《漫長的敗北：日本的文化創傷、記憶與認同》
作者：橋本明子（Akiko Hashimoto）
出版：牛津大學出版社，2015年
頁數：208頁，平裝本售價24.95美元
雖然集體記憶與創傷研究這一學術領域長期探討文化產物與敘事，但它在處理「文化差異」所帶來的困境方面幾乎一無所獲。橋本明子的這本新書，正確地把「文化差異」置於核心位置，用以解釋日本如何面對第二次世界大戰的遺緒。至今，該領域的研究多以西方國家為主，學者群體也主要來自西方。由於這種失衡，偏見與預設自然滲入了相關文獻。
在這以西方為中心的研究傳統中，日本是唯一重要的例外。然而，即使在日本研究中，學界仍鮮少深入理解日本與西方文化的差異如何深刻影響其處理戰爭暴力遺產的方式。學者普遍承認日本與德國走上了不同的道路，但對其原因的解釋卻奇異地缺乏文化層面的分析。這點尤其令人驚訝，因為這一研究領域高度依賴質性研究與文化文本的分析。原因之一，或許在於缺乏明確的比較研究；即使有比較，也多半集中於日本與德國，但解釋差異時仍回到政治、經濟或國際關係等宏觀層面。
橋本明子的這本新作，大幅修正了這種偏差，也提醒學者們——即便他們不專注於日本——在研究各國如何處理艱難歷史時，也必須更重視文化差異。橋本之所以能比他人做得更好，部分原因在於她強調「微觀層面」——家庭中的日常互動——如何深刻地影響國家層面的歷史敘事（第19–20頁）。她對日本家庭的理解尤為深入。身為1960年代成長於日本的女性，她能以親身經驗反思此題。此外，日本家庭與家屋制度的變遷與持續性，一直是她主要的研究領域。
當然，集體記憶的形成中也存在一些普遍性因素，橫跨不同地區與歷史時期。例如，全人類都要面對「死亡」這一根本問題，但不同文明處理生死、界定生者與死者關係的方式卻差異極大。同樣地，所有文明都承認親子關係的特殊性，但關於父母與子女義務的文化規範又各不相同。
在這兩個層面上，日本生活方式都與西方規範有顯著不同。確實，
在西德，「加害者世代」與「戰後世代」之間的對峙是艱難的，即使家庭中仍多避而不談，但這類對話確實發生過；
而在日本，這種世代衝突幾乎未曾在家庭或公共領域出現。
橋本指出，這是因為日本的世代關係與依附模式與西方不同。
父權、年齡階序、性別規範與孝道服從，使任何對父母權威的批評都被視為「禁忌」（第36–37頁）。
這些因素使得戰爭過去的艱難對話被封鎖，特別是關於「加害者敘事」的討論，反而把注意力集中於一種普遍的無力感上。
戰後的日本孩子厭惡戰爭，和平主義確實是日本社會的核心信念，但他們因把父母視為「無力的受害者」，反而缺乏如何對抗不義權威的理解與正當性意識。
橋本在書中如此寫道，值得長引一段，因為它觸及了對當代政治極其重要的核心問題：
「由敗戰敘事所塑造的普遍無效感，是戰後世代狹隘、非政治化視野的一部分……這種無力問題也讓我們理解，
為何戰後的和平主義未能培養公民思考、甚至想像如何正當地抵抗戰爭機器的能力……
這種去除侵略與好戰正當性的教條，雖使公民去武化，卻同時剝奪了他們在必要時對抗權威的正當手段。」（第47–48頁）
這裡出現了日本與西德——乃至任何西方社會——在面對戰爭與法西斯遺產時的最大差異：
「抵抗」。
這是橋本敘事中那條
「未曾吠叫的狗」——
她若能在書中更深入探討，將更為精彩。在每一個涉及德國法西斯的國家案例中，今日都會讚頌對邪惡的抵抗：
德國、法國、義大利、荷蘭、丹麥皆然。
然而在日本，戰後的公共討論幾乎讓人以為根本沒有任何抵抗存在——事實並非如此。橋本在對教科書與大眾文化的分析中指出，
日本的戰時抵抗幾乎未被提及，問題在於：為什麼？
橋本在本書中未直接回答這一問題，但她在其他著作中（特別是關於日本家庭的研究）提供了充足線索。例如，在〈日本的文化、權力與孝道論述〉一文中，她指出：
「孩子逐漸明白反叛是無用的，反叛意味著失敗，除了順從之外別無他法。」
同樣地，
丸山真男在其經典論文〈超國家主義的理論與心理〉中，也指出即使是自由派的日本人，也無法想像違背孝道的核心原則。
歷史學者家永三郎在《太平洋戰爭（1931–1945）》一書中，也曾困惑於日本缺乏戰時抵抗。他找到的例子多屬「消極抵抗」與「退出」，而真正積極抵抗者，多半是基督徒。
正如家永與Robert Bellah、橋本所指出的，
基督信仰提供了一種超越世俗孝道秩序的超驗真理觀，使人們能以道德理由正當化自己的抵抗。
家永希望日本人能從這些戰時抵抗的例子中
學習如何、以及為何應該對抗不義權威，
但直到今日，日本社會幾乎仍忽視這段歷史。
因此，《漫長的敗北》之所以是此領域的重要貢獻，正是因為橋本以文化分析為核心，關注家庭與日常生活層次，並強調非西方社會的集體記憶形成方式，可能與主導學界的西方模式有根本不同。這本書文筆優美、結構清晰，是極為傑出的學術著作。
—— 馬克．A．沃爾夫格拉姆（Mark A. Wolfgram）
奧克拉荷馬州立大學
參考文獻：
-
Akiko Hashimoto, “Culture, Power, and the Discourse of Filial Piety in Japan: The Disempowerment of Youth and Its Social Consequences,” 收錄於 Filial Piety: Practice and Discourse in Contemporary East Asia, 編者 Charlotte Ikels（史丹佛大學出版社，2004），頁186。
-
丸山真男〈超國家主義的理論與心理〉，收錄於 Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics，Ivan Morris 編譯（倫敦：牛津大學出版社，1969），頁1–24。
-
家永三郎《太平洋戰爭：1931–1945》（紐約：Pantheon Books，1978）。
-
Robert N. Bellah，《想像日本：日本傳統與其現代詮釋》（加州大學出版社，2003），頁169。
是否希望我接著為這篇書評撰寫重點摘要與主題分析（如：文化創傷、孝道與抵抗意識、和平主義的心理結構）？这有助于整理成学术笔记或投稿评论稿。
😃😃😃😃
好的，以下是橋本明子《漫長的敗北：日本的文化創傷、記憶與認同》（The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan）書評的重點摘要與主題分析，整理成適合學術筆記或評論稿的結構：
🧩 一、書籍主旨與核心問題
橋本明子以「戰後日本的文化記憶與家庭倫理」為切入點，探討日本如何在戰敗後形成一種獨特的「和平主義心態」與「道德無力感」。
她主張：
日本的戰後記憶並非僅由國家政策或國際壓力塑造，而是深深植根於家庭倫理、孝道與世代關係之中。
此書意圖挑戰以西方為主的戰敗創傷理論，指出「非西方文化背景」如何形塑記憶、責任與抵抗的可能性。
🏛 二、主要理論觀點
1️⃣ 文化差異的中心性（Cultural Centrality）
-
過去集體記憶研究多以德國、法國為中心，忽視文化差異的深層影響。
-
橋本主張，文化結構（特別是孝道、年齡階序、性別角色）會決定一個社會如何「講述」戰敗。
-
日本的「戰敗敘事」之所以不同於德國的「罪責敘事」，正是文化倫理的產物。
2️⃣ 家庭作為記憶場域（Family as a Site of Memory）
3️⃣ 無力與和平主義的心理結構（Inefficacy and Pacifism）
橋本指出戰後日本的和平主義並非來自「積極的反戰理性」，而是出於「失敗與無力感」的延續。
⚔️ 三、與德國戰敗文化的對比
| 面向 |
德國（西方） |
日本（東方） |
| 世代對話 |
加害世代與後代之間有衝突、辯論 |
家庭內避談戰爭，加害責任未公開化 |
| 抵抗敘事 |
抗納粹運動被頌揚為道德英雄 |
幾乎沒有「抵抗」被納入國族記憶 |
| 主體意識 |
承擔責任、學習抵抗不義 |
轉化為無力與服從的延續 |
| 道德來源 |
個人主體與理性倫理 |
孝道與社會和諧的持續性 |
橋本指出，這種差異並非政治制度造成，而是文化倫理長期運作的結果。
💬 四、學者對話與延伸文獻
橋本的觀點延伸並對話於以下幾位學者：
-
丸山真男（Masao Maruyama）：指出日本自由派仍無法超越孝道體系。
-
家永三郎（Saburo Ienaga）：指出戰時抵抗多為「消極」與「撤退」而非主動抗爭。
-
Robert Bellah：強調基督徒因具「超越社會秩序」的信仰，才能發展出道德抵抗的正當性。
橋本綜合以上觀點，提出：
日本的文化創傷在於「無法產生對權威的抵抗倫理」，而非單純的罪責逃避。
🕯 五、關鍵概念與主題
| 主題 |
關鍵意涵 |
| 文化創傷（Cultural Trauma） |
戰敗後的羞恥與無力感被「家族倫理化」，而非政治化。 |
| 孝道與權威（Filial Piety and Authority） |
對父母的順從延伸為對國家權威的服從。 |
| 和平主義的心理基礎 |
非出於道德信念，而是源自敗北與恐懼。 |
| 抵抗的缺席（Absence of Resistance） |
戰時抵抗未被敘事化，使國族道德經驗不完整。 |
| 「漫長的敗北」意象 |
不只是戰爭的失敗，而是文化上對自我更新與抵抗的持續失敗。 |
📚 六、學術貢獻
-
去西方中心化（Decentering the West）：為戰敗文化研究引入非西方倫理視角。
-
家庭社會學與歷史記憶的交叉研究。
-
揭示日本和平主義的心理矛盾——和平與服從之間的糾結。
-
啟發性議題：
-
戰敗後的「情感政治」如何被制度化？
-
日本的教育與媒體如何再生產「被動的和平主義」？
-
當代日本是否仍處於「漫長的敗北」之中？
🧠 七、評論與啟示
Mark A. Wolfgram 評價此書為：「文筆優美、論證清晰、真正開拓性的作品。」
他特別強調橋本的貢獻在於提醒學界：
戰敗的記憶不只是政治問題，更是文化與家庭倫理問題。
這一觀點對今日台灣、韓國乃至中國皆具啟發性：
若國家記憶長期由「服從倫理」支撐，則民主化與公民抵抗的根基將始終脆弱。
是否希望我下一步幫你撰寫一篇約1000字的評論性短文（以謝東森的筆名風格），題目如〈日本的和平主義是一種失語的服從──讀〈漫長的敗北〉〉，用於投稿或社群發表？
😃😃😃😃
The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan. Akiko Hashimoto. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 208. USD $24.95 paper.
Although the field of collective memory and trauma studies deals extensively with cultural artefacts and narratives, it has largely failed to engage the dilemmas posed by cultural differences. Akiko Hashimoto's new book rightly puts cultural difference front and center in explaining the Japanese encounter with the legacy of World War II. To date, scholarship in this area has been largely based upon studies of Western countries and is dominated by Western scholars. Given this imbalance in the scholarship and scholars, it is hardly surprising that certain biases and assumptions have crept into the literature.
The most significant exception to this general focus on Western countries in the literature has been Japan. But even here the scholarship is very thin in terms of recognizing how the cultural differences between Japan and other Western countries might play a significant role in shaping how the country has processed the violent legacy of World War II. That Japan has taken a different route from that of Germany is generally acknowledged, but the reasons offered in the existing literature are curious for their lack of culturally specific explanations. This is doubly curious for a field of scholarship that is highly qualitative in nature and draws extensively upon the analysis of cultural artifacts. One reason for this probably relates to the lack of explicit comparative work in the field, although again here the one outstanding exception is that Germany and Japan have been brought into direct comparison most frequently. But even here, the explanation for the differences often comes back to politics, economics, and international relations.
Akiko Hashimoto's newest book does a great deal to correct this imbalance in the literature and will hopefully alert scholars, not necessarily interested in Japan, that they need to be more aware of the cultural differences that exist between different cases and how these factors can have a dramatic impact on how countries deal with their difficult histories. One reason why Hashimoto does a far better job at this than many others is that she recognizes the centrality of how micro-level, daily interactions in the family can have profound effects on how the national narratives about the past are shaped (19-20). And she knows the Japanese family quite well. Raised in the Japan of the 1960s, she is able to reflect on her personal experiences. Furthermore, the changing and persistent characteristics of the Japanese family and household have been, until now, her primary field of research.
There are certainly some universal or near universal aspects of collective memory formation that travel across many different locations today, and throughout human history, but these aspects probably also exist on a continuum in terms of their salience. For example, all humanity has to deal with the basic problems of human existence, such as mortality. However, how different human civilizations cope with death and define the relationship between the living and the dead varies a great deal. All human civilizations have recognized a privileged relationship between parents and children, but the cultural rules that govern the obligations between the two again vary significantly.
On both of these factors, Japanese life differs significantly from Western norms. While it is true that confrontation between the generation of "perpetrators" and the postwar generation in West Germany was difficult and something to still be avoided within families if not also in public, such confrontations did occur. In Japan, these confrontations hardly materialized inside Japanese families or in the general public. The reason for this, Hashimoto notes, is that the generational proximity and dependence is significantly different in Japan compared to Western norms. Patriarchy, age hierarchies, gender norms, and filial obedience made any criticism of parental authority "anathema" (36-37). All of these factors tended to shut down difficult discussions about the wartime past, especially with regards to perpetrator narratives, and to focus attention instead on a pervasive sense of powerlessness. Postwar Japanese children came to abhor war, and there is no question that pacifism is a strongly held sentiment in Japan, but by coming to see their parents as powerless, Japanese children have developed little understanding of how effective resistance against an unjust authority might be mounted or even justified.
Let me quote Hashimoto at length on this point because it goes to the heart of why it matters so much for present day politics, "A pervasive sense of inefficacy, shaped by accounts of defeat, is part of what forms the narrow apolitical vision of the postwar generation... This problem of inefficacy also makes sense when we realize that postwar pacifism failed to train postwar citizens to think about, or even imagine, the legitimate means of resistance to a military machine at war... This prescription to delegitimize aggression and belligerence declawed the citizens, and also deprived them of the legitimate means to act against authority when needed" (47-48)
And here we come to one of the most striking differences between the West German case, and indeed any Western case in relationship to German fascism and World War II, and Japan-resistance. This is the non-barking dog in Hashimoto's narrative, which would have been fascinating for her to explore in this book. In every single case related to German fascism, there is now, today, a celebration of the resistance against an obvious evil. The national resistance against German fascism is celebrated in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, everywhere. In Japan, one would assume based on postwar discussions that there had been no resistance at all, which was not the case. Indeed, in Hashimoto's fascinating discussion of school textbooks and popular culture, the Japanese wartime resistance is never discussed. Why?
Hashimoto does not address this question in this text, but there are ample suggestions as to why this is the case in her other writings about Japanese families, as well as the writings of others on Japan. For example, in her essay, "Culture, Power, and Filial Piety in Japan," she writes, "that the child comes to understand that rebellion is useless, that it results in defeat, and that she/he is powerless to do otherwise than acquiesce." Similarly, Masao Maruyama wrote in his classic essay, "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," of how even Japanese liberals could not conceive of violating the central tenets of filial piety. Saburo lenaga also puzzled over the lack of Japanese wartime resistance in his book, The Pacific War, 1931-1945. lenaga wrote about the examples he could find, but most of them involved passive resistance and withdrawal, rather than active resistance. Those that did take an active resistance role tended to be Christian converts, notes lenaga. The reason for this, according to Robert Bellah and Hashimoto is that Christianity provided converts with a transcendent view of the ultimate truth, which went beyond the existing social order dominated by the principle of filial piety. It gave them a moral justification for their resistance. lenaga hoped that the Japanese would draw upon the examples of wartime resistance as a way to learn about how one can and should resist unjust authority. But even today, the Japanese wartime resistance is almost wholly ignored.
And this brings us back to why The Long Defeat is such a significant contribution to the literature - Hashimoto's cultural analysis, her focus on the micro-level and the family, and the emphasis upon the fact that the way in which collective memory formation takes shape in non-Western countries may be significantly different from those in Western countries, which
currently dominate the field. It is truly a beautifully written book, exceptional in its clarity of prose and organization.
MARK A. WOLFGRAM Oklahoma State University
Akiko Hashimoto, "Culture, Power, and the Discourse of Filial Piety in Japan: The Disempowerment of Youth and Its Social Consequences," in Filial Piety: Practice and Discourse in Contemporary East Asia, ed. Charlotte Ikels (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 186
2 Masao Maruyama, "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, edited and translated by Ivan Morris, 1-24 (Expanded Edition ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
Saburo lenaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978. Akiko Hashimoto "Culture, Power and the Discourse of Filial Piety in Japan," 191. Robert N. Bellah. Imagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and Its Modern Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 169.
沒有留言:
張貼留言
注意：只有此網誌的成員可以留言。