儘管存在貿易戰，對華鷹派在川普世界的影響力正在減弱：“限制派”正在取代“首要主義者”
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中國|老鷹訴 MAGA
儘管存在貿易戰，對華鷹派在川普世界的影響力正在減弱
“限制論者”正在取代“首要論者”
埃即使在唐納德·川普的關稅風暴之前，也很難看出明確的中國戰略。由於決策很大程度取決於總統的突發奇想，他的外交政策顧問似乎已經分裂成敵對的陣營。用華盛頓常用的一句話來說，
「首要主義者」尋求重建美國在世界上的主導地位，承擔一切威脅；
「優先考慮者」認為美國祇能對付中國，應該放棄烏克蘭；
而
「抑制者」則只想關注本土，避免未來發生戰爭。
自 4 月 2 日以來，川普的貿易戰進一步引發了混亂。但無論他本人的觀點如何，有一點似乎越來越清楚：
傳統的對華鷹派，無論是首要主義者還是優先主義者，在影響力爭奪戰中都在節節敗退。
儘管受到貿易風波的影響，但這一趨勢
最強烈的跡象之一是
4 月 3 日公佈的六名國家安全委員會 ( nsc ) 官員被解僱或調任的消息。
這顯然是由前一天與川普會面的右翼陰謀論者勞拉·魯默 (Laura Loomer) 促成的。
魯默女士表示，這些官員是“不忠誠的人”，他們幫助破壞川普。
然而，她的要求似乎與包括小唐納德·川普在內的限制者的要求非常一致，他們希望
剷除那些他們眼中一心挑起與中國戰爭的「新保守主義者」。
被解僱的人之一是國家安全委員會技術高級主管戴維·費思 (David Feith)。
從某種程度上來說，他是一個象徵性的目標。
他的父親道格拉斯是最初的新保守主義者之一。
身為五角大廈官員，他幫助策劃了2003年的伊拉克戰爭。
但小費思也是白宮最有經驗的中國問題專家之一，在川普第一任期內曾在國務院工作，並協助制定了主張升級美國聯盟的印度-太平洋戰略。
此後，身為智庫專家，他主張對華採取更強硬的政策。
在國家安全委員會，他處理的問題包括美國對中國的技術出口以及擬將 TikTok 出售給非中國所有者。
在這一職位上，他似乎在拜登時代的許多舉措的基礎上進行了改進，同時也提出了新的舉措，包括
「美國優先投資政策」。
該法案將俄羅斯和中國視為“對手”，並擴大了對中國投資的限制。
目前尚不清楚他的政策觀點是否導致他被解職，但前同事表示，
這是孤立主義者的勝利，也是中國專業知識的損失。
另外兩名對華鷹派人士——
國家安全委員會亞洲事務高級主任伊凡·卡納帕蒂 (Ivan Kanapathy) 和國家安全副顧問亞歷克斯·黃 (Alex Wong)——的未來現在也充滿疑問。
盧默女士指責卡納帕蒂先生曾與川普的批評者合作，並攻擊黃先生和他的妻子的中國血統以及她之前作為律師的工作經歷。
儘管這兩位官員都保住了工作，但由於他們的上司國家安全顧問邁克·沃爾茲（另一位被削弱的對華鷹派人士）的猛烈攻擊和權威的減弱，他們的權力被削弱了。
中國和台灣的官員將密切關注卡納帕蒂先生，因為他被視為白宮中台灣最堅定的支持者之一。他曾於 2014 年至 2017 年擔任美國駐台灣代表處的武官，並為川普第一任期內國家安全委員會亞洲事務負責人馬特·波廷格 (Matt Pottinger) 編輯的有關 2024 年台灣防務的書籍撰寫了文章。
去年，卡納帕蒂先生與波廷格先生會見了台灣總統。波廷格先生因 2021 年 1 月 6 日國會大廈遇襲事件而辭職，此後他呼籲
採取更強硬的政策，以鼓勵中國的政治變革。
這對於美國與中國的交往有何影響尚不清楚。
川普沒有表達過他在貿易之外的偏好，並且可能沒有意識到他的員工之間在政策上的爭論。
但一個潛在的後果是，對華鷹派將更難像第一個任期時那樣，在他不知情的情況下推動事情進展。有些人看到了近期變化的影響，
包括與盟友發表更堅定的聯合聲明，反對中國脅迫台灣，以及從美國國務院網站上刪除不支持台灣獨立的承諾。
限制器再訓練器
五角大廈內部的平衡可能也正在改變。
缺乏經驗的國防部長皮特·赫格塞斯 (Pete Hegseth) 在 3 月首次地區巡演中重申了總統喬·拜登 (Joe Biden) 的許多承諾，以此安撫美國的亞洲盟友。
但這可能是因為川普政府尚未確定其在亞洲的軍事重點。
4月8日，參議院批准埃爾布里奇·科爾比出任國防部負責政策的副部長，這項任命將使上述問題變得更加明朗。
科爾比是國防部的第三號人物，預計將在指導赫格塞斯先生的工作中發揮關鍵作用。
科爾比先生一直是優先考慮中國問題的最積極倡導者。
前同事表示，他致力於實現這一目標（包括台灣的國防），並且完全有資格擔任新職位。雖然他不是職業中國問題專家，但他在川普第一任期內在五角大廈工作，制定了國家國防戰略，將中國和俄羅斯列為主要對手。隨後，他創立了一個智庫並寫了一本書，都主張打擊中國在亞洲的霸權。
即便如此，他最近的言論更像是一個克制者，
稱台灣對美國來說不是一個「生存」問題，台灣應該將國防開支從目前的不到 3%增加到（不切實際的） GDP的 10%。他也認為，身為盟友，韓國應該採取更多措施來保衛自己。
這些言論為他贏得了副總統 JD Vance 和小川普的公開支持。川普最近表示，
科爾比支持總統與中國領導人習近平談判的願望，以避免“不必要地觸怒對方”，並尋求“與中國實現力量平衡，避免戰爭”。
柯比的語氣轉變或許是出於政治考慮，但它卻讓美國和盟國防務圈中的一些人感到不安，因為他們聽到了川普對歐洲的看法的呼應。
他們擔心，這位對台灣沒什麼個人感情的總統可能會願意與習近平達成協議，以犧牲台灣的安全為代價換取中國的貿易讓步和對美國在亞洲其他利益的尊重。
考慮到川普對亞洲盟友徵收的關稅以及他最近將航空母艦和飛彈防禦系統從亞洲重新部署到中東，其他人則懷疑川普能否堅持任何連貫的中國戰略。
儘管美國國務卿馬爾科·盧比奧持強硬立場，但美國國務院在中國問題上的發言權似乎有限。
他的政策規劃主管麥可·安東認為美國不應該保衛台灣。一些重要的中國通最近提前退休。
而負責東亞和太平洋事務的最高職位的提名人是邁克爾·德松布爾 (Michael DeSombre)，他是一名律師，唯一的外交經驗是擔任了一年駐泰國大使。
此類人事變動並未引起中國公眾的關注。
研究美國並為美國領導層提供建議的研究人員認為，
川普第一屆政府深受國家安全委員會、五角大廈和國務院中對華鷹派人士的影響。
復旦大學孟偉湛在最近的評論中表示，相較之下，
現任政府中的鷹派力量較弱。
他預計，中國將在技術和貿易問題上採取越來越強硬的立場，但在意識形態和軍事問題上則不會那麼強硬，因為中國將專注於國內復興。
這些都不會最終決定川普的中國戰略。
從過去幾週的情況來看，
這很大程度上取決於他自己的衝動，
而他的衝動可能很快就會改變。
但誰來管理日常關係和政策仍然很重要。如果川普確實尋求與中國達成協議，或者貿易戰蔓延到安全領域，那麼擺在他面前的選項以及預測中國反應的能力都將至關重要。
例如，在台灣問題上示弱，與過度挑釁一樣有可能引發中國的軍事行動。
在沒有連貫戰略的情況下與中國進行貿易戰已經夠危險的了。
安全方面的不一致可能會造成災難性的後果。 ■
訂閱者可以訂閱 我們新的每週新聞通訊《鼓樓》，了解世界如何看待中國，以及中國如何看待世界。
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中國的鞋匠似乎比政治人物更樂觀
貿易戰將造成巨大損失，但許多人已經經歷過風暴
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China | Hawks v MAGA
China hawks are losing influence in Trumpworld, despite the trade war
“Restrainers” are taking over from “primacists”
Even before Donald Trump’s tariff turmoil, it was hard to discern a clear China strategy. With decisions depending largely on presidential whim, his foreign-policy advisers seemed to have split into warring tribes. To use a shorthand common in Washington, the “primacists” seek to re-establish America’s dominance in the world, taking on all threats; the “prioritisers” think America can handle only China and should abandon Ukraine; and the “restrainers” want to focus on only the homeland, avoiding future wars. Since April 2nd Mr Trump’s trade war has sown further confusion. But whatever his own views, one thing seems increasingly clear: conventional China hawks, whether primacists or prioritisers, are losing ground in the battle for influence.
Though overshadowed by the trade drama, among the strongest indications of this trend was the firing or reassignment of six National Security Council (nsc) officials, which became public on April 3rd. That was apparently prompted by Laura Loomer, a right-wing conspiracy theorist who met Mr Trump a day earlier. Ms Loomer said the officials were “disloyal people” who helped to sabotage Mr Trump. Yet her demands seem to align closely with those of the restrainers (including Donald Trump junior) who want to root out those they see as “neocons” bent on provoking war with China.
One of those sacked was David Feith, the nsc’s senior director for technology. He was in some ways a symbolic target. His father, Douglas, was one of the original neocons. As a Pentagon official, he helped to plan the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But the younger Mr Feith was also among the White House’s most experienced China specialists, working in the State Department through Mr Trump’s first term and helping to create his Indo-Pacific Strategy, which advocated upgrading American alliances. As a think-tanker after that, he argued for tougher China policies.
On the nsc he handled issues that included American tech exports to China and the proposed sale of TikTok to a non-Chinese owner. In that role he appears to have built on many Biden-era initiatives, while also taking up new ones, including the America First Investment Policy. This identified Russia and China as “adversaries” and broadened curbs on investment in China. Whether his views on policy contributed to his sacking is unclear but, former colleagues say, it is a win for the isolationists and a loss of China expertise.
The future of two other China hawks—Ivan Kanapathy, the nsc’s senior director for Asia, and Alex Wong, the deputy national security adviser—is also now in doubt. Ms Loomer accused Mr Kanapathy of working previously with Trump critics, and attacked Mr Wong and his wife over their Chinese heritage and her previous work as a lawyer. Although both officials have kept their jobs, they have been weakened by the broadside and by the waning authority of their boss, Mike Waltz, the national security adviser (another wing-clipped China hawk).
Officials in China and Taiwan will be watching Mr Kanapathy closely, as he is seen as one of the island’s staunchest supporters in the White House. He served as military attaché to America’s representative office in Taiwan from 2014 to 2017, and contributed to a book on Taiwan’s defence in 2024 that was edited by Matt Pottinger, the nsc’s Asia chief in Mr Trump’s first term. Mr Kanapathy met Taiwan’s president last year with Mr Pottinger, who resigned over the attack on the Capitol on January 6th 2021 and has since called for tougher policies aimed at encouraging political change in China.
How this affects America’s dealings with China is unclear. Mr Trump has not expressed his preferences beyond trade, and may be unaware of the battles over policy among his staff. But one potential consequence is that it gets harder for China hawks to push things through without him noticing, as they did in his first term. Some see their fingerprints on recent changes, including firmer joint statements with allies opposing Chinese coercion of Taiwan and the removal from the State Department’s website of a commitment not to support the island’s independence.
Restrainer retrainer
The balance may be shifting in the Pentagon, too. Pete Hegseth, the inexperienced defence secretary, reassured America’s Asian allies by echoing many of President Joe Biden’s commitments during his first regional tour in March. But that was probably because the Trump administration has yet to work out its military priorities in Asia. Those could become clearer after the Senate’s confirmation on April 8th of Elbridge Colby as under-secretary of defence for policy, the Pentagon’s number-three post and one expected to play a critical role in guiding Mr Hegseth.
Mr Colby has been the most vocal advocate of prioritising China. Former colleagues say he is committed to that goal (including Taiwan’s defence) and well qualified for his new post. Though not a career China specialist, he worked in the Pentagon in Mr Trump’s first term, developing a National Defence Strategy which identified China and Russia as primary adversaries. He then founded a think-tank and wrote a book, both of which advocate combating Chinese hegemony in Asia.
Even so, he has sounded more like a restrainer of late, saying that Taiwan is not an “existential” issue for America and should increase its defence spending to (an unrealistic) 10% of gdp, from under 3% now. He has also argued that South Korea, an ally, should do more to defend itself. Such remarks have earned him public backing from Vice-President J.D. Vance and the junior Mr Trump, who said recently that Mr Colby supported the president’s desire to negotiate with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, to avoid “poking the dragon in the eye unnecessarily” and to seek a “balance of power with China that avoids war”.
Mr Colby’s change of tune may have been politically savvy, but it has unnerved some in American and allied defence circles who hear echoes of Mr Trump’s views on Europe. They worry that the president, who has little personal regard for Taiwan, might be open to striking a deal with Mr Xi that compromises the island’s security in exchange for trade concessions from China and deference to other American interests in Asia. Others doubt Mr Trump can stick to any coherent China strategy, considering his tariffs on Asian allies and the recent redeployment of an aircraft-carrier and missile-defence systems from Asia to the Middle East.
The State Department seems to have a limited say on China despite the hawkish views of Marco Rubio, the secretary of state. Michael Anton, his policy-planning chief, has argued that America should not defend Taiwan. Some leading China hands recently retired early. And the nominee for the top post covering East Asia and the Pacific is Michael DeSombre, a lawyer whose only diplomatic experience was a year as ambassador to Thailand.
Such personnel changes have not gone unnoticed in China. Researchers there who study America and advise the leadership believe that the first Trump administration was strongly influenced by China hawks in the nsc, Pentagon and State Department. Hawks in the current administration are weak by comparison, said Meng Weizhan of Fudan University in a recent commentary. He expects it to become increasingly hardline on technology and trade, but less so on ideology and military matters as it focuses on domestic revival.
None of this will ultimately decide Mr Trump’s China strategy. Judging by the past few weeks, that will depend largely on his own impulses, which can quickly change. But who manages relationships and policy day to day still matters. And if Mr Trump does seek a deal with China or if the trade war spills over into the security realm, the options presented to him and the capacity to predict China’s response will all be vital. Signalling weakness on Taiwan, for instance, has as much potential to trigger Chinese military action as being over-provocative. To engage China in a trade war without a coherent strategy is risky enough. Incoherence on the security front could be catastrophic. ■
Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.
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This article appeared in the China section of the print edition under the headline “Clipped wings”
China
April 19th 2025From the April 19th 2025 edition
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China’s propagandists preach defiance in the trade war with America
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More free time means more consumption, they hope
Why are Chinese soldiers fighting in Ukraine?
They have been showing up on both sides of the battlefield throughout the war
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A trade war will cause a lot of damage, but many have weathered storms before
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