你說：

作者：Kaiser Kuo（郭怡廣）
發表日期：2025年2月16日


翻译成中文 Sinica Sinica The Legitimacy Barrier How American reluctance to accept China's political system shapes the relationship Kaiser Y Kuo Feb 16, 2025 In April of 2019, over lunch near my home in Chapel Hill, a senior U.S. diplomat in town to give a talk gave me what I recognized immediately as a litmus test. I had just finished pitching an informal group I was helping to organize, which I hoped she would join. It was a group of policy professionals, analysts, and scholars focused on China. We hoped to influence the next administration's approach — and yeah, that whole “influencing” idea didn’t work out so well. After listening to my high-minded mission statement, she looked at me and said, "I have two questions for you.” “First,” she began, “do you believe U.S. policy can positively impact China's development?” I answered with an emphatic and immediate yes. What would be the point, after all, of wanting to help shape U.S. policy if I didn’t believe it could have a positive effect? But her second question caught me off guard: "Do you believe the rule of the Chinese Communist Party to be legitimate?" After a moment's hesitation — mostly to process her intent — I also answered yes. She smiled, nodded, and said, "Good. I'm in." She understood immediately what many in Washington do not: that the refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of China’s political system isn’t just an ideological stance but also an obstacle to crafting effective policy. It ensures that American engagements with China are as often about moral posturing as about smart strategy. And more profoundly, it reflects an American mindset that has never truly had to confront the possibility that legitimacy might not be universally defined. This question of legitimacy — how governments earn and maintain their right to rule — lies at the heart of mounting tensions between the United States and China. For decades, if not indeed centuries, Americans have operated under a simple assumption: political legitimacy derived primarily from democratic processes — in particular, free elections as an expression of popular sovereignty. Other mechanisms like checks and balances and the rule of law helped maintain that legitimacy by preventing abuse and ensuring accountability. This wasn't just one way to organize political power — it was seen as the only truly legitimate way. In this way of thinking, China was supposed to follow this trajectory. As it grew wealthier through market reforms, as its middle class expanded, as its citizens traveled abroad, and as its students filled Western universities, political liberalization would inevitably follow. This wasn't just wishful thinking: it seemed to be backed by sophisticated theories about modernization and democratization, supported by case studies from South Korea to Taiwan. This is not to suggest that all or even most proponents of engagement operated under this assumption, as the strawman version of the longstanding American policy has it. But even if that were the case — if China’s “becoming more like us” were, in fact, the premise and the goal of engagement — any fair-minded observer must acknowledge that one society's “master narrative,” the American one, has shaped the other's development much, much more than the other way around. Not, to be sure, in the way many hoped or expected. But compare China today with China on the eve of Reform and Opening: The transformation is staggering, and much of it reflects the absorption of core elements of American market capitalism, entrepreneurial culture, and certain individualistic values. From its hypercompetitive business culture to its celebration of self-made entrepreneurs — Wang Xing, Lei Jun, and yes, even Jack Ma (who appears to be back in good graces with the Party), and from its embrace of consumer culture to its cultivation of global brands, China has selectively but extensively absorbed elements of the American mentalité.1 Yet it has done so while maintaining — and in some ways strengthening — its distinct political system and many features of its political culture. And yet something unexpected has begun to emerge. China's development is starting to challenge core American assumptions about political legitimacy. It’s not doing so through push so much as through pull. The longstanding American belief that China would inevitably democratize rested on an assumption of gravitational inevitability: the liberal order was the center of global development, and all nations were drawn toward it. But today, that gravitational pull is weakened and perhaps might indeed be in the process of reversal. Instead of China orbiting the American model, a growing number of Americans now look at China’s governance — not, perhaps, with admiration, but with a reluctant recognition that it works, at least for China: a state that over several decades has delivered growth, stability, and more recently, even cleaner air. This is not just an ideological embarrassment; it could prove to be a profound rupture in the American self-conception. It doesn’t have to be. China’s rise and this (grudging) admiration now offered by a growing segment of Americans has exacerbated an inherent tension between two core values in the American political culture — that between universalist claims about electoral democracy as the sine qua non of political legitimacy, on the one hand, and a commitment to pluralism on the other. Pluralism, as I’ve noted elsewhere, is something that the U.S. has, at least until very recently, prized in its domestic political order: the laudable belief in diversity and tolerance of multiple perspectives. The question is whether Americans can accept political pluralism at the global level. Dialing down the universalism and leaning into pluralist traditions in our international outlook depends first on jettisoning deeply entrenched ideas of legitimacy. The big question, then, is whether the U.S. will continue to insist that legitimacy belongs only to those who adopt its political model. China's staggering ascent is forcing that question. The Coming Collapse of Procedural Legitimacy? The American conception of political legitimacy is fundamentally procedural. Power is legitimate when it follows established rules: regular elections expressing the will of the people, transparent institutions, and codified laws. This framework has deep roots in Western political thought, from the Enlightenment's emphasis on rational systems and social contracts to Protestant ideas about covenant and consent. It sat in superficial harmony next to pluralist values, but their compatibility had never really been stress-tested. America could see itself as a pluralistic society that welcomed different cultures, religions, and viewpoints while also believing its political system was the inevitable endpoint of history, a model toward which all other nations would eventually gravitate in part because of that tolerant pluralism. It’s an internal logic that’s hard to assail. In the last century, it was never meaningfully assailed. America faced either outright ideological adversaries (e.g., the Soviet Union) or societies that largely assimilated into the liberal order (e.g., postwar Germany and Japan). But China presents a wholly different challenge — not because it rejects liberal democracy, but because it does so while succeeding on its own terms. This procedural view now faces a potential crisis on two fronts. First, China's success could challenge the assumed link between democratic procedures and effective governance. When a non-democratic system — or what China insists is "whole-process democracy" — delivers sustained economic growth, technological innovation, and rising living standards, it raises questions about the relationship between political processes and outcomes. In January of 2025, a wide swath of American youth seemed suddenly to have become aware that China has, to an impressive extent, delivered those things. The “TikTok refugees” on Xiaohongshu and the startling arrival of DeepSeek may prove to have been the catalysts for a narrative shift: one that sees China more positively and sees the power of its technocratic state as a feature, not a bug. This challenge is arising at a particularly vulnerable moment, as faith in procedural democracy is already eroding within democracies themselves. When American democratic institutions seem incapable of addressing pressing challenges — climate change, inequality, gun violence, an oligarchic takeover of democratic institutions themselves — citizens begin questioning whether following the right procedures is sufficient justification for political authority. China's rise could accelerate this erosion by presenting, even if only passively, an alternative model. Or American institutions, especially the judicial branch, could ride to the rescue and restore faith. That seems depressingly unlikely at the time of writing. Performance and Political Legitimacy China’s conception of legitimacy rests on foundations different from America’s. While it does not reject democratic values outright — indeed, it formally embraces “whole-process democracy” and regards democracy as one of its “core socialist values” — it prioritizes outcomes over procedures. Economic development, social stability, and this abstract goal of “national rejuvenation” are the key metrics by which governance is judged. It’s tempting to see this emphasis on performance legitimacy — the idea that a government’s right to rule is validated by its ability to deliver material improvements and maintain stability — as having deep roots in Chinese political thought. I think, however, that it would be a mistake to see this simply as a warmed-over version of the imperial Mandate of Heaven. The Party’s claim to legitimacy is rooted not just in historical precedent but in the practical experience of a century of upheaval (and, yes, humiliation). The collapse of the Qing dynasty, the chaos of the Republican era, and both the successes and failures of the Mao era all reinforced a national ethos that prioritizes order and effective governance over abstract procedural ideals. By this measure, China has delivered. The country’s transformation from widespread poverty to the world’s second-largest economy is central to the Party’s legitimacy narrative. Even as economic challenges mount, the Party continues, so far, to maintain public trust through rapid adaptation — investing in technology, social programs, and economic restructuring. China’s unprecedented rise as a manufacturing superpower, going from about 6% of global manufacturing value-add in 2000 to over 30% today, has produced material abundance domestically. It’s not all for export. Meanwhile, the Party’s ability to correct mistakes and respond pragmatically to crises — whether financial shocks, pandemics, or environmental disasters — reinforces its legitimacy among much of the population, at least so far. This model, however, has inherent contradictions. A government that derives legitimacy from performance must continue to deliver or risk undermining itself. If economic growth slows, if social expectations outpace policy responses, or if corruption erodes public trust, the very foundation of legitimacy is threatened. For now, China’s leadership is acutely aware of these risks, which is why maintaining economic dynamism and social stability remains paramount — and why I would caution against placing too much faith in self-soothing narratives of an inevitable Chinese economic collapse. Of course, critics will argue that China’s legitimacy is tenuous — tied too closely to economic growth, sustained through repression, or propped up by state-controlled narratives. These are not trivial concerns. But the assumption that legitimacy in China is purely coercive or that it will inevitably unravel misunderstands both the resilience of its governance model and the adaptability of the Party. Even in moments of crisis, China has shown an ability to course-correct, even if belatedly, whether through policy shifts, technocratic adjustments, or selective political reforms. The bigger mistake would be to assume that legitimacy in China functions exactly as it does in the West — or that it is so fragile that one economic downturn will bring the entire system into crisis So China’s success also raises that uncomfortable question for the United States: If a government delivers prosperity, order, and technological progress, does it matter whether it holds competitive elections? The real danger to democracy is not that authoritarian states are actively challenging the belief that the ballot box is the only path to political legitimacy. The danger is that this is being quietly challenged within democracies themselves. But when elections yield gridlock, when legislatures fail to tackle urgent crises, and when policy is dictated by corporate lobbies rather than public will, who can blame Americans for questioning whether electoral legitimacy is enough? The rise of “performance legitimacy” as a concept in American discourse — whether in the form of industrial policy, skepticism toward absolute free speech, or the embrace of state intervention in the economy — suggests that, perhaps unintentionally, aspects of China’s governance model are gaining traction. This shift is particularly visible among younger Americans. Polls show growing disenchantment with democratic institutions, skepticism about the fairness of capitalism, and openness to alternative governance models. The question now is whether this emerging mindset represents a passing disillusionment or the beginning of a deeper ideological shift. While the American conception of legitimacy is overwhelmingly procedural, it bears noting that the reality is more complex. In moments of national crisis, U.S. governance has often relied on performance legitimacy, implicitly recognizing that procedural democracy alone is not always sufficient to maintain public trust. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal fundamentally reshaped the social contract, securing legitimacy not just through elections but by delivering economic recovery and social security. Abraham Lincoln, in the face of existential war, suspended habeas corpus and centralized executive power, arguing that preserving the Union was the ultimate test of legitimacy. More recently, the expansion of executive orders, the rise of the administrative state, and even pandemic-era emergency measures suggest that Americans, too, place weight on outcomes. This raises an uncomfortable question: If Americans have historically accepted performance legitimacy in times of crisis, why is it considered illegitimate in China’s case? The answer likely lies in selective acknowledgment. When performance legitimacy operates within a procedural framework, it is accepted as a necessary adaptation; when it exists outside that framework — as in China — it is often dismissed as mere authoritarian expediency. This cognitive dissonance prevents a more pragmatic approach to China’s governance, in which legitimacy is understood not as a binary (democratic or illegitimate) but as a dynamic negotiation between process and outcomes. The Stakes of Legitimacy Recognition The reluctance of many Americans to recognize the legitimacy of China's political system has consequences far beyond academic debate. It shapes policy choices, constrains diplomatic options, and could even make conflict more likely. When a rising power is viewed as fundamentally illegitimate by the established power, every action it takes — from military modernization to economic development — tends to be interpreted in the most threatening light possible. This dynamic becomes particularly dangerous when combined with what political scientists call the "security dilemma" — where measures taken by one state to increase its security are interpreted by others as aggressive, leading to an escalatory spiral. When filtered through the lens of legitimacy, this spiral can accelerate: If China's system is seen as illegitimate, then its efforts to secure its interests appear more sinister than similar actions taken by democratic states. The assumption of illegitimacy is the fuel for the fire of escalation. Consider how this plays out in specific domains. When China develops advanced technologies, the response isn't simply about competitive advantage or security implications — it often includes an assumption that these technologies will inevitably be used for authoritarian control because they emerge from an "illegitimate" system. When China builds international institutions or development frameworks, they're frequently dismissed as attempts to undermine the "rules-based order" rather than being evaluated on their merits. Even China's efforts to combat corruption or poverty can be interpreted cynically as mere attempts to shore up illegitimate rule rather than genuine governance improvements. The political scientist Iza Ding has given this tendency a name: authoritarian teleology.2 The Historical Context This legitimacy gap didn't emerge in a vacuum. The American conception of political legitimacy as primarily procedural evolved through specific historical experiences: the Revolutionary War's rejection of monarchy, the Civil War's preservation of democracy, the triumph over fascism in World War II, and the Cold War victory over Soviet communism. Each of these moments reinforced the belief that democratic procedures were not just preferable but necessary for legitimate governance. China's emphasis on performance legitimacy similarly reflects its historical path. The Century of Humiliation, the chaos of the Republican period, the trauma of the Cultural Revolution — these experiences helped shape a political culture that prioritizes stability and material progress over procedural democracy. The Reform and Opening period's success in delivering unprecedented economic growth further reinforced the idea that performance could serve as a primary source of legitimacy. But here we encounter another asymmetry: While China's leadership has studied democratic systems extensively and understands their internal logic, American policymakers and thought leaders have, in general, invested less effort in understanding how China's system functions on its own terms. This knowledge gap compounds the legitimacy gap, making it harder to engage constructively with China's political reality. Ironically, as America remains fixated on China’s supposed lack of legitimacy, it has quietly begun to absorb aspects of the Chinese mentalité. Performance legitimacy is creeping into American political thought, with Americans of both parties (and those who are understandably frustrated by the two-party system) now asking whether elections alone are enough if they do not produce competent governance. Skepticism toward absolute free speech is growing, with both the left and right advocating for more controlled information environments. The return of industrial policy and state intervention in the economy signals a move away from neoliberal assumptions — an approach that, while still a far cry from China’s state capitalism, moves in that direction. This is not an ideological conversion but a pragmatic adaptation. As American institutions falter, elements of the Chinese model become more intellectually respectable, even if few openly advocate adopting them wholesale. To be clear, I see this as a positive development only to a limited extent. Taken far enough, it can dissolve the shackles of universalist thinking on political legitimacy and remove a major obstacle to better relations not just with China but with other less-than-fully-democratic states. Taken too far, it can destroy the intellectual and institutional foundations of the United States. Beyond Simple Binaries The legitimacy question becomes even more complex when we look closely at how political systems actually funct
ChatGPT 說：

Sinica：合法性障礙——美國對中國政治制度不願承認的影響

作者：Kaiser Kuo（郭怡廣）
發表日期：2025年2月16日

2019年4月，在北卡羅來納州教堂山（Chapel Hill）我家附近的一場午餐聚會中，一位來此演講的資深美國外交官向我拋出了一個我立刻辨識出來的「立場測試」。

當時，我剛剛向她簡要介紹了一個我正協助籌組的非正式團體，希望她能加入。這個團體由關注中國的政策專家、分析師與學者組成，目標是對下一屆美國政府的對華政策施加影響——雖說「施加影響」這件事最後並不太成功。聽完我那高尚的使命陳述後，她看著我說：「我有兩個問題要問你。」

「第一，」她開始問道，「你相信美國的政策能對中國的發展產生正面影響嗎？」

我立刻肯定地回答：「當然相信。」畢竟，如果我不相信美國政策能產生積極效果，那還有什麼理由投入其制定？

但她的第二個問題讓我有些措手不及：「你認為中國共產黨的統治是正當的嗎？」

我稍微停頓了一下——主要是在處理她問題的意圖——之後也回答了「是的」。她微笑點頭說：「很好，我加入。」

她立刻明白了華盛頓許多人無法理解的一點：拒絕承認中國政治制度的正當性，不僅是一種意識形態立場，更是制定有效政策的一個障礙。這讓美國對中國的互動，經常流於道德姿態而非務實策略。更深層來說，這反映出美國從未真正面對過一個可能：政治正當性不一定具有普世定義。

正當性的分歧是中美緊張的核心

長久以來，美國人根據一個簡單假設運作：政治正當性主要來自民主制度，尤其是透過自由選舉體現的主權在民。制衡機制與法治則是維持這種正當性的保障手段，用來防止濫權並確保問責。在這種觀念中，民主不僅是組織政治權力的一種方式，而是唯一真正正當的方式。

在這種思維框架下，中國理當會朝這方向發展：隨著市場改革促進經濟成長、中產階級壯大、人民出國旅行、學生湧入西方大學，自然會出現政治自由化。這不只是樂觀幻想，還有現代化與民主化理論支持，南韓與台灣的經驗更成了實證案例。

雖然並非所有對中接觸政策的支持者都相信「中國會變得更像我們」，但即便真是如此，一位理性觀察者也應承認：美國的主流敘事對中國的發展塑造影響遠比中國反過來影響美國還大。雖然未如預期，但若將今日中國與改革開放初期相比，其轉變驚人，其中許多部分體現了美式市場資本主義、創業文化、甚至某些個人主義價值的吸收。從極度競爭的商業文化、自我成功創業家的推崇（王興、雷軍、甚至已被「復黨」的馬雲），到消費文化與全球品牌的追求，中國選擇性地吸收了大量美國精神。

然而，隨著中國的發展，一種美國從未預期的局勢開始浮現——中國開始挑戰美國對「政治正當性」的核心假設。這不是主動的挑釁，而是一種「吸引力」的轉向。美國長期以來的信念是，全球會自然朝向自由秩序靠攏。但如今，那種重力似乎正在削弱甚至逆轉。越來越多美國人開始不情願地承認，中國的治理方式「在中國來說」是有效的——這個國家幾十年來帶來了成長、穩定，甚至最近還有更清潔的空氣。

這不僅是意識形態上的尷尬，也動搖了美國自我認知的基礎。

從普世民主到全球多元：美國準備好了嗎？

中國的崛起與美國內部對其某種「不情願的敬佩」，放大了美國政治文化中兩個核心價值的緊張：

  1. 選舉民主的普世性主張

  2. 對多元性的尊重

美國是否能接受「全球政治多元化」的可能？是否能放下那根深蒂固的正當性定義？這將是美中未來互動的關鍵。

程序正當性與美國的脆弱時刻

美國政治的正當性基礎在於「程序」：有規則的選舉、透明的制度、法治等。這一觀念根植於啟蒙運動與新教倫理之中。然而，在面對中國時，這套程序性的正當性觀正面臨雙重挑戰：

  1. 中國治理成果挑戰了「選舉=良治」的假設。
    一個不民主的體制（中國所稱「全過程民主」）竟能實現長期經濟成長、技術創新與生活改善，這打破了程序與成果之間的假定連結。

  2. 民主體制內部正面臨信任危機。
    當美國自身的民主機制無法應對氣候變遷、貧富差距、槍枝暴力、政商勾結時，人民開始質疑：只是遵守程序，是否就足以建立政治正當性？

2025年初，「小紅書TikTok難民」與「DeepSeek」的衝擊也許將成為敘事轉折點——讓一部分美國年輕人驚覺，中國真的做到了某些他們國家無法達成的目標。

中國的「表現型正當性」：只是現代版的天命嗎？

中國的正當性邏輯與美國截然不同。中國不完全否定民主價值，反而以「全過程人民民主」等方式納入話語體系。但其真正優先的是治理成果：經濟發展、社會穩定與民族復興。

這種「表現型正當性」是否僅是「天命論」的現代翻版？不完全是。中國的政治文化深受近代動盪歷史影響——從清朝崩潰、民國亂局到毛時代動盪——這些教訓形成了一種「秩序優先」的國家心態。

黨的合法性也正是建基於這種集體記憶之上。在大多數中國人民眼中，中國共產黨的治理成果是現實可見的：從2000年佔全球製造業附加值6%躍升至30%以上，從普遍貧困變為全球第二大經濟體。即使當前面臨經濟困境，黨仍持續透過技術投資、社會政策與結構轉型維持信任。

但此模式存在一個內建矛盾：一旦表現停滯，正當性也隨之動搖。

為何美國對「中國式正當性」如此排斥？

美國對表現型正當性的態度具有選擇性。在美國內部歷史上，如富蘭克林·羅斯福的「新政」、林肯的戰時緊急權力運用、疫情時代的政府干預，都是依靠成果而非純程序維持正當性的例證。

但為什麼中國的表現型正當性就不能被接受？問題出在觀念框架上——只要不在民主制度內部運作，任何表現都被視為專制的工具。這種認知落差阻礙了對中國政治實情的務實理解。

承認正當性問題的政策代價

美國對中國制度「不承認其正當性」的立場，不只是學術問題，它帶來具體政策後果：

  • 限制外交選項

  • 加劇「安全困境」：當中國強化軍力、發展科技或打擊貪腐，這些行為在民主國家的視角下往往被解讀為「另有圖謀」，而不是正常國家行為。

這種態度正如政治學者丁伊莎（Iza Ding）所言，是一種「威權目的論」（authoritarian teleology）——預設威權國家一切行動終將導向控制與鎮壓。

歷史成因與認知落差

中美對正當性的不同理解，源自各自歷史：

  • 美國的程序正當性源於革命、內戰、對抗法西斯與蘇聯的勝利

  • 中國的表現正當性則來自百年恥辱、共和混亂、毛時代與改革開放的現代化轉型

而中國對民主制度的研究深入，美國對中國制度的理解則明顯不足，這種「認知不對等」加深了雙方的溝通障礙。

諷刺的是，當美國高舉普世民主的同時，卻正在悄悄吸收部分中國思維：
表現型正當性、對言論自由的限制性辯論、國家產業政策復興……這些都不是轉向威權，而是一種務實的制度適應。

總結：拒絕二元思維，走向多元理解

美國若要與中國和平共處，必須學會擺脫「正當＝民主／非民主即不正當」的思維框架。合法性的認定不應僅由選舉程序主導，而是應視為一種動態平衡，取決於治理成果與制度信任的交互作用。

這種調整不僅能促進與中國的更務實關係，也能幫助美國重塑自身制度的可信度。

（未完待續……）

你說：
翻译成中文 Beyond Simple Binaries The legitimacy question becomes even more complex when we look closely at how political systems actually function. No system derives its legitimacy from a single source. Democratic procedures alone don't guarantee good governance, just as economic performance alone doesn't ensure political stability. Most successful systems combine multiple sources of legitimacy — procedural, performance-based, and even traditional or charismatic. Consider how this plays out in practice. The United States, while primarily relying on procedural legitimacy through elections and constitutional processes, also depends heavily on performance legitimacy in areas like national defense, economic management, and disaster response. A president elected through impeccable democratic procedures who fails to deliver on these fundamental tasks will quickly face legitimacy challenges. Similarly, China's system, while emphasizing performance legitimacy, has increasingly incorporated procedural elements — from village elections to administrative law reforms to public consultation processes to sophisticated digital sentiment analysis systems. Without claiming some moral equivalence with Western democratic procedures, we can recognize that they do represent efforts to create predictable, institutionalized channels for public input and accountability. The Role of Narrative and Identity The legitimacy gap between the U.S. and China is widened by how it intersects with national narratives and identity. The American self-image as leader of the "free world" requires, to some degree, a belief in the universal applicability of democratic legitimacy. Accepting alternative sources of legitimacy might seem to undermine this core aspect of American identity. For China, the situation is different. Its historical experience as a civilization-state that, at least in its own telling, absorbed and transformed foreign influences while maintaining its essential character makes it more comfortable with the idea of multiple legitimate political systems. This oft-observed habit of syncretism helps explain why China can recognize the legitimacy of democratic systems while insisting on its right to develop differently. This asymmetry presents both challenges and opportunities. While it can exacerbate tensions when Americans question China's legitimacy, it also means that China's recognition of democratic legitimacy provides potential common ground for engagement — if American policymakers can move beyond a purely procedural understanding of legitimate governance. Practical Implications The legitimacy gap has immediate practical consequences for international relations. It affects how disputes are handled, how cooperation is structured, and how each side interprets the other's actions. When American policymakers view China's system as fundamentally illegitimate, they may: Discount Chinese diplomatic assurances or agreements, assuming they come from an illegitimate actor Interpret Chinese domestic policies primarily through the lens of regime survival rather than governance (more authoritarian teleology) Overestimate the fragility of China's system, leading to miscalculations about its behavior under pressure Undervalue opportunities for cooperation where interests align, and Miss chances to influence Chinese behavior by failing to engage with its actual governance mechanisms Similarly, when Chinese officials encounter automatic questioning of their system's legitimacy, they may: Become more defensive and less willing to engage in substantive dialogue Focus on short-term performance metrics rather than longer-term reforms View American criticism as fundamentally hostile rather than constructively intended Emphasize nationalism as an alternative source of legitimacy Invest more in alternative international institutions where their legitimacy isn't constantly questioned The legitimacy gap takes on new significance in the context of rapid technological change. As artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and other advanced technologies reshape governance capabilities, questions of legitimate use become increasingly urgent. Yet the legitimacy gap makes it harder to develop common frameworks for responsible innovation. When Americans view China's political system as illegitimate, they may assume that any advanced technology in Chinese hands will inevitably be used for authoritarian control. That lens of authoritarian teleology is hard to displace. This can lead to — indeed, has led to — overboard restrictions that harm innovation and cooperation. Meanwhile, Chinese developers may feel compelled to pursue technological autonomy at any cost, seeing Western criticism of their governance model as a pretext for containing China's rise. The Challenge for China Specialists The legitimacy barrier creates particular challenges for American China specialists, who often find themselves caught between competing imperatives. On one hand, their deep knowledge of China's system leads them to recognize its functional legitimacy — its ability to govern effectively and maintain popular support through mechanisms beyond elections. On the other hand, publicly acknowledging this reality can invite accusations of being an "apologist" for authoritarianism or of failing to uphold democratic values. This tension distorts the policymaking process in subtle but profound ways. When the legitimacy of China’s system is treated as a settled question — rather than as an evolving political reality with internal debates, pressures, and points of leverage — it constrains U.S. options. Policymakers who see China’s system as irredeemably illegitimate tend to adopt a stance of rejection rather than engagement, limiting their ability to shape its trajectory in ways favorable to U.S. interests. Instead of seeking to understand how China’s governance mechanisms operate and where they might be influenced, Washington defaults to a strategy of containment, pressure, and denunciation — usually with little effect except to galvanize Chinese resolve. This self-imposed intellectual straitjacket has tangible policy costs. If U.S. officials refuse to engage seriously with China’s evolving governance structures, they forfeit opportunities to shape how those structures interact with the world. Whether in areas like regulatory transparency, judicial reforms, corporate governance, or environmental policy, dismissing the Chinese system outright cedes influence to those who are willing to work within it. More concerning, it may lead American policymakers to miscalculate the resilience of the Chinese state, basing strategy on the faulty assumption that internal instability or ideological contradictions will eventually bring about its unraveling. A more pragmatic approach would acknowledge that political systems are dynamic rather than static. Engaging with China’s governance structures in targeted areas — without explicitly endorsing and certainly not embracing its ideological foundations — would allow Washington to better anticipate shifts, exploit points of leverage, and influence outcomes where interests align. The Multilateral Challenge The legitimacy barrier between the U.S. and China creates particular complications in multilateral settings, where other countries may have different views on political legitimacy. Many developing nations, for instance, may place greater emphasis on performance legitimacy, having experienced their own struggles with imported democratic systems. Even among established democracies, there can be significant variation in how political legitimacy is understood and validated. This becomes especially apparent in international institutions. When the U.S. frames issues primarily in terms of democracy versus authoritarianism, it may find less resonance than expected among partners who view legitimacy through different lenses. This can create gaps that China has sometimes been able to exploit, not by challenging democratic legitimacy itself but by emphasizing practical cooperation and mutual benefit — the Belt and Road Initiative being only the most conspicuous example. Looking at the strides in international diplomacy across the Global South that China made during the Biden years, while the U.S. convened “Democracy Summits” while continuing to arm Israel, it’s hard not to conclude that China has done just this. Consider the response of many Southeast Asian nations to U.S.-China competition. While many of these countries generally value democratic institutions, they often take a more pragmatic view of legitimacy that encompasses both procedural and performance elements. Their willingness to engage with China's system on its own terms, while maintaining democratic practices domestically, presents a model of pluralistic engagement that American policymakers might learn from. Domestic Politics and the Legitimacy Barrier The legitimacy barrier is complicated by how it interacts with domestic politics in both countries. In the United States, questioning the legitimacy of China's political system can serve domestic political purposes, rallying support around shared democratic values and providing a clear framework for competition with China. This can make it politically costly to acknowledge the functional aspects of China's governance system, even when doing so might lead to more effective policy. It’s hard to imagine a member of the House Select Committee on U.S. Competition with the Chinese Communist Party standing up and candidly stating something so simple as, “I recognize the legitimacy of the CCP.” In China, American reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of its political system can strengthen — indeed, does strengthen — nationalist narratives about Western hostility and the need to maintain a distinct political path. This can make it harder for Chinese leaders to pursue reforms that might be seen as concessions to Western pressure, even when such reforms might serve China's own interests. The interaction of these domestic dynamics can create a negative feedback loop. American questioning of Chinese legitimacy strengthens nationalist reactions in China, which in turn reinforces American skepticism about China's system, and so on. Breaking this cycle requires leadership willing to risk domestic political capital for the sake of more constructive engagement. When Legitimacy Barriers Become Policy Barriers The legitimacy barrier manifests concretely in specific policy domains, often in ways that harm both American and Chinese interests. Consider three areas where this dynamic plays out with particular clarity: Technology and Innovation: When American policymakers frame China's technological development primarily through the lens of regime legitimacy, they often miss crucial distinctions. Not every Chinese innovation is a tool of authoritarian control, just as not every American technology inherently promotes democratic values. This framework can lead to overbroad restrictions that harm scientific cooperation and economic growth while doing little to address genuine security concerns. Global Warming: The existential threat of global warming requires unprecedented global cooperation, yet the legitimacy barrier complicates even this shared challenge. When American politicians cast doubt on China's climate commitments based on its political system rather than its actual performance, they risk undermining crucial collaboration. Meanwhile, China's impressive deployment of renewable energy and electric vehicles — achievements that would typically bolster performance legitimacy — are often viewed skeptically through the lens of strategic competition. Global Health: The COVID-19 pandemic illustrated how the legitimacy barrier can impede vital cooperation. Early Chinese successes in containment were often dismissed in the U.S. as authoritarian overreach rather than evaluated on their public health merits. Conversely, American pandemic responses were sometimes characterized in Chinese media as evidence of democratic dysfunction rather than specific policy failures. Both characterizations missed opportunities to learn from each other's experiences. The Media Mirror The way media in each country covers the other both reflects and reinforces these legitimacy dynamics. American media coverage of China often frames stories through the lens of regime legitimacy, even when covering non-political topics. A new infrastructure project becomes a story about boosting Party legitimacy; an anti-corruption campaign becomes primarily about internal power struggles; economic policies are viewed mainly through the prism of maintaining social stability. This framing, while not entirely incorrect, can miss important details and developments. When every Chinese action is viewed primarily through the lens of regime preservation, it becomes harder to recognize genuine governance improvements or policy innovations that might be worth studying or even adopting. Chinese media coverage of the United States, while critical of American policies and social problems, rarely questions the fundamental legitimacy of the American political system. Instead, it tends to focus on specific failures of governance or policy implementation — a framework that, ironically, might allow for more practical learning from American experiences. The Language of Legitimacy The very language used to discuss China's political system often carries implicit judgments about legitimacy. Consider the term "regime," frequently employed in Western media and academic writing. While technically neutral, its use in modern English, when applied to a national leadership, carries distinctly pejorative connotations, suggesting illegitimacy and temporariness. To Chinese ears, describing their government as a "regime" rather than a "government" or "administration" signals a refusal to acknowledge its legitimacy. Similar issues arise with phrases like "Chinese Communist Party rule" or "CCP control," which not-so-subtly connote coercion rather than governance. Even seemingly neutral terms like "authoritarian" or "one-party state," while accurately describing certain features of China's system, can — depending on context — often be deployed in ways that suggest inherent illegitimacy rather than simply describing different organizational principles. We need not even mention “totalitarian.” This linguistic framework shapes how we think about and discuss China's political system. When Western analysts describe Chinese leaders as "clinging to power" rather than "governing" or frame domestic policies primarily as efforts to "maintain control" rather than to "govern effectively," they're employing language that presupposes illegitimacy. This framing makes it harder to analyze Chinese governance objectively or engage with it constructively. Even more problematic is language deployed in domestic discourse that reinforces unwillingness to accord legitimacy to China's system. The reflexive addition of "Communist" to "Chinese" in contexts where it serves no descriptive purpose ("Communist China's Olympic team," "Communist China's solar industry") serves mainly to delegitimize. The insistence on referring to "the CCP" rather than "the Chinese government" even in discussions of routine governance implies that every action, no matter how mundane, is primarily about Party control rather than normal statecraft. Phrases like "China's rulers" or "Beijing's grip on power" carry similar delegitimizing freight. Some China specialists have begun advocating for more neutral language that describes rather than implicitly judges Chinese governance. This shift isn't about apologizing for real problems or concerns, but about creating space for less normative analysis and productive dialogue. The challenge is to maintain the ability to criticize specific policies or actions while avoiding language that automatically delegitimizes the entire system. The Generation Gap Younger generations in both countries may offer some hope for bridging the legitimacy barrier, though not necessarily in ways their elders would prefer. Many young Americans, having come of age during a period of democratic dysfunction and economic inequality, are more open to questioning whether electoral democracy alone confers legitimacy. They're more likely to judge political systems by their outcomes — addressing climate change, ensuring economic fairness, providing healthcare — than by their procedural characteristics. It’s not hard to see signs of disillusion with proceduralism on the left and right alike: the lionization in some quarters of Luigi Mangione and the rise of “Doomerism” are manifestations of a growing pessimism regarding the American system that polls seem, depressingly, to bear out. We may look back on Trump’s electoral victory as both a symptom and an accelerant. Meanwhile, young Chinese, while still generally supportive of their political system, often take a more cosmopolitan view than their parents' generation. They may defend China's right to its own political path while still appreciating aspects of other systems. This perspective might seem contradictory to older observers but reflects their experience of growing up in an increasingly complex, interconnected world. The Path Ahead The legitimacy barrier between the United States and China presents no easy solutions. I don’t anticipate that this essay will persuade a single individual wedded to the idea of electoral democracy as the sole basis for legitimacy to reconsider, even if they’ve read this far. In many, China’s successes will doubtless galvanize ideological commitments to procedural democracy. I’d love to see Americans open up to the possibility that other forms can enjoy legitimacy without turning on democracy at home, disparaging it or becoming too cynical, fatalistic, or defeatist. Meanwhile, it’s clear to me that China's leadership, and even most of its ordinary people, will show little interest in adopting Western-style democratic procedures, convinced as they are that their current system better suits China's circumstances and development needs, and watching the American dumpster fire burn. Still, it would be nice if more Americans and Chinese alike started evaluating specific policies and actions on their merits rather than through predetermined ideological frames and acknowledged the obvious truth that both systems face serious challenges and might benefit from learning from each other's experiences. As China’s surge continues and the domestic American political crisis continues, the legitimacy barrier between the two nations will grow into a philosophical and ideological crisis for America itself. Three possible paths lie ahead. We may see a hardening of universalism, with the U.S. doubling down on the democracy-vs.-autocracy framing as the competition with China hits home even harder, escalating ideological confrontation with China. That, to use the term of art from political science, would suck. We might instead witness a fragmentation of the American mentalité — a divided America, with one camp clinging to universalism and another rejecting many facets of American exceptionalism, embracing aspects of pragmatic governance models, Chinese or otherwise. Interestingly, as far as I can tell, that cleavage would have little to do with partisanship; it might emerge along generational lines or between populists (whether of the left or right) and more establishment and “elite” Americans, between self-identified “winner” and “losers.” Fragmentation or division would arguably be a better option, but far from ideal.
ChatGPT 說：

超越簡單的二元對立

當我們深入探究政治體系實際運作的方式，合法性的問題就變得更加複雜。沒有任何體制能僅靠單一來源獲得其合法性。民主程序本身無法保證良好治理，正如經濟績效本身也無法保證政治穩定。大多數成功的政治體系通常結合了多種合法性來源——程序性、績效性，甚至傳統或魅力型合法性。

這在實踐中的表現如下：美國雖然主要依賴透過選舉和憲政程序所建立的程序性合法性，但在國防、經濟管理和災難應對等領域也極度依賴績效合法性。一位通過民主程序當選的總統，若在這些基本任務上表現不佳，將很快面臨合法性危機。

同樣地，中國的體制雖然強調績效合法性，但也日益納入程序性元素——從村級選舉到行政法改革、公共諮詢制度，乃至先進的數位輿情分析系統。雖然無意將其與西方民主程序作道德層面的等量齊觀，我們仍可承認這些努力反映出一種嘗試：透過制度化和可預測的渠道吸納民意並實現問責。

敘事與身份的角色

美中之間的合法性鴻溝，也與各自的國族敘事與身份認同交織互動。美國將自己視為「自由世界的領袖」，這種自我形象在某種程度上仰賴民主合法性的普世適用性。若承認其他形式的合法性，似乎會動搖美國身份的核心基石。

中國的情況則有所不同。中國作為「文明型國家」，在其自我敘述中，歷來習慣吸納並轉化外來影響，同時保持自身的核心特質，因此更能接受多元政治合法性的存在。這種歷史上的「融合性」部分解釋了為何中國可以承認民主體制的合法性，同時堅持自身有權發展不同於西方的制度。

這種不對稱既帶來挑戰，也蘊含機會。當美國人質疑中國體制的合法性時，可能加劇緊張；但中國對民主體制合法性的承認，也為雙方對話提供了潛在的共通語言——前提是美國政策制定者願意超越對合法性僅以程序定義的思維定式。

實際影響

合法性鴻溝對國際關係有立竿見影的影響。它會影響雙邊如何處理爭端、如何安排合作，乃至如何詮釋對方的行動。當美國政策制定者視中國體制為根本不合法時，他們可能會：

  • 不信任中國的外交承諾或協議，因為這些來自「非法政權」

  • 主要從政權存續而非治理成效的角度解讀中國內政（即「威權目的論」）

  • 高估中國體制的脆弱性，進而錯判其在壓力下的行為

  • 低估利益契合下的合作機會

  • 錯失透過實質參與影響中國治理行為的契機

同樣地，當中國官員遭遇西方對其體制的自動性否定時，他們可能會：

  • 更加防衛性，較不願進行實質對話

  • 將重心放在短期績效上，而非長遠改革

  • 將美國批評視為敵意攻擊，而非善意建議

  • 更強調民族主義作為合法性的替代來源

  • 更加投入於替代性的國際制度，以逃避合法性被質疑的困境

科技變革與合法性問題

在人工智慧、生物科技與其他先進技術重塑治理能力的當下，合法性的問題變得格外迫切。但合法性鴻溝也使得建立共同的技術規範變得更加困難。

當美國將中國政治體制視為不合法時，往往預設中國手中的先進科技將不可避免地用於威權控制。這種「威權目的論」的視角根深蒂固，導致了過度的限制措施，傷害了雙邊創新與合作。反之，中國開發者則可能因這些批評而下定決心追求技術自主，將西方對其治理體制的批評視為遏制崛起的藉口。

中國研究者的挑戰

合法性障礙對美國中國問題專家構成特殊挑戰。他們一方面因對中國體系的深入了解，認識到其「功能性合法性」——即透過非選舉機制實現有效治理與民意支持的能力；但另一方面，若公開承認這一現實，卻容易被指控為「替威權背書」或「背棄民主價值」。

這種張力以微妙卻深刻的方式扭曲政策制定過程。當中國體制的合法性被視為已定論，而非處於演變中、有內部辯論與壓力、亦存在槓桿點的政治現實時，就會限制美方的政策選擇。認定中國體制「無可救藥」，會導致拒斥姿態而非參與策略，使美方無法有效塑造對方行為。

更實際的做法，是承認政治體系是動態而非靜態的。選擇性地在特定領域與中國治理機制互動——不需認可其意識形態，更不等於擁抱其模式——可以讓美方更好預測變化、發揮影響力、實現策略利益。

多邊外交中的挑戰

合法性鴻溝在多邊層面更加顯著，特別是在各國對政治合法性的理解並不一致的情況下。許多開發中國家在與民主輸入制度的失敗經歷之後，可能更重視績效合法性。即便是在成熟民主國家之間，合法性的理解方式也存在顯著差異。

在這種背景下，美國若持續將國際議題框定為「民主 vs. 威權」，可能無法獲得預期中的廣泛共鳴，尤其在全球南方。中國有時成功填補了這些落差，不是因為否定民主合法性，而是藉由強調務實合作與互利原則——如「一帶一路」倡議便是典型例子。回顧拜登政府任內中國在全球南方的外交進展，美國雖然召開了「民主峰會」，卻同時持續軍援以色列，對比鮮明，不禁令人感嘆中國是否更善於務實外交。

觀察東南亞國家對美中競爭的反應，我們發現這些國家雖大體重視民主制度，但對合法性的理解往往更務實，兼容程序與績效。他們一方面保有民主制度，另一方面與中國在其體制架構內互動，提供了一種美方可借鏡的多元參與模式。

（未完，續下頁）

你說：
翻译成中文 Finally, in what I personally would see as an optimal outcome, we could see a rise of global pluralism, in which Americans accept that different societies have different legitimacy models, recognize that procedural democracy is a great fit — really, the only fit — for the American political culture, and work to preserve and protect it while shifting toward a more pragmatic, priority-pluralist approach in dealing with China and other countries. The question for America is simple: Can America accept that it is not the sole arbiter of political legitimacy? If America refuses to acknowledge China's legitimacy, how does this story end? Does Washington believe that denying legitimacy will bring about China's collapse? Or is it willing to accept that engagement must begin from the reality of plural political models? A great deal hinges on the answers to these questions. 1 I agonized over whether or not to use the word “mentalité,” and in the end, decided that it captures best what I intend here: that amalgam of both consciously-held beliefs, values, and preferences along with subconscious or tacit assumptions, habits of mind, mental frames, prejudices, and attitudes. Worldview or Weltanschauung describes something much more conscious. In this essay, I use mentalité and words like “mindset” more or less interchangeably. 2 As she explained it on the Sinica Podcast, “Authoritarian teleology is a style of thinking. It interprets everything an authoritarian government does as a strategy to stay in power. It has two features. First, a functionalist feature — teleology is the explanation of something through its design purpose rather than the actual cause… the second feature of authoritarian teleology is the assumption that the primary driver of an authoritarian regime is to stay in power or “survive.” And therefore, anything they do is to survive. And okay, this may be true, but we can never truly know if it’s true or not so long as the regime is still in power. And just because a regime has collapsed doesn’t mean whatever it was doing before collapsing was a source of its fragility.”
ChatGPT 說：

最後，就我個人而言，理想的結果將是全球多元主義的興起：美國人接受不同社會有不同的合法性模式，承認程序性民主非常適合——事實上，是唯一適合——美國的政治文化，並致力於維護與保護它；同時在面對中國與其他國家時，轉向一種更務實、優先多元的政策路徑。

對美國而言，問題其實很簡單：**美國能否接受自己不是政治合法性的唯一裁判者？**如果美國拒絕承認中國的合法性，這個故事最終會如何收場？華盛頓是否相信，拒絕承認合法性能導致中國崩潰？還是願意接受一個事實：**交往必須從承認政治多樣性的現實開始？**這些問題的答案，將決定未來走向的關鍵。

註釋：

  1. 我曾長時間掙扎是否應該使用「mentalité（心態／集體心智）」這個詞，但最終決定它最能表達我在此所想表達的概念：一種由有意識的信念、價值與偏好，加上潛意識的假設、思維習慣、心智框架、偏見與態度所構成的綜合體。「世界觀（worldview 或 Weltanschauung）」則更偏向一種有意識的概念。在本文中，我將 mentalité 與「心態（mindset）」等詞語交替使用。

  2. 正如她在《Sinica Podcast》中所說：「『威權目的論』（authoritarian teleology）是一種思維模式。它將威權政府所做的一切都解釋為維持政權延續的策略。它有兩個特徵。第一是功能主義特徵——目的論是一種以設計目的而非實際原因來解釋事物的方式……第二個特徵是預設威權政體的主要驅動力就是維持政權或『生存』。因此，他們所做的一切都是為了生存。這可能是事實，但只要該政權還存在，我們就永遠無法確定這是否為真。而即使某政權最終崩潰了，也不能說它先前所做的一切就是其脆弱的根源。」

ChatGPT 可能會發生錯誤。請查核重要資訊。

"

合法性障礙
郭怡
2月16日
249
19
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美國不願接受中國的政治體制如何影響兩國關係

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19條評論

亞歷克斯
2月16日
已編輯

這論點是否也適用於俄羅斯或伊朗？歷史上其他經濟成功的專制國家，例如皮諾切特統治下的智利，又如何呢？甚至薩達姆統治下的伊拉克，一個經濟略有成功的國家，又如何？

您在這裡提出的許多評論也適用於這些國家。停止對這些國家的意識形態反攻，或許會讓接觸變得更容易。或許更容易預測這些國家的下一步。或許更容易在某些方面與這些國家合作。

如果這個論點不適用於俄羅斯、伊朗或皮諾切特的智利，那為什麼呢？

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郭怡
2月16日

感謝您發自內心的評論。您完全正確地提出了一個問題：我所概述的框架是否適用於其他國家——俄羅斯、伊朗、皮諾切特統治下的智利，甚至薩達姆統治下的伊拉克。這很有助於檢驗我的論點。

從廣義上講，「合法性障礙」指的是這樣一種情況：根深蒂固的意識形態預設使得一個國家——這裡指的是美國——不願承認另一個國家是國際體系中的合法參與者，無論後者的實際行為如何。這體現在：國家從根本上不願務實地參與，默認地傾向於假設對方有敵意，並且傾向於不僅尋求政策改變，甚至尋求政權更迭。

要確定這個框架是否適用於您提到的案例，我們需要問：美國拒絕與這些國家進行務實接觸，無論其實際行為如何，是因為美國認為這些國家本質上不合法嗎？還是說，這些譴責源自於具體的行動──入侵其他主權國家、大規模失蹤以及其他形式的殘酷內部鎮壓、支持恐怖主義等等？

俄羅斯：圍繞俄羅斯的道德說教確實盛行，尤其是在2014年之後，甚至可以追溯到普丁發動的喬治亞戰爭。俄羅斯曾一度受到製裁和排斥，但從未完全斷絕與俄羅斯的接觸。蘇聯時期，對俄羅斯的意識形態敵意就已存在，但這種敵意甚至被疊加在現實政治互動的歷史之上。

伊朗：在這裡，「合法性障礙」的適用範圍更加廣泛。自1979年以來，美國一直拒絕承認伊朗伊斯蘭共和國的合法行為體地位，無論其實際政策為何。即使在伊朗遵守伊核協議條款的情況下，該協議也因人們認為伊朗政府本質上永遠不值得信任而遭到破壞。話雖如此，在這種情況下，「表現」也很難被用來為伊朗辯護——當然，正如我所指出的，它在中國問題上可以得到充分的證明。

皮諾切特統治下的智利：我認為這更像是一個啟發性的反例。皮諾切特政權是獨裁政權，但美國政府從未將其視為本質上不合法——正是因為它在意識形態上與冷戰期間的美國利益相符。這強調了合法性障礙並非民主與獨裁之間的對立，而是可以被塑造美國外交政策的其他目標所超越。

薩達姆統治下的伊拉克：美國對伊拉克的政策隨著時間的推移而發生了巨大變化。 1980年代，美國支持薩達姆政權對抗伊朗；到2003年，伊朗被視為不可救藥的威脅，必須加以清除。但伊拉克與中國的關鍵差異在於，伊拉克當時是一個弱小得多的國家，其被認為的不合法性直接導致了美國的入侵和政權更迭。而對中國而言，合法性障礙阻礙了務實的接觸，但並不會（至少目前還沒有，而且值得慶幸的是，這種情況在許多國家中並不多見）導緻美國產生政權更迭的幻想。

所以，回答你的問題：合法性障礙並非普遍適用於所有獨裁國家或敵對國家。當美國將一個國家定性為與其所認為的全球秩序的道德和意識形態基礎從根本上不相容時，即使沒有重大的越界行為，合法性障礙也適用。皮諾切特統治下的智利之所以倖免於難，是因為它與美國的意識形態優先事項一致。俄羅斯和伊朗都面臨不同程度的合法性喪失，但其方式並不完全與中國相似。中國的獨特之處在於，它代表著對冷戰後美國世界觀的系統性意識形態挑戰——我認為，這種挑戰使得務實的接觸變得困難，即使這符合美國的利益。

簡言之，檢驗標準不在於一個國家是否專製或敵對，而是美國是否將其視為一種超越務實考量的、本質上不合法的存在。這才是關鍵的差別。

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亞歷克斯
2月16日
已編輯

我確實同意，在某些方面，意識形態障礙阻礙了事情的進展。我當然認同這種觀點：過度關注中共政府的合法性會讓我們錯失良機，最後釀成大禍。我觀察到了你提到的一些問題。但我不確定（公開）承認中共政府的合法性是否是解決這些問題的最佳途徑，甚至是唯一途徑。

關於俄羅斯，我不確定你的回應是否觸及了反對意見的實質。你說中國模式正在發揮作用，所以我們應該接受並公開承認它本身就享有盛譽。不這樣做會使兩國關係惡化。這樣做反而會使兩國關係改善。這很合理。但我不確定為什麼類似的論點不適用於俄羅斯。如果美國停止對俄羅斯的意識形態攻勢，我們就能更好地理解俄羅斯，更理性地與其打交道，並在可能的情況下開展合作等等。

同樣，在伊朗問題上，您公正地指出，與中國共產黨相比，成功並非伊朗的緩和因素。但想必您提出的許多論點仍然適用。如果我們認為毛拉的統治不合法，我們就不會認為他們的外交政策值得信賴，也不會錯誤解讀他們的政策，也不會高估其體制的脆弱性等等。這些聽起來確實像是我們在與伊朗打交道時遇到的問題。如果真是這樣，那麼打破合法性障礙又何嘗不是好事呢？

我要指出的是，我認為智利倖免於難的說法是不真實的。卡特和國會大幅削減了援助，使智利飽受各種批評。同樣，對於沙阿統治下的伊朗——同樣是一個略有成就且略有同盟的獨裁政權——來說，援助的削減可以說是導致了政府的垮台。

順便說一句，對於中國案例中是否存在重大越軌行為，我們必須同意持有不同意見。即使撇開過去的各種事件（…以及同一組織掌權，在某些情況下，責任人受到官方的追捧，但從未真正得到官方的清算等等），也有合理的理由表明，你提到的許多具體侵權行為在當今中國仍然存在。

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史蒂文·哈雷爾
2月19日

美國在俄羅斯和中國（甚至在某種程度上還有伊朗）問題上（基於程序原因）不承認其合法性，這主要是一種意識形態上的（或者說是道貌岸然、玩世不恭的）對抗地緣政治對手的方式嗎？我在美國的政治話語中很少看到質疑沙烏地阿拉伯或埃及政府合法性的舉動，例如，一個沒有選舉，另一個則效仿俄羅斯舉行了虛假選舉？或者，美國承認以色列的合法性，以色列是一個地緣政治盟友，舉行了真正的選舉（顯然是在被佔領土之外），並且犯下了與俄羅斯類似的公開的帝國主義行徑，而自菲律賓非殖民化以來，美國一直避之不及。

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托馬斯·萊因哈特
2月16日

我認為這個論點在俄羅斯的案例中是成立的。事實上，普丁之所以受到一定支持，主要原因在於他在90年代的混亂之後帶來了穩定和經濟復甦。因此，他可以被視為俄羅斯的合法統治者，但現在卻正在進行一場非法的侵略戰爭。

伊朗統治者帶來了經濟苦難，但卻擁有某種源自（誤導的）宗教信仰的合法性；據我所知，這種合法性至少在社會保守派中仍然很受歡迎。

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格達維
2月16日

就「治理」如何「造福」人民而言，與中國進行適當的比較並非美國與中國，而是中國與其文化和地理上近鄰——台灣、韓國和日本——之間的比較。 Kaiser，我期待您深入分析這些國家的政府如何與中國相比，為人民「帶來」福祉！

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郭怡
2月16日
已編輯

這並不是比較美國在中國的政府表現，而是在比較兩種不同的合法性基礎。我擔心你找錯對象了。不過，如果你堅持要比較，那就先撇開這一點不談，我們來逐一分析一下。批評中國經濟表現的人經常把日本當作一個典型例子，而不是一個實體教訓：中國是否會面臨和日本一樣的未來？在1980年代，日本進入了多個「失去的十年」中的第一個，幾乎沒有成長。韓國的人口比北京、上海和天津的總和還少，而且將近一半的人口居住在大首爾地區。韓國的總人口只有中國的0.036。再加上近75年來一直生活在美國的直接保護之下，我想我們之間的比較已經不再是一回事了。那麼，我們是否需要像台灣？一個較小的人口，甚至更長的美國保護期？

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格達維
2月16日
已編輯

我有一個嚴肅的建議：如果日本、韓國和台灣的任何人（同樣，這些人與中國有著相似的文化背景）認為中國的一黨制、無選舉制度應該在他們自己的國家（或省份）採用（或重新採用），那就和他們談談。問問他們，政府的合法性是否僅取決於結果而非程序。我認為質疑中國政府合法性的人不會佔100%，但我認為這三個地方的絕大多數人都會認同這個基本原則：一個從未允許自己接受自由公正選舉的政府實際上是不合法的。但我願意接受反駁這一論點的人——只要有證據。

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郭怡
2月16日

誰在談論讓他們採用中國的體制？你怎麼斷定我會支持這種做法？無論如何，如果問題不是誘導性的——也就是說，他們需要問「一個政府享有政治合法性的方式是否不止一種？」或類似的問題——我很樂意對人們進行你的測試。

更有趣的是，你的回答似乎暗示著你也相信投票箱是唯一可能的合法性基礎，對吧？所以，直到18世紀末，除了少數幾個希臘城邦之外，所有國家都是不合法的，而且在18世紀以及接下來的兩個世紀裡，很大一部分國家也是不合法的？

最後，我們至少能不能同意，你不會在我每一條你反對的帖子下都評論“……可是台灣？？？”？這至少是你第三次這麼做了，我感覺有種似曾相識的感覺，必須一遍又一遍地談論規模和歷史條件。

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格達維
2月16日

如果您在討論中美之間非常複雜的關係時偶爾想到台灣，我保證不會提起台灣——因為人們可以合理地爭辯說，台灣的地位一直是、並且仍然是這種關係的重要組成部分！

不過，我的確提到投票箱對於「合法性」至關重要，因為這是世界上大多數國家，以及幾乎所有中國以外的現代國家都認同的理念。當然，這不僅僅是自由公正的選舉，還包括獨立的新聞媒體、獨立的司法機構以及政府不得侵犯的公民憲法權利。這些不再是美國價值觀，甚至不是西方價值觀了。這就是我提到日本、韓國和台灣的原因。這些構成合法治理的原則實際上在中國大陸以外的漢文化圈（包括新加坡）已被廣泛接受。只要政府允許討論這些原則，它們肯定會在中國再次紮根，就像它們在80年代末短暫地紮根一樣。

說真的，在中國，有人能像你我一樣，公開辯論（以書面形式，記錄在案）「投票箱」是否適合中國治理嗎？答案是沒有。沒有人能夠公開支持這個概念──你還能接受嗎？

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郭怡
2月16日

我並非抽象意義上的「同意」。我個人更希望的是，不僅能夠在中國公開討論這個問題，而且能夠在中國建立一種更直接參與的程序形式。但我權衡了各種必要性，明白有充分的理由反對倉促邁向這一目標，因為這可能導致諸多混亂，我也認識到，從許多中國人的角度來看，選舉制度現在應該是什麼樣的，他們認為沒有選舉制度更好，並最終接受不同國家會有不同的優先考慮。我根本不相信，僅僅因為小型政體及其特殊情況可以擁有成功的選舉政治制度，大陸也能做到同樣的事情。同時，僅僅因為中國政府不民主就認定其不合法，會阻礙最終的民主化進程，這又是為了什麼呢？

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史蒂文·哈雷爾
2月19日

我感覺你們兩位可能都沒理解關於台灣的部分要點。當然，台灣的經濟發展和統治的維持（無論是在從列寧主義轉型為選舉民主之前還是之後）都依賴美國的支持。台灣當然很小，這一點眾所皆知。但如今，台灣政府可以宣稱其程序和績效合法性。我認為，全世界大多數人都會認為，如果績效合法性保持不變，在其基礎上再增加程序合法性總比沒有程序合法性要好。我不確定規模論是否站得住腳，但如果站得住腳，那就意味著大國最好被瓜分，像我這樣生活在半個世紀的喀斯喀特人會虔誠地認為這是理所當然的。那些接受中國治理中一些較為粗暴的部分，即使它們並非理想狀態的人，常常會說「中國人口太多，沒辦法」之類的話，以及類似的相當不著邊際的口頭禪。

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騎士福
2月19日

我認為這篇文章並沒有反對或貶低程序合法性；凱撒在評論中也沒有這樣做。我個人不確定程序合法性——特別是民主制度——是否比績效“更好”，但即使我能簡潔地闡述這一點（我做不到），也只是一種直覺，不值得費力地敲擊鍵盤。

這裡提出的問題是，民主制度是​​否應該具有普遍性，以及這些制度是否構成國家合法性的基礎。我不記得這篇文章曾論證過，中國既經濟發達（我敢說是社會進步）又民主，這既不合理，甚至不可能，這與事實相反；我的印像是，凱澤在其“多元主義優先論”一文中為相反的觀點留有餘地。一些批評這篇文章的人認為，中國應該展現民主制度才能獲得合法性，他們列舉了其他在績效和程序上都取得合法性的國家，以此來證明這一說法的合理性。值得注意的是，台灣、韓國和日本。 （順便說一句，越南或新加坡沒有被提及；也許我們也質疑這些國家的合法性。）

凱撒對國家合法性建立在民主制度之上的懷疑並非空穴來風：（用洛克式的簡單解釋）財產權、正當法律程序、思想的表達和傳播自由，以及公民選舉政府。我不能也不想代表凱撒發言，因此，以下是我自己的懷疑，不僅針對中國，也涵蓋更廣泛的領域：1）國家合法性似乎並非「民主治理」；2）如果合法性的含義不同，我們能否將國家合法性視為植根於其他事物？在本例中，是經濟表現和政府的反應能力。需要注意的是，舉證責任在於那些主張合法性是基於民主制度的人。

因此，即使我承認，如果中國實行民主，其財富或治理會比現在多幾百倍（無論這意味著什麼），但這並不能證明國家合法性與民主治理的含義不同。簡而言之：那又怎樣？未能充分發揮其經濟和社會潛力的國家就不合法？那麼印度或希臘呢？事實上，凱澤列舉了一大批合法的（至少乍看之下）政權來佐證這種關聯。歷史上大多數國家都不是民主國家，無論是直接的還是間接的；它們不可能都是不合法的，所以任你挑選吧。

不過，我還要再詳細闡述兩點：頗具爭議的是，英國直到20世紀——確切地說是1918年——才真正成為一個民主國家。 （除非考慮到…英國那理想主義的憲法框架，剝奪婦女的選舉權可以被視為無關緊要的偏差。）而美國直到20世紀下半葉，種族主義才被徹底根除，才為其大部分少數族裔提供自由公正的選舉程序——更不用說公民保護和社會平等了。

那麼，我們如何理解20世紀以前這些政府的合法性？這些政府合法嗎？對誰而言合法？如果這些政府是合法的，那麼一個統治不公正社會的政府——我希望你們也同意種族隔離國家是不公正的——何時（如果有的話）會被視為不合法？正義無關緊要嗎？那麼，民主又為何成為正當性因素呢？如果這些政府並非不合法，那麼當大約一半的成年人口無法也未投票使其合法化時——就像戰前的英國那樣——更不用說殖民地和英聯邦領土的情況了——為什麼不合法呢？

如果這些國家不合法，那麼我們能把歷史上國家權力的行使僅僅描述為披著白人男性民主治理外衣的強制權力嗎？荒謬！這些國家能獲得其合法性嗎？當然！當它們最終在漫長的歷史長河中自我救贖時，它們是否合法？美國和英國已經自我救贖了嗎？

所有這些並非為中國那些真正與我們的價值觀乃至利益相衝突的國內外政策辯護。我也不要求美國或英國政府在當下或歷史上不合法，但我希望我提出了一個類似蘇格拉底式的觀點：合法性或許並不像我們最初想像的那麼直觀。而應用於中國，正如本文令人信服地指出的那樣，在中共治理的各個方面中，我們如何看待國家權力的行使，不應同樣狹隘。

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托馬斯·萊因哈特
2月16日

我同意，透過選舉獲得合法性並非放諸四海皆準的原則；歷史上，一些最糟糕的政府都是由多數票選出來的。歐洲的法西斯主義者、非洲的「大人物」或拉丁美洲的軍事領袖都曾經贏得多數票——而現在，美國也走上了同樣的道路。我也同意，如果一方先驗地認為另一方不合法，外交手段也難以取得多大成效。

但我不同意不存在普世價值。對我來說，個人權利至高無上。這意味著每個人都擁有權利，無論屬於哪個宗教、種族、黨派，是否屬於「弱勢」群體或其他任何群體。對任何政府而言，考驗在於個人能否在獨立法庭上捍衛這些權利，甚至對抗國家本身。這如今是美國抵禦日益蔓延的威權主義的最後一道防線，而中國也未能通過考驗。這也是為什麼中國人喜歡將部分資產（以及家人）轉移到尊重個人權利的國家的原因。從這個意義上講，中國政府在其本國公民眼中確實缺乏一定的合法性。

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郭怡
2月16日

我絕對不會──中國也不會──主張不存在普世價值。請參閱我關於優先多元主義的長文：https: //www.sinicapodcast.com/p/priority-pluralism-rethinking-universal ?utm_source=publication-search

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托馬斯·萊因哈特
2月17日

謝謝你的回复，Kaiser！我記得你那篇很棒的文章；我們還在留言區簡短地討論了一下:-)。

遺憾的是，自那以後，情況發生了變化，美國不再致力於推廣普遍的道德和人道標準；因此，我感到有必要公開支持這些過時的原則。我希望你們能為此提供幫助。

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約翰·斯威尼
2月16日

我認為沒有人擔心中共的合法性。中共只是一個需要處理的事實。在西方人眼裡，他們只是自取其辱。

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帕特里夏·張
2月21日

再次感謝Kaiser的深刻見解。身為研究早期中國歷史的學生，這篇文章表達了我內心深處一直在思考卻難以理解的許多問題。我期待著對此進行更深入的思考，並可能提出更多問題和評論。請繼續你正在做的事情——就你對中美雙方正在發生的事情的觀察，提供深刻且批判性的評論。

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史蒂文·哈雷爾
2月19日

我覺得這篇文章（我認為它精彩絕倫，發人深省）忽略了「優先多元主義」那篇文章中提到的幾個因素：言論自由和對某些社會群體的壓迫。既然你在其他脈絡中已經討論過這些因素，為什麼現在卻要放在合法性討論中？我會盡力解釋。

首先，言論自由。與其僅僅根據領導人選舉方式來評判一個國家是民主還是專制（美國流行的說法是：選舉=民主；沒有選舉=獨裁或專制），我認為將民主視為一系列因素的集合，就像《經濟學人》在其年度民主指數中所使用的那樣，更有成效，也更公平。本頁面的大多數人可能都知道它（除非你對古典自由主義深惡痛絕，甚至不願閱讀《經濟學人》），但它的五個因素是：1. 選舉程序和多元化 2. 政府運作 3. 政治參與 4. 政治文化 5. 公民自由。以這種方式思考民主會模糊程序性民主和表演性民主的差異。當然，第5項，即公民自由，是一個表演性因素（第2項，即政府運作也是如此）；它是國家允許或提倡的，也是大多數擁有公民認為生活在這種國家所帶來的好處，有時甚至比本文認為的評估政績、進而評估政績合法性的主要因素——物質利益——更為重要。中國在這項標準上的得分很低，但這當然不是一個普遍的標準，或者說，它之所以普遍，是因為每個人都重視某種形式或程度的公民自由，但在不同的價值體系中，重視程度和方式差異很大。但如果公民並不高度重視公民自由，卻仍然支持他們的政府，那麼公民自由的缺乏並不會顯著削弱政府的合法性。同時，人們當然也可以說，目前中國政府的運作（至少在某些領域）與美國政府一樣好，甚至更好，例如在限制持槍殺人或提供便捷的公共交通方面。因此，即使以這些標準來看，考慮到民主制度，中國政府也具有一定的合法性。

第二，對社會群體的壓迫。直到1965年，美國政府在某些地方積極壓迫黑人，在其他地方也積極壓迫亞裔，但程度可能較輕。 1965年在憲法上相當於1865-1867年，可以說，在《選舉權法案》、《民權法案》和《聯合公民》運動之間，美國處於最民主的時期。但即使在《聯合公民》運動之後，種族歧視在美國仍然是非法的。種族歧視完全合法，實際上是一項政策，就像1925年在阿拉巴馬州和南卡羅來納州一樣，在2025年的新疆和西藏也是如此。這就是中華人民共和國國家合法性受到質疑的地方。國家積極壓迫基於種族的人民。這意味著在某些公民眼中，它並不合法。

但最終，我認為合法性就像民主一樣，並非非此即彼。沒有一個政府能夠得到所有公民的支持。那麼，分界線又在哪裡呢？我們該如何看待馬杜羅領導的委內瑞拉、阿薩德領導的敘利亞，甚至是沙雷領導的敘利亞？它們是否足夠合法，能夠進行建設性地處理？

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