，可能促成區域權力再平衡；若加倍意識形態對抗，則不穩定將擴大。
以色列、土耳其、沙烏地在黎巴嫩、敘利亞、伊拉克的勢力競逐若缺乏協調，只會導致國家崩潰與長期衝突，任何建立在瓦解他國主權之上的秩序都不可持續。
一句總結
這篇文章的核心判斷是：中東不缺力量，缺的是「彼此承認界線的政治妥協」；沒有一場屬於中東的「維也納會議」，動盪只會反覆重演。
如果你需要，我也可以把這四點改寫成：
📌 投書版
📌 課堂簡報版
📌 對照台灣／印太秩序的比較分析版
中東政治的悲劇
該區域各國持續展開競爭，這既考驗了它們的能力，也暴露了它們的局限性，同時它們也在抵制競爭對手的支配。在這種動盪局勢下，能否建立一個更穩定的秩序？如果可以，又需要具備哪些條件？
介紹
當今中東的核心地緣政治問題——借用政治學家約翰·米爾斯海默的說法，即地區強權政治的悲劇——在於其各國無力建構穩定的區域秩序。這源自於該地區昔日霸權國家——美國的影響力和乾預主義傾向的減弱，由此產生的權力真空使得一些實力雄厚、自信滿滿的國家得以展開持續競爭，試探自身能力的極限，同時抵制被競爭對手主導。然而，沒有一個國家強大到足以主導並徹底重塑該地區。
隨著加薩戰爭似乎結束，以色列日益將自己視為區域霸主。然而，霸權不僅需要實力，還需要被認可和合法性，而以色列遠未獲得這些。去年9月以色列襲擊卡達後，海灣國家領導人也開始將以色列視為對其安全利益的威脅。同時，以色列與土耳其之間的緊張關係正在加劇，尤其是在敘利亞；而以色列在黎巴嫩的攻擊表明，該國仍然是以色列和伊朗對抗的戰場。
這種情況史無前例嗎？ 1960年代至80年代，阿拉伯國家體系 充斥著意識形態衝突、強勢領導、代理人戰爭和相互衝突的野心，然而，區域秩序卻出乎意料地保持一致性。維繫阿拉伯政權的並非共同願景，而是共同的迫切需求：維護現有的威權體制，防止那些尋求區域霸權或推行強勢意識形態的國家挑戰權力平衡和區域穩定。對內部崩潰的恐懼是阿拉伯秩序的黏合劑。這個體系遏制了埃及在1962年後透過也門戰爭在阿拉伯半島站穩腳跟的企圖，結束了1970年約旦和巴勒斯坦各派之間的衝突，暫時中止了1975-1976年黎巴嫩內戰，並在伊朗革命後抑制了其輸出伊斯蘭意識形態的野心。
然而，自2010-2011年阿拉伯之春以來，十餘年的動盪至今仍未找到任何機制來建構區域穩定，使其效仿結束拿破崙戰爭的1815年維也納會議 ，以及更廣泛意義上法國大革命後的革命階段。除非區域各國承認自身的局限性，並就一項各方都能接受的區域安排進行談判，否則中東將繼續深陷於反覆出現的緊張局勢、不斷變化的聯盟和系統性衝突之中。明確這種平衡的輪廓對該地區的未來至關重要。
美國治下的和平終結
冷戰結束後，以美國為主導的中東地區秩序——「美國治下的和平」（Pax Americana）——走向終結 ，這成為中東地區不穩定的根源，造成了權力真空，而該地區各國如今正試圖填補這一真空。美國霸權時代的經驗教訓，對於理解未來幾十年中東地區的穩定前景具有借鏡意義。
首先，美國治下的「美國治下的和平」（Pax Americana）本身未必有穩定作用。區域霸權通常會引發對霸權的反抗，而過去四十年間，美國一直受到多國挑戰。伊朗自1979年起挑戰以美國為主導的秩序，並在1989年後繼續挑戰。阿薩德政權統治下的敘利亞在2003年入侵伊拉克後，既與華盛頓接觸，也反對美國，許多國家認為這次入侵是對現狀的威脅。中東地區的特徵是教派、種族和意識形態的分裂，國家機構薄弱，以及持續不斷的敵對關係。這使得該地區難以接受強加的秩序，尤其是來自像美國這樣的遠距離強權的秩序。
其次，美國在以巴衝突中屢次未能發揮可信的斡旋作用 。歷屆美國政府要不是不願，就是無力解決這個至關重要的區域問題，而這問題持續破壞區域穩定，疏遠阿拉伯世界的公眾輿論。華盛頓也難以平衡伊朗、土耳其、沙烏地阿拉伯和以色列等主要區域大國相互競爭的野心。結果是，美國領導層在對抗性的政治環境中失去了凝聚力和權威性。
第三，美國的政策一再無常削弱了華盛頓盟友間的信任，並助長了對手的氣焰。從歐巴馬在敘利亞動亂期間未能堅持其禁止使用化學武器的“紅線”，到他從中東轉向亞洲，再到川普退出伊朗核協議，以及拜登試圖調整美國地區政策卻未能向其海灣盟友提供長期安全保障，華盛頓的戰略立場屢屢搖擺不定。甚至在加薩戰爭爆發之前，美國就無條件支持以色列，這表明華盛頓不僅尋求保障以色列的軍事優勢，也尋求保障其政治免責，而這已經付出了政治代價。
最後，隨著中國的崛起、俄羅斯的強勢回歸以及多極世界秩序的出現，單極格局的終結加速了這一進程，削弱了華盛頓單方面左右局勢的能力。這使得區域強國有機會拓展其軍事和經濟夥伴關係，並從美國爭取更有利的條件。如果「美國治下的和平」（Pax Americana）未能保障穩定，那麼它的終結只會引發區域影響力的爭奪。
2020年的《亞伯拉罕協議》 是美國試圖鞏固以華盛頓為核心的區域秩序的嘗試。該協議旨在透過實現以色列與部分阿拉伯國家關係正常化，將 以色列的技術和軍事優勢與阿拉伯國家的財政和外交影響力結合，從而創建一個能夠對抗伊朗的集團。然而，其限制很快就顯現。以色列在加薩的暴行激起了阿拉伯世界的憤怒，削弱了與以色列關係正常化的合法性。尤其是在中國斡旋促成沙烏地阿拉伯與伊朗關係緩和，以及華盛頓拒絕向沙烏地阿拉伯提供安全保障後，沙烏地阿拉伯對《亞伯拉罕協議》失去了興趣。即便川普政府在2025年11月將沙烏地阿拉伯列為 “美國的主要非北約盟友”，美國仍然拒絕提供安全保障。儘管《亞伯拉罕協議》仍然有效，但它並未發展成為美國主導的區域秩序基石。
美國霸權或許已經終結，但真正的多極格局仍遙遙無期。阿薩德政權在2024年的垮台使俄羅斯在中東失去了一個重要的盟友，削弱了莫斯科在該地區的影響力；而中國的經濟崛起和戰略夥伴關係並未對美國的地位構成實質性挑戰。北京在加薩衝突中基本上保持沉默，僅限於口頭譴責，甚至在安薩爾真主封鎖紅海航運期間也未採取任何行動。目前，儘管中國依賴海上貿易路線和中東能源，但它似乎仍樂於享受 美國軍事優勢的好處。穩定的多極格局尚未形成。
未來區域秩序將由哪些因素決定？
中東正處於關鍵時刻。在缺乏像美國這樣的地區霸權國家的情況下，該地區如何擺脫動盪，建立能夠緩解緊張局勢的區域秩序？只有當地區大國承認自身的結構性限制並認識到彼此的限制時，穩定才有可能實現。
自本世紀初以來，多項事態發展加劇了地區動盪。 2003年美國入侵伊拉克後，伊朗的影響力不斷擴張，形成了所謂的“什葉派新月地帶”，從伊朗經伊拉克和敘利亞延伸至黎巴嫩，沙烏地阿拉伯對此視之為威脅。同時，土耳其和卡達將2010-2011年爆發的阿拉伯之春視為透過穆斯林兄弟會運動擴大自身影響力的良機。這引發了許多國家的強烈反彈 ，其中以沙烏地阿拉伯和阿拉伯聯合大公國最為突出。這兩個國家的行動前後矛盾：它們支持埃及和突尼斯的反革命勢力，卻不支持敘利亞的反革命勢力，其選擇取決於自身利益。而以色列則將加薩和西岸的軍事行動，以及2024-2025年針對伊朗及其盟友的軍事行動，視為其擴張自身勢力的重要一步。
阿薩德政權的垮台、伊朗支持的「抵抗軸心」的瓦解 、海灣國家與伊朗關係的重新調整、區域大國為建立勢力範圍所做的努力，以及美國的交易主義策略 ，都可能重塑中東格局。一個凝聚力強的地區體系能否形成，將取決於三個因素：首先，一個更加保守甚至反動的政治環境——以權力平衡和反革命傾向為特徵——能否形成，因為各國在實現自身目標後，往往會傾向於並捍衛這種環境；其次，鑑於伊朗作為修正主義地區強國的角色，其發展軌跡將是決定性因素；
邁向新的反革命秩序
在阿拉伯之春後的十年間，一些阿拉伯政權在沙烏地阿拉伯和阿聯酋等海灣主要國家的支持下，不遺餘力地試圖結束這段歷史篇章。此後發生的衝突並非全部由反革命勢力引發，也並非全部由海灣國家挑起。然而，所有這些衝突都源自於區域內普遍存在的不穩定性，這種不穩定性重塑了權力關係，各國都在追求各自的利益，並試圖將自身利益鞏固在一個更穩定的秩序之中。
但這並未改變威權政權將起義視為威脅並試圖消除一切革命可能性的事實。他們所追求的秩序類似1815年後的歐洲秩序，當時君主制國家同意恢復權力平衡，並遏制法國大革命釋放出的力量。即使是敘利亞新領導人也將阿薩德政權的垮台描述為符合地緣政治共識的過渡，而非革命浪潮的一部分。艾哈邁德·沙拉展現出溫和姿態，安撫海灣國家首都，並強調敘利亞將遵守1974年與以色列達成的脫離接觸協議，防止外國勢力利用敘利亞領土對該地區任何國家採取行動。
新保守秩序的核心條件之一是根除被視為破壞穩定的意識形態運動。一些阿拉伯政權正力推 以民族主義、技術官僚現代化和國家主導發展為中心的後意識形態階段。它們對穆斯林兄弟會的敵意影響了其國內和區域政治，這些政權試圖邊緣化政治伊斯蘭，並削弱各種跨國意識形態的影響力。同時，一些分析人士 認為，伊朗在區域遭遇的挫折正為建立一個更為傳統的民族主義國家鋪路，並預示著跨國什葉派的終結。
然而，一個保守的、甚至是反革命的區域秩序，需要的不只是清除意識形態上的敵人。它的存續取決於各國的經濟能力以及巴勒斯坦問題的解決。只有當各國滿足民眾對經濟安全的最低期望時，威權統治的復闢才能持續下去。但這並非易事。埃及、突尼斯、伊拉克、黎巴嫩和約旦等多個國家正面臨嚴重的財政壓力、制度衰敗和環境惡化。治理不善和腐敗使得菁英階層難以維持合法性，也難以遏止社會不滿情緒。
巴勒斯坦問題仍然是一個長期的障礙。整個阿拉伯世界的公眾輿論仍然深切關注巴勒斯坦人的困境，加薩的破壞加劇了這種不滿。巴勒斯坦人的命運不斷削弱那些被視為漠視巴勒斯坦人權利的政權的合法性，尤其是那些加入《亞伯拉罕協議》的國家。該地區無法在一個無視巴勒斯坦建國願望的保守秩序下實現穩定。約旦和埃及會將以色列吞併西岸或驅逐加薩巴勒斯坦人的計劃視為嚴重的動盪，這進一步強化了阿拉伯政權和公眾對以色列是一個以領土擴張為驅動的殖民定居者的信念。沙烏地阿拉伯是唯一有能力促成區域共識的阿拉伯國家，它已將與以色列關係正常化與巴勒斯坦建國取得實際進展掛鉤。儘管兩國方案似乎越來越不切實際，但啟動一個切實可行的和平進程對於鞏固保守的區域秩序仍然至關重要。
伊朗的發展軌跡決定著該地區的走向
影響中東能否維持永續平衡的第二個關鍵因素是伊朗的未來。最高領袖阿亞圖拉·阿里·哈梅內伊去世後局勢將如何發展仍不明朗，但鑑於伊朗革命意識形態的失敗以及民眾日益增長的不滿，該意識形態很可能會受到質疑，甚至被徹底修正。
幾十年來，西方國家、以色列和許多阿拉伯國家一直將伊朗視為區域不穩定的主要根源。自從兩伊戰爭（1980-1988）結束以來，德黑蘭一直依靠「前線防禦」戰略來保護其領土免受衝突侵擾。這項戰略深受戰爭創傷以及美國在阿富汗（2001年）和伊拉克（2003年）軍事幹預的影響，其基礎是三大支柱：一個由包括黎巴嫩真主黨、伊拉克人民動員部隊和也門安薩爾真主在內的武裝團體組成的聯盟網絡；一項提供戰略能力的威道導彈和無人機計劃；以及一套基於非對稱威懾的海軍水道和力量在威懾戰術。
這項策略的兩大主要目標是：阻止以色列和美國直接攻擊伊朗；以及確保在黎巴嫩、敘利亞、伊拉克和葉門的影響力，使之成為伊朗行動的緩衝地帶或平台。然而，加薩戰爭的後果表明，伊朗的「抵抗軸心」計畫有其限制。2024年11月真主黨的實際投降、加薩地帶的毀滅性破壞，以及2025年6月以色列和美國對伊朗（包括其核設施和飛彈能力）進行轟炸的12天戰爭 ，暴露了其跨國代理網絡的缺陷。伊朗轉而鞏固了一個包括海灣國家和以色列在內的反制軸心，使伊朗陷入孤立，戰略受到限制。
後哈梅內伊時代的伊朗，其民族主義傾向很可能依然盛行 ，並趨於封閉。這將產生深遠的影響：伊朗的代理人需要重新審視自身角色，並在內部重新定位，有可能演變為更具民族主義色彩、軍事化程度更低的行動者。它們的未來將主要取決於伊朗的選擇。
然而，伊朗最大的軟肋在於國內。政權面臨國內的脆弱性、合法性的下降和經濟的惡化。外部對抗或許能在短期內激發民族主義團結，但卻無法解決該國的結構性危機。年輕一代對現狀感到失望，他們日益摒棄「法基赫監護」（wilayat al-faqih）的意識形態——該意識形態將最高司法、宗教和政治權力集中於一位伊斯蘭法學家手中——並將伊朗的地區冒險主義視為代價高昂且會導致國際孤立的舉措。
區域秩序能否穩定，很大程度上取決於伊朗的戰略方向。德黑蘭越是優先考慮國家利益、經濟重建和緩和局勢，越是遠離地區冒險主義，就越有可能重塑中東格局，使其達到可持續的平衡。反之，如果伊朗加倍對抗和意識形態抵抗，區域不穩定將會加劇。
重新劃分區域勢力範圍
美國撤軍、長達十五年的變革性衝突以及新興地區強國的崛起，引發了中東國家間前所未有的擴張勢力範圍的競爭。黎巴嫩、敘利亞和伊拉克也因此成為以色列、土耳其、伊朗和沙烏地阿拉伯爭奪的戰場，這些國家往往以犧牲其他國家的利益為代價來推進自身利益。決定該地區未來走向的關鍵因素在於，這些勢力範圍能否得到協調，還是會繼續成為彼此敵對的區域。
儘管以色列自詡為該地區的霸權國家，但實際上它已成為該地區不穩定的主要驅動因素。在「鐵牆」戰略的指導下，以色列奉行以壓倒性軍事力量強加結果的「以實力求和平」的做法，忽視了衝突的政治和歷史根源、軍事行動造成的人道主義災難，以及其他地區大國的利益——而這些利益必須納入可持續的地區解決方案的考慮範圍。其局限性顯而易見。首先，以色列在加薩和西岸的暴力行動，如同其整體的侵略行徑一樣，引發了 埃及、沙烏地阿拉伯、土耳其、約旦乃至巴基斯坦的防禦性反制措施，因為這些國家越來越認為以色列威脅到了阿拉伯國家的利益。有鑑於此，甚至在以色列的空襲削弱伊朗在2024年的區域軍事網絡之前，海灣國家就已經開始與德黑蘭重新接觸。
其次，以色列的野心正在損害鄰國的主權 ，尤其是黎巴嫩和敘利亞。以色列佔領了這兩個國家的領土，並頻繁地轟炸它們，同時阻止兩國重建國家能力，甚至阻止戰後地區的重建。這與土耳其和沙烏地阿拉伯的優先事項相衝突。土耳其尋求 恢復敘利亞的國家權威，以遏制伊朗的網絡，同時阻止庫德自治區的出現。對以色列而言，一個強大的敘利亞，尤其是一個與安卡拉結盟的敘利亞，可能會挑戰以色列在其北部地區塑造局勢的能力。敘利亞南部正是這些緊張局勢的縮影。德魯茲社群的部分領導人越來越希望擺脫大馬士革的控制，而東北部的庫德人也不願接受新的領導階層，這進一步強化了以色列賦予敘利亞少數族裔權力的傾向。
黎巴嫩也面臨類似的風險：什葉派社群陷入兩難：一方面，外部壓力要求其解除真主黨的武裝；另一方面，伊朗希望保持影響力；而什葉派本身也需要一個能夠提供保護和服務的國家。沙烏地阿拉伯和其他國家的目標是遏制伊朗在敘利亞和黎巴嫩的影響力，但它們不會接受以色列對黎巴嫩南部的破壞，也不會接受以色列在敘利亞採取的任何可能為伊朗重建其「抵抗軸心」創造條件的行動。
以色列的戰略依賴一個危險的假設 ，即地區分裂和國家崩潰能夠確保以色列長期主導其政治環境。例如，強迫真主黨解除武裝有可能將黎巴嫩推入內戰。在佔領敘利亞的同時與敘利亞實現關係正常化，並加劇教派衝突，可能會進一步削弱敘利亞政權，使其領導人失去合法性。任何阿拉伯國家都不會接受建立在國家崩潰基礎上的區域秩序，尤其是在伴隨著巴勒斯坦人從加薩和西岸大規模流離失所的情況下，因為這將破壞埃及和約旦的穩定。然而，此類計劃卻得到了以色列政治階層的明確支持。
歸根究底，中東的未來將取決於地區強國能否就各自的勢力範圍達成共識，並致力於建立運作良好的國家。如果沒有一個明確各方角色、界線和責任的談判框架，該地區將繼續深陷對抗和分裂的惡性循環。
結論
中東或許正朝著類似1815年後歐洲的權力平衡體系演變。然而，那個時代缺乏單一主導的國家，穩定源自於對彼此權力界線的相互認可。中東從未召開過類似維也納會議的會議，但其結構性條件正在形成。下一階段需要建構一個更永續的區域秩序，該秩序建立在區域各國首都之間達成共識、全球大國共同維護的利益平衡基礎上，並透過談判和勉強接受的方式實現。
作者簡介
Hamza Meddeb 是貝魯特馬爾科姆·H·克爾卡內基中東中心的研究員，他共同領導該中心的政治經濟學計畫。
穆罕默德·阿里·阿德拉維是喬治城大學的研究教授，著有《薩拉菲主義走向全球：從海灣地區到法國郊區》（牛津大學出版社，2020 年）。
本作品採用 知識共享署名 4.0 國際授權協議進行授權。有關許可協議的更多詳細信息，請訪問： CC BY 4.0 協議 | 署名 4.0 國際 | 知識共享。
The Tragedy of Middle Eastern Politics
The countries of the region have engaged in sustained competition that has tested their capacities and limitations, while resisting domination by rivals. Can a more stable order emerge from this maelstrom, and what would it require?
Introduction
The central geopolitical problem in the Middle East today—the tragedy of regional power politics, to borrow from political scientist John Mearsheimer—lies in the inability of its states to build a stable regional order. This comes as the influence and interventionist impulses of the region’s former hegemonic power, the United States, are receding, creating a vacuum in which strong, assertive countries have engaged in sustained competition and tested the limits of their capacities, while resisting domination by rivals. However, none is strong enough to dominate and reshape the region decisively.
Now that the Gaza war appears to have ended, Israel increasingly sees itself as a regional hegemon. Yet hegemony requires not only power but also acceptance and legitimacy, which Israel is far from securing. Following Israel’s attack against Qatar last September, Gulf leaders also came to view Israel as a threat to their security interests. At the same time, tensions between Israel and Türkiye are deepening, particularly in Syria, while Israeli attacks in Lebanon show the country remains an arena of confrontation between Israel and Iran.
Is such a situation unprecedented? Between the 1960s and 1980s, the Arab state system was characterized by ideological conflict, assertive leadership, proxy wars, and clashing ambitions, yet the regional order operated with surprising coherence. What unified Arab regimes was not a shared vision but a shared imperative: preserving existing authoritarian systems and preventing challenges to the balance of power and regional stability by states seeking regional hegemony or promoting powerful ideological agendas. Fear of internal collapse was the glue of the Arab order. This system contained Egypt’s attempt to gain a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula through its Yemen campaign after 1962, ended the conflict between Jordan and Palestinian factions in 1970, temporarily halted Lebanon’s civil war in 1975–1976, and inhibited Iran’s ambitions to export its Islamist ideology after the revolution.
Yet after more than a decade of upheaval, starting with the Arab uprisings in 2010–2011, no mechanism has been found to organize regional stability, along the lines of the 1815 Congress of Vienna that ended the Napoleonic wars, and more broadly the revolutionary phase that followed the French Revolution. Until regional states acknowledge their limitations and negotiate a regional arrangement they can all tolerate, the Middle East will remain trapped in recurring tensions, shifting alliances, and systemic conflict. Defining the contours of such an equilibrium will be essential for the region’s future.
The End of Pax Americana
The end of Pax Americana in the Middle East, the U.S.-led regional order that emerged after the Cold War’s end in 1989, has been a driver of instability, creating a void that countries in the region are now seeking to fill. The era of American hegemony offers lessons for understanding the prospects for stability in the coming decades.
First, Pax Americana itself was not necessarily stabilizing. Regional dominance usually provokes resistance to a hegemonic power, and throughout the past four decades the United States has been contested by multiple countries. Iran challenged the U.S.-anchored order starting in 1979 and continued doing so after 1989. Syria under the Assads both engaged with Washington and opposed it after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which many countries regarded as a threat to the status quo. The Middle East is characterized by sectarian, ethnic, and ideological divisions, weak state institutions, and persistent rivalries. This makes it resistant to imposed order, particularly from a distant power such as the United States.
Second, the U.S. repeatedly failed as a credible powerbroker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Successive administrations have been either unwilling or unable to resolve this paramount regional concern, which continues to undermine stability and alienate Arab public opinion. Washington has also struggled to balance the competing ambitions of major regional powers—Iran, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The result has been an antagonistic political environment in which U.S. leadership has lost coherence and authority.
Third, U.S. inconsistency has eroded trust among Washington’s allies and emboldened adversaries. From Barack Obama’s failure to carry through on his “red line” against chemical weapons use during the Syrian uprising to his pivot away from the Middle East toward Asia, to Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear accord with Iran, to Joe Biden’s efforts to recalibrate U.S. regional policy without offering long-term security guarantees to his Gulf allies, Washington has repeatedly embodied strategic drift. Unconditional support for Israel, even before the Gaza war, has demonstrated that Washington not only seeks to guarantee Israel’s military superiority but also its political impunity, which has had political costs.
Finally, the end of unipolarity, accelerated by China’s rise, Russia’s renewed boldness, and the emergence of a multipolar global order, has weakened Washington’s ability to unilaterally shape outcomes. This has given regional powers opportunities to diversify their military and economic partnerships and extract better terms from the United States. If Pax Americana failed to guarantee stability, its end has only produced a struggle for regional influence.
The Abraham Accords of 2020 were a U.S. attempt to consolidate regional order around states aligned with Washington. By normalizing ties between Israel and certain Arab countries, the accords aimed to combine Israel’s technological and military advantages with Arab financial and diplomatic clout, creating a bloc capable of countering Iran. Yet the limits were quickly apparent. Israeli brutality in Gaza provoked outrage in the Arab world, undermining the legitimacy of normalization with Israel. Saudi Arabia, in particular, lost interest after China brokered a rapprochement with Iran and Washington refused to provide security guarantees to the kingdom, even if the Trump administration designated it a “major non-NATO U.S. ally” in November 2025. While the Abraham Accords remain in place, they haven’t evolved into a U.S.-led cornerstone of regional order.
U.S. hegemony may have ended, but genuine multipolarity remains a distant prospect. The Assad regime’s downfall in 2024 removed a major Russian ally in the Middle East, reducing Moscow’s regional footprint, while China’s economic rise and strategic partnerships have not meaningfully challenged the U.S. role. Beijing was largely absent from the Gaza conflict, limiting itself to rhetorical condemnation, and took no action even during Ansar Allah’s blockade of Red Sea shipping. For now, China appears content to benefit from the dividend of U.S. military preponderance, despite its dependency on maritime trade routes and Middle Eastern energy. The landscape is not yet one of a stable multipolar system.
What Will Define a Future Regional Order?
The Middle East stands at a critical juncture. In the absence of a regional hegemon, such as the United States, how can the region move beyond its instability and build a regional order that reduces tensions? Stability is possible if regional powers acknowledge their structural limitations and recognize their mutual constraints.
Since the beginning of the century, several developments have heightened regional volatility. The expansion of Iran’s influence after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, like the emergence of a so-called “Shia crescent” stretching from Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria, was perceived by Saudi Arabia as threatening. At the same time, Türkiye and Qatar viewed the Arab uprisings beginning in 2010–2011 as an opportunity to extend their influence through Muslim Brotherhood movements. This triggered a backlash in many countries, mainly driven by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose actions could be inconsistent: they backed counterrevolutionary forces in Egypt and Tunisia, but not in Syria, as interests determined their choices. Israel, in turn, has seen its campaigns in Gaza and the West Bank, and against Iran and its allies in 2024–2025, as major strides in expanding its power.
The collapse of the Assad regime, the unravelling of the Iran-sponsored Axis of Resistance, the recalibration of Gulf-Iran relations, regional powers’ efforts to establish zones of influence, and the transactional U.S. approach might well reorder the Middle East. Three factors will determine if a cohesive regional system emerges, namely whether a more conservative, even reactionary, political environment, defined by a balance of power and counterrevolutionary instincts, can take shape, as this is what states will gravitate toward and defend after securing their aims. A second defining factor will be Iran’s trajectory, given its role as a revisionist regional power. A third will be whether regional powers can coexist in their respective spheres of influence.
Toward a New Counterrevolutionary Order
In the decade after the Arab uprisings, several Arab regimes, supported by key Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, worked relentlessly to close that chapter. Not all conflicts since then have been caused by counterrevolutionary dynamics, or provoked by Gulf states alone. However, they have all been instigated by the widespread nature of regional instability that has recast power relations, with countries pursuing their contending interests and seeking to anchor their gains in a more stable order.
This has not altered the fact that authoritarian regimes viewed the uprisings as a threat and sought to eliminate all revolutionary potential. That to which they aspired was similar to the post-1815 European order, in which monarchies agreed to restore a balance of power and neutralize forces unleashed by the French Revolution. Even Syria’s new leaders framed the Assad regime’s downfall as a transition aligning with the geopolitical consensus, not as part of a revolutionary wave. Ahmad al-Sharaa signaled his moderation, reassuring Gulf capitals and emphasizing that Syria would maintain the 1974 Disengagement Agreement with Israel and prevent foreign actors from using Syrian territory against anyone in the region.
A core condition of a new conservative order is the eradication of ideological movements regarded as destabilizing. Several Arab regimes are pushing for a post-ideological phase centered on nationalism, technocratic modernity, and state-driven development. Their animus toward the Muslim Brotherhood has shaped domestic and regional politics alike, and these regimes seek to marginalize political Islam and defang transnational ideologies of all stripes. In parallel, some analysts see Iran’s regional setbacks as paving the way for a more conventional, nationalist state, ushering in the end of transnational Shiism.
However, a conservative, even counterrevolutionary, regional order requires more than eliminating ideological foes. Its viability depends on the ability of countries to deliver economically and a settlement of the Palestinian question. Authoritarian restoration can only endure if states meet the minimal expectations of their populations for economic security. This is not guaranteed. Several countries—Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan—face acute fiscal stress, institutional decay, and environmental degradation. Governance failures and corruption make it difficult for elites to sustain legitimacy and contain social discontent.
The Palestinian issue remains an enduring obstacle as well. Public opinion across the Arab world remains deeply attached to the Palestinians’ plight, and Gaza’s devastation has intensified grievances. The fate of the Palestinians continues to erode the legitimacy of regimes seen as disregarding Palestinian rights, particularly from countries that joined the Abraham Accords. The region cannot stabilize around a conservative order that ignores Palestinian aspirations for statehood. Jordan and Egypt would perceive Israeli plans for the West Bank’s annexation or the displacement of Gaza’s Palestinians as deeply destabilizing, reinforcing the conviction among Arab regimes and publics that Israel is a settler-colonial project driven by territorial expansion. Saudi Arabia, the only Arab state with the capacity to forge a regional consensus, has tied normalization with Israel to credible progress on a Palestinian state. Although the two-state solution appears increasingly illusory, launching a viable peace process remains essential to consolidating a conservative regional order.
Iran’s Trajectory as a Determinant of the Region’s Direction
A second, and decisive, factor shaping the likelihood of a sustainable Middle Eastern equilibrium is Iran’s future. What will ensue after the passing of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei remains uncertain, but it is likely the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary ideology will be contested, if not fully revised, given its failures and growing public discontent.
For decades, much of the West, Israel, and many Arab states have viewed Iran as a primary source of regional instability. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Tehran has relied on a “forward defense” strategy to insulate its territory from conflict. Shaped by the trauma of the war and U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), this doctrine rested on three pillars: a network of allied armed groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen; a ballistic missile and drone program providing strategic capabilities; and a naval posture based on asymmetrical tactics to deter U.S. forces and be effective in key Persian Gulf waterways.
The two main objectives in this approach were deterring Israel and the United States from attacking Iran directly; and securing influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, turning them into buffers or platforms for Iranian action. However, the Gaza war’s ramifications showed that Iran’s Axis of Resistance project had its limits. Hezbollah’s effective surrender in November 2024, Gaza’s devastation, and a twelve-day war in June 2025 that saw Israel and the United States bomb Iran, including its nuclear facilities and missile capabilities, exposed the shortcomings of its transnational proxy network. Instead, it consolidated a counter-axis including the Gulf states and Israel, leaving Iran isolated and strategically constrained.
A post-Khamenei nationalistic Iran may well remain authoritarian and become inward-looking. This would have profound implications: Iran’s proxies would need to review their role and reposition themselves internally, potentially evolving into more nationalistic, less militarized actors. Their future will be shaped mainly by the direction Iran chooses.
Yet Iran’s greatest vulnerability lies at home. The regime faces domestic fragility, declining legitimacy, and a deteriorating economy. External confrontation may briefly generate nationalistic solidarity, but it cannot resolve the country’s structural crisis. A young, disillusioned population increasingly rejects the ideology of wilayat al-faqih, which combines supreme judicial, religious, and political power in a single Islamic jurist, and views Iranian regional adventurism as costly and leading to international isolation.
The prospects for a stable regional order depend heavily on Iran’s strategic direction. The more Tehran moves toward national prioritization, economic reconstruction, and deescalation, and away from regional adventurism, the greater the chances of reshaping the Middle East around a sustainable equilibrium. Conversely, if Iran doubles down on confrontation and ideological resistance, regional instability will deepen.
Redrawing Regional Spheres of Influence
U.S. disengagement, a decade and a half of transformative conflicts, and the rise of new regional powers have unleashed unprecedented competition among Middle Eastern states to expand their spheres of influence. Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, in turn, have become contested arenas in which Israel, Türkiye, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are seeking to advance their interests, usually at each other’s expense. A decisive factor shaping the region’s future will be whether these spheres of influence can be reconciled or will remain zones of rivalry.
While Israel sees itself as the region’s hegemonic power, in practice it has become a major driver of instability. Guided by the “Iron Wall” doctrine of imposing outcomes through overwhelming military force, Israel’s “peace through strength” approach disregards the political and historical roots of conflict, the humanitarian toll of military campaigns, and the interests of other regional powers that must be factored into sustainable regional settlements. The limitations are evident. First, Israel’s violent actions in Gaza and the West Bank, like its aggressiveness in general, have triggered defensive counterreactions from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Jordan, and even Pakistan, amid a growing perception that Israel threatens Arab interests. In light of this, even before Israeli strikes weakened Iran’s regional military network in 2024, Gulf states had already begun reengaging with Tehran.
Second, Israel’s ambitions are undermining the sovereignty of neighboring states, particularly Lebanon and Syria. Israel occupies both countries’ territory and frequently bombs them, while preventing the rebuilding of state capacities and even of areas destroyed by war. This has clashed with Turkish and Saudi priorities. Türkiye seeks to restore state authority in Syria to contain Iranian networks, while preventing the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous zone. For Israel, a strong Syrian state, especially aligned with Ankara, potentially challenges Israel’s ability to shape events to its north. Southern Syria is a microcosm of these tensions. Segments of the Druze community’s leadership increasingly want to escape Damascus’ grip, while Kurdish groups in the northeast are also reluctant to accept the new leadership, furthering Israel’s preference for empowering Syria’s minorities.
Lebanon faces similar risks: the Shia community is caught between outside pressures to disarm Hezbollah, Iran’s desire to retain leverage, and its own need for a state that can provide protection and services. Saudi Arabia and other countries aim to curtail Iran’s influence in Syria and Lebanon, but will not accept Israel’s destruction of southern Lebanon or actions in Syria that create circumstances for Iran to reconstitute its Axis of Resistance.
Israel’s strategy relies on a dangerous assumption that regional fragmentation and state collapse can secure long-term Israeli domination of its political environment. Forcing Hezbollah’s disarmament, for instance, risks pushing Lebanon into civil war. Normalizing relations with Syria while occupying the country and widening sectarian fractures could further weaken the state and delegitimize its leaders. No Arab government will accept a regional order built on state collapse, particularly if accompanied by the mass displacement of Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank, which would destabilize Egypt and Jordan. Yet such plans enjoy explicit support within Israel’s political class.
Ultimately, the Middle East’s future will be determined by whether regional powers reach an understanding over their spheres of influence and commit to building functional states. Without a negotiated framework delineating roles, limits, and responsibilities, the region will remain trapped in a cycle of confrontation and fragmentation.
Conclusion
The Middle East may be evolving toward a balance-of-power system, reminiscent of post-1815 Europe. However, that era lacked a single dominant state, and stability emerged from a mutual recognition of limits. The Middle East has never had a Congress of Vienna, but the structural conditions for one are taking shape. The next phase will require constructing a more sustainable regional order, based on negotiation and grudging acceptance of a balance of interests, agreed among regional capitals and anchored by global powers.
About the Authors
Hamza Meddeb is a research fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where he co-leads the Political Economy Program.
Mohamed Ali Adraoui is a research professor at Georgetown University and the author of Salafism Goes Global: From the Gulf to the French Banlieues (Oxford University Press, 2020).
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. For more details regarding the license deed, please visit: CC BY 4.0 Deed | Attribution 4.0 International | Creative Commons.
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paper2025 Carnegie California Global Affairs SurveyCalifornia is acutely aware of the intense renegotiation happening almost daily in domestic and international politics.
- Ian Klaus,
- Mark Baldassare,
- Marissa Jordan,
- Abigail Manalese
researchDiplomacy in Crisis, Subnational Diplomacy EvolvesFor practitioners of subnational diplomacy, 2025 has required quick adaptation and evolution to tectonic shifts.
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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