作者： Elbridge A. Colby和 亞歷克斯·維萊斯·格林
科爾比 (Elbridge A. Colby) 於 2017 年至 2018 年擔任國防部負責戰略和部隊發展的副助理部長，著有《拒絕戰略：大國衝突時代的美國防禦》一書。亞歷山大·維萊斯-格林 (Alexander Velez-Green) 曾擔任參議員喬什·霍利 (Josh Hawley) (共和黨-密蘇裡州) 的國家安全顧問。
五角大廈經常表示，為與中國在台灣問題上的衝突做準備是其首要任務。確實如此。如果台灣遭到中國進攻，美國在該地區的軍事地位以及亞洲國家對華盛頓對抗北京的能力和決心的信心都將嚴重削弱。結果將是中國朝著霸權邁出重要一步，稱霸全球最大、最重要的市場。如果中國能夠建立這樣的主導地位，它將能夠取代美國成為世界主要經濟體，並利用這種優勢削弱我們的繁榮，干涉我們的國家生活——這將對美國人的日常生活產生可怕的影響。
恢復威懾力仍然是可能的——只要我們能盡快給予台灣和駐亞洲的美國軍隊他們所需要的東西。但我們不能指望在 向烏克蘭提供如此多援助的同時做到這一點。事實上，烏克蘭和台灣都需要許多相同的武器，而美國庫存中此類武器的數量有限，我們的國防工業在未來幾年內都無法生產足夠的這些關鍵武器。隨著中國歷史性的軍事集結持續進行以及烏克蘭戰爭的持續，這些權衡只會變得更加惡化。
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那麼，我們如何確保台灣得到保衛，同時仍能維護美國在歐洲的重要但次要的利益？
首先，美國必須加速向台灣運送關鍵武器，包括海馬迴火箭系統、美國戰術飛彈系統、美國導引多管火箭系統和無人機等打擊能力，以及美國太空總署飛彈、愛國者飛彈、魚叉飛彈、刺針飛彈和標槍飛彈等防禦系統。由於美國已向烏克蘭派遣了許多此類軍事系統，美國人對其中一些軍事系統的名稱已漸趨熟悉。但台灣也迫切需要這些武器──包括可供地面部隊對抗兩棲入侵的武器。
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不幸的是，由於對烏克蘭的援助，美國的武器庫存已經耗盡，因此台灣將被迫更多地依賴較慢的對外軍售進程。為了幫助台灣盡快實現這一目標，美國政府還應將台灣放在對外軍售的前沿——不僅要領先烏克蘭，還要領先中東及其他地區的合作夥伴。
同時，華盛頓應該加大對台灣的安全援助。此類援助既可以促進提款，也可以促進新的銷售。但它不應該是一張空頭支票。相反，美國對台援助應嚴格以台灣增加國防開支和採取不對稱防禦戰略為條件。
其次，政府和國會需要緊急擴大美國國防生產，重振我們疲軟的國防工業基礎，而且要迅速。在此過程中，他們必須集中精力提高太平洋地區的庫存，優先於歐洲或其他地區。當因資金、供應商、勞動力、零件或其他限製而產生權衡時，台灣的防禦必須優先考慮。
最後，儘管美國政府一直在談論威懾中國，但它已將烏克蘭的國防作為其明確的優先事項，並定期與烏克蘭高層接觸，聽取國會簡報，併申請資金。相較之下，美國政府今年為美國印度太平洋司令部留下了近35億美元的優先資金缺口。美國政府必須以更迫切的態度對待台灣的國防問題，包括確保駐亞洲的美軍獲得必要的情報資源，並確保美國的政治資本集中用於加強我們在亞洲的防禦圈。
這並不意味著我們應該拋棄歐洲。相反，我們的盟友必須對歐洲的常規防禦承擔主要責任，主要依靠美國的擴大核威懾力和精選的常規能力，以免削弱我們威懾中國的能力。我們的歐洲盟友也必須帶頭幫助烏克蘭。
北約內部的勞動力重新分配不僅僅是一個公平的問題。當美國專注於應對來自中國的更大挑戰時，歐洲是否能夠阻止並防禦俄羅斯也至關重要。俄羅斯的威脅不會消失。我們和歐洲應該做好相應的準備。
確定優先次序從來都不是一件容易的事——但它早就該做了。美國政府和國會正確地將中國描述為美國最大的威脅，但他們並沒有採取必要的重點、規模和緊迫性來應對這項威脅。應對中國對台灣的威脅以及這對美國實際利益意義的窗口正在迅速關閉。如果不這樣做，可能會導致第二次世界大戰以來最嚴重的衝突。
, and is the author of “The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict.” Alexander Velez-Green served as national security adviser to Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo).
Many argue that the United States does not need to choose between aiding Ukraine and deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. This is a comforting but dangerous delusion. The sad truth: It does.
The main question is how to do so. The answer is by focusing U.S. resources on Taiwan’s defense against China, by far the United States’ strongest rival, while relying primarily on European allies to defend against a weakened Russia.
The Pentagon regularly says that preparing for conflict with China over Taiwan is its top priority. And rightly so. If Taiwan falls to a Chinese assault, the United States’ military position in the region, and Asian states’ confidence in Washington’s ability and resolve to confront Beijing, will both be gravely weakened. The result would be a major step toward Chinese hegemony over the world’s largest and most important market. If China can establish such dominance, it will be able to supplant the United States as the world’s premier economy and use that leverage to diminish our prosperity and interfere in our national life — with dire implications for Americans’ everyday lives.
But the United States’ ability to prevent China from conquering Taiwan has been severely eroded in recent years. China’s navy already dwarfs our own; its air and space forces are rapidly improving; and its missile forces threaten to prevent the U.S. military from intervening effectively to defend Taiwan. Even the normally confident commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command recently testified that trends in the Pacific are going “in the wrong direction.” As a result, it is now a very serious question whether the United States can defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Restoring deterrence is still possible — if we get Taiwan and U.S. forces in Asia what they need as quickly as possible. But we cannot expect to do that while delivering so much aid to Ukraine. The fact is that both Ukraine and Taiwan need many of the same weapons, the United States only has limited quantities of those weapons in its available stockpiles, and our defense industry will not be able to produce enough of these critical capabilities for years. These trade-offs will only worsen as China’s historic military buildup continues and the war in Ukraine goes on.
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So how do we ensure Taiwan can be defended while still securing important but secondary U.S. interests in Europe?
First, the United States must accelerate delivery of critical weapons to Taiwan, including strike capabilities such as HIMARS, ATACMS, GMLRS and drones, as well as defensive systems such as NASAMS, Patriots, Harpoons, Stingers and Javelins. Americans have grown familiar with the names of several of these military systems because the United States has sent many of them to Ukraine. But Taiwan also desperately needs them — including weapons for its ground forces that would confront an amphibious invasion.
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Josh Rogin
counterpointTaiwan is urging the U.S. not to abandon Ukraine
To accomplish this, the Biden administration should use presidential drawdown authority to rapidly send weapons to Taiwan from U.S. stockpiles, as the administration has announced it will do. But it must favor Taiwan over Ukraine for any weapons that both need.
Unfortunately, U.S. stockpiles are depleted as a result of aid to Ukraine, so Taiwan will be forced to rely more heavily on the slower foreign military sales process. To help it do so as quickly as possible, the administration should put Taiwan at the front of the line for foreign military sales as well — ahead of Ukraine but also ahead of partners in the Middle East and beyond.
At the same time, Washington should ramp up security assistance to Taiwan. Such assistance can facilitate both drawdowns and new sales. But it should not be a blank check. Instead, U.S. aid to Taiwan should be strictly conditioned on Taiwan increasing defense spending and embracing an asymmetric defense strategy.
Second, the administration and Congress need to urgently expand U.S. defense production by reinvigorating our anemic defense industrial base — and fast. As they do so, it is imperative to focus on boosting inventories for the Pacific ahead of Europe or elsewhere. Where trade-offs arise because of limited funds, suppliers, labor, components or other constraints, Taiwan’s defense must take precedence.
Finally, for all its talk about deterring China, the administration has made Ukraine’s defense its clear priority with regular high-level engagement, congressional briefings and requests for funds. By contrast, the administration left U.S. Indo-Pacific Command with almost $3.5 billion in unfunded priorities this year. The administration must treat Taiwan’s defense with far greater urgency, including by ensuring U.S. forces in Asia receive essential intelligence resources and that the United States’ political capital is laser-focused on bolstering our defensive perimeter in Asia.
None of this means we should abandon Europe. Instead, our allies must take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense, relying on the United States mainly for its extended nuclear deterrent and select conventional capabilities that do not detract from our ability to deter China. Our European allies must also take the lead in helping Ukraine.
This redistribution of labor within NATO is not just a matter of fairness. It is also imperative if Europe is to be able to deter and defend itself against Russia while the United States focuses on the much bigger challenge from China. The Russia threat is not going away. We and Europe should prepare accordingly.
Prioritization is never easy — but it is long overdue. The administration and Congress have rightly described China as the preeminent threat to the United States, but they have not acted with the focus, scale and urgency needed to address it. The window for facing the Chinese threat to Taiwan, with all that entails for Americans’ concrete interests, is fast closing. Failing to do so could lead to the most consequential conflict since World War II.
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