「美國戰爭方式」如何在伊朗失敗——川普並非異數
「美國戰爭方式」如何在伊朗失敗——川普並非異數
這句話出自一個著名的英文典故，完整說法是：「除了那點之外，林肯夫人，這齣戲演得怎麼樣？」（Aside from that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?） 背景是：美國總統亞伯拉罕·林肯在華盛頓的福特劇院看戲時遭人刺殺身亡，當時他的夫人瑪麗·托德·林肯就坐在旁邊。因此，若有人問林肯夫人「除了那件刺殺意外，您覺得這齣戲好不好看？」——這等於故意忽略一個極其重大、悲慘且核心的事件，而去討論一個無關緊要的小問題。 這句話後來被用作諷刺或反諷的修辭，意思是：「如果你忽略掉那個最明顯、最嚴重的災難性問題，那麼其他事情或許還說得過去——但事實上，那件大事已經毀了一切，根本無法忽略。」 在您提供的文章脈絡中，作者列出美國從韓戰、越戰、阿富汗到伊朗等一系列重大戰略失敗之後，寫出「除了那點，林肯夫人，這齣戲演得怎麼樣？」正是要反諷：如果我們暫時不看這些慘痛的失敗，美國的戰略勝利確實很少；但實際上，這些失敗如此巨大，根本不容忽視。換句話說，作者是在提醒讀者：別再自欺欺人地只看好的方面，美國的「戰爭方式」問題重重，失敗才是常態。 |
Wreckage of US aircraft in central Iran. Credit: Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, via Getty
以下為文章的正體中文翻譯：
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「美國戰爭方式」如何在伊朗失敗——川普並非異數
美國與伊朗伊斯蘭共和國的最新一場熱戰，似乎正步履蹣跚地走向尾聲。華府已在波斯灣恢復有限度的轟炸，儘管華府與德黑蘭之間的諒解備忘錄尚待川普總統及伊朗最高領袖莫伊塔巴．哈米尼批准。川普可能會竭力堅稱自己「贏」得了這場戰爭。但伊朗倖存的統治者終止其核武追求以及對區域內反以色列代理勢力的支持——這樣的前景，與該國與猶太國家實現關係正常化並加入亞伯拉罕協議一樣，看似渺茫。目前來看，最可能的結果是數年甚至數十年的低強度衝突——類似1991年波灣戰爭至2003年美國入侵伊拉克期間的情況。因此，這是一場結果不明的失敗。
然而，與其追問為何美國在伊朗的戰爭失敗，不如問一個更根本的問題：為何人們會預期美國在世界任何地方發動的重大戰爭能夠成功？這場戰爭遠非僅能歸咎於川普無能的個別案例，而是一系列美國軍事遠征行動中最新的一次——這些行動拖延數年，最終適得其反，反而壯大了美國的敵人。從韓戰到伊朗，二戰以來美國的軍事政策歷史是一連串的失策，戰術上的成就總是被戰略上的失敗所接續。
將這類慘敗歸咎於美國總統的錯誤決策或個人特質確屬常見，但1945年以來美國重大戰略失敗的歷史，無法單獨甚至主要根據從杜魯門到川普這些領導人的表現來解釋。美國戰略悲劇——一連串短期戰術成功後緊接著戰略失敗——的深層原因，正是專家們所稱的「美國戰爭方式」。這是一種失敗的模式，未來的美國領導人必須尋求改革。
與前任總統歐巴馬一樣，川普當選的部分原因，被視為是造就阿富汗與伊拉克「永久戰爭」的鷹派人物的替代選項。然而，正如歐巴馬在利比亞和敘利亞發動新的美國軍事行動，川普在其第二任期內也引發了對伊朗的戰爭。這場戰爭對全球經濟造成的立即後果，源於油價上漲，其影響甚至比韓戰、越戰和阿富汗戰爭在其各自時代對全球造成的後果更為深遠。
但這種模式與那些早期的冒險行動並無太大不同。韓戰令美國措手不及，始於1950年6月25日共產主義北韓入侵親西方的南韓，背後受到美國的一個失策影響：國務卿迪安．艾奇遜在1950年1月12日一場不明智的演說中，將南韓排除在美國於亞洲的防禦圈之外。史達林迅速利用此次入侵，敦促一年前剛在中國奪權的毛澤東共產政權參戰。結果是一場血腥的僵局，作為北韓和中國贊助者與供應者的史達林，為了消耗美國資源而讓戰爭持續。同時，史達林策劃了由蘇聯支持的越南共產黨人在印度支那對抗美國支持的法國的平行戰爭。直到史達林於1953年3月3日逝世後，他在莫斯科的繼任者才在1954年與美國及其盟友談判，劃分了南北韓和南北越。
以超過3萬6千名美國軍人與超過100萬韓國人生命的代價，華府僅能恢復兩韓在38度線的原先分裂狀態。朝鮮半島緊張的武裝休戰狀態持續至今。在越南，由蘇聯和毛澤東中國支持的北越共產黨政權及其南越叛亂盟友，為建立統一的越南而戰，並於1975年成功。在此之前，美國將衝突「越南化」的努力失敗，奪走了超過5萬8千名美國人的生命，以及大約2百萬到3百萬越南人的生命，還有更多柬埔寨與寮國人民。越戰的大國贏家是蘇聯，在冷戰剩餘時間裡，蘇聯將越南變成了其在東歐以外最大的軍事基地。
繼1991年有限的波灣戰爭之後，美國於2003年全面入侵伊拉克，同樣為華府帶來了「烏龍球」般的後果。此次入侵與阿富汗戰爭同在911事件後展開，導致伊拉克沿種族和教派界線瓦解為無政府狀態，基地組織、伊斯蘭國及其他伊斯蘭組織在此蓬勃發展。這場戰爭並未扶植一個親美、允許美國在伊拉克領土上建立永久基地的民主政權上臺，反而以什葉派伊朗的傀儡政權取代了海珊的世俗復興黨政權。今年1月，伊拉克宣布已完全撤離美軍。
部分因反對小布希災難性的伊拉克戰爭而當選的歐巴馬，隨後帶領美國陷入利比亞和敘利亞新的軍事泥淖。2011年，以美國為首的北約推翻了利比亞獨裁者格達費。結果是利比亞持續的分裂與無政府狀態。在敘利亞，從2014年開始，華府反常地同時對內戰中的雙方——一方面伊斯蘭激進分子，另一方面獨裁者巴夏爾．阿塞德政府——發動低強度戰爭。美國的戰略再次適得其反。2024年底，阿塞德及其家人逃往俄羅斯。今天的敘利亞總統是艾哈邁德．夏拉，一名曾是蓋達組織的軍閥，直到2025年，美國還將其列在「特別指定全球恐怖分子名單」上。
阿富汗戰爭——美國史上最長的戰爭——結局或許最具諷刺意味。華府最初於2001年出兵推翻塔利班政權，因為該政權窩藏了策劃911攻擊的蓋達組織。然而，在20年戰爭、造成超過2,400名美軍陣亡、估計花費2兆美元之後，美國於2021年狼狽撤軍，塔利班重新奪回政權。今天，塔利班已重建其壓迫性的神權政體，剝奪婦女、少數民族與異議人士的權利，並對「不正當關係」等罪名執行公開鞭刑和處決。
引人注目的是，美國重大戰爭的頻繁結局，不是讓美國的敵人掌權，就是讓他們得以繼續掌權。時至今日，超過8萬名美國士兵以及數百萬韓國人和印度支那人喪生之後，與北京和莫斯科結盟的北韓共產黨人統治北韓，而越南共產黨人則統治統一的越南。敘利亞和阿富汗由前反美聖戰分子治理。關於韓戰，可以辯稱維持了72年的停火是局部的成功，讓南韓得以發展繁榮。即便如此，北韓仍擁有核武威脅美國及其東亞盟友，已部署數千名部隊參與普丁對烏克蘭的戰爭，並持續牽制美國在亞洲的軍事力量。
烏克蘭戰爭或許很快會加入這些令美國蒙羞的戰略失敗之列。2022年俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭後，拜登總統宣稱：「看在上帝的份上，這個人（普丁）不能繼續掌權。」今天，普丁仍然掌權，而拜登已失去權力。由於西方對基輔的軍事與經濟支持而延宕的烏克蘭戰爭，很可能在某個時間點以俄羅斯控制克里米亞及大部分烏克蘭東部告終——這對山姆大叔而言，又是一次尷尬且代價高昂的戰略挫敗。
「除了那點，林肯夫人，這齣戲演得怎麼樣？」與美國在越南、阿富汗、敘利亞和利比亞外交政策的戰略挫敗相比，過去七十年來美國的戰略勝利少之又少。最重要的戰略勝利，是美國與後毛澤東時代的中國共享戰略，透過武裝叛亂分子，成功在1989年將蘇聯趕出阿富汗——這項政策無需投入任何美國軍隊。美國及其北約盟國，以極小的聯盟損失，並與俄羅斯合作，也協助在1995年前終結了南斯拉夫解體戰爭。除此之外，近幾十年來美國少數的戰略勝利，多涉及在其西半球勢力範圍內的小規模干預——巴拿馬、海地、委內瑞拉。
所有這些都可歸因於「美國戰爭方式」。這種方式受到以最少美國人傷亡實現最大軍事目標的目標所形塑，因為美國公眾厭惡重大損失，不僅厭惡徵兵，也厭惡職業軍人在戰鬥中的傷亡。為將美國損失降至最低，美國長期依賴科技，期望空中力量和常規大單位戰爭能擊垮敵對政權的意志。韓戰期間，美國在朝鮮半島投下的炸彈數量，超過了整個二戰期間美國在太平洋戰區投下的炸彈總量。在越南，山姆大叔沒有進行傳統的低強度平叛行動，而是依賴轟炸、直升機空中支援，並部署橙劑等落葉劑和除草劑來摧毀南越的森林與農作物。在阿富汗，美國使用昂貴的無人機來減少飛行員的損失。
在所有這些案例中，美國在高科技工業化戰爭中的優勢，都未能阻止戰略僵局（韓國）或徹底失敗（越南、阿富汗）。鑒於這些歷史先例，美國在對伊朗戰爭中初期的戰術成功——包括消滅伊朗多名高層領袖及削弱其大部分軍事能力——未能推翻壓迫性的伊斯蘭政權或結束衝突，也就不足為奇了。
這種不成功的「美國戰爭方式」不僅是技術上的，也是政治上的——這既包括美國國內政治，也包括地緣政治。在國內政治方面，當總統發起一場預期為短暫且成功的戰爭時，通常會出現「聚旗效應」（儘管在美以對伊朗的戰爭中並未出現）。然而，若出現美軍傷亡，隨著時間推移，不斷增加的遺體袋數量以及衝突似乎看不到盡頭的感受，會導致美國公眾轉而反對戰爭，大多數美國人最終寧願放棄行動，「撤離」以避免更多生命與財富的損失。
但即使在公眾轉而反對戰爭之後，國內政治因素仍可能導致戰爭延續數年——以阿富汗為例，延續了數十年——跨越了多屆總統任期。一方面，處於戰時的總統會注意到公眾對一場無望戰爭日益增長的反對聲浪。同時，他們又擔心自己或所屬政黨會被兩黨中的鷹派指責為軟弱和失敗主義，從而在選舉中受挫。因此，為避免指責，從詹森到布希，包括第一任期的川普，總統們都怯於從泥淖中抽身，並將災難留給白宮的繼任者，使其成為美國軍事失敗的代罪羔羊。美國的國內政治，使得發動戰爭在政治上容易，而終結戰爭則很困難。
在地緣政治層面，美國領導人缺乏堅定承諾，為美國的敵人提供了優勢。對敵人而言至關重要的利益——例如北韓政權的存續、共產黨人征服整個越南、塔利班的生存與勝利——對華府而言僅是次要利益。在敵對獨裁國家的案例中，生存威脅是個人化的。一場戰爭的失敗對獨裁者及其盟友和家人來說，可能意味著處決、監禁或流亡。誠然，美國的戰爭領導人會假裝美國像其敵人一樣，在對外戰爭中擁有至關重要的利益，經常援引納粹與二戰的記憶，或警告區域內的「骨牌效應」或美國城市上空升起的核蘑菇雲。但這已被證明是不真誠的：華府拒絕動員國家進行全面戰爭，迴避管制經濟和戰時徵兵等手段，這表明這些威脅終究並非關乎生存的根本威脅。
因此，根本問題在於「美國戰爭方式」本身，無論是就軍事手段還是戰略目標而言。自二戰以來，美國對高科技、空中力量密集型、大單位戰爭的依賴，與許多低強度衝突中成功的實際要求之間存在錯位；同時，美國輿論與美國兩黨政治菁英大部分好戰傾向之間也存在錯位。美國人民和美國政治人物都更喜歡像二戰那樣的戰爭——對美國來說僅持續四年，並以對敵國徹底勝利和政權更迭告終。同時，美國陸軍更傾向於在北非與隆美爾元帥作戰，附帶平民傷亡少；美國海軍則希望在遠離人口中心的區域進行海戰。
美國人想要的是一場有限的戰爭，能夠對被妖魔化或確實邪惡的敵人取得全面勝利。當這一點無法實現時，戰爭在美國平民和軍人中都變得不孚眾望。沒有人願意在國外的山區或叢林中進行殘酷、曠日持久、低強度的平叛戰役，那裡的敵軍和平民混雜在一起。美國人不太可能支持將美國軍隊轉變為永久性的、殖民地風格的憲兵部隊，專門在全球破碎國家協助代理人、作戰或協助叛亂活動。
有鑑於此，避免反覆戰略失敗的唯一方法，是為美國總統動輒訴諸戰爭的傾向設置更高的國內政治障礙。但自杜魯門時代起，國會已將發動戰爭的權力輸給了行政部門；自1942年國會對羅馬尼亞、保加利亞和匈牙利宣戰（此前在1941年珍珠港事件後已對日本、德國和義大利宣戰）以來，美國再也沒有過正式的宣戰。像歐巴馬和川普這樣的總統，在競選時相對鴿派，上任後卻發動了利比亞、敘利亞和伊朗等新的失敗戰爭，這證明美國總統將美國拖入戰爭仍然太容易，而總統要脫身仍然太困難。
要打破這種一再重演的美國大規模戰略與軍事失敗的可悲模式，華府必須調整其外交政策，使之與大多數美國人的價值觀一致，而不僅僅是讓白宮換上一個又一個由鴿轉鷹的領導人。
【原文作者】：麥可．林德（Michael Lind），UnHerd專欄作家。
Afghanistan warBarack ObamaDonald TrumpIran WarIraq WarJoe Bidenkorean warmojtaba khameneiPersian GulfVietnam War
Michael Lind
May 29 2026 - 12:00am 9 mins
America’s latest hot war with the Islamic Republic appears to be limping to its conclusion. Washington has resumed limited bombing in the Persian Gulf, even as a memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran awaits the approval of President Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Trump might go blue in the face insisting he “won” the war. But the prospect that the surviving rulers in Iran will end their quest for nuclear weapons and their support for anti-Israel proxies across the region seems as unlikely as the country normalizing relations with the Jewish state and joining the Abraham Accords. At present, the most likely outcome is years or decades of low-intensity conflict — similar to what happened in Iraq between the Gulf War in 1991 and the US invasion of 2003.
An inconclusive failure, then.
Yet instead of asking why America’s war in Iran has been a failure, the better question is: why would anyone expect any major American war, anywhere in the world, to be a success? Far from being an isolated instance that can be blamed on Trump’s incompetence, this war is only the latest in a series of American expeditions that drag on for years, only to backfire and empower US enemies. From Korea to Iran, the story of American military policy since World War II has been one blunder after another, in which tactical achievements are followed by strategic defeat.
It is popular to blame the American president’s bad decisions or personal traits for such fiascos, but the history of major American strategic failures since 1945 can’t be explained solely or even primarily based on the performance of leaders from Truman to Trump. The underlying cause of America’s strategic tragedy — its chain of short-term tactical successes followed by strategic failures — is what experts describe as the American Way of War — a failing style that future American leaders must seek to reform.
Like President Barack Obama before him, Trump was elected in part because he was viewed as an alternative to the hawks who brought about the “forever wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq. And just as Obama proceeded to launch new American military campaigns in Libya and Syria, so Trump in his second term has brought about the war in Iran, with immediate consequences for the global economy, caused by rising prices for oil, that are far more consequential than were the global consequences of the Korean, Vietnam, and Afghan wars in the eras in which they were fought.
But the pattern isn’t all that different from those earlier adventures. The Korean War, which caught the United States by surprise, began with Communist North Korea’s invasion of the Western-aligned South on June 25, 1950, influenced by an American blunder: Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s exclusion of South Korea from America’s defense perimeter in Asia, in an unwise speech on Jan. 12, 1950.
Stalin was quick to take advantage of the invasion, urging Mao’s Communist regime, which had seized power in China a year earlier, to enter the war. The result was a bloody stalemate that Stalin, the sponsor and supplier of North Korea and China, kept going in order to drain American resources. At the same time, Stalin orchestrated the parallel war of Soviet-backed Vietnamese Communists against American-backed France in Indochina. Only after Stalin died, on March 3, 1953, did his successors in Moscow negotiate the partition of Korea and Vietnam with the United States and its allies in 1954. At the cost of more than 36,000 American fatalities and more than a million Korean lives, Washington was only able to restore the former division between the two Koreas at the 38th parallel.
The tense, armed truce in Korea has persisted to this day. In Vietnam, the North Vietnamese Communist regime and its South Vietnamese insurgent allies, backed by the Soviet Union and Mao’s China, fought to establish a united Vietnam and succeeded in 1975, after a failed Americanization of the conflict that took the lives of more than 58,000 Americans dead, as well as those of some 2 million to 3 million Vietnamese, plus more in Cambodia and Laos. The great-power victor of the Vietnam War was the Soviet Union, which for the remainder of the Cold War turned Vietnam into its largest military base outside of Eastern Europe.
The all-out invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the United States, following the earlier, limited Gulf War of 1991, similarly resulted in an “own goal” for Washington. Undertaken along with the war in Afghanistan, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US invasion caused Iraq to disintegrate along ethnic and sectarian lines into anarchy, in which al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other Islamist organizations flourished. Instead of bringing to power a pro-American democracy that would permit permanent bases on Iraqi soil, the war replaced Saddam’s secular Baathist regime with a satrapy of Shiite Iran. Last January, Iraq declared that the withdrawal of US forces from its territory was complete.
Obama, elected in part on the basis of his opposition to George W. Bush’s disastrous Iraq War, then led America into new military quagmires in Libya and Syria. In 2011, NATO, led by the United States, deposed Libya’s dictator Muammar Qaddafi. The result has been continuing fragmentation and anarchy in Libya. In Syria, beginning in 2014, Washington perversely waged a low-level war simultaneously against both sides in a civil war — Islamist militants, on the one hand, and the government of dictator Bashar al-Assad, on the other. Once again, the American strategy backfired. At the end of 2024, Assad and his family fled to Russia. Syria’s president today is Ahmed al-Sharaa, an al-Qaeda warlord whom the US until 2025 had named on its Specially Designated Global Terrorist List.
This brings us to the war in Afghanistan (2001-2021), the longest war in American history. The purpose of the war was to topple the Taliban, the Islamist faction that had provided a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his allies before the 9/11 attacks. The result? Following years of warfare under the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, the Biden administration beat a chaotic retreat in August 2021. The victor is the Taliban, which came to power and has imposed a repressive Islamist regime, stripping women, ethnic minorities, and dissidents of rights and carrying out public floggings and executions for crimes including “illicit relationships.”
“It’s unlikely that Americans will ever support the transformation of the US military into a permanent colonial-style constabulary.”
What is striking is the frequency with which major American wars have ended by bringing US enemies to power or allowing them to remain in power. Today, following the deaths of more than 80,000 American soldiers, and millions of Koreans and Indochinese, North Korean Communists aligned with Beijing and Moscow rule North Korea, while Vietnamese Communists rule united Vietnam. Syria and Afghanistan are governed by former anti-American jihadists.
In the case of Korea, it can be argued that the 72-year truce was a partial success that has allowed South Korea to develop and flourish. Even so, North Korea has nuclear weapons with which it threatens America and its East Asian allies, has deployed thousands of troops to fight in Putin’s war in Ukraine, and continues to tie down American military forces in Asia.
To these humiliating American strategic failures, the Ukraine war might soon be added. In 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Joe Biden declared, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.” Today, Putin is still in power and Biden is out of power. The Ukraine War, which has been prolonged as a result of Western military and economic support for Kiev, is likely to end at some point in Russian control of both Crimea and much of eastern Ukraine — yet another embarrassing and costly strategic defeat for the Uncle Sam.
“But other than that, how was the play, Mrs. Lincoln?” Compared to the strategic defeats of US foreign policy in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya, US strategic victories in the last seven decades have been few and far between. The most significant strategic victory came with the success of the US strategy, shared with post-Maoist China, in arming insurgents to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan in 1989 — a policy that did not require the commitment of any American troops. The United States and its NATO allies, with minimal coalition losses, and together with Russia, also helped to bring an end to the wars of the Yugoslav Secession by 1995. Otherwise, the few US strategic victories in recent decades have involved small-scale interventions, both peaceful and violent, in America’s western hemisphere sphere of influence — Panama (1989), Haiti (1994), Venezuela (2026).
All of this can be attributed to the American Way of War, which is shaped by the goal of achieving maximum military objectives with minimum American fatalities, due to the US public’s aversion to significant losses, not only of draftees but also of professional American soldiers in combat. To minimize American losses, the United States has long relied on technology, hoping that air power and conventional big-unit warfare will break the will of enemy regimes.
During the Korean War, the United States dropped more bombs on the Korean peninsula than were dropped in America’s entire Pacific campaign during World War II. In Vietnam, instead of engaging in a classic, low-level counterinsurgency campaign, Uncle Sam relied on bombing and air-support by helicopters against insurgents and North Vietnamese infiltrators in South Vietnam, and deployed defoliants and herbicides like Agent Orange to destroy South Vietnamese forests and crops. In Afghanistan, the United States sought to minimize the loss of pilots by using expensive drones. In all of these cases, America’s advantages in high-tech industrialized warfare failed to prevent strategic stalemate (Korea) or total defeat (Vietnam, Afghanistan). Given these historic precedents, it comes as no surprise that America’s initial tactical successes in the war against Iran, including the massacre of Iran’s top leaders and the degrading of much of its military capacity, have failed to dislodge the repressive Islamist regime or end the conflict.
The unsuccessful American Way of War is not merely technological, but also political — a category that includes both domestic US politics and geopolitics.
In domestic politics, when a president launches what is hoped to be a brief, successful war, there is often a “rally-around-the-flag” effect (though this has been missing in the case of the US-Israel war against Iran). If there are American casualties, however, over time the rising number of body bags and the perception that no end to the conflict is in sight lead the American public to turn against the war, to the point that most Americans come to prefer abandoning the effort and “bugging out” to further losses in blood and treasure.
But even after the public has turned against a war, domestic political factors can result in its prolongation for years — or, in the case of Afghanistan, for decades — through multiple presidencies. On the one hand, wartime presidents are mindful of rising public opposition to a doomed war. At the same time, they fear that they or their party will be accused of weakness and defeatism by hawks in both parties and will suffer electoral setbacks. So in order to avoid blame, presidents from Johnson to Bush, including Trump in his first term, have flinched from withdrawing from a quagmire and passed the disaster to a successor in the White House who can serve as the scapegoat for American military defeat.
American domestic politics, then, makes it politically easy to start wars and hard to end them.
At the geopolitical level, American leaders’ lack of commitment provides an advantage for US enemies. What is a vital interest for the enemy — the survival of the North Korean regime, the conquest of all of Vietnam by Communists, the survival and if possible the triumph of the Taliban — is only a lesser interest for Washington. In the case of enemy dictatorships, the existential threat is personal. A lost war may mean execution, imprisonment, or exile for dictators and their allies and families.
To be sure, America’s war leaders pretend that the United States, like its enemies, has vital interests in the foreign war, often invoking memories of the Nazis and World War II or warning of “domino effects” throughout a region or nuclear mushroom clouds rising above American cities. But this has proved insincere: Washington has refused to mobilize the country for all-out war, eschewing means such as regimentation of the economy and a wartime draft, suggesting that the threats haven’t been existential, after all.
The underlying problem, then, is the American Way of War itself, with respect to both military means and strategic ends. Since World War II, there has been a mismatch between America’s reliance on high-tech, air-power-intensive, big-unit warfare and the actual requirements for success in many low-intensity conflicts, as well as a mismatch between American public opinion and the trigger-happiness of much of America’s bipartisan political elite.
The American people and American politicians alike prefer a war like World War II, which for the United States lasted only four years and ended with total victory and regime change in the enemy countries. At the same time, the US Army would prefer to fight Field Marshall Rommel in North Africa, with few collateral civilian casualties, and the US Navy would prefer naval battles far from centers of population. What Americans want is a limited war in which a complete victory against demonized or genuinely demonic enemies is possible. When that cannot be achieved, war is unpopular with American civilians and soldiers alike. There is no appetite for brutal, protracted, low-level counterinsurgency campaigns in foreign mountains or jungles, where enemy soldiers and civilians are intermingled.
It’s unlikely that Americans will ever support the transformation of the US military into a permanent colonial-style constabulary specialized in assisting proxies and fighting or assisting insurgencies in broken countries around the world. In light of this, the only way to avoid repeated strategic failures is for there to be much higher domestic political obstacles to American presidents’ tendency to resort to war.
But Congress lost control of the process for launching war to the executive branch in the Truman years; there has not been a formal declaration of war by the United States since 1942, when Congress declared war against Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, having earlier declared war against Japan, Germany, and Italy following the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. The launching of new and failed wars like those in Libya, Syria, and Iran by presidents like Obama and Trump after they campaigned as relative doves proves that it is still too easy for American presidents to drag America into war and still too hard for presidents to get out.
Breaking this sad pattern of repeated, large-scale American strategic and military failure will require Washington to align its foreign policy with the values of most Americans, not simply replacing one dove-turned-hawk with another in the White House.
Michael Lind is a columnist at UnHerd.
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