註釋

 1 One representative French observer describes “a U.S. mindset” that “tends to emphasize military, technical and unilateral solutions to international problems, possibly at the expense of co-operative and political ones.” See Gilles Andreani, “The Disarray of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy,” Survival 41 (Winter 1999–2000): 42–61.

2 The case of Bosnia in the early 1990s stands out as an instance where some Europeans, chiefly British Prime Minister Tony Blair, were at times more forceful in advocating military action than first the Bush and then the Clinton administration. (Blair was also an early advocate of using air power and even ground troops in the Kosovo crisis.) And Europeans had forces on the ground in Bosnia when the United States did not, although in a UN peacekeeping role that proved ineffective when challenged.

3 Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace (New Haven, 2001), p. 47.

4 Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800 (Princeton, 1959), 1:242.

5 Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1961), p. 17.

6 Quoted in Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), p. 134.

7 Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), p. 94.

8 Edvard Benes quoted in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (London, 1948), p. 30.

9 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 12.

10 Quoted in A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York, 1983), pp. 73–74.

11 Quoted in Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), p. 307.

12 As one French official stationed in Berlin put it, “If Hitler is sincere in proclaiming his desire for peace, we will be able to congratulate ourselves on having reached agreement; if he has other designs or if he has to give way one day to some fanatic we will at least have postponed the outbreak of a war and that is indeed a gain.” Quoted in Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, 1936– 1939 (London, 1977), p. 30; Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 294.

13 Quoted in Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties (New York, 1983), p. 341.

14 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York, 1987), p. 55.

15 Ibid.

16 Quoted in ibid., p. 65

17 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999): 35–49.

18 X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, reprinted in James F. Hoge Jr. and Fareed Zakaria, eds., The American Encounter: The United States and the Making of the Modern World (New York, 1997), p. 165.

19 The United Kingdom and France had the greatest capability to project force overseas, but their capacity was much smaller than that of the United States.

20 For that matter, this is also the view commonly found in American textbooks.

21 Steven Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy,” working paper, Centre for European Reform, February 2001.

22 Notwithstanding the sizable British contribution to military operations in Iraq.

23 The poll, sponsored by the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, was taken between June 1 and July 6, 2002. Asked to identify which “possible threats to vital interests” were “extremely important,” 91 percent of Americans listed “international terrorism” as opposed to 65 percent of Europeans. On “Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction,” the gap was 28 points, with 86 percent of Americans identifying Iraq as an “extremely important” threat compared to 58 percent of Europeans. On “Islamic fundamentalism,” 61–49; on “military conflict between Israel and Arab neighbors,” 67–43; on “tensions between India and Pakistan,” 54–32; on “development of China as a world power,” 56–19; on “political turmoil in Russia,” 27–15.

24 Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?”

25 Charles Grant, “European Defence Post-Kosovo?,” working paper, Centre for European Reform, June 1999, p. 2.

26 The comment was by former State Department adviser Charles Maechling Jr., quoted in Thomas W. Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (Boulder, CO, 2000), p. 165.

27 Address by Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk to the Council on Foreign Relations, April 22, 1999, quoted in ibid., p. 183.

28 Tim Garden and John Roper, “Pooling Forces,” Centre for European Reform, December 1999.

29 Christoph Bertram, Charles Grant, and François Heisbourg, “European Defence: The Next Steps,” Centre for European Reform, CER Bulletin 14 (October/November 2000).

30 Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York, 2001), p. 449. 31 Americans also didn’t want their pilots flying at low altitudes where they were more likely to be shot down. Ibid.

31 Garden and Roper, “Pooling Forces.”

32 Clark, Waging Modern War, pp. 420, 421. “The lack of legal authority,” Clark recalls, “caused almost every NATO government initially to reject Secretary Cohen’s appeal to authorize a NATO threat” prior to the outbreak of war in early 1999.

33 Ibid., p. 449.

34 Ibid., p. 426.

35 As Clark wryly reports, “No one laughed.” Ibid., p. 417.

36 Ibid., p. 430.

37 John Vinocur, “On Both War and Peace, the EU Stands Divided,” International Herald Tribune, December 17, 2001.

38 Europeans insist that there are certain structural realities in their national budgets, built-in limitations to any significant increases in defense spending. But if Europe were about to be invaded, would its politicians insist that defense budgets could not be raised because this would violate the terms of the EU’s growth and stability pact? If Germans truly felt threatened, would they insist nevertheless that their social welfare programs be left untouched?

39 Fischer speech at Humboldt University in Berlin, May 12, 2000.

40 Robert Cooper, The Observer, April 7, 2002.

41 See Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace (Lawrence, KS, 1999), pp. 200–201.

42 Speech by Romano Prodi at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, May 29, 2001.

43 Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?,” p. 10.

44 Chris Patten, “From Europe with Support,” Yediot Ahronot, October 28, 2002.

45 The common American argument that European policy toward Iraq and Iran has been dictated by financial considerations is only partly right. Are Europeans greedier than Americans? Do American corporations not influence American policy in Asia and Latin America as well as in the Middle East? The difference is that American strategic judgments sometimes conflict with and override financial interests. For the reasons suggested in this essay, that conflict is much less common for Europeans.

46 See Gerard Baker, “Europe’s Three Ways of Dealing with Iraq,” Financial Times, October 17, 2002, p. 17.

47 Fischer speech at Humboldt University, May 12, 2000.

48 Prodi speech at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, May 29, 2001.

49 Charles Grant, “A European View of ESDP,” working paper, Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2001.

50 As Grant observes, “An EU that was less impotent militarily would have more diplomatic clout.” Grant, “European Defence,” p. 2.

51 Dominique Moisi, Financial Times, March 11, 2002.

52 Timothy Garton Ash, New York Times, April 9, 2002.

53 Quoted in David Ignatius, “France’s Constructive Critic,” Washington Post, February 22, 2002.

54 As the historian John Lamberton Harper has put it, FDR wanted “to bring about a radical reduction in the weight of Europe” and thereby make possible “the retirement of Europe from world politics.” Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge, UK, 1996), pp. 79, 3.

55 William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937–1940 (New York, 1952), p. 14.

56 Quoted in Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (New York, 1957), p. 142; Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 396.

57 Cooper, The Observer, April 7, 2002.

58 Quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 452.

59 Quoted in James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York, 1998), p. 107.

60 Ibid., p. 108.

61 Quoted in Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton, p. 195.

62 Quoted in Edward Handler, America and Europe in the Political Thought of John Adams (Cambridge, MA, 1964), p. 102.

63 “Half a Billion Americans?,” The Economist, August 22, 2002.

64 Quoted in Chace, Acheson, p. 150.

65 Quoted in ibid., p. 157.

66 Quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 416.

67 Quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 425.

68 X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” p. 169.

69 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York, 1962), p. 134

70 Quoted in Harper, American Visions of Europe, pp. 114–15.

71 Joschka Fischer interview in Der Spiegel, March 24, 2003.

72 Dominique de Villepin, address to the UN Security Council, March 19, 2003.

73 See Transatlantic Trends 2003, a survey commissioned by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo. Polling was conducted June 10–25, 2003, in eight countries: the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. (Results can be viewed at www.transatlantictrends. org.)

74 Gerhard Schroeder interview in The New York Times, September 4, 2002.

75 As the British political scientist Christopher Croker has observed, “Nothing is more naïve than the claim that the rifts are likely to end if Bush fails to be reelected in 2004 or if the Schroeder government loses power.” Christopher Croker, Empires in Conflict: The Growing Rift

76 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, 1992), p. 263.

77 Actually, Europeans and Americans do at times question each other’s political and economic institutions.

78 Outside of Europe and Japan, in places such as Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, and of course Russia and China, America was generally accorded less legitimacy.

79 The exception, of course, is in Eastern and Central Europe, where most nations still feel strategically dependent on the United States. But if and as these powers feel less threatened over the coming years, and as they become more entangled in the European Union’s web of economic and political relationships, they may follow the path of the Western European peoples.

80 Fischer interview in Der Spiegel, March 24, 2003.

81 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997): 915.

82 In fact, according to realist and neo-realist theory, a unipolar world of the kind we now live in is impossible, or at least is inherently unstable and short-lived, because the emergence of a sole superpower must quickly lead the world’s other powers to band together in opposition and restore international balance. For a summary and refutation of this theory, see William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24 (Summer 1999): 5–41.

83 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations , (New York, 2004), pp. 163–64.

84 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations , p. 167.

85 As Huntington noted, “political and intellectual leaders in most countries strongly resist the prospect of a unipolar world and favor the emergence of true multipolarity.” See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999): 34.

86 Indeed, there is something contradictory in Europeans seeking a return to a global balance of power, in order to restore peace and justice to the international system, when they have rejected the balance of power as the greatest threat to peace and justice on the continent of Europe.

87 For all the talk about American “empire,” Europeans know that the United States does not have imperial ambitions to control the continent of Europe as would-be hegemons have tried in the past, from Louis XIV to Napoleon to Hitler.

88 Again, the fact that Russia, China, and many nations of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East opposed the use of American power as illegitimate is not a new phenomenon. What is new and dramatic is the defection of America’s European allies to that camp.

89 Fischer interview in Der Spiegel, March 24, 2003.

90 Jacques Chirac, televised interview, July 14, 2003.

91 Javier Solana, “The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinvention or Reform?” Progressive Governance, July 10, 2003.

92 Fischer interview, Die Zeit, May 8, 2003.

93 De Villepin address to the UN Security Council, March 19, 2003.

94 So much so that he sacrificed a great deal of his personal and international political capital in the futile attempt to gain a second resolution explicitly authorizing war.

95 De Villepin address to the UN Security Council, March 19, 2003.

96 See Transatlantic Trends 2003.

97 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, p. 57.

98 Had the Soviet Union blocked a resolution authorizing the first Gulf war, no one, including the Soviets, believed Bush would have brought his half million troops back home.

99 When NATO went to war against Serbia in 1999, the allies tried but failed to obtain authorization because Russia, Serbia’s historic protector, opposed the war.

100 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, p. 61.

101 Croker, Empires in Conflict: 3.

102 De Villepin, “Law, Force and Justice,” speech delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 27, 2003.

103 Some might point to the Convention on Genocide as providing some legal justification for the war, but the Convention stipulated that nations must “call upon the competent organs of the United Nations” to take such action “under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.” Nations were not supposed to undertake such actions on their own or even in large groups. NATO was not conceived as a substitute for the legal authority of the UN.

104 Henry Kissinger, “The End of NATO as We Know It?”, The Washington Post, August 15, 1999, B7.

105 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, pp. 60–61. Emphasis added. “Postmodern intervention” outside the European context, it has become clear, is another matter.

106 Michael J. Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, lss. 3, May/June 2003.

107 Michael J. Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, Iss. 3, May/June 2003.

108 Fischer interview, Die Zeit, May 8, 2003.

109 Solana, “The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinvention or Reform?”

110 Dana Milbank, “At UN, Bush Is Criticized Over Iraq,” The Washington Post, September 24, 2003, A1.

111 See Kofi A. Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” The Economist, September 18, 1999.

112 Milbank, “At UN, Bush Is Criticized Over Iraq.”

113 The following discussion of liberalism and international law owes much to the work of Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf in their book, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace (Lawrence, Kansas, 1999.)

114 Both Kant and Montesquieu believed peace would be based primarily on the rise of commercialism in liberal nations, which would make them unwilling to fight one another.

115 Letter to Lord Grenville of August 18, 1792, in Harvey C. Mans-field Jr., Selected Letters of Edmund Burke (Chicago, 1984); Pangle and Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations, pp. 184–85.

116 See Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty.”

117 See Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 281–82.

118 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, p. 58.

119 Ibid.

120 Tony Blair speech to the Chicago Chambers of Commerce, September 1998; Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, pp. 59–60. Nor have Europeans limited themselves in such intrusions on national sovereignty to their own continent. The International Criminal Court, which European governments championed, authorizes action against leaders and officials of other nations, even where those nations have not ratified the treaty.

121 The list of “friendly” dictators ultimately toppled with the connivance of the United States is long. Consider the fates of Ferdinand Marcos, Anastasio Somoza, Manuel Noriega, and the military junta of South Korea, to name a few.

122 Letter to William Plumer, January 17, 1817, in Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. VI, (New York, 1968), p. 143; Lockey, Pan-Americanism, p. 159.

123 Bill Clinton, in fact, argued in July 2003 that seeking “regime change” in Iraq was the correct policy if Saddam Hussein did not disarm. Bill Clinton interview on CNN, July 22, 2003.

124 The term “pre-emption” is not an accurate description of the Bush administration’s doctrine. It implies taking action against a nation or group that is about to strike. What the Bush administration did in Iraq was “prevention,” which implies taking action even before the decision to strike has been taken by a potentially hostile power, and perhaps well before. This is the harder case from a traditional international legal point of view. For the purposes of this essay, I will use the term “preventive” war.

125 Milbank, “At U.N., Bush is Criticized Over Iraq.”

126 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, p. 64.

127 Michael Walzer, “The Hard Questions: Lone Ranger,” The New Republic, April 27, 1998.

128 Henry Kissinger, “Iraq Poses Most Consequential Foreign-Policy Decision for Bush,” Los Angeles Times, August 8, 2002.

129 Glenn Kessler, “Bush: Israel Must Defend Itself,” The Washington Post, October 7, 2003, A19.

130 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations , p. 64.

131 Kofi Annan speech to the UN General Assembly, September 22, 2003.

132 See Transatlantic Trends 2003.

133 De Villepin, “Law, Force, and Justice,” speech to the International Institute for Security Studies, March 27, 2003.

134 De Villepin statement to the UN Security Council, February 14, 2003.

135 Solana, “The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinvention or Reform?” Progressive Governance, July 10, 2003.

136 Fischer interview, Die Zeit, May 8, 2003.

137 Javier Solana, “The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinvention or Reform?” Progressive Governance, July 10, 2003.

138 It is not yet the case that the world’s other major liberal democracies, including India and Japan, weigh as heavily in American calculations as does Europe. Whether this is because they are relative newcomers to “the West” or because of cultural and racial prejudices in the transatlantic community is hard to say. But the views of New Delhi do not carry as much weight, or excite as much passion, as the views of Paris.

139 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, 79 (January/February 2000): 47.

140 Ibid.

141 Joschka Fischer interview, Stern, October 2, 2002.