冷戰後的競爭性威權主義混合政體

Competitive Authoritarianism Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War

競爭性威權主義：冷戰後的混合政體

Competitive authoritarianism – regimes that combine competitive elections with serious violation of democratic procedure – proliferated in the post–Cold War era. This book explains the rise and diverging fate of competitive authoritarian regimes since 1990. Based on a comparative study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, the Americas, and post-communist Eurasia, the book finds that extensive ties to the West led to democratization. By raising the external cost of abuse, linkage to the West brought democracy even where domestic conditions were unfavorable. Where such ties were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker. Regime outcomes in these cases hinged on the character of state and ruling-party organizations. Where incumbents possessed robust coercive and party structures, competitive authoritarian regimes were durable; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.

 

steven levitsky is Professor of Government at Harvard University. His research interests include political parties, political regimes, and informal institutions, with a focus on Latin America. Professor Levitsky is author of Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective (2003); is coeditor of Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness (2005) and Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (2006); and is currently coedit-ing a volume on the rise of the Left in Latin America in the 2000s. He has published articles in the Annual Review of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Comparative Politics, Journal of Democracy, Journal of Latin American Studies, Latin American Politics and Society, Latin American Research Review, Party Politics, Perspectives on Politics, Studies in Comparative International Development, and World Politics. He is on the editorial board of the Journal of Democracy.

 

lucan a. way is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto.

 

His research interests include political regimes and weak states, with a focus on post-communist Eurasia. Professor Way is currently completing a book, Pluralism by Default: Sources of Political Competition in the Former Soviet Union, and has published articles in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Comparative Politics, East European Politics and Societies, Journal of Democracy, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Politics & Society, Post-Soviet Affairs, Studies in Comparative and International Development, and World Politics, as well as numerous book chapters. He is on the editorial board of the Journal of Democracy.

 

More praise for Competitive Authoritarianism “This landmark contribution to the comparative study of political regimes will be widely read and cited. In an epic act of theoretical synthesis, Levitsky and Way weave careful empirical research on three-dozen countries across five world regions into a convincing account of patterns of regime change. In distinguishing democratic transitions from a range of authoritarian outcomes, they reach nuanced conclusions about the relative explanatory influence of international factors (linkage and leverage) and domestic power politics (rulers versus oppositions). Above all, they help us understand how autocrats learn to live with elections. Strongly recommended.” – Michael Bratton, University Distinguished Professor of Political Science and African Studies, Michigan State University “This is the most anticipated book in comparative politics in more than a decade.

 

Written in a single authorial voice, Levitsky and Way’s arguments about the distinct trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes are theoretically grounded, conceptually nuanced, geographically wide ranging, and empirically well supported. I expect this book to have a major impact on the field for many years to come.” – Marc Morjé Howard, Georgetown University “Regimes that blend meaningful elections and illicit incumbent advantage are not merely resting points on the road to democracy; Levitsky and Way guide us along the multiple paths these regimes can take and provide powerful reasoning to explain why nations follow these distinct paths. This deeply insightful analysis of an important subset of post–Cold War regimes is conceptually innovative and precise, empirically ambitious, and theoretical agile, moving fluidly between international and domestic causes of regime dynamics. Read it to understand the dynamics of contemporary hybrid regimes; then read it again to appreciate its many lessons for our general understanding of regime change.” – David Waldner, University of Virginia Problems of International Politics Editors: Keith Darden, Yale University Ian Shapiro, Yale University The series seeks books central to the understanding of international politics that are empirically rich and conceptually innovative. The editors are interested in works that illuminate the evolving character of nation-states within the international system. The series sets out three broad areas for investigation: identity, security, and conflict; democracy; and justice and distribution.

 

 Competitive Authoritarianism Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War steven levitsky Harvard University lucan a. way University of Toronto CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521882521 © Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way 2010 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

 

First published in print format 2010 ISBN-13 978-0-511-90226-0 eBook (NetLibrary) ISBN-13 978-0-521-88252-1 Hardback ISBN-13 978-0-521-70915-6 Paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

 

For Zareen For Liz and Alejandra Contents Acknowledgments page xi Acronyms and Abbreviations xv Part I: Introduction and Theory 1 1 Introduction 3 2 Explaining Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories: International Linkage and the Organizational Power of Incumbents 37 Part II: High Linkage and Democratization: Eastern Europe and the Americas 85 3 Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization in Eastern Europe 87 4 Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization in the Americas 130 Part III: The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Low-Linkage Regions: The Former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia 181 5 The Evolution of Post-Soviet Competitive Authoritarianism 183 6 Africa: Transitions without Democratization 236 7 Diverging Outcomes in Asia 309 8 Conclusion 339 Appendix I: Measuring Competitive Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Stability 365 Appendix II: Measuring Leverage 372 Appendix III: Measuring Linkage 374 Appendix IV: Measuring Organizational Power 376 References 381 Index 493 ix Acknowledgments This book grew out of a conversation over lunch in the old Coolidge Hall cafeteria at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (WCFIA).

 

What began as a discussion of political scandals involving leaked tapes and autocrats in Peru and Ukraine led to a realization that the two countries’ regimes were surprisingly similar – and that we had no term for these regimes. We wrote a conference paper on the two cases, never imagining that the project would grow to encompass 35 countries across five continents (or that both of our initial cases would turn out to be outliers!). Nor did we have quite the right label – until Tim Colton inadvertently invented the term “competitive authoritarianism” when he misremembered our inferior moniker in a conversation in the hallway.

 

This book took a long time to write, and during that time, we accumulated many debts. Our initial ideas about competitive authoritarianism were shaped by conversations with Keith Darden and Richard Snyder, two fellow members of the Berkeley mafia, and with Jason Brownlee and Dan Slater, two thengraduate students who were already at the forefront of a new wave of research on authoritarianism.

 

Two figures exerted an enormous intellectual influence on this project.

 

Andrew Janos, who taught us comparative politics at Berkeley, first helped us understand the centrality of the international environment in the evolution of political regimes. Samuel Huntington, who was Director of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies when this project began, was a major influence for both of us. His ideas about political organization and regime stability pervade this book.

 

We owe an important debt of gratitude to several institutions. First, the WCFIA provided an intellectual home – and generous funding – to both of us.

 

The WCFIA and the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, where Lucan was a Scholar, provided us with a critical opportunity to work together under the same roof during the project’s early stages. Steve thanks the WCFIA and its extraordinary staff for providing a friendly and supportive environment in which to work, as well as a wide variety of forums for scholarly feedback xi xii Acknowledgments and exchange, beginning with the hallways and extending to a range of seminars, conferences, and an invaluable authors’ conference. Lucan is grateful to the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame for stimulating discussions about political regimes during his time there, as well as to the Connaught Fund, Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and Temple University, whose support made possible research trips to Belarus, Moldova, Tanzania, and Ukraine. Lucan is also grateful for the camaraderie and intellectual exchange provided by faculty and students at the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES) at the University of Toronto.

 

A large number of graduate and undergraduate students have contributed their research assistance and/or editing skills to this project. We are particularly thankful to Mark Adomanis, Francisco Flores, Catherine Kelly, Maria Koinova, Alicia Llosa, Gabriel Loperena, Elena Maltseva, Jonathan Luke Melchiorre, Mason Pesek, Peter Schwartzstein, Jonathan Taylor, and Lisa Turkewitsch for their able research assistance. We thank James Loxton, John Sheffield, and George Soroka for their extraordinarily careful editing and fact-checking.

 

We also owe a special debt of gratitude to the editors of the Journal of Democracy, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, who encouraged this project from the beginning, backed it throughout, and provided an important forum for our ideas.

 

Larry’s encouragement convinced us to write this book, his feedback improved it, and his prodding helped to ensure that we actually finished it. Larry, our debt to you is enormous.

 

While researching and writing this book, we received valuable (and sometimes painful) feedback from numerous colleagues. We owe a particular debt of gratitude to Timothy Colton, Jorge Dom´ınguez, Gerald Easter, Marc Howard, Dan Slater, Hillel Soifer, Nicolas van de Walle, and David Waldner, who read large portions of the manuscript and provided critical advice. We also thank Mark Beissinger, Eva Bellin, Valerie Bunce, Michael Coppedge, Richard Deeg, M.

 

Steven Fish, Robert Fishman, Francisco Flores, Gustavo Flores, Barbara Geddes, Kenneth Greene, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Axel Hadenius, Frances Hagopian, Henry Hale, Antoinette Handley, Stephen Hanson, Jeffrey Herbst, Susan Hyde, Pauline Jones-Luong, Charles Kenney, Jeffrey Kopstein, Beatriz Magaloni, Scott Mainwaring, Michael McFaul, Mar´ıa Victoria Murillo, Thomas Pepinsky, Kenneth Roberts, James Robinson, Ed Schatz, Andreas Schedler, Joe Schwartz, Oxana Shevel, Susan Solomon, Alfred Stepan, Susan Stokes, Ronald Suny, Jay Ulfelder, J. Samuel Valenzuela, Brenda Way, Laurence Whitehead, Sean Yom, and Daniel Ziblatt. Their comments and suggestions contributed much to this book.

 

Robert Austin, John Gledhill, and Milada Vachudova provided much-needed help on Chapter 3. Serhiy Kudelia, Taras Kuzio, Ora John Reuter, Richard Sakwa, Vitali Silitski, Christoph Stefes, Cory Welt, and Jonathan Wheatley offered useful comments and assistance on Chapter 5. Kate Baldwin, Joel Barkan, Robert Bates, Michael Bratton, John Harbeson, Goran Hyden, Nahomi Ichino, Nelson Kasfir, Catherine Kelly, Michael Lambek, Staffan Lindberg, Carrie Manning, Susanne Mueller, Jacqueline Solway, and Richard Whitehead generously offered their time and feedback on Chapter 6.

 

Acknowledgments xiii We are also grateful to Lew Bateman, Eric Crahan, and Jason Przybylski at Cambridge University Press and to Keith Darden and Ian Shapiro, the editors of the Problems of International Politics series. Their patience, support, and suggestions (as well as their willingness to take on such a large manuscript!) are much appreciated.

 

Portions of the book draw on materials previously published as “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 13 (2): 51–64 (April 2002); “Linkage versus Leverage: Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change,” Comparative Politics, 38 (4): 379–400 ( July 2006); “The dynamics of autocratic coercion after the Cold War,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39 (3): 387–410 (September 2006); and “Why Democracy Needs a Level Playing Field,” Journal of Democracy, 21 (1) 57–68 (January 2010).

 

Finally, we owe enormous gratitude to our families. Steve thanks Liz Mineo and Alejandra Sol Mineo-Levitsky, who do not care very much about competitive authoritarianism (and make life much better as a result). Lucan thanks Zareen Ahmad for her seemingly limitless capacity to share in both the joys and the frustrations that this project has brought. We dedicate this book to them.

 

Acronyms and Abbreviations ABIM Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement ADEMA Alliance for Democracy (Mali) ADP Agrarian Democratic Party (Moldova) AFORD Alliance for Democracy (Malawi) ANM Armenian National Movement APEC Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation APSA American Political Science Association AREMA Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (Madagascar) ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BA Alternative Front (Malaysia) BDP Botswana Democratic Party BN Barisan Nasional (Malaysia) BNF Botswana National Front CAFTA Central America Free Trade Agreement CARICOM Caribbean Community CCM Party of the Revolution (Tanzania) CDN Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator CDR Democratic Convention (Romania) CEP Provisional Electoral Council (Haiti) CIO Central Intelligence Organization (Zimbabwe) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States COSEP Superior Council of Private Enterprise (Nicaragua) CPDM Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement CPP Cambodian People’s Party CRN National Reconciliation Committee (Madagascar) CSCE Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe CUG Citizen’s Union of Georgia DAP Democratic Action Party (Malaysia) DN National Directorate (Nicaragua) xv xvi Acronyms and Abbreviations DOS Democratic Opposition of Serbia DPA Democratic Party of Albanians (Macedonia) DPP Democratic Progressive Party (Malawi, Taiwan) DSS Democratic Party of Serbia DUI Democratic Union for Integration (Macedonia) EC European Community; Electoral Commission EPP European People’s Party EPS Sandinista Popular Army (Nicaragua) EU European Union EZLN Zapatista National Liberation Army (Mexico) FAPSI Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (Russia) FDPM For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova FDSN Democratic National Salvation Front (Romania) FJKM Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar FL Lavalas Family (Haiti) FORD Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Kenya) Frelimo Front for the Liberation of Mozambique FSB Federal Security Service (Russia) FSK Federal Counter-Intelligence Service (Russia) FSLN Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua) FSN National Salvation Front (Romania) FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia GDF Guyana Defense Forces GDP gross domestic product GPRTU Ghana Private Rural Transport Union HDZ Croatian Democratic Union HNP Haitian National Police HSP Croatian Party of Rights HZDS Movement for Democratic Slovakia ICFY International Commission on Former Yugoslavia ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IFE Federal Electoral Institute (Mexico) IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems IMF International Monetary Fund INGO international nongovernmental organization IO international organization IPPG Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (Kenya) IRI International Republican Institute ISA Internal Security Act (Malaysia) JCE Central Elections Board (Dominican Republic) JOC Joint Operation Command (Zimbabwe) KANU Kenya African National Union KGB Committee for State Security (Belarus, USSR) KMT Kuomintang (Taiwan) Acronyms and Abbreviations xvii KNP Khmer National Party (Cambodia) KPRF Communist Party of the Russian Federation LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Kenya) MB Ministry of Security (Russia) MCA Malaysian Chinese Association MCP Malawi Congress Party MDC Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe) MFN Most Favored Nation MIC Malaysian Indian Congress MMD Movement for Multiparty Democracy (Zambia) MP Member of Parliament MYP Malawi Young Pioneers NAC National Affairs Conference (Taiwan) NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NARC National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (Kenya) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCA National Constitutional Assembly (Zimbabwe) NCEC National Convention Executive Council (Kenya) NDA National Democratic Alliance (Malawi) NDC National Democratic Congress (Ghana) NDI National Democratic Institute for International Affairs NDP National Development Party (Kenya) NDU National Democratic Union (Armenia) NED National Endowment for Democracy NGO nongovernmental organization NPP New Patriotic Party (Ghana) NRIIA National Republican Institute for International Affairs NUF National United Front (Cambodia) OAS Organization of American States ODM Orange Democratic Movement (Kenya) OPL Lavalas Political Organization (Haiti) OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OVR Fatherland-All Russia PA Provincial Administration (Kenya) PAN National Action Party (Mexico) PAS Islamic Party of Malaysia PCRM Communist Party of Moldova PD Democratic Party (Albania) PDG Gabonese Democratic Party PDS Senegalese Democratic Party PDSR Party of Democratic Socialists (Romania) PHARE Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies PLC Constitutional Liberal Party (Nicaragua) PLD Dominican Liberation Party PNC People’s National Congress (Guyana) xviii Acronyms and Abbreviations PNDC Provisional National Defense Council (Ghana) PNU Party of National Unity (Kenya) PPP Progressive People’s Party (Guyana) PRD Dominican Revolutionary Party; Party of the Democratic Revolution (Mexico) PRES Party of Russian Unity and Concord PRI Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico) PRM Greater Romania Party PRPB Popular Party of the Revolution (Benin) PRSC Social Christian Reformist Party (the Dominican Republic) PS Socialist Party (Albania, Senegal) PSD Social Democratic Party (Romania) RB Benin Renaissance Renamo Mozambican National Resistance SAP Stabilization and Association Process SBU Committee on Security in Ukraine SDF Social Democratic Front (Cameroon) SDP Social Democratic Party (Croatia) SDSM Social Democratic Union of Macedonia SIN National Intelligence Service (Peru) SPS Socialist Party of Serbia SRI Romanian Intelligence Service SRP Sam Rainsy Party (Cambodia) SRS Serbian Radical Party SVR Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia) TACIS Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States TANU Tanganyika African National Union (Tanzania) TC Constitutional Tribunal (Peru) TTS Youth Aware of Responsibilities (Madagascar) UDF United Democratic Front (Malawi) UMNO United Malays National Organization UNDP National Union for Development and Progress (Cameroon) UNIP United National Independence Party (Zambia) UNO National Opposition Union (Nicaragua) UNTAC United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia UPC Cameroon People’s Union USIA United States Information Agency VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions; Zambian Central Trade Union ZNA Zimbabwe National Army ZUM Zimbabwe Unity Movement I Introduction and Theory 1 Introduction The end of the Cold War posed a fundamental challenge to authoritarian regimes. Single-party and military dictatorships collapsed throughout Africa, post-communist Eurasia, and much of Asia and Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time, the formal architecture of democracy – particularly multiparty elections – diffused across the globe.

 

Transitions did not always lead to democracy, however. In much of Africa and the former Soviet Union, and in parts of Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Americas, new regimes combined electoral competition with varying degrees of authoritarianism. Unlike single-party or military dictatorships, post–Cold War regimes in Cambodia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Russia, Serbia, Taiwan, Ukraine, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere were competitive in that opposition forces used democratic institutions to contest vigorously – and, on occasion, successfully – for power. Nevertheless, they were not democratic. Electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence skewed the playing field in favor of incumbents. In other words, competition was real but unfair.1 We characterize such regimes as competitive authoritarian. Competitive authoritarian regimes proliferated after the Cold War. By our count, 33 regimes were competitive authoritarian in 1995 – a figure that exceeded the number of full democracies in the developing and post-communist world.2 The study of post–Cold War hybrid regimes was initially marked by a pronounced democratizing bias.3 Viewed through the lens of democratization, hybrid regimes were frequently categorized as flawed, incomplete, or “transitional” democracies.4 For example, Russia was treated as a case of “protracted” 1 On post–Cold War hybrid regimes, see 2 See, for example, the scoring of Diamond Carothers (2002), Ottaway (2003), Schedler (2002: 30–1) and Schedler (2002b: 47).

 

(2006a), and the cluster of articles in the April 3 For a critique, see Carothers (2002).

 

2002 Journal of Democracy.

 

4 See Collier and Levitsky (1997).

 

3 4 Competitive Authoritarianism democratic transition during the 1990s,5 and its subsequent autocratic turn was characterized as a “failure to consolidate” democracy.6 Likewise, Cambodia was described as a “nascent democracy” that was “on the road to democratic consolidation”7; Cameroon, Georgia, and Kazakhstan were labeled “democratizers”8; and the Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville were called “would-be democracies.”9 Transitions that did not lead to democracy were characterized as “stalled” or “flawed.” Thus, Zambia was said to be “stuck in transition”10; Albania was labeled a case of “permanent transition”11; and Haiti was said to be undergoing a “long,”12 “ongoing,”13 and even “unending”14 transition.

 

Such characterizations are misleading. The assumption that hybrid regimes are (or should be) moving in a democratic direction lacks empirical foundation.

 

Hybrid regimes followed diverse trajectories during the post–Cold War period.

 

Although some of them democratized (e.g., Ghana, Mexico, and Slovakia), most did not. Many regimes either remained stable (e.g., Malaysia and Tanzania) or became increasingly authoritarian (e.g., Belarus and Russia). In other cases, autocratic governments fell but were succeeded by new authoritarians (e.g., Georgia, Madagascar, and Zambia). Indeed, some regimes experienced two or more transitions without democratizing.15 As of 2010, more than a dozen competitive authoritarian regimes had persisted for 15 years or more.16 Rather than “partial,” “incomplete,” or “unconsolidated” democracies, these cases should be conceptualized for what they are: a distinct, nondemocratic regime type. Instead of assuming that such regimes are in transition to democracy, it is more useful to ask why some democratized and others did not. This is the goal of our study.

 

This book examines the trajectories of all 35 regimes that were or became competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995.17 The study spans five regions, including six countries in the Americas (the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, and Nicaragua); six in Eastern Europe (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia); three in Asia (Cambodia, Malaysia, and Taiwan); six in the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine); and 14 in Africa (Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).

 

5 This view of Russia was widely shared in 13 Erikson (2004: 294).

 

the 1990s. This quote comes from McFaul 14 Fatton (2004).

 

(1999); see also Colton and Hough (1998); 15 Examples include Georgia, Haiti, MadagasAron (2000); Nichols (2001).

 

car, and Moldova.

 

6 Smyth (2004).

 

16 These include Armenia, Botswana, Cambo7 Brown and Timberman (1998: 14) and dia, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Albritton (2004).

 

Malaysia, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, 8 Siegle (2004: 21).

 

Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

 

9 Chege (2005: 287).

 

17 Thus, cases of competitive authoritarian10 Rakner and Svasand (2005).

 

ism that emerged after 1995, such as Nige11 Kramer (2005).

 

ria and Venezuela, are not included in the 12 Gibbons (1999: 2).

 

study.

 

Introduction 5 The book asks why some competitive authoritarian regimes democratized during the post–Cold War period, while others remained stable and authoritarian and still others experienced turnover without democratization. Our central argument, which is elaborated in Chapter 2, focuses on two main factors: ties to the West and the strength of governing-party and state organizations. Where linkage to the West was high, competitive authoritarian regimes democratized.

 

Where linkage was low, regime outcomes hinged on incumbents’ organizational power. Where state and governing party structures were well organized and cohesive, regimes remained stable and authoritarian; where they were underdeveloped or lacked cohesion, regimes were unstable, although they rarely democratized.

 

This introductory chapter is organized as follows. The first section defines competitive authoritarianism and presents the case for a new regime type. The second section examines the rise of competitive authoritarianism. It attributes the proliferation of competitive authoritarian regimes to the incentives and constraints created by the post–Cold War international environment. The third section shows how competitive authoritarian regime trajectories diverged after 1990 and provides an overview of the book’s central argument and main theoretical contributions.

 

what is competitive authoritarianism? “Politics . . . is not like football, deserving a level playing field. Here, you try that and you will be roasted.” – Daniel arap Moi, President of Kenya18 Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents.

 

Competition is thus real but unfair.

 

Situating the Concept Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime type, with important characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism.19 We employ a “midrange” definition of democracy: one that is procedural but demanding.20 Following Dahl, scholars have converged around a “procedural minimum” definition of democracy that includes four key attributes: (1) free, fair, and competitive elections; 18 Quoted in Munene (2001: 24).

 

and Way (2002), Schedler (2002a, 2002b, 19 For discussions of hybrid regimes, see 2006a, 2006b); Ottaway (2003), and Howard Karl (1995), Collier and Levitsky (1997), and Roessler (2006).

 

Carothers (2002), Diamond (2002); Levitsky 20 See Diamond (1999: 13–15).

 

6 Competitive Authoritarianism (2) full adult suffrage; (3) broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association; and (4) the absence of nonelected “tutelary” authorities (e.g., militaries, monarchies, or religious bodies) that limit elected officials’ power to govern.21 These definitions are essentially “Schumpeterian” in that they center on competitive elections.22 However, scholars have subsequently “precised” the concept of democracy by making explicit criteria – such as civil liberties and effective power to govern – that are implicitly understood to be part of the overall meaning and which are viewed as necessary for competitive elections to take place.23 Although we remain committed to a procedural-minimum conception of democracy, we precise it by adding a fifth attribute: the existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition.24 Obviously, a degree of incumbent advantage – in the form of patronage jobs, pork-barrel spending, clientelist social policies, and privileged access to media and finance – exists in all democracies. In democracies, however, these advantages do not seriously undermine the opposition’s capacity to compete.25 When incumbent manipulation of state institutions and resources is so excessive and one-sided that it seriously limits political competition, it is incompatible with democracy.26 A level playing field is implicit in most conceptualizations of democracy.

 

Indeed, many characteristics of an uneven playing field could be subsumed into the dimensions of “free and fair elections” and “civil liberties.” However, there are at least two reasons to treat this attribute as a separate dimension. First, some aspects of an uneven playing field – such as skewed access to media and finance – have a major impact between elections and are thus often missed in evaluations of whether elections are free and fair. Second, some government actions that skew the playing field may not be viewed as civil-liberties violations. For example, whereas closing down a newspaper is a clear violation of civil liberties, de facto governing-party control of the private media – achieved through informal proxy or patronage arrangements – is not. Likewise, illicit government–business ties that create vast resource disparities vis-à-vis the opposition are not civil-liberties violations per se. Attention to the slope of the playing field thus highlights how regimes may be undemocratic even in the absence of overt fraud or civil-liberties violations.

 

It is important to distinguish between competitive and noncompetitive authoritarianism. We define full authoritarianism as a regime in which no viable 21 See Dahl (1971), Huntington (1991: 5–13), 23 On conceptual precising, see Collier and Schmitter and Karl (1991), Collier and LevLevitsky (1997).

 

itsky (1997), Diamond (1999: 7–15), and 24 See Levitsky and Way (2010).

 

Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Li ˜nan (2001).

 

25 Thus, although district-level competition in Other scholars, including Przeworski and his U.S. congressional elections is marked by collaborators (Alvarez et al. 1996; Przeworski an uneven playing field, incumbents of both et al. 2000), employ a more minimalist defimajor parties enjoy these advantages.

 

nition that centers on contested elections and 26 Greene (2007) describes this as “hyperturnover.

 

incumbency advantage.” 22 See Schumpter (1947) and Huntington (1989).

 

Introduction 7 channels exist for opposition to contest legally for executive power.27 This category includes closed regimes in which national-level democratic institutions do not exist (e.g., China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia) and hegemonic regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist on paper but are reduced to fac¸ade status in practice.28 In hegemonic regimes, elections are so marred by repression, candidate restrictions, and/or fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome. Much of the opposition is forced underground and leading critics are often imprisoned or exiled. Thus, in post–Cold War Egypt, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, elections served functions (e.g., a means of enhancing regime legitimacy, generating information, or distributing patronage) other than determining who governed29; opponents did not view them as viable means to achieve power.

 

Competitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished from full authoritarianism in that constitutional channels exist through which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power. Elections are held regularly and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting them. Opposition activity is above ground: Opposition parties can open offices, recruit candidates, and organize campaigns, and politicians are rarely exiled or imprisoned. In short, democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power.

 

What distinguishes competitive authoritarianism from democracy, however, is the fact that incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy: (1) free elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably level playing field.30 Elections In democracies, elections are free, in the sense that there is virtually no fraud or intimidation of voters, and fair, in the sense that opposition parties campaign on relatively even footing: They are not subject to repression or harassment, and they are not systematically denied access to the media or other critical resources.31 In fully authoritarian regimes, multiparty elections are either nonexistent or noncompetitive. Elections may be considered noncompetitive when (1) major candidates are formally barred or effectively excluded on a regular basis32; (2) repression or legal controls effectively prevent opposition parties from running public campaigns; or (3) fraud is so massive that there is virtually no observable relationship between voter preferences and official electoral results.

 

27 Our category of full authoritarianism thus (2002a). See also Howard and Roessler includes a wide range of authoritarian (2006).

 

regimes, including monarchies, sultanistic 29 See Lust-Okur (2007) and Blaydes (forthregimes, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and coming).

 

single-party regimes. The differences among 30 For a full operationalization of competitive these regimes are vast and of considerauthoritarianism, see Appendix I.

 

able theoretical importance (Snyder 2006).

 

31 See Elklit and Svensson (1997).

 

For the purposes of this study, however, all 32 Effective exclusion occurs when physical of them lack significant legal contestation for repression is so severe or the legal, adminispower.

 

trative, and financial obstacles are so onerous 28 We borrow the distinction between closed that most viable candidates are deterred from and hegemonic regimes from Schedler running.

 

8 Competitive Authoritarianism Competitive authoritarian regimes fall in between these extremes. On the one hand, elections are competitive in that major opposition candidates are rarely excluded, opposition parties are able to campaign publicly, and there is no massive fraud. On the other hand, elections are often unfree and almost always unfair.

 

In some cases, elections are marred by the manipulation of voter lists, ballot-box stuffing, and/or falsification of results (e.g., the Dominican Republic in 1994 and Ukraine in 2004). Although such fraud may alter the outcome of elections, it is not so severe as to make the act of voting meaningless.33 Elections also may be marred by intimidation of opposition activists, voters, and poll watchers, and even the establishment of opposition “no-go” areas (e.g., Cambodia and Zimbabwe).

 

However, such abuse is not sufficiently severe or systematic to prevent the opposition from running a national campaign. In other cases (e.g., Botswana), voting and vote-counting processes are reasonably clean but an uneven playing field renders the overall electoral process manifestly unfair. In these cases, unequal access to finance and the media as well as incumbent abuse of state institutions make elections unfair even in the absence of violence or fraud.34 Thus, even though Mexico’s 1994 election was technically clean, skewed access to resources and media led one scholar to compare it to a “soccer match where the goalposts were of different heights and breadths and where one team included 11 players plus the umpire and the other a mere six or seven players.”35 Civil Liberties In democracies, civil liberties – including the rights of free speech, press, and association – are protected. Although these rights may be violated periodically, such violations are infrequent and do not seriously hinder the opposition’s capacity to challenge incumbents. In fully authoritarian regimes, basic civil liberties are often violated so systematically that opposition parties, civic groups, and the media are not even minimally protected (e.g., Egypt and Uzbekistan). As a result, much opposition activity takes place underground or in exile.

 

In competitive authoritarian regimes, civil liberties are nominally guaranteed and at least partially respected. Independent media exist and civic and opposition groups operate above ground: Most of the time, they can meet freely and even protest against the government. Yet, civil liberties are frequently violated.

 

Opposition politicians, independent judges, journalists, human-rights activists, and other government critics are subject to harassment, arrest, and – in some cases – violent attack. Independent media are frequently threatened, attacked, and – in some cases – suspended or closed. In some regimes, overt repression – including the arrest of opposition leaders, the killing of opposition activists, and the violent repression of protest – is widespread, pushing regimes to the brink of full authoritarianism.36 33 For example, vote fraud in Serbia in 2000 and 34 See Greene (2007) and Levitsky and Way Ukraine in 2004 accounted for about 10% (2010).

 

of the vote, which was large enough to alter 35 Casta ˜neda (1995: 131).

 

the results but small enough to make voting 36 Examples include Cambodia, Zimbabwe, and meaningful.

 

Russia under Putin.

 

Introduction 9 More frequently, assaults on civil liberties take more subtle forms, including “legal repression,” or the discretionary use of legal instruments – such as tax, libel, or defamation laws – to punish opponents. Although such repression may involve the technically correct application of the law, its use is selective and partisan rather than universal. An example is Putin’s Russia. After Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the owner of Russia’s largest oil company, began to finance opposition groups in 2003, the government jailed him on tax charges and seized his company’s property and stock.37 On a more modest scale, the Fujimori government in Peru “perfected the technique of ‘using the law to trample the law,’”38 transforming judicial and tax agencies into “a shield for friends of the regime and a weapon against its enemies.”39 Rivals – often internal ones – also may be prosecuted for corruption. In Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammad used corruption and sodomy charges to imprison his chief rival, Anwar Ibrahim; in Malawi, President Bingu wa Mutharika had his chief rival, ex-President Bakili Muluzi, arrested on corruption charges; and in Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma used corruption charges to derail Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko’s presidential candidacy.40 Perhaps the most widespread form of “legal” repression is the use of libel or defamation laws against journalists, editors, and media outlets. Thus, in Malaysia, the Mahathir government entered into a “suing craze” in the wake of the 1998– 1999 political crisis, making widespread use of defamation suits to silence critical reporting41; in Cameroon, more than 50 journalists were prosecuted for libel in the late 1990s and several newspapers were forced to close due to heavy fines42; and in Croatia, independent newspapers were hit by more than 230 governmentsponsored libel suits as of 1997.43 In some cases (e.g., Belarus, Cambodia, and Russia), the repeated use of costly lawsuits led to the disappearance of many independent media outlets. In other cases (e.g., Malaysia and Ukraine), the threat of legal action led to widespread self-censorship.

 

Although “legal” and other repression under competitive authoritarianism is not severe enough to force the opposition underground or into exile, it clearly exceeds what is permissible in a democracy. By raising the cost of opposition activity (thereby convincing all but the boldest activists to remain on the sidelines) and critical media coverage (thereby encouraging self-censorship), even intermittent civil-liberties violations can seriously hinder the opposition’s capacity to organize and challenge the government.

 

An Uneven Playing Field Finally, nearly all competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by an uneven playing field.44 Obviously, a degree of incumbent advantage exists in all democracies. Indeed, many new democracies in Eastern Europe and 37 Goldman (2004, 2008).

 

43 Pusic (1998).

 

38 Youngers (2000a: 68).

 

44 For discussions of uneven playing fields 39 Durand (2003: 459, 463).

 

in hybrid regimes, see Schedler (2002a, 40 Darden (2001).

 

2002b), Mozaffar and Schedler (2002), 41 Felker (2000: 51).

 

Ottaway (2003: 138–56), Greene (2007), and 42 Fombad (2003: 324).

 

Levitsky and Way (2010).

 

10 Competitive Authoritarianism Latin America are characterized by extensive clientelism and politicization of state bureaucracies. To distinguish such cases from those of unfair competition, we set a high threshold for unfairness. We consider the playing field uneven when (1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends, (2) incumbents are systematically favored at the expense of the opposition, and (3) the opposition’s ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped. Three aspects of an uneven playing field are of particular importance: access to resources, media, and the law.

 

access to resources. Access to resources is uneven when incumbents use the state to create or maintain resource disparities that seriously hinder the opposition’s ability to compete.45 This may occur in several ways. First, incumbents may make direct partisan use of state resources. In a few cases, this funding is legal. In Guyana and Zimbabwe in the 1980s, governing parties were financed by special public ministries and/or official state subventions to the exclusion of other parties. More frequently, state finance is illicit. In Mexico, for example, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) reportedly drew $1 billion in illicit state finance during the early 1990s46; in Russia, tens of millions of dollars in government bonds were diverted to Yeltsin’s 1996 reelection campaign.47 Incumbents also may systematically deploy the machinery of the state – for example, state buildings, vehicles, and communications infrastructure – for electoral campaigns, and public employees and security forces may be mobilized en masse on behalf of the governing party. In former Soviet states such as Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, this mobilization included not only low-level bureaucrats but also teachers, doctors, and other professionals.48 In underdeveloped countries with weak private sectors, such abuse can create vast resource advantages.

 

Incumbents also may use the state to monopolize access to private-sector finance. Governing parties may use discretionary control over credit, licenses, state contracts, and other resources to enrich themselves via party-owned enterprises (e.g., Taiwan), benefit crony- or proxy-owned firms that then contribute money back into party coffers (e.g., Malaysia), or corner the market in privatesector donations (e.g., Mexico and Russia). In Malaysia and Taiwan, for example, governing parties used control of the state to build multibillion-dollar business empires.49 The state also may be used to deny opposition parties access to resources. In Ukraine, for example, businesses that financed the opposition were routinely targeted by tax authorities.50 In Ghana, entrepreneurs who financed 45 For a sophisticated discussion of how incum-49 On Malaysia, see Gomez (1990, 1991) and bent abuse of state resources shapes party Searle (1999); on Taiwan, see Guo, Huang, competition, see Greene (2007).

 

and Chiang (1998) and Fields (2002). Simi46 Oppenheimer (1996: 88).

 

larly, in Mexico, the PRI raised hundreds of 47 Hoffman (2003: 348–51).

 

millions of dollars in donations from business 48 See Allina-Pisano (2005) and Way (2005b).

 

magnates who had benefited from governIn Guyana and Peru, soldiers were mobiment contracts, licenses, or favorable treatlized for electoral campaigns; in Serbia, the ment in the privatization process (Oppensecurity apparatus provided logistical support heimer 1996; Philip 1999).

 

for the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” move50 As a former head of Ukraine’s security serment that helped Milošević consolidate power vices stated, “If [your business is] loyal to (LeBor 2002: 200–201).

 

the authorities, they will ignore or overlook Introduction 11 opposition parties “were blacklisted, denied government contracts, and [had] their businesses openly sabotaged”51; in Cambodia, the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) was “starved for funds by a business community told by [the government] that financing SRP was committing economic suicide.”52 In these cases, resource disparities far exceeded anything seen in established democracies. In Taiwan, the $200 million to $500 million in annual profits generated by the $4.5 billion business empire of the Kuomintang (KMT) gave the party a financial base that was “unheard of . . . in any representative democracy,”53 which allowed it to outspend opponents by more than 50-to-1 during elections.54 In Mexico, the PRI admitted to spending 13 times more than the two major opposition parties combined during the 1994 election, and some observers claim that the ratio may have been 20-to-1.55 In Russia, the Yeltsin campaign spent between 30 and 150 times the amount permitted the opposition in 1996.56 access to media. When opposition parties lack access to media that reaches most of the population, there is no possibility of fair competition. Media access may be denied in several ways. Frequently, the most important disparities exist in access to broadcast media, combined with biased and partisan coverage. In many competitive authoritarian regimes, the state controls all television and most – if not all – radio broadcasting. Although independent newspapers and magazines may circulate freely, they generally reach only a small urban elite. In such cases, if radio and television are state-run and state-run channels are biased in favor of the governing party, opposition forces are effectively denied access to the media.

 

Thus, even after the Banda dictatorship in Malawi gave way to elected President Bakili Muluzi, incumbent control of the media was such that one journalist complained, “Before it was Banda, Banda, Banda – every day. Now it is Muluzi, Muluzi, Muluzi.”57 In other cases, private media is widespread but major media outlets are linked to the governing party – via proxy ownership, patronage, and other illicit means. In Ukraine, for example, President Kuchma controlled television coverage through an informal network of private media entities. The head of the Presidential Administration, who also owned the popular 1+1 television station, issued orders (“temnyki”) to all major stations dictating how events should be covered.58 In Malaysia, all major private newspapers and private television stations were controlled by individuals or firms linked to the governing Barisan Nasional (BN).59 In Alberto Fujimori’s Peru, private television stations signed “contracts” with the state intelligence service in which they received up to $1.5 million a month in exchange for limiting coverage of opposition parties.60 anything. If you are disloyal, you or your 55 Oppenheimer (1996: 110); Bruhn (1997: business will be quashed immediately” (Way 283–4).

 

2005b: 134).

 

56 McFaul (1997: 13).

 

51 Oquaye (1998: 109).

 

57 Africa Report, November–December 1994, 52 Heder (2005: 118).

 

57.

 

53 Chu (1992: 150); see also Fields (2002: 58 Human Rights Watch (2003c); Kipiani (2005).

 

127).

 

59 Nain (2002); Rodan (2004: 25–6).

 

54 Wu (1995: 79).

 

60 Bowen and Holligan (2003: 360–1).

 

12 Competitive Authoritarianism biased referees: uneven access to the law. In many competitive authoritarian regimes, incumbents pack judiciaries, electoral commissions, and other nominally independent arbiters and manipulate them via blackmail, bribery, and/or intimidation. As a result, legal and other state agencies that are designed to act as referees rule systematically in favor of incumbents. This allows incumbents to engage in illicit acts – including violations of democratic procedure – with impunity. It also ensures that critical electoral, legal, or other disputes will be resolved in the incumbent’s favor. Thus, in Malaysia, a packed judiciary ensured that a schism in the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) was resolved in Prime Minister Mahathir’s favor in 1988; a decade later, it allowed Mahathir to imprison his main rival, Anwar Ibrahim, on dubious charges. In Peru, Fujimori’s control over judicial and electoral authorities ensured the legalization of a constitutionally dubious third term in 2000. In Belarus in 1996, the constitutional court terminated an impeachment process launched by parliamentary opponents of President Lukashenka, which facilitated Lukashenka’s consolidation of autocratic rule. In Venezuela, the electoral authorities’ 2003 ruling invalidating signatures collected for a recall referendum against President Hugo Chavez delayed the referendum long enough for Chavez to rebuild public support and survive the referendum.

 

Competition without Democracy: Contestation and Uncertainty in Nondemocracies Table 1.1 summarizes the major differences among democratic, full authoritarian, and competitive authoritarian regimes (for a full operationalization, see Appendix I). As suggested in the table, a distinguishing feature of competitive authoritarianism is unfair competition. Whereas full authoritarian regimes are characterized by the absence of competition (and, hence, of uncertainty) and democracy is characterized by fair competition, competitive authoritarianism is marked by competition that is real but unfair. Opposition parties are legal, operate aboveground, and compete seriously in elections. However, they are subject to surveillance, harassment, and occasional violence; their access to media and finance is limited; electoral and judicial institutions are politicized and deployed against them; and elections are often marred by fraud, intimidation, and other abuse. Yet such unfairness does not preclude serious contestation – or even occasional opposition victories.61 Stated another way, whereas officials in full authoritarian regimes can rest easy on the eve of elections because neither they nor opposition leaders expect anything but an incumbent victory, incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes cannot. Government officials fear a possible opposition victory (and must work hard to thwart it), and opposition leaders believe they have at least some chance of victory. In competitive authoritarian regimes, incumbents are forced to sweat.

 

61 Examples include opposition electoral vic2000; and Kenya in 2002. Indeed, even viotories in Nicaragua in 1990; Zambia in lent regimes, such as Cambodia, Serbia, and 1991; Guyana in 1992; Belarus, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, may be quite competitive.

 

Ukraine in 1994; Albania in 1997; Croatia in Introduction 13 table 1.1. Comparing Democratic, Competitive Authoritarian, and Closed Regimes Competitive Full Democracy Authoritarianism Authoritarianism Status of Core Systematically Exist and are Nonexistent or Democratic respected.

 

meaningful, but reduced to fac¸ade Institutions Widely viewed as systematically status.

 

(Elections, only route to violated in favor of Not viewed as a Civil power.

 

incumbent.

 

viable route to Liberties) Widely viewed as primary power.

 

route to power.

 

Status of Competes on Major opposition is legal Major opposition Opposition more or less equal and can compete openly, banned, or largely footing with but is significantly underground or in incumbent.

 

disadvantaged by exile.

 

incumbent abuse.

 

Level of High Lower than democracy but Low Uncertainty higher than full authoritarianism.

 

What this suggests is that uncertainty and even incumbent turnover are not defining features of democracy. Influential scholars, particularly Adam Przeworski and his collaborators, have argued that uncertainty of outcomes and the possibility of electoral turnover are what distinguish democratic from nondemocratic regimes.62 Such a conceptualization ignores the real possibility that serious violation of democratic procedure may occur in competitive elections. At times during the 1990–2008 period, elections in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Cameroon, Cambodia, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Russia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe were characterized by considerable uncertainty and, in some cases, incumbent defeat. However, none of them was democratic and some were not even remotely so. We therefore must be able to conceptualize regimes that are sufficiently competitive to generate real uncertainty (and even turnover) but which fall short of democracy. As this book demonstrates, such regimes were widespread during the post–Cold War period.

 

Alternative Conceptualizations of Hybrid Regimes: Do We Need a New Subtype? Scholars should create new regime subtypes with caution. Studies of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s generated hundreds of new subtypes of democracy.63 As Collier and Levitsky warned, such an “excessive proliferation of new terms and 62 See Przeworski (1986, 1991) and Alvarez ized democracy as a “system in which parties et al. (1996); see also McFaul and Petrov lose elections” (1991: 10).

 

(2004: 5–6). Przeworski famously character63 Collier and Levitsky (1997).

 

14 Competitive Authoritarianism concepts” is likely to result in “conceptual confusion.”64 Similarly, Richard Snyder has called for a “conservative bias with regard to concept formation.” Rather than fall prey to the “naturalists’ temptation to proclaim the discovery, naming, and classification of new political animals,” Snyder argues, scholars should “carefully evaluate the null hypothesis that the political phenomena of interest . . . are actually not sufficiently novel to warrant new categories and labels.”65 We contend that competitive authoritarianism is a new phenomenon and that no existing term adequately captures it.66 First, these regimes routinely proved difficult for scholars to categorize during the post–Cold War period. For example, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was described as “a hybrid perhaps unique in the annals of political science”67; Fujimori’s Peru was said to be a “new kind of hybrid authoritarian regime”68; and the PRI regime in Mexico was labeled a “hybrid, part-free, part authoritarian system” that does “not conform to classical typologies.”69 Which existing regime categories might be appropriate for these cases? One scholarly response has been simply to label them as democracies. Regimes in Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Peru, Russia, Ukraine, and Zambia were routinely labeled democracies during the 1990s. Even extreme cases such as Belarus, Cambodia, Haiti, and Russia under Putin occasionally earned a democratic label.70 The problem with such a strategy is straightforward: Regimes with serious electoral irregularities and/or civil-liberties violations do not meet procedural minimum standards for democracy. To label such regimes democracies is to stretch the concept virtually beyond recognition.

 

Another conceptual strategy has been to use generic intermediate categories, such as hybrid regime,71 semi-democracy,72 or Freedom House’s “partly free,”73 for cases that fall between democracy and full authoritarianism. The problem with such categories is that because democracy is multidimensional, there are multiple ways to be partially democratic. Competitive authoritarianism is only one of several hybrid regime types. Others include (1) constitutional oligarchies or exclusive republics, which possess the basic features of democracy but deny suffrage to a major segment of the adult population (e.g., Estonia and Latvia in the early 1990s)74; (2) tutelary regimes, in which elections are competitive but the power of elected governments is constrained by nonelected religious (e.g., Iran), military (e.g., Guatemala and Pakistan), or monarchic (e.g., Nepal in the 1990s) authorities; and (3) restricted or semi-competitive democracies, in which elections are free but a major party is banned (e.g., Argentina in 1957–1966 and Turkey in 64 Collier and Levitsky (1997: 451). For a 70 On Belarus, see Korosteleva (2006); on similar critique, see Armony and Schamis Cambodia, see Brown and Timberman (1998: (2005).

 

14) and Langran (2001: 156); on Haiti, see 65 Snyder (2006: 227).

 

Gibbons (1999: 2) and Shamsie (2004: 1097); 66 See Diamond (1999: 25; 2002), Carothers on Russia, see Nichols (2001: v–vii).

 

(2000a, 2002), Linz (2000: 33–4), and Sche71 Karl (1995).

 

dler (2002b, 2006b).

 

72 Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Li ˜nan (2001).

 

67 Leiken (2003: 183).

 

73 See Freedom House (http://www.freedom 68 Burt (1998: 38).

 

house.org).

 

69 Cornelius (1996: 25).

 

74 See Roeder (1994).

 

Introduction 15 the 1990s). The differences among these regimes – and between them and competitive authoritarianism – are obscured by categories such as semi-democratic or partly free. For example, El Salvador, Latvia, and Ukraine were classified by Freedom House as partly free – with a combined political and civil-liberties score of 6 – in 1992–1993.75 Yet, whereas in Latvia the main nondemocratic feature was the denial of citizenship rights to people of Russian descent, in El Salvador it was the military’s tutelary power and human-rights violations. Ukraine possessed full citizenship and civilian control over the military, but it was competitive authoritarian. “Semi-democratic” and “partly free” are thus residual categories that reveal little about regimes other than what they are not.

 

Another strategy is to classify hybrid regimes as subtypes of democracy.76 For example, Larry Diamond used the term electoral democracy to refer to cases in which reasonably fair elections coexist with a weak rule of law and uneven protection of human and civil rights, such as in Colombia, Brazil, India, and the Philippines.77 Similarly, Fareed Zakaria applied the term illiberal democracy to “democratically elected regimes” that “routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and [deprive] their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.”78 Subtypes such as “defective democracy,” “managed democracy,” and “quasi-democracy” are employed in a similar manner.79 However, the value of such labels is questionable. As Andreas Schedler argued, many hybrid regimes: . . . violate minimal democratic norms so severely that it makes no sense to classify them as democracies, however qualified. These electoral regimes . . . are instances of authoritarian rule. The time has come to abandon misleading labels and to take their nondemocratic nature seriously.80 Similarly, Juan Linz argued that although scholars “might positively value some aspects” of hybrid regimes, they “should be clear that they are not democracies (even using minimum standards).” To avoid confusion, Linz proposed “the addition of adjectives to ‘authoritarianism’ rather than to ‘democracy.’”81 Competitive authoritarianism does not easily fit existing subtypes of authoritarianism (e.g., “post-totalitarianism” and “bureaucratic authoritarianism”) in large part because these regimes are noncompetitive. As Diamond noted, none of Linz’s seven principal types of authoritarianism even remotely resembles competitive authoritarianism – and “for good reason. This type of hybrid regime, which is now so common, is very much a product of the contemporary world.”82 75 See Freedom House (http://www.freedom(Kazakhstan) to collapsed states (Sierra house.org).

 

Leone).

 

76 See Collier and Levitsky (1997).

 

79 On managed democracy, see Colton and 77 Diamond (1999: 9–10; 2002: 27–31).

 

McFaul (2003); Balzer (2003) uses the term Although Diamond (2002: 27–9) considers managed pluralism; on quasi-democracy, see such regimes less democratic than “liberal Villal ón (1994). On defective democracy, see democracies,” he treats them as fully competCroissant and Merkel (2004).

 

itive – and therefore distinct from competitive 80 Schedler (2002b: 36).

 

and other authoritarian regimes.

 

81 Linz (2000: 34). See also Brown (2005: 2).

 

78 Zakaria (1997: 22–3). Zakaria applies this 82 Diamond (2002: 24). See also Linz (2000: term loosely, including everything from 33–4).

 

democracies (Argentina) to closed regimes 16 Competitive Authoritarianism Newer subtypes of authoritarianism, such as electoral authoritarianism and semi-authoritarianism, are closer to ours in that they refer to nondemocracies with multiparty elections.83 However, they have generally been defined broadly to refer to all authoritarian regimes with multiparty elections – both competitive and hegemonic.84 Thus, the concept of electoral authoritarianism encompasses both competitive authoritarian regimes and noncompetitive regimes such as those in Egypt, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

 

Our conceptualization is more restrictive. We limit the category to regimes in which opposition forces use democratic institutions to contest seriously for executive power. Such a narrow definition is not a mere exercise in conceptual hairsplitting. Competitiveness is a substantively important regime characteristic that affects the behavior and expectations of political actors. As we argue later in this chapter, governments and opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes face a set of opportunities and constraints that do not exist in either democracies or other forms of authoritarian rule. Furthermore, competitive authoritarianism is widespread. More than 40 countries – including Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Serbia, Taiwan, and Venezuela – were competitive authoritarian at some point after 1989. Indeed, competitive authoritarian regimes easily outnumbered democracies in Africa and the former Soviet Union. Thus, the conceptual space we are carving out – that of competitive nondemocracies – may be narrow, but it is both densely populated and substantively important.

 

the rise of competitive authoritarianism “[Why liberalize?] When you see your neighbor being shaved, you should wet your beard.

 

Otherwise you could get a rough shave.” – Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania85 “Don’t you know how these Westerners are? They will make a fuss [about electoral fraud] for a few days, and then they will calm down and life will go on as usual.” – Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia86 83 Schedler (2006b: 3) defines electoral authorauthoritarian regimes, in which the electoral itarianism as a regime that is “minimally arena is a “genuine battleground in the strugpluralistic,” “minimally competitive,” and gle for power,” and “hegemonic” electoral “minimally open” but which “violate[s] the authoritarian regimes, in which elections are liberal-democratic principles of freedom and “little more than a theatrical setting,” but he fairness so profoundly and systematically as to finds it useful to “collapse both into one broad render elections instruments of authoritarian category.” See also Ottaway (2003) on semirule.” Thus, elections are “minimally competauthoritarianism. Hyde and Marinov (2009) itive” but opposition parties are “denied vicsimilarly conceptualize competitive authortory” (2006b: 3). On semi-authoritarianism, itarianism to include both competitive and see Carothers (2000a) and Ottaway noncompetitive regimes.

 

(2003).

 

85 Quoted in Morna (1990: 24).

 

84 For example, Schedler (2002b: 47) dis86 Quoted in Karumidze and Wertsch (2005: tinguishes between “competitive” electoral 24).

 

Introduction 17 Competitive authoritarianism is a post–Cold War phenomenon. Although a few competitive authoritarian regimes existed during the interwar and Cold War periods,87 they proliferated after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This was not a coincidence. Beginning in the late 1980s, major changes in the international environment undermined the stability of many closed regimes and encouraged the rise of electoral ones. First, the end of the Cold War led to a withdrawal of external support for many superpower-sponsored dictatorships. Soviet-backed Leninist regimes and U.S.-backed anti-communist regimes faced a precipitous decline in external military and economic assistance. In many cases, the elimination of Cold War subsidies coincided with mounting economic crises, which undermined the stability of many autocracies. States became bankrupt, patronage resources disappeared, and – in many cases – coercive apparatuses began to disintegrate, leaving autocrats with little choice but to liberalize or abandon power.88 The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to a marked shift in the global balance of power, in which the West – particularly the United States – emerged as the dominant center of economic and military power. In the post–Cold War era, as in interwar Eastern Europe,89 the disappearance of a military, economic, and ideological alternative to the liberal West had a major impact on peripheral states. For example, it created an “almost universal wish to imitate a way of life associated with the liberal capitalist democracies of the core regimes,”90 which encouraged the diffusion of Western democratic models.91 Yet diffusion was also rooted in an instrumental logic: The primary sources of external assistance were now located almost exclusively in the West. Effectively “[r]eading the handwriting on the (Berlin) wall,” many autocrats adopted formal democratic institutions in an effort to “position their countries favorably in the international contest for scarce development resources.”92 The end of the Cold War was also accompanied by a major shift in Western foreign policy.93 With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the United States and other Western powers stepped up efforts to encourage and defend democracy through a combination of external assistance, military and diplomatic pressure, and unprecedented political conditionality.94 In 1990, the United States, United 87 In interwar Eastern Europe, competitive au-89 See Janos (2000).

 

thoritarian regimes emerged in Bulgaria, 90 Whitehead (1996b: 21).

 

Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 91 See Sharman and Kanet (2000), Schmitz and Romania. During the Cold War and Sell (1999), and Kopstein and Reilly period, cases of competitive authoritarian(2000).

 

ism included Argentina under Per ón (1946– 92 Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 182–3). See 1955); Zambia in the late 1960s; the Dominialso Joseph (1999a).

 

can Republic during the 1970s; Senegal after 93 See Carothers (1991, 1999), Diamond (1992), 1976; and postcolonial Guyana, Malaysia, and Burnell (2000a), von Hippel (2000), and Zimbabwe.

 

Schraeder (2002a).

 

88 See Herbst (1994) and Joseph (1997). Out94 U.S. funding for democracy-assistance proside of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet grams “took off ” (Burnell 2000b: 39–44), Union, regimes that were particularly hard hit increasing from near zero in the early 1980s by the end of the Cold War include those to $700 million at the turn of the century in Benin, Cambodia, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, (Carothers 1999: 6; Burnell 2000b: 49).

 

Madagascar, Mozambique, and Nicaragua.

 

18 Competitive Authoritarianism Kingdom, and France announced that they would link future economic assistance to democratization and human rights. Western governments and multilateral institutions began to condition loans and assistance on the holding of elections and respect for human rights.95 Although it was never applied consistently, the “new political conditionality” induced many autocrats to hold multiparty elections.96 Political conditionality was accompanied by efforts to create permanent international legal frameworks for the collective defense of democracy.97 Thus, the 1990s saw the emergence of an “international architecture of collective institutions and formal agreements enshrining both the principles of democracy and human rights.”98 These efforts went farthest in Eastern Europe, where full democracy was a requirement for European Union (EU) membership.99 However, they also were seen in the Americas, where the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted new mechanisms for the collective defense of democracy.100 Finally, the post–Cold War period saw the emergence of a transnational infrastructure of organizations – including international party foundations, electionmonitoring agencies, and a plethora of international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) – that were committed to the promotion of human rights and democracy.101 Strengthened by new information technologies such as the Internet, transnational human-rights and democracy networks drew international attention to human-rights abuses, lobbied Western governments to take action against abusive governments, and helped protect and empower domestic opposition groups.102 Due to the presence of these networks, rights abuses frequently triggered a “boomerang effect:” they were widely reported by international media and human rights groups, which often led Western powers to take punitive action against violating states.103 At the same time, the growing number and sophistication of international election-observer missions helped call international attention to fraudulent elections, which deterred an increasing number of governments from attempting fraud.104 These changes in the international environment raised the external cost of authoritarianism and created incentives for elites in developing and postcommunist countries to adopt the formal architecture of Western-style democracy, which – at a minimum – entailed multiparty elections. The change 95 See Nelson and Eglinton (1992) and Stokke 101 See Sikkink (1993), Keck and Sikkink (1998), (1995a).

 

Middlebrook (1998), Carothers (1997b, 96 The term new political conditionality is taken 1999, 2000b), Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink from Callaghy (1993: 477). See also Clinken(1999), Burnell (2000b), Florini (2000), and beard (2004).

 

Ottaway and Carothers (2000).

 

97 Farer (1996a), Schraeder (2002b), and Peve102 Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse and house (2005).

 

Sikkink (1999).

 

98 Diamond (1995: 38).

 

103 Keck and Sikkink (1998: 12–13).

 

99 Pridham (2005) and Schimmelfennig and 104 See McCoy, Garber, and Pastor (1991), Sedelmeier (2005).

 

Rosenau and Fagen (1994), Carothers 100 See Farer (1993, 1996b) and Halperin (1997b), Chand (1997), and Middlebrook (1993).

 

(1998).

 

Introduction 19 was particularly striking in sub-Saharan Africa, where the number of de jure single-party regimes fell from 29 in 1989 to zero in 1994,105 and in postcommunist Eurasia, where only one de jure one-party regime (Turkmenistan) endured through the 1990s.

 

Yet if the post–Cold War international environment undermined autocracies and encouraged the diffusion of multiparty elections, it did not necessarily bring democracy. External democratizing pressure was limited in several ways. First, it was applied selectively and inconsistently, with important countries and regions (e.g., China and the Middle East) largely escaping pressure.106 Second, external pressure was often superficial. In much of the world, Western democracy promotion was “electoralist” in that it focused almost exclusively on multiparty elections while often ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties and a level playing field.107 As Zakaria observed: In the end . . . elections trump everything. If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a great deal from the resulting government. . . . In an age of images and symbols, elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?).108 The international community’s focus on elections left many autocrats – both old and new – with considerable room to maneuver.109 Governments “learned that they did not have to democratize” to maintain their international standing.110 Partial liberalization – usually in the form of holding passable elections – was often “sufficient to deflect international system pressures for more complete political opening.”111 In short, the post–Cold War international environment raised the minimum standard for regime acceptability, but the new standard was multiparty elections, not democracy.

 

Even in the post–Cold War international environment, therefore, full democratization often required a strong domestic “push.” Where favorable domestic conditions such as a strong civil society and effective state institutions were absent (e.g., much of the former Soviet Union and sub-Saharan Africa), transitions were more likely to result in regimes that combined multiparty elections with some form of authoritarian rule.112 In other words, they were likely to result in competitive authoritarianism.

 

The proliferation of competitive authoritarian regimes in the early 1990s was striking. In 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader, only a 105 See Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 8) and 110 Joseph (1999a: 61).

 

Joseph (1997).

 

111 Young (1999a: 35). As Carothers (1997a: 106 See Nelson and Eglinton (1992), Carothers 90–1) wrote, governments learned how to (1999), Lawson (1999), and Crawford “impose enough repression to keep their (2001).

 

opponents weak and maintain their own 107 On electoralism, see Karl (1986). See also power while adhering to enough democratic Carothers (1999), Diamond (1999: 55–6), formalities that they might just pass themLawson (1999), and Ottaway (2003).

 

selves off as democrats.” 108 Zakaria (1997: 40).

 

112 See Carothers (1997a, 2000a, 2002), Joseph 109 See Stokke (1995b), Joseph (1997, 1999a), (1999a), and Ottaway (2003).

 

Carothers (2000b), and Ottaway (2003).

 

20 Competitive Authoritarianism handful of competitive authoritarian regimes existed in the world.113 By 1995, nearly three dozen countries were competitive authoritarian. Thus, although the end of the Cold War triggered a wave of democratization, it also triggered a wave of hybridization. The “fourth wave” was at least as competitive authoritarian as it was democratic.114 diverging outcomes: competitive authoritarian regime trajectories, 1990–2008 Competitive authoritarian regimes are marked by an inherent tension. The existence of meaningful democratic institutions creates arenas of contestation through which oppositions may legally – and legitimately – challenge incumbents.

 

At times, authoritarian governments manage these arenas of contestation without difficulty. When incumbents enjoy broad public support (e.g., Botswana and Peru in the mid-1990s) and/or face very weak opposition (e.g., Tanzania), they may retain power without egregiously violating democratic institutions. However, the existence of multiparty elections, nominally independent legislatures, judiciaries, and media creates opportunities for periodic challenges, and when incumbents lack public support, these challenges may be regime-threatening.

 

Most frequently, opposition challenges take place at the ballot box, as in Serbia (2000), Kenya (2002), Ukraine (2004), and Zimbabwe (2008). However, they also may emerge from parliament (e.g., Russia in 1993 and Belarus in 1996) or the judiciary.115 Such contestation poses a serious dilemma for incumbents. On the one hand, thwarting the challenge often requires a blatant assault on democratic institutions (i.e., stealing elections or closing parliament). Because such challenges are legal and generally perceived as legitimate (both at home and abroad), openly repressing them may be quite costly. On the other hand, if incumbents allow democratic procedures to run their course, they risk losing power. In effect, such challenges force incumbents to choose between egregiously violating democratic rules, at the cost of international isolation and domestic conflict, and allowing the challenge to proceed, at the cost of possible defeat. The result is often a regime crisis, as occurred in Cambodia and Russia in 1993, the Dominican Republic in 1994, Armenia in 1996, Malaysia in 1998–1999, Peru and Serbia in 2000, Madagascar in 2001, Ukraine in 2004, Kenya in 2007, and Zimbabwe in 2008. It is perhaps for this reason that Huntington wrote that “liberalized authoritarianism” is “not a stable equilibrium. The halfway house does not stand.”116 Yet competitive authoritarian regimes were not bound to collapse; in fact, many of them proved strikingly robust. In several cases, incumbents either 113 Cases included Botswana, Gambia, Guyana, for a third term in Peru and the ZimbabMalaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Senegal, and wean Supreme Court’s 2000 ruling against Zimbabwe.

 

the Mugabe government’s land-reform 114 The term “fourth wave” is taken from program.

 

McFaul (2002).

 

116 Huntington (1991: 137). See also Howard 115 Examples include the Constitutional Triand Roessler (2009).

 

bunal’s 1997 ruling against Fujimori’s bid Introduction 21 table 1.2. Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories, 1990–2008 Unstable Stable Democratization Authoritarianism Authoritarianism Benin Albania Armenia Croatia Belarus Botswana Dominican Republic Georgia Cambodia Ghana Haiti Cameroon Guyana Kenya Gabon Macedonia Madagascar Malaysia Mali Malawi Mozambique Mexico Moldova Russia Nicaragua Senegal Tanzania Peru Zambia Zimbabwe Romania Serbia Slovakia Taiwan Ukraine repeatedly thwarted opposition challenges or maintained such effective control that no serious challenge emerged. In other cases, incumbents were defeated by opposition challenges but successors ruled in a competitive authoritarian manner – in other words, the government changed but the regime did not. Indeed, 19 of our 35 cases remained competitive authoritarian for 15 years or more,117 a lifespan that is comparable to even the most durable bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in South America.118 Hence, it appears that many halfway houses do stand.

 

Competitive authoritarian regimes followed three distinct paths between 1990 and 2008 (Table 1.2). The first is democratization, or the establishment of free and fair elections, broad protection of civil liberties, and a level playing field.119 Democratization may be overseen by authoritarian governments, as in Ghana, Mexico, and Taiwan, or they may occur after those governments fall from power, 117 The lifespan of all 35 competitive author(1992–), Mozambique (1992–), Nicaragua itarian regimes in our sample are Albania (1983–1990), Peru (1992–2000), Russia (1991–), Armenia (1992–), Belarus (1992– (1992–2007), Romania (1990–1996, 2000– 1999), Benin (1990–2006), Botswana (1966–), 2004), Senegal (1976–), Serbia (1990–2003), Cambodia (1992–), Cameroon (1991–), Slovakia (1993–1998), Taiwan (1991–2000), Croatia (1992–2000), Dominican RepubTanzania (1992–), Ukraine (1992–2004), lic (1986–1996), Gabon (1990–), GeorZambia (1990–), and Zimbabwe (1980–).

 

gia (1992, 1995–), Ghana (1991–2000), 118 Military regimes in Brazil and Chile survived Guyana (1985–1992), Haiti (1994–2004, for 21 and 16 years, respectively.

 

2006–), Kenya (1991–), Macedonia (1991– 119 We score outcomes as democratic if regimes 2007), Madagascar (1989–1993, 1997–), remain democratic for at least three presMalawi (1993–), Malaysia (1957–), Mali idential/parliamentary terms and/or were (1992–2002), Mexico (1982–2000), Moldova democratic at the end of 2008.

 

22 Competitive Authoritarianism as in Croatia, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia, and Slovakia. Although the removal of authoritarian incumbents is not necessary for democratization,120 all of our democratizing cases experienced turnover. Between 1990 and 2008, 15 of our 35 cases democratized: Benin, Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Macedonia, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Ukraine.

 

The second outcome is unstable authoritarianism, or cases that undergo one or more transition but do not democratize. In these cases, authoritarian incumbents were removed at least once but new governments were not democratic. Successors inherited a skewed playing field and politicized state institutions, which they used to weaken and/or disadvantage their opponents.121 Ten cases fell into the unstable authoritarian category: Albania, Belarus, Georgia, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova, Senegal, and Zambia.

 

The third outcome is stable authoritarianism. In these cases, authoritarian incumbents or their chosen successors remained in power for at least three presidential/parliamentary terms following the establishment of competitive authoritarian rule.122 This category includes cases that became more closed over time (e.g., Russia). During the 1990–2008 period, 10 of our 35 cases remained stable and nondemocratic: Armenia, Botswana, Cambodia, Cameroon, Gabon, Malaysia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Russia, and Zimbabwe.

 

This diversity of outcomes challenges the democratizing assumptions that underlie much of the post–Cold War literature on regime change. Neither the breakdown of authoritarian regimes nor the holding of multiparty elections necessarily led to democratization during the post–Cold War period.123 Indeed, most (20 of 35) of our cases failed to democratize between 1990 and 2008. These regime patterns suggest that – contra Lindberg and others – multiparty elections are not by themselves an independent cause of democratization.124 They also make it clear that electoral turnover – even where longtime autocrats are removed – should not be equated with democratic transition. In many cases – from Albania, Belarus, Malawi, Moldova, Ukraine, and Zambia in the 1990s to Georgia, Kenya, Senegal, and Madagascar in the 2000s – the removal of 120 Arguably, democratization occurred in regimes held regular multiparty elections, Mexico and Taiwan before incumbents lost and some did so for three (Zimbabwe), elections.

 

four (Senegal), and even five (Malaysia and 121 Cases of brief democratization followed by Mexico) decades without democratizing.

 

a reversion to competitive authoritarianism The holding of elections thus cannot (e.g., Madagascar 1993–1997) are scored as explain why some competitive authoritarunstable authoritarian.

 

ian regimes democratized whereas others did 122 Cases in which incumbents remained in not. Neither can they explain why Guyana, power but three full terms had not yet been Mexico, and Taiwan democratized via eleccompleted as of December 2008 (e.g., tions during the 1990s but not during preCameroon and Tanzania) are scored as vious decades. More generally, Brownlee stable.

 

(2007a) has shown that holding of multican123 Carothers (2002) and Brownlee (2007a) didate elections has no independent causal make similar points.

 

impact on authoritarian stability.

 

124 See Lindberg (2006a, 2006b, 2009a, 2009b).

 

See also Rigger (1999, 2000). All of our Introduction 23 autocratic incumbents brought little institutional change, and successor parties did not govern democratically. Such cases are too numerous to be ignored or treated as exceptions.

 

explaining divergent outcomes: the argument in brief This book explains the diverging trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes since 1990. As a starting point, we assume that incumbents seek to retain power and that they are willing to use extralegal means to do so. We argue that incumbents’ capacity to hold onto power – and the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes more generally – hinges primarily on two factors: (1) linkage to the West, or the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) between particular countries and the United States and the EU; and (2) incumbents’ organizational power, or the scope and cohesion of state and governing-party structures.

 

We make a three-step argument. First, where linkage to the West was extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, competitive authoritarian regimes democratized during the post–Cold War period. By heightening the international salience of autocratic abuse, increasing the likelihood of Western response, expanding the number of domestic actors with a stake in avoiding international isolation, and shifting the balance of resources and prestige in favor of oppositions, linkage raised the cost of building and sustaining authoritarian rule. High linkage created powerful incentives for authoritarian rulers to abandon power, rather than crack down, in the face of opposition challenges. It also created incentives for successor governments to rule democratically. Among high-linkage cases, not a single authoritarian government remained in power through 2008 and nearly every transition resulted in democracy. This outcome occurred even where domestic conditions for democracy were unfavorable (e.g., Guyana, Macedonia, and Romania).

 

Where linkage was low, as in most of Africa and the former Soviet Union, external democratizing pressure was weaker. Consequently, regime outcomes were driven primarily by domestic factors, particularly the organizational power of incumbents. Where state and/or governing parties were well organized and cohesive, as in Malaysia and Zimbabwe, incumbents were able to manage elite conflict and thwart even serious opposition challenges (both in the streets and at the ballot box), and competitive authoritarian regimes survived. Indeed, in nearly all low-linkage cases in which incumbents had developed coercive and/or party organizations, autocrats or their chosen successors remained in power through 2008.

 

Where state and governing-party structures were underdeveloped and lacked cohesion, regimes were less stable. Because incumbents lacked the organizational and coercive tools to prevent elite defection, steal elections, or crack down on protest, they were vulnerable to even relatively weak opposition challenges. Consequently, regimes were more open to contingency than in other cases.

 

24 Competitive Authoritarianism In this context, a third factor – states’ vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure (which we call Western leverage) – was often decisive. Where countries’ strategic or economic importance inhibited external pressure (e.g., Russia), or where assistance from counter-hegemonic powers blunted the impact of that pressure (e.g., Cameroon, Gabon, and post-1994 Belarus), even relatively weak regimes survived. Where Western leverage was high, such governments were more likely to fall. In these cases, turnover created an opportunity for democratization. Indeed, fragile democracies emerged in Benin, Mali, and Ukraine.

 

However, in the absence of close ties to the West or a strong domestic push for democracy, transitions frequently brought to power new authoritarian governments (e.g., Georgia, Malawi, and Zambia). In low-linkage cases, therefore, low organizational power was associated with unstable competitive authoritarianism.

 

Like all theories of regime change, ours cannot explain all cases. Regime outcomes are influenced by a variety of factors – including economic performance, the strength and strategies of opposition movements, leadership, and historical contingency – that lie outside of our theoretical framework. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the regimes analyzed in this study follow trajectories not predicted by our theory (e.g., democratization in Benin, Ghana, and Ukraine).

 

Nevertheless, linkage, leverage, and organizational power explain a striking number of cases.

 

theoretical implications Our research has a range of implications for the study of contemporary political regimes and regime change. For example, it contributes to the emerging literature on the international dimension of regime change. The massive wave of democratization that swept across the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s defied nearly all established theories of democratization. Framed in terms of Dahl’s cost of toleration versus cost of suppression,125 many leading theories expect stable democracy to emerge when either (1) increased societal wealth or equality reduces the cost of toleration126; or (2) a strengthening of civil society or opposition forces – often a product of socioeconomic modernization – increases the cost of repression.127 Neither of these phenomena occurred on a large scale prior to the transitions in Latin America, Africa, or communist Eurasia. What did change was the international environment. Changes in the post–Cold War international environment heightened the cost of suppression in much of the developing world. Thus, it was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s.128 This book presents a new framework for analyzing the international influences on regime change. The recent literature highlights a dizzying array of international influences including diffusion, demonstration effects, conditionality, 125 Dahl (1971: 15).

 

127 See Dahl (1971) and Rueschemeyer, Ste126 Lipset (1959/1981); Dahl (1971); Przeworski phens, and Stephens (1992).

 

and Limongi (1997); Boix (2003); Acemoglu 128 We thank David Waldner for drawing our and Robinson (2005).

 

attention to this point.

 

Introduction 25 transnational civil society, and new information technologies. We organize these various mechanisms into two dimensions: Western leverage and linkage to the West. This framework enables us to capture cross-national variation in the nature and degree of external democratizing pressure. We find that the impact of the international environment varied considerably across cases and regions, and that this variation was rooted, to a large degree, in the extent of countries’ ties to the West. Where linkage was high (e.g., Eastern Europe and the Americas), regimes often democratized – even in the absence of favorable domestic conditions; where it was low (e.g., Africa and the former Soviet Union), domestic factors predominated. Moreover, we find that although political conditionality and other forms of direct (or leverage-based) pressure may be effective, the democratizing impact of conditionality is far greater in countries with extensive linkage to the West.

 

Second, this book highlights the role of incumbent organizational power in shaping regime outcomes. Recent studies of democratization have given considerable attention to the role of societal or opposition-centered factors, including civil society,129 organized labor,130 mass protest,131 and opposition cohesion,132 in undermining authoritarianism and/or installing democracy. However, in much of post-Cold War Africa, Asia, and post-communist Eurasia, civil societies and opposition parties were weak and fragmented; as a result, the societal push for democratization was meager.133 In many of these cases, regime outcomes were rooted less in the character or behavior of opposition movements than in incumbents’ capacity to thwart them. Where incumbents possessed a powerful coercive apparatus and/or party organization, even well-organized and cohesive opposition challenges often failed. By contrast, where incumbents lacked the organizational tools needed to steal elections, co-opt opponents, or crack down on protest, transitions occurred even when oppositions were weak. Indeed, this book shows that successful opposition movements were often rooted in state and party weakness. Much of the financial and organizational muscle behind successful opposition challenges in Zambia (1990–1991), Kenya (2002), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004) was provided by ex-government officials who had defected only weeks or months before the transition.

 

Two implications are worth noting. First, although strong parties and states are widely – and correctly – viewed as critical to democratic stability, they also are critical to stable authoritarianism.134 Where incumbents lacked strong state and party organizations, they rarely survived during the post–Cold War period. In a competitive authoritarian context, therefore, successful state- or party-building (e.g., Zimbabwe in the 1980s, Armenia and Cambodia in the 1990s, and Russia in the 2000s) may contribute not to democratization but rather to authoritarian 129 See Fish (1995), Diamond (1999), and 132 Howard and Roessler (2006).

 

Howard (2003).

 

133 On the weakness of civil society in post130 See Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens communist countries, see Howard (2003).

 

(1992), Collier (1999a), and Bellin (2000).

 

On opposition weakness in Africa, see 131 See Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Rakner and van de Walle (2009).

 

Beissinger (2002, 2007), Thompson and 134 See Huntington (1968, 1970) and, more Kuntz (2004, 2005), Bunce and Wolchik recently, Way (2005a), Brownlee (2007a), (2006a, b), and Tucker (2007).

 

and Slater (forthcoming).

 

26 Competitive Authoritarianism consolidation. Second, many post–Cold War transitions were rooted more in the weakness of incumbent governments than in the strength, strategies, or mobilization of opposition forces. Such transitions were marked by a paradox: The weakness of state and governing-party organizations made it more likely that an autocrat would be forced from power but less likely that the transition would result in democracy. Transitions by collapse generally occurred in a context of weak states, parties, and civil societies – conditions that were hardly propitious for democratization. Because both institutional and societal checks on successor governments tended to be weak, transitions often gave rise to new authoritarian incumbents.

 

This book also speaks to the emerging literature on political parties and authoritarian stability. Scholars such as Barbara Geddes, Jason Brownlee, and Beatriz Magaloni have highlighted the role that parties play in maintaining elite cohesion, which is widely viewed as central to authoritarian stability.135 For these scholars, parties manage elite conflict mainly through the organization and distribution of patronage. By providing institutional mechanisms for rulers to reward loyalists and by lengthening actors’ time horizons through the provision of future opportunities for career advancement, parties encourage elite cooperation over defection.136 Not all ruling parties are alike, however. As our study demonstrates, authoritarian parties vary considerably in their organizational strength and cohesion.

 

This variation has important implications for regime stability. Indeed, our case analyses show that strictly patronage-based parties – even institutionalized ones – are often vulnerable to collapse during periods of crisis. During the post–Cold War period, established ruling parties in Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, and Zambia were decimated by defection in the face of economic and/or succession crises.

 

By contrast, cohesion is greater in parties that are bound by salient ethnic or ideological ties or a shared history of violent struggle, such as revolutionary or liberation movements (e.g., Frelimo in Mozambique, the FSLN in Nicaragua, and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe). Such nonmaterial bonds often help hold parties together even in the face of declining patronage resources. Frelimo, the FSLN, and ZANU remained intact despite severe economic crises and serious threats to their hold on power. Thus, parties that combined patronage with nonmaterial ties – such as those rooted in violent conflict or struggle – provided the most robust bases for authoritarian rule during the post–Cold War era.

 

the distinctive logic of competitive authoritarian politics This book also highlights the importance of taking seriously the dynamics of contemporary authoritarian regimes.137 Until recently, the assumption that hybrid regimes were “in transition” to democracy biased analyses in important ways.

 

135 Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2007a); Magaloni 137 Here, we echo the calls of Linz (2000: 32–8), (2008). See also Smith (2005).

 

Brown (2005), Schedler (2006b), and Snyder 136 Geddes (1999) and Brownlee (2007a).

 

(2006).

 

Introduction 27 Scholars gave disproportionate attention to factors that shaped the performance and stability of democracy, such as constitutional design, executive–legislative relations, electoral and party systems, and voting behavior. As a result, the factors that contribute to building and sustaining contemporary nondemocracies, as well as the internal dynamics of these regimes, were left underexplored.138 In treating competitive authoritarian regimes as “transitional” democracies, scholars often assumed that political processes (e.g., candidate selection, electoral campaigns, and legislative politics) worked more or less as they do under democracies.

 

Yet such assumptions are often misguided. The coexistence of meaningful democratic institutions and authoritarian incumbents creates distinctive opportunities and constraints for actors, which – in important areas of political life – generate distinct patterns of political behavior. We examine some of these areas in the following sections.