普京的愚蠢之旅

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普京的愚蠢之旅

2024 年 11 月 22 日 卡尔-比尔特

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俄乌战争

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瓦尔代

本月，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京在瓦尔代讨论俱乐部年会上发表了长篇讲话。

普京总统试图概述他的世界观。 他滔滔不绝地讲述了全球

"他让我们相信俄罗斯属于后者。 然而，当俄罗斯试图破坏今年秋天联合国未来峰会的最终公报时，来自全球南部的国家坚决予以回击。

在瓦尔代会议上，普京一直在竭力掩盖一个事实：他真正关心的是避免在乌克兰遭遇 "战略失败"。 事实上，俄罗斯已经遭受了战略失败，不是西方造成的，甚至也不是乌克兰造成的，而是普京自己造成的。 过去二十年来，普京自己的短视、破坏性政策迫使乌克兰向西方寻求支持和声援。

普京的第一个失误是在 2004 年乌克兰总统大选之后，当时他试图选择获胜者，结果挑起了橙色革命，温和的前中央银行行长维克托-尤先科（Viktor Yushchenko）被推举为乌克兰总统。 此后，普京一直试图对乌克兰施加影响。

但模式很明显：克里姆林宫的高压手段一次又一次地适得其反，让乌克兰人更加坚定地与西方结盟。 与一些西方评论家和克里姆林宫宣传人员的说法相反，这绝不是西方向东扩张的恶意阴谋。 是乌克兰人在采取战略行动，这反映出普京在努力削减他们的主权。

2008 年，关于让乌克兰加入北约的提议显然缺乏必要的支持，因为当时法国和德国都反对这一想法。 乌克兰接受了这一暗示，并于 2010 年重申了其中立地位，以此来遏制普京。

但在 2013 年，普京向乌克兰亲俄总统维克托-亚努科维奇施压，迫使其拒绝与欧盟签署结盟协议，局势再次发生了变化。 与欧洲建立更紧密的贸易关系本可以促进乌克兰的经济发展，并通过要求乌克兰适应欧盟的法律规范来遏制腐败；但亚努科维奇为了换取俄罗斯提供的 150 亿美元救助金和更低的天然气价格，默许了普京的要求，放弃了该协议。 作为回应，乌克兰人走上街头，爆发了后来的 "欧罗莫起义"，亚努科维奇很快在深夜逃往俄罗斯。

亚努科维奇很快在深夜逃往俄罗斯。

普京的反应非常清楚地表明了他的意图。 他在克里米亚部署了俄罗斯特种部队--制服上没有任何标识的 "小绿人"--克里米亚自 1954 年以来一直是乌克兰的一部分，然后非法吞并了克里米亚。 在别无选择的情况下，乌克兰放弃中立，寻求加入北约，并推进欧盟协议。 此外，北约本身也感受到了普京公然抢夺土地的威胁，首次在其东欧成员国驻军。

这些都是对普京侵略行径完全可以理解的回应。 同样，西方并不是要在战略上打败俄罗斯，而是普京在自取灭亡。 到 2020 年代初，随着乌克兰进一步向西方靠拢，他认识到了自己的失误所带来的严重后果，并决定结束这一问题。 他发动全面入侵的目的要么是将乌克兰变成类似白俄罗斯的殖民地，要么是彻底消灭乌克兰这个民族国家。

很快，普京显然又一次失算了。 他认为一次快速的特别行动就足以推翻乌克兰总统沃洛德梅尔-泽连斯基的政府，并在基辅建立一个对克里姆林宫友好的政权。 然而，他的部队却遇到了一个意志坚定的民族，他们根本没有做好战斗准备。 近三年后，俄罗斯控制的乌克兰领土仅比 2014 年多出约 10%，当时俄罗斯只占领了 7%。 这是一个可悲的结果，尤其是考虑到被占领地区大部分已被摧毁，2014 年之前的人口可能只剩下一半。

普京的目标仍然是完全控制乌克兰，再造一个帝国俄罗斯。 但这一努力必将失败。 虽然布尔什维克军队在 20 世纪 20 年代初的俄罗斯内战后重新控制了乌克兰，但即使是弗拉基米尔-列宁也明白，乌克兰是而且必须继续是一个独立的政治实体。 虽然普京认为列宁的信念是一个严重错误，但正是约瑟夫-斯大林使乌克兰成为联合国的一个独立成员。

随着普京继续发动侵略战争，伤亡人数将不断增加（可能达到每周一万人左右）。 但他的错误行动唯一可以肯定的结果就是乌克兰人现在对俄罗斯的仇恨。 这将带来长期的后果，而这对俄罗斯来说已经是一次重大的战略失败。 对

的责任始于普京，也终于普京。 西方国家永远不可能取得普京所取得的成就： 乌克兰与俄罗斯完全疏远。

卡尔-比尔特是瑞典前首相和外交部长。 本文与 Project Syndicate © 2024 合作发布。

弗拉基米尔-普京在 2024 瓦尔道尔讨论俱乐部会议上的照片： Maxim Shipenkov/Pool/AFP via Getty Images。

ASPI AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE

THE STRATEGIST

Putin's march of folly

22 Nov 2024 Carl Bildt

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Russia-Ukraine war

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Валдай

Valdai

In a lengthy address at the annual Valdai Discussion Club meeting this month, Russian

President Vladimir Putin tried to outline his view of the world. Rambling on about a global

"minority' that is stymying the ambitions of the 'majority', he would have us believe that Russia belongs to the latter. Yet when Russia attempted to derail the final communique at the United Nations Summit of the Future this fall, countries from across the Global South firmly rebuffed the attempt.

Throughout his Valdai appearance, Putin struggled to hide the fact that what he really cares about is avoiding a 'strategic defeat' in Ukraine. In fact, Russia has already suffered a strategic defeat, inflicted not by the West or even by Ukraine, but by Putin himself. For the past two decades, his own myopic, destructive policies have forced Ukraine to turn toward the West for support and solidarity.

One of Putin's first blunders came after Ukraine's 2004 presidential election, when his ham- fisted attempt to choose the winner ended up provoking the Orange Revolution, which swept the moderate former central banker Viktor Yushchenko into the Ukrainian presidency. Putin has been trying to exert influence over the country ever since.

But the pattern is clear: time after time, the Kremlin's heavy-handed efforts have backfired, leaving Ukrainians even more determined to align themselves with the West. Contrary to what some Westen commentators and Kremlin propagandists claim, this was never a case of the West expanding eastward as part of some malevolent plot. It was the Ukrainians who were making the strategic moves, which reflected Putin's efforts to curtail their sovereignty.

In 2008, proposals to extend NATO membership to Ukraine clearly lacked the necessary support, as both France and Germany opposed the idea at the time. Ukraine took the hint and in 2010 reaffirmed its neutral status as a means of keeping Putin at bay.

But the situation changed again in 2013, after Putin pressured Ukraine's pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to reject an Association Agreement with the European Union. Closer trade ties with Europe would have boosted Ukraine's economy and curtailed corruption by requiring it to adapt EU legal norms; but Yanukovych, in exchange for a $15 billion bailout by Russia and lower gas prices, acquiesced to Putin's demands and abandoned the agreement. In response, Ukrainians took to the streets in what would become the Euromaidan uprising, and Yanukovych soon fled for Russia in the dead of

night.

Putin's response made his intentions all too clear. He deployed Russian special forces -little green men' whose uniforms bore no identifying insignias-in Crimea, a part of Ukraine since 1954, and then illegally annexed it. Left with no other choice, Ukraine responded by ditching neutrality, seeking NATO membership and moving forward with the EU agreement. Moreover, NATO-itself feeling threatened by Putin's brazen land grab- stationed forces in its Eastern European member states for the first time.

These were perfectly understandable responses to Putin's acts of aggression. Again, the West was not trying to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia; Putin was doing it to himself. By the early 2020s, with Ukraine moving even closer toward the West, he recognized the grim consequences of his blunders and decided to put an end to the issue. His goal in launching a full-scale invasion was either to transform Ukraine into a Belarus-like satrapy or eliminate it as a nation state altogether.

It soon became obvious that Putin had miscalculated yet again. He believed that a quick special operation would be enough to topple Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's administration and install a Kremlin-friendly regime in Kyiv. Instead, his forces encountered a determined nation that they were not prepared to fight. Almost three years later, Russia controls only around 10 percent more of Ukraine's territory than it had in 2014, when it grabbed 7 percent. It is a pathetic result, especially considering that the occupied areas have largely been destroyed, with probably only half of their pre-2014 population remaining.

Putin's aim is still to take full control of Ukraine and recreate Imperial Russia. But this effort will fail. Although Bolshevik forces re-established control of Ukraine after the Russian civil war in the early 1920s, even Vladimir Lenin understood that Ukraine is and must remain a separate political entity. And while Putin has rejected Lenin's belief as a grave error, it was Joseph Stalin who made Ukraine a separate member of the United Nations.

With Putin continuing his war of aggression, the casualties will keep mounting (probably to around ten thousand per week). But the only certain outcome of his misadventure will be the hatred that Ukrainians now bear toward Russia. This will have long-lasting consequences, and it already represents a major strategic defeat for Russia. Responsibility for

the situation starts and ends with Putin. The West could never have achieved what Putin has: Ukraine's total alienation from Russia.

Carl Bildt is a former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden. The article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2024.

Image of Vladimir Putin at the 2024 Valdal Discussion Club meeting: Maxim Shipenkov/Pool/AFP via Getty Images.