國際法與「台灣光復」議題的研討會

當然可以。以下是這篇推文的完整中文翻譯：

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Thomas Hu（@epochquehu）

今天早上，我參加了一場關於國際法與「台灣光復」議題的研討會，由「外交事務協會」（Association for Foreign Affairs）主辦。
在問答時間中，我原本打算分享以下幾點觀察：

在1990年德國統一之前，東德與西德並未正式接受《波茨坦宣言》。
這意味著，在長達45年的期間——至少從西德的立場來看——德國的東部領土（即所謂的奧得－尼斯線以東地區），這些領土是史達林在德黑蘭會議上提出要求，並未遭到羅斯福反對，後來又在雅爾達會議、《波茨坦協定》及波蘭與東德之間的條約中被確認下來，但依然被視為「未定狀態」（undetermined）。

這也是後來所謂的「2+4條約」（即《關於德國最終解決條約》）的背景，該條約由兩個德國（東、西德）與四個同盟國（美、蘇、英、法）共同簽署。
在國際法上，這份條約被視為取代《波茨坦宣言》所對同盟國及德國施加之拘束的最終法律文件。

從這個國際法先例推論，有人可能會認為，美國國務院所稱「台灣地位未定」的說法，或許預示了一種潛在情境：
若第四份《中美公報》明確反對台灣獨立，或表明不反對和平統一，那麼或許可以為一種新局鋪路——即承認台海兩岸在某種程度上共同繼承1945年時「中華民國」的主權與國際法人格，同時彼此互不承認為主權國家，而僅視對方為「敵對政府」。

透過重新確認《波茨坦宣言》，雙方（中、美、日）可以「確認」那些在《舊金山和約》中尚未最終確定的領土邊界——畢竟當時無論中華民國或中華人民共和國都不是簽約國。

本質上，這將需要重新承認由中華民國政府簽署的《中日和約》（Treaty of Taipei）的效力，而這份條約未來可被納入「一個中國」架構之中。

換句話說，若能將兩份條約（《中日和約》與《舊金山和約》）與四份《中美公報》（即《上海公報》、《建交公報》、《八一七公報》以及可能的「第四公報」）進行綜合，就能在實質上達成類似「2+4條約」的結果。

這正體現了「2+4精神」。

若北京發表一份聲明，內容類似當年中華民國外交部就香港主權移交所發布的聲明——
從「中華民族」或「中國整體」的立場，表達對「國民政府」依據《中日和約》實施「台灣光復」的承認——
那麼此舉將有效終結「台灣地位未定論」。

在我看來，北京近日宣布將10月25日（台灣光復節）正式列為中國大陸的公眾假期，其實傳達的正是這個微妙訊息。

同時，台灣立法院在國民黨多數的情況下，也通過了恢復「台灣光復節」為公定假日的決議。

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是否希望我接著為你撰寫這篇推文的中文重點摘要與國際法分析解讀（約500字）？

19:23

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貼文

RA

Thomas Hu @epoquehu

回覆給 @lylegoldstein

跟隨

This past morning, I attended a seminar on international law and Taiwan's retrocession, hosted by the Association for Foreign Affairs. I had intended to share the following views during the Q&A session:

Prior to their unification in 1990, East and West Germany did not formally accept the Potsdam Proclamation. This meant that, for a span of 45 years-at least from West Germany's perspective-the eastern territories of Germany (namely, the so-called Oder-Neisse Line), which Stalin had demanded at the Tehran Conference without opposition from Roosevelt and which were later confirmed at Yalta Conference, Potsdam Conference and by treaties between Poland and East Germany, remained "undetermined."

This is also why the agreement commonly referred to as the 2+4 Treaty (signed by East and West Germany along with the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France) is formally titled the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany.

In international law, this treaty is regarded as the definitive legal document that supplanted the Potsdam Proclamation's binding constraints on the Allied powers and Germany.

Drawing from this precedent in international law, one might infer that the U.S. State Department's assertion of Taiwan's status as "undetermined" could foreshadow a potential scenario: should a fourth U.S.-China communiqué explicitly oppose Taiwan independence or refrain from opposing peaceful unification, it might pave the way for acknowledging that both sides of the Taiwan Strait partially inherit the sovereignty and international legal personality of the Republic of China as it existed in 1945-while mutually refraining from recognizing each other as independent states, viewing one another merely as rival governments.

Through a renewed reaffirmation of the Potsdam Proclamation, the two sides, along with the United States and Japan, could "confirm" the territorial boundaries not definitively settled in the San Francisco Treaty, to which neither ROC nor PRC was a signatory.

In essence, this would necessitate recognizing the validity of the Treaty of Taipei, signed by the Republic of China government, which would then be acknowledged (at least by a future) "One China."

In other words, by synthesizing two treaties (the Treaty of Taipei and the San Francisco Treaty) with four communiqués (the Shanghai Communiqué, the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, the August 17 Communiqué, and perhaps a forthcoming fourth U.S.-China communiqué), one could effectively achieve an outcome substantively akin to the 2+4 Treaty.

This, too, embodies the spirit of "2+4"

If Beijing were to issue a statement akin to the one released by the Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei regarding Hong Kong's handover-expressing, from the standpoint of the Chinese race/nation, its approval of the Nationalist government "administering" Taiwan's retrocession in accordance with the Treaty of Taipei-it would effectively dispel all notions of Taiwan's status remaining undetermined.

That in my view, is the subtle message conveyed by Beijing's formally establishing October 25th the Taiwan Retrocession Day as a public holiday on Chinese Mainland.

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, where the KMT holds a majority, passed a resolution to re-establish Taiwan Retrocession Day as well. 由

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