超越重置：逆轉“尼克森訪華”

 超越重置：逆轉“尼克森訪華”

將俄羅斯安置在西方將使美國能夠平衡中國的崛起​​。

Beyond the Reset: Reverse “Nixon Goes to China”

Ensconcing Russia in the West would enable America to balance against China’s rise.

格雷格·勞森

格雷格·勞森

2012 年 5 月 12 日

1970 年代，理查德·尼克森總統和他的國家安全顧問亨利·基辛格開啟了與中國的關係，其目的是尋找冷戰的新槓桿，尤其是當時美國還深陷越南戰爭。其目標是使美國與中國和蘇聯的關係更加密切，從而能夠根據力量平衡的需要，在兩大國之間來回搖擺。

當時，中國顯然處於弱勢，需要加強。美國考慮扭轉這項政策的時機可能很快就要成熟了。

今天的戰略環境與尼克森會見毛澤東時相比有很大不同。冷戰已經結束，蘇聯不復存在，中國正迅速崛起為全球超級大國。在此條件下，美國正竭力管理世界各主要地區的多重戰略利益。其中最重要的是與中國的關係。

儘管沒有人對即將卸任的

• 世界銀行行長羅伯特·佐利克的言論提出異議，即中國成為全球事務的「負責任的利益相關者」將大有裨益，
• 但是，
• 這種情況無法發生意味著美國需要額外的槓桿來平衡中國在即將佔據經濟主導地位的亞洲地區的力量。

歐巴馬政府大肆宣揚的「轉向」顯示華盛頓已經認識到了這項需要。然而，要全面實施這項策略，美國必須確保其西部邊疆不受不穩定影響。這意味著確保歐洲的安全。

對於正試圖將重心轉向亞洲的美國來說，當前的歐洲財政危機為其帶來了各種中長期挑戰。這也為民族主義總統普丁領導下的俄羅斯的惡作劇打開了大門。

如果不加以重視和解決，俄羅斯問題可能會成為美國的重要障礙，使美國無法在亞洲發揮決定性作用。

歐巴馬政府意識到與俄羅斯建立更好的關係對歐洲穩定至關重要，這一點值得稱讚。然而，隨著普丁重新佔據克里姆林宮權力金字塔頂端無可爭議的地位，其備受吹捧的「重啟」似乎將擱淺。

從最近俄羅斯威脅對歐洲北約飛彈防禦基地採取先發制人行動的消息可以證實這一點。如果美國不想在與中國打交道時受到在中亞和東歐長期不滿的俄羅斯的擠壓，他們就必須超越“重啟”，尋求更全面的參與。

這需要打開與俄羅斯達成合法、廣泛諒解的大門，最終處理蘇聯解體的揮之不去的後果和普丁總統的復仇主義傾向。

美國應該放棄「重啟」的象徵意義，考慮與俄羅斯進行更廣泛、更深入的接觸，以使其對西方採取不那麼好戰的態度。從本質上來說，就像尼克森和基辛格尋求「龍」來平衡更強大的「熊」一樣，美國必須考慮相反的做法。

這樣做可以最大限度地減少俄羅斯對歐洲的侵略。更重要的是，俄羅斯在西方的穩固地位將為美國提供額外的槓桿，迫使中國將其軍事重點從亞洲轉移。

此舉也能擴大西方國家的經濟基礎，透過獲取俄羅斯和中亞地區巨大的碳氫化合物財富，同時在中俄地緣政治緊張局勢出現需要時，增強西方國家擠壓中國能源供應的能力。

這樣的政策可能存在許多缺陷。

• 首先，西方、特別是北約與俄羅斯的關係中瀰漫著不信任。莫斯科仍然認為北約在中歐和東歐的擴張違反了老布希政府時期以及蘇聯解體後立即做出的承諾。必須透過諸如美國支持北約向俄羅斯開放飛彈防禦合作等機制實質地解決這個問題，而不是堅持建立兩個獨立的系統。

此外，

• 美國應該減少對烏克蘭和格魯吉亞等關鍵國家非政府組織的資助，並悄悄停止對反覆無常的米哈伊爾·薩卡什維利的支持。

• 美國也應鼓勵普丁總統推動建立「歐亞聯盟」。這意味著美國不再因政治改革進展緩慢而責罵俄羅斯。相較之下，它應該只是主張「最終過渡到建立在普遍自由原則基礎上的真正的多黨民主」。

其他長期政策選項可能包括

• 擴大自由貿易區，不僅涵蓋與歐盟的傳統「跨大西洋」夥伴關係，還涵蓋最終的「歐亞聯盟」。

最後，最終應該考慮真正

• 邀請俄羅斯加入北約，但不應取決於俄羅斯國內的政治演變。

從根本上說，這是要改變伊斯梅勳爵對北約的評論，

將其存在的理由從

• 「擋住俄羅斯、穩住美國、壓制德國」

改為

• 「在亞洲崛起的同時，讓美國和俄羅斯都穩住，讓歐洲其他國家保持安靜」。

從目前的新聞頭條來看，這些政策建議似乎有些異想天開。然而，回顧俄羅斯歷史的軌跡非常重要。

俄羅斯長期以來一直處於左右為難的狀態，一方面它希望進入更加西方化的軌道，這是彼得大帝以來俄羅斯現代化者們的願望，另一方面它又保留了拜占庭式的東正教傳統，並且傾向於蒙古統治時期留下的“東方專制主義”。

面對當前人口挑戰和多個亞洲國家重回大國地位的局勢，俄羅斯面臨著多種選擇：嘗試與中國競爭並保持以中亞為基礎的獨立力量，擁抱中國並成為其小夥伴，或加入西方。上述每個選擇都符合俄羅斯的歷史自我形象，同時也引發了俄羅斯社會某些階層的擔憂。

目前還不清楚俄羅斯最終會選擇哪個方向。美國應該激勵俄羅斯最終做出向西方傾斜的決定，這也將使其能夠更充分地實現其中亞目標。

新的全球現實要求創造力和靈活性，而不是僵化性。將俄羅斯納入西方可能是這一代人最引人注目的外交舉措。這樣的政策顯然違背了許多美國傳統。然而，尼克森在 1972 年訪問北京時​​的政策也是如此。此舉如今被認為是一次強而有力的勝利。

@@@

我認為這是一場全球三大巨頭的舞蹈。在精確核武時代，沒有一個國家可以聯手對付另一個國家，如果一方被逼入絕境，它就可以轉身用核武反擊另外兩個國家。在這種情況下，所有國家都會失敗，並付出難以接受的高昂代價——也就是說，只要其中一個國家拖累另外兩個國家，就會引發核子浩劫/自殺。後核時代世界將是一場恢復的競賽，這可能需要幾個世紀的時間，甚至根本不需要！

三國都必須降低各自的排他性野心，在共同利益上保持合作，以便在三角關係中維持全球平衡。他們將必須在全球範圍內實踐比爾·克林頓的三角測量戰略。願上帝賜給他們有智慧的領導者。

Beyond the Reset: Reverse “Nixon Goes to China”

Ensconcing Russia in the West would enable America to balance against China’s rise.

Greg Lawson

Greg R. Lawson

May 12, 2012

When President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, opened up relations with China in the 1970s, it was done in the context of needing a new lever in the Cold War, especially when the United States was still mired in Vietnam. The goal was for the United States to be closer to both China and the Soviet Union than either was to each other and to be able to swing back and forth between the two powers as needed depending on what the exigencies of the balance of power dictated.

At that time, China was clearly the lesser power and required bolstering. The time for the United States to consider an inversion of that policy may soon become ripe.

The strategic environment today is vastly different than when Nixon met Mao. The Cold War is over, the Soviet Union is no more and China is rapidly ascending to the position of a global superpower. Under these conditions, the United States are struggling to manage a multiplicity of strategic interests in every major region of the world. Paramount among those are relations with China.

While no one disputes outgoing World Bank President Robert Zoellick’s statement that it would be advantageous for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in global affairs, the prospect of this not happening means that the United States need additional levers to balance against China in the soon to be economically dominant Asia.

The Obama Administration’s vaunted “pivot” shows Washington’s recognition of this need. To fully embrace this strategy, though, the United States must secure its Western flank from instability. This means securing Europe.

Inconveniently for the United States as it seeks to shift its focus to Asia, the ongoing European fiscal crisis opens the door to all kinds of medium- to long-term challenges. It also opens the door for Russian mischief under the nationalistic president Vladimir Putin.

Left unattended and unresolved, the Russian question could become a significant enough distraction that the United States find themselves unable to be decisive in Asia.

To the extent that the Obama Administration realized building better relations with the Russians would be essential for European stability, it should be commended. Yet, its much vaunted “reset” looks set to run aground as Putin reassumes his undisputed position on the top of the Kremlin’s power pyramid.

This can be confirmed from recent news of Russian threats of preemption against NATO missile defense sites in Europe. If the United States are not to be squeezed by a perennially dissatisfied Russia in Central Asia and Eastern Europe while trying to deal with China, they are going to have to move beyond the “reset” and seek a more comprehensive engagement.

This entails opening the door to a legitimate and wide ranging understanding with Russia that can finally deal with the lingering aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and President Putin’s taste for revanchism.

Discarding the mere symbolism of the “reset,” the United States should consider a broader and deeper outreach to Russia in order to pull it into a far less bellicose attitude vis-à-vis the West. In essence, much as Nixon and Kissinger sought the “dragon” to balance against the stronger “bear,” the United States must consider the reverse.

Doing so could minimize Russian aggression toward Europe. Even more important, having Russia ensconced in the West will offer the United States an additional lever it can employ to force China to divert its military focus from Asia.

Such a move could also expand the economic base of the West by capturing the huge hydrocarbon wealth of both Russia and Central Asia while having more ability to squeeze China’s energy supply if it is ever seen as necessary due to geopolitical tensions with the Middle Kingdom.

Such a policy has many possible pitfalls.

First, distrust pervades Western and, particularly, NATO relations with Russia. Moscow continues to believe that NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe violates promises made in the George H.W. Bush Administration and during the immediate aftermath of the Soviet implosion. It is essential to address this substantively, through mechanisms such as American support for NATO opening missile defense cooperation to Russia rather than insisting on two separate systems.

In addition, the United States should reduce funding to nongovernmental organizations in critical countries such as Ukraine and Georgia and quietly move from supporting the mercurial Mikheil Saakashvili.

The United States should also encourage President Putin’s push for a “Eurasian Union.” This would entail the United States no longer hectoring Russia over the slow pace of political reform. By contrast, it should simply argue for an “eventual transition to genuine multiparty democracy founded on generally liberal principles.”

Other policy options over the longer term could include an expansion of a free-trade zone to encompass not only the traditional “transatlantic” partnership with the European Union but also an eventual “Eurasian Union.”

Finally, a real invitation for Russia to join NATO should eventually be considered but not made contingent upon the domestic political evolution of the Russian state.

Fundamentally, this is about changing Lord Ismay’s comments on NATO and changing its raison d’être from “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down” to “keeping both the Americans and Russians in and the rest of Europe quiet” while Asia rises.

In light of current headlines, these policy proposals seem fanciful. Yet, it is important to recollect the arc of Russian history.

Russia has long been torn between its desire enter a more Western orbit, something Russian modernizers since Peter the Great have desired, and its Byzantine based Orthodox Christian heritage, as well as a tendency toward “oriental despotism” as inherited from its time under the Mongol Yoke.

With its current demographic challenges and the return to great power status of multiple Asian states, Russia faces several choices: attempt to compete with China and maintain an independent pole of power based on Central Asia, embrace China and become a junior partner, or join the West. Each of those options appeals to one of Russia’s historical self-images while also raising fears in certain segments of Russian society.

The jury is out as to which direction Russia will ultimately choose. It is up to the United States to incentivize Russia to make the final decision of tilting toward the West, which will also enable it to more fully realize its Central Asian goals.

A new global reality demands creativity and flexibility as opposed to rigidity. Moving to bring Russia into the West could be the most dramatic diplomatic move in a generation. Such a policy clearly runs against many American traditions. Yet, so did the Nixon policy when he traveled to Beijing in 1972. That move is now considered a powerful triumph.

China Eastern Europe Geopolitics Russia Russia and the West Sino-American Relations United States

Avatar photoupsidedown119

May 13, 2012 at 10:17

I think that it is a dance of 3 global giants. No two can gang up on the other one as in the era of precision nuclear weapons, if one is cornered, it can turn and bite back with nuclear weapons at the other two. In this case all will lose and pay an unacceptably high price – i.e. it will take just one of them to drag the other two to nuclear holocaust/suicide. The post nuclear world will be a race to recover, which may take centuries or not at all!

All three will have to lower their exclusive ambitions and maintain cooperation on their mutual interest in order to maintain global equilibrium in their triangular dance. They will have to practice on a global scale Bill Clinton’s triangulation strategy. May God give them the leaders with the wisdom to do so.