“柏林糖果炸弹客”是谁?他为什么如此重要?

众所周知,柏林空难“化敌为友”。但这一过程比人们想象的要复杂得多。我在其他一些条目中对此进行了评论,即:

海伦娜·施拉德 (Helena Schrader) 的回答是,柏林空运使“敌人变成了朋友”,这已经成为陈词滥调,但在封锁开始时,德国人真的仍然对西方盟国怀有敌意吗?




Helena Schrader
 · Aug 19
Did the cliche about the Berlin Airlift turning enemies into friends apply to the British as well as the Americans and Germans?
Yes! Of Germany's wartime enemies, none had been more tenacious than the British. The Soviets had been Germany's Allies for the first 20 months of the war, and the United States waited until Germany declared war on it in December 1941 before officially taking sides. Britain not only declared war 1 September 1939, it remained in the conflict to the end. Yet that very tenacity tempered British attitudes toward Germany. As one British Airlift veteran put it to me: "We'd both been bombed." At both official and personal levels, British policy was more subtle and the attitudes more differentiated than America’s. Even during the War, the British recognized to a greater extent than the Americans that there were many shades of grey among “Nazis.” They were likewise more sceptical of the Soviet Union and so more sensitive to the need to maintain Allies on the Continent of Europe. Britain did not ever embrace the concept of “collective guilt” to the same degree as America and so from the beginning was always willing to utilise capable German specialists in efforts to re-establish a working German administration. As a result: The British occupiers in Germany behaved less as conquerors, more like conscientious colonial civil servants. They were dedicated to sound administration, the creation of democracy in industry and government, the inculcation of liberal values, a mission to instruct and improve….The Zone was treated as a colony for which the administrators felt responsible, but for whose inhabitants they had no affection and little understanding. The British remained aloof in their clubs and requisitioned houses, viewing the Germans as natives…British intentions were basically decent and benevolent, but tended to be concealed by reticence. [i] These official attitudes were reflected in the personal remembrances of British Airlift veterans. At the Royal Air Force Historical Society Proceedings in Sept. 1989, Sir Kenneth Cross, who was with BAFO during the Airlift, reminded participants: We didn’t have a great deal of affection for the German nation and it would be wrong for anyone to have any views to the contrary. When it came to doing the Airlift, it was a professional job and whether it had been Hindus or Germans, the Air Force would have done it. [ii] Many ordinary pilots and airmen felt the same. A civilian flight engineer, Victor Bingham, remembers that the Airlift had nothing to do with humanitarian efforts: “if it had been flying to Timbuctoo we would have been just as interested.” [iii] And yet they were human too and many – even or particularly former Bomber Command personnel – remember being shocked and appalled by the scale of destruction found in Germany. Many RAF ground personnel were post-war conscripts who had never known war first-hand, and even for the veterans the scars of war had started to heal and were not so raw. Virtually every observer admits that in Germany they were confronted with destruction far worse than they had known at home or had expected to find. One RAF conscript described what he found in Germany as follows: The troop train…wound its way through a neat, clean and tidy Holland into a truly devastated Germany. Like most of my friends I was absolutely horrified at the scenes which met my eyes – every town it seemed, consisted only of piles of rubble with just an odd fireplace or wall still standing. Where, and how, the occupants lived I never knew, but conditions must have been terrible for them, war or no war. The war still loomed large in our minds but to see such ruin three years after it had ended was shocking. My friend lived in Stepney, London and I’d seen a lot of bomb damage there, but nothing on this scale. Even today it makes me shudder. [iv] Even returning aircrew often admitted that they had not truly pictured the effects of their raids until confronted with the results. Few men felt guilty for what they had done – they still believed in the cause they had fought for and they had too many friends whose deaths they did not want to consider wasted – but there seems little doubt that the scale of destruction produced the first hint of sympathy for the Germans. Friendships are not built on pity, however, and many observers reported with alienation the way in which the Germans huddled in their ruins, listless and - in the eyes of many - sullen. The sight of appalling devastation may have paved the way to a change in attitude, but the change itself was sparked by the unexpected defiance of the Berliners to the Blockade. As has been recorded earlier, the Allies seriously expected the Berliners to give in to the Soviet pressure. The assumption was that the Germans, who had wantonly trampled on their own freedom just 15 years earlier, would not value it now. When they unexpectedly chose freedom, they surprised the world and ignited a new interest in Germany and especially Berlin. Suddenly the images of Germany presented to people in Britain weren’t the Nuremberg Trials, but rather the speech of Ernst Reuter defiantly demanding support in the cause of Freedom. Berlin rubble women were no longer portrayed as the piteous defeated enemy or an economic burden, but rather as heroic foot-soldiers in the struggle against Communism. The degree to which the Berliners were willing to suffer hardships – and even joke about them – made them seem human in a positive sense. Lingering wartime distrust and dislike and post-war pity and contempt gave way to outright enthusiasm. For those actively involved in the Airlift, however, personal contacts were most important. Unsurprisingly, given the notorious reserve of the British, many RAF personnel retained an ambivalent attitude toward the Germans well summarized by a sergeant of the Signals regiment, who put it this way: Most of the communications network stations were manned by Germans and supervised by Royal Signals personnel. Many had worked for the German post office, were very knowledgeable and could speak good English. None of them were ever Nazis, to hear them tell it, and although I could not forgive them for the hurt they had caused this world, individually they could be nice people. But collectively, Nazis or not, they had been a bunch of real bastards. [v] The British engineer in charge of building a bridge across the Havel was more neutral. He remembers that he could not speak a word of German and the German engineer working under him could not speak English but “both of [us] could read plans and got on very well.” [vi] Likewise, when the British charter companies turned to German mechanics for DIs and emergency maintenance conducted in Germany they discovered that the German mechanics hired to help service aircraft shared a common language despite their lack of English – namely a devotion to aircraft and flying. One of the civilian charter employees remembers: “[The Germans] were extremely keen to do even the most menial tasks around the aircraft. Flying was in their blood.” [vii] Although earning far less than their British counterparts, by all accounts, they worked with the same dedication. An RASC Lieutenant remembered: I thought I knew about Germans – that they were obedient to authority, with little sense of humour, hard-working and dull…These fellows were half-starved, yet cheerful, and cracking with repartee. I never understood the quick Berliner Deutsch, or the reasons for the gusts of laughter that erupted from the stevedores as they toiled over the salt bags…[but it was always there.] [viii] Yet one of the RAF mechanics remembers in addition: …all my RAF colleagues noted with some amusement that all the Germans we met had fought against the Russians, none against the Western powers. [ix] On the other hand, it could be the reverse - the shared experiences of war - formed a bond. RAF Bomber Command pilot, DFC, AFC, reports: I became friendly with a German wood-carver who had a nephew working with him who had been a FW190 Night Fighter Pilot. We got on very well. We used to exchange reminisces and found we had both been involved in the same operations on the same nights as each other. [x] Another former member of Bomb Command aircrew, Master Signaller Robert A. Hide, had been shot down over northeast Germany following a raid on Berlin in March 1944. He was badly burned on his hands and face, but treated with “unbelievable compassion, sympathy and first aid” by the Germans who first found him. Throughout the Airlift he felt that he had “to reciprocate the compassion and sympathy that had been afforded [him] in the hour of [his] need.”[xi] Ultimately, it was the tangible gratitude of the Berliners to the foot-soldiers of the Airlift that changed attitudes most. Every day thousands of Berliners gathered on the street outside Gatow Airfield "clapping and cheering as the four-engined Yorks taxied in.” [xii] People climbed on the rubble, perched in the trees, stood upon parked cars and trucks, and waved from balconies and the roof-tops at the landing planes. At Gatow, the Station Commander has received many gifts for presentation to the aircrews, and most of these were touching in their simplicity. Captain Edward Hensch, working for one of the civilian charter companies, remembers receiving a package sent anonymously to a “Blockade Flier” which contained a porcelain snail, a few flowers and a toy walrus made with rat fur. Another pilot tells how two small boys collected broken pieces of marble from the ruins and set them in metal bases to make bookends dedicated in thanks to the Airlift crews. The humbleness of the gifts brought home to the aircrews just how little the Berliners had left to give. In consequence crews were touched by the gift of a watch that had survived Soviet plundering, or by a piece of china that had survived the air raids, by a handmade carving or a beat-up teddy bear…. [i] Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift, Sarpedon, 1988, p. 52-53. [ii] RAFHS Proceedings No. 6, Sept. 1989, p. 53. [iii] Victor E. Bingham, letter to the author, Sept. 2005. [iv] Peter Day, letter to the author, Jan. 2006. [v] Sgt. John Overington, quoted in Edwin Gere, The Unheralded, Trafford, 2003, p. 147. [vi] Robert Rodrigo, Berlin Airlift, Cassel and Co., 1960. p. 81. [vii] D.G. Upward of Flight Refuelling, quoted in Rodrigo, p. 190. [viii] Lt. Courtney Latimer, RASC, quoted in Gere, p. 63. [ix] Peter Day, letter to the author, Jan. 2006. [x] Fl/Lt Rusty Waughman DFC AFC, letter to the author 21 September 2005. [xi] Robert A. Hide, quoted in Gere, p. 144. [xii] Arthur Pearcy, Berlin Airlift, Airlife, 1997, p. 16. NOTE: The content of this blog post is based on Helena P. Schrader. The Blockade Breakers. Pen & Sword, 2008. The Berlin Airlift is the subject of Bridge to Tomorrow, a trilogy of novels starting with Cold Peace. Watch a video teaser here: Winning a War with Milk, Coal and Chocolate

然而,态度转变的一个共同点是,真正俘获柏林人心的是民间交流和美国和英国参与者的非正式慷慨。其中没有一个人比一位美国中尉更出名,也没有那么有影响力,他被历史铭记为“柏林糖果炸弹手”

盖尔·哈尔沃森中尉在二战期间加入了美国陆军航空兵团,驾驶运输机从巴西纳塔尔起飞。作为一名军事专业人士,1948 年柏林危机爆发时,他仍在驾驶运输机。虽然他的中队(驾驶新型 C-74)没有被安排调往柏林,但基地上另一个配备 C-54 的中队在部署前几个小时才接到通知。当哈尔沃森得知一位怀有双胞胎婴儿的朋友即将被部署时,他自愿代替他。

哈尔沃森和他的新中队于 7 月初抵达柏林。空运才刚刚开始几周,机组人员被告知这种情况不会持续超过 25 天左右。事实上,某种外交协议终止空运的可能性似乎很大,以至于哈尔沃森急切地想在被送回美国之前从地面上看到希特勒著名的首都。所以,有一天,他没有睡觉,而是搭便车搭乘另一架 C-54 飞往柏林,成为一名游客。

他想做的第一件事就是拍下货机在滕珀尔霍夫机场降落时,勉强飞过周围五层公寓楼顶的情景。于是哈沃森走到机场对面,从围栏旁边拍摄了一张照片。在这里,他发现大约有 30 名德国孩子在观看飞机降落。哈沃森微笑着向他们挥手,他们也微笑着向他们挥手。有几个孩子会说一点英语,于是他们开始交谈。用哈沃森自己的话来说:

第一个问题是:“每架飞机能运载多少袋面粉?”有人讨论过每架飞机能运过多少条面包。我们真的在为年幼的孩子运送鲜牛奶吗?其他货物呢?多少吨?一个问题接一个问题。

然后我学到了优先考虑的问题。他们对自由的兴趣超过了对面粉的兴趣。他们完全认识到两者之间存在着真正的关系,但他们已经决定了哪个是最重要的。他们在告诉我他们的价值观是什么以及在这种情况下什么对他们最重要时表现出的成熟和清晰令我感到惊讶。

其中一位主要发言人是一位 12 岁左右的小女孩,她有一双忧郁的蓝眼睛。她穿着一条看起来像是哥哥的裤子,脚上穿着一双比她大一半的鞋子,这双鞋子曾经风光无限。[她说]:“我们这里几乎每个人都经历过柏林最后的战斗。在你们的轰炸机杀死了我们的一些父母、兄弟姐妹后,我们认为没有什么比这更糟糕的了。但那是在最后的战斗之前。从那时起直到美国、英国和法国进入这座城市,我们亲眼目睹了共产主义制度。从那时起,我们学到了很多东西。我们不需要自由的说教。我们可以走在边界的两边。你所看到的比你听到或读到的话语更有说服力。”

[盖尔·哈尔沃森。《柏林糖果轰炸机》。地平线出版社。1997 年,第 98-99 页。]

另一件令哈沃森印象深刻的事情是,孩子们从来不向他要任何东西——不像他在拉丁美洲经常遇到的孩子们。当他转身要走的时候,他会自动伸手到口袋里看看是否有东西可以和孩子们分享。他只找到了两块口香糖。两块口香糖和三十个孩子?他担心会发生争吵,但还是把每块口香糖撕成两半,给了四位“翻译”中的每人半块。不仅没有打架,包装纸也被传来传去,孩子们欣喜地闻着。

看到孩子们的表情,哈尔沃森就崩溃了。他承诺第二天会从飞机上扔下更多糖果。这让孩子们先是欣喜若狂,然后又开始怀疑,因为孩子们意识到他们认不出他的飞机了。他说他会先摆动翅膀,并用手臂演示他的意思。

然而,回到基地后,哈尔沃森很快意识到自己有点得意忘形了。他不可能在飞机以每小时 120 英里的速度飞过围栏时就从 2000 英尺的高空扔下糖果。此外,他的机组人员确信他们会惹上各种麻烦,不想参与其中。哈尔沃森用备用手帕做了几个迷你降落伞,解决了第一个问题;第二个问题则顽固地驳回了所有反对意见。他们第一次从照明弹降落伞中“扔下糖果”,孩子们欣喜若狂。

当然,他们不能就此罢休。不仅他的机组人员,其他飞行员和朋友也开始将他们的口粮和手帕放在哈尔沃森的床上。随着围栏旁的孩子越来越多,他们一次又一次地扔糖果。寄往滕珀尔霍夫的邮件堆也越来越多,收件人是“摇摆翅膀叔叔”、“糖果轰炸机”和“巧克力飞行员”等。

不可避免的事情发生了。一天,在一次特别大的糖果投放之后,一名参谋军官在哈尔沃森从柏林返回后等候着他。军官让他立即向他的中队指挥官报告。哈尔沃森知道他有麻烦了。原来是一名新闻记者拍下了前一天糖果投放的照片,飞机的尾号很容易读出。结果,他的上级知道他在做什么。似乎这还不够糟糕,他的中队指挥官让他向特纳将军报告。

特纳中将担任空运部队总指挥官,他以严于律己、缺乏幽默感而闻名。他的绰号是“鞭子威利”。令哈沃森惊讶的是,特纳非但没有生气,反而很高兴。特纳有政治头脑,能够看到并抓住哈沃森行动的宣传和心理价值。他意识到糖果空投是美国空军的绝佳宣传,将具有巨大的吸引力。哈沃森在法兰克福举行了新闻发布会,然后被送回美国进行公关之旅。他出现在热门电视节目“我们人民”中——几乎立刻就成了名人。

这位身穿军装的年轻人——战争结束后的几年里,这种人几乎销声匿迹——他是空运的代表,空运曾深深地吸引了美国人的想象力,他也是一个有着自己温馨故事的独特人物。他真诚而谦逊。在忧虑的时代,他象征着避免战争和实现和解的可能性。[安德烈·切尔尼。《糖果轰炸机》。GP Putnam's Sons,2008 年,第 385-386 页。]

很快,哈尔沃森的照片和故事便在各大媒体上广泛传播,而他接下来得知的是,他被邀请与约翰·斯沃西共进晚餐,而斯沃西是美国糖果协会的主席。斯沃西承诺从美国所有主要的糖果、巧克力和口香糖制造商那里收集糖果捐款,而他的妻子(亚利桑那州前国会女议员)则承诺每周送出一千个降落伞。斯沃西信守诺言,一整车厢的糖果、巧克力和枪支乘船横跨大西洋,在圣诞节前抵达莱茵-美因机场。

与此同时,在柏林,糖果空投活动正在扩大。不仅其他男子捐献了糖果,还将旧丝绸降落伞剪成迷你降落伞。但有一段时间,降落伞材料短缺,因此呼吁孩子们归还降落伞以供重复使用。孩子们照做了——直到美国开始大量捐赠,其中大部分来自妇女。哈尔沃森说,有些是黑色花边和香水,但哈尔沃森把它们全部扔了。

至于空投,这不再是哈尔沃森一个人的工作。地图上标明了各种空投区,任何从威斯巴登或莱茵-美因出发的机组人员都可以领取一盒挂在迷你降落伞上的糖果。每架参与的飞机都有一个空投区,空投被纳入空中交通管制模式。事实上,糖果空投已经成为一项正式行动。空运本身的官方名称是“食物行动”,糖果空投则变成了“小食物行动”。1949 年 1 月,当哈尔沃森离开柏林时,他正式将小食物行动的“指挥权”移交给了一位新的“指挥官”。

柏林空运是《通向明日之桥》的主题,这部小说是从《冷和平》开始的三部曲。

在此观看视频预告:用牛奶、煤炭和巧克力赢得战争

欲了解有关这些书籍的更多信息,请访问:

通向明日的桥梁

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