Download and read as a PDF: Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling
This perception was articulated by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who argued that the US must prevent Russia from becoming a “permanent junior partner” to China.[1] He warned that completely isolating Moscow would push it into total dependence on Beijing, potentially resulting in two nuclear powers aligning against the United States. He thus maintained that some level of engagement with Russia is preferable. This logic may have contributed to the hasty US-Russian agreement in Riyadh, where both sides discussed not only Ukraine’s future without Kyiv present but also the mutual restoration of embassy activities and future economic cooperation.
Some experts compare Trump’s Russia deal to Nixon’s surprise visit to China in 1972, which drove a wedge between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.[2] The dynamics today are vastly different: China is more powerful than Russia and has become Washington’s primary strategic concern.
However, this ‘Reverse Nixon’ strategy—an attempt to decouple Russia from China—is unlikely to succeed. Instead, as Japan’s similar experiment suggests, it risks being exploited by Moscow and ultimately strengthening the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.
A Reality Check
The year 2024 marked 75 years of Sino-Russian diplomatic ties. During a May 2024 concert celebrating this anniversary, Vladimir Putin quoted a Soviet-era song, telling Xi Jinping that “Russians and Chinese are brothers forever.”[3]
Yet, the Sino-Soviet alliance was never as solid as its propaganda song suggested. From their first meeting in 1949, with hindsight, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong distrusted each other, arguing over Soviet influence in Manchuria and Xinjiang. Ten years later, the supposedly monolithic alliance ideologically split, and twenty years later, the two nuclear weapon states engaged in direct military clashes along their borders.
The ‘Reverse Nixon’ strategy risks strengthening the Sino-Russia partnership
Even Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, not known for his honesty, admitted that the phrase “Russians and Chinese are brothers forever” had been “a bit far-fetched back then” as the relationship later “deviated from its course.”[4]
China and Russia are and will remain strategically autonomous players with distinct and sometimes conflicting geopolitical interests. While Russia likely will be a de facto junior partner in the coming decades, this does not mean that Beijing exercises direct control over Moscow, as the Soviet Union once did over the Warsaw Pact states by deploying its military and intelligence advisers.
China is a major political and economic enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine, yet their “no-limit” partnership conceals underlying contradictions. While Russia is preoccupied with Ukraine, China has accelerated its expansion into Central Asia and the South Caucasus—regions Russia has traditionally considered its “sphere of influence.” This includes investments in the Middle Corridor connecting China to Europe while bypassing Russia.[5] Meanwhile, the renewed Russia-North Korea alliance may trouble Beijing, which has long been Pyongyang’s largest trade partner and diplomatic shield.[6] Chinese nationalists remain hostile to Russian counterparts, such as Aleksandr Dugin, who once advocated for “dismembering China” for Russia’s security.[7] While China continues industrial espionage against Russia, the Russian political leadership has only temporarily scaled back its intelligence operations on Chinese soil.[8]
Parallels in Abe and Trump’s Approach to Russia
Trump’s Russia policy echoes former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s engagement strategy with Russia from 2016 to 2019. Despite Russia’s annexation of Crimea and G7 sanctions, Abe sought to improve relations with Moscow, pursuing two goals. One was to resolve the long-standing territorial dispute with Russia. However, the more pressing objective was preventing Russia from moving closer to China, which remains Japan’s major security challenge. After his resignation, Abe explained Japan’s strategic view: “Russia should not be driven to the Chinese side and our relations with Russia should be improved.”[9] However, Japan’s decoupling effort not only failed to separate Russia from China but led Tokyo to adopt a series of conciliatory measures toward Russia, such as new economic cooperation programmes in 2016.
Trump recently revealed that Abe had “100 percent” agreed with his idea of readmitting Russia to the G7.[10] Abe’s memoir recalls while President Obama opposed his visit to Sochi for a meeting with Putin, Trump was supportive of Abe’s Russia policy, even asking him to relay messages to Putin. Putin, however, was cautious—though he spoke positively of Trump to Abe, he said that he had “no illusion about the US,” remaining sceptical of changes in the US government’s stance toward Russia. As part of his decoupling strategy, Abe also sought to explain the China issue to Putin but found his response elusive:
I spent a considerable amount of time discussing the China issue with Putin, both in Sochi and during subsequent summits, but I could not discern his true intentions. While he openly criticised the United States, he was notably cautious in his remarks about China.
One curious observation is that the main advocates of the decoupling strategy were Japanese participants of the Kremlin-backed Valdai Discussion Club and a pro-Putin Japanese lawmaker along with his allies, who actively lobbied for stronger ties with Moscow. In contrast, Japanese leading sinologists were sceptical of this approach.[11]
China and Russia are and will remain strategically autonomous players with distinct and sometimes conflicting geopolitical interests
Similarly, one of the American proponents of this view is Thomas Graham, a Valdai Club participant, who has engaged in what he considers “Track 1.5 diplomacy” with Moscow even after the full-scale invasion.[12] In 2023, he argued that the US still needs a strong Russia to maintain regional balances of power in Asia, urging Washington and its partners to provide Moscow with “commercial opportunities, technological cooperation, and geopolitical options” to help it “avoid becoming China’s junior partner.”[13]
In January 2025, Graham contended that resolving the war in Ukraine requires a broader European security dialogue, with the most critical negotiations occurring between Moscow and Washington, “without the Europeans and Ukrainians in the room.” He views that the primary incentive for Moscow would be the offer to restore more normal diplomatic relations. Ultimately, Graham advocates for “competitive coexistence” with Russia, a stance that largely aligns with Russia’s foreign policy concept revised in 2023, which emphasises “strategic parity, peaceful coexistence with the United States.”[14]
Abe’s Pragmatic Diplomacy with Trump
In 2016, Abe became the first foreign leader to meet President-elect Donald Trump. During their unofficial meeting at Trump Tower, Abe briefed Trump on China’s military build-up and the value of the US-Japan alliance in the Indo-Pacific region—and, more importantly, promised to play golf together. Abe had more phone calls with Trump than any other world leader during his first term. Abe recalled one phone call that lasted 1.5 hours—Trump spent only 15 minutes discussing substantive matters, while the rest of the conversation revolved around golf and his complaints about other world leaders.
Russia has been exploiting western concerns about the Sino-Russia alliance
Abe’s memoir published in 2023 offers insightful observations about Trump.[15] Abe noted that although many viewed Trump as impulsive in his use of military force, the reality was quite the opposite:
At his core, Trump is a businessman—he is cautious about anything that costs money and views diplomacy and security through an economic lens. For example, he would say, “Joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea are a huge waste of money. We should stop them.”
Abe handled Trump’s indifference to security issues in close collaboration with US officials:
If Kim Jong-un had realised that Trump was actually reluctant to take military action, we might not have been able to exert diplomatic pressure. That’s why, together with Trump’s national security team, we were desperate to conceal his true nature—to make North Korea believe Trump could take action, thereby maintaining leverage in negotiations.
At the same time, Abe noted Trump’s empathetic moves on certain issues. Trump devoted more attention than his predecessor to the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea, even extending a meeting with their families during his busy schedule in Japan.
Abe’s golf diplomacy and flattery of Trump were criticised by some media, but he defended his approach:
If simply offering verbal praise by saying, “You are admirable,” can make everything go smoothly, then there’s nothing better than that. Taking a high-handed stance and complaining, “US policy is wrong,” would only strain US-Japan relations, and bring no benefit to Japan.
Former prime minister Abe tragically died in 2022, but his legacy still lingers. In December 2024, Abe’s widow, Akie, was invited to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago residence and dined with President-elect Trump and his wife, Melania, while incumbent Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba was unable to secure a meeting with Trump.[16] Trump values personal friendships.
Premature Decoupling
The US-China rapprochement in the 1970s occurred amid PRC-USSR military tensions and Washington’s efforts to de-escalate the Vietnam War. By the time of Nixon’s visit, Moscow and Beijing were already in serious conflict. Today, however, China and Russia manage their tensions and are likely to continue doing so. A Chinese spokesperson dismissed Secretary Rubio’s remarks as an attempt to sow discord between Beijing and Moscow, asserting that the Sino-Russian relationship will progress at its own pace.[17]
For years, Russia has been exploiting western concerns about the Sino-Russia alliance and their intentions to decouple Russia from China. A premature engagement with Russia could hand Moscow a diplomatic—and ultimately military—success in Ukraine. Furthermore, if the US scales down its military presence in Europe, both China and Russia will interpret this as confirmation that their “multipolar world order” strategy—dividing the world into spheres of influence with diminished US influence—is succeeding, reinforcing their belief in the validity of their alignment against Washington. Despite Trump’s amicable policy, Moscow will continue treating the US as its main adversary. A perceived lack of the US resolve to confront Russia in Ukraine could encourage China to take more aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific, particularly against Taiwan.
Rather, maintaining military support for Ukraine and strong sanctions on Russia, along with the threat of secondary sanctions to close loopholes, will exacerbate contradictions between the two Eurasian powers. Anti-western alignment per se will not straighten out underlying tensions between China and Russia. Moreover, their partnership remains highly personalised, dependent on two autocratic leaders. When one of them leaves power or is removed, the other will have to carefully assess their successor. Rushing to decouple them through a reset with Moscow would have severe consequences for US strategic interests.
Perhaps even more important is that western leaders develop strategic communication specifically tailored to Donald Trump, ensuring that what seems obvious to them is effectively conveyed to the US president. Conventional diplomacy that emphasises shared interests and values does not resonate in Trump’s America.
Endnotes
[1] “Secretary of State Marco Rubio With Matthew Boyle for Breitbart News Network,” US Department of State, 24 February 2025.
[2] “Trump’s Russia Pivot Keeps China Guessing on Ukraine,” France 24, 28 February 2025.
[3] “China and Russia Reaffirm Their Close Ties as Moscow Presses Its Offensive in Ukraine,” AP News, 15 May 2024.
[4] “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions during a News Conference on Russia’s Foreign Policy Performance in 2023, Moscow, 18 January 2024,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 18 January 2024.
[5]“China Expanding Economic Presence in South Caucasus,” Eurasianet, 17 October 2024.
[6] Laurie Chen, Josh Smith, and Laurie Chen, “China Keeps Its Distance as Russia and North Korea Deepen Ties,” Reuters, 19 June 2024.
[7] Wenhao Ma, “Scholar Called ‘Putin’s Brain’ Attacked on Chinese Internet,” Voice of America, 17 May 2024.
[8] “‘Широкий, подвинься’. Как на Дальнем Востоке ФСБ заводит дела о шпионаже в пользу Китая,” BBC News Русская служба, 2 May 2023; Sanshiro Hosaka, “A Forbidden Zone of ‘No Limits’ Friendship: Possibilities and Constraints in Sino-Russia Intelligence Cooperation,” ICDS, January 2024.
[9] Shinzo Abe, “安倍外交七年八ヵ月を語る(中)「自由で開かれたインド太平洋」にみる戦略的思考 [Interview about Abe’s diplomacy for seven years and eight months: strategic thinking in ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’],” Gaiko, February 2021, 97.
[10] Seb Starcevic, “Russia Should Rejoin G7, Trump Says,” POLITICO, 13 February 2025.
[11] Sanshiro Hosaka, “China-Russia ‘Alliance’: Lessons from Japan’s Failed ‘Detachment’ Strategy,” ICDS, October 2021.
[12] “Former U.S. Officials Have Held Secret Ukraine Talks with Russians,” NBC News, 6 July 2023; Thomas Graham was the co-chair of the US–Russia Boistö Group meeting in 2014, which echoed Russia’s stance on the so-called Ukraine crisis; Sanshiro Hosaka, “Epistemic Communities and ‘Agents of Influence’: Insights from Soviet Intelligence Documents,” Europe-Asia Studies (2025).
[13] Thomas Graham, “What Russia Really Wants,” Foreign Affairs, 9 October 2023.
[14] Thomas Graham, “Toward a Settlement of the Russia-Ukraine War,” Council on Foreign Relations, 22 January 2025; “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 31 March 2023.
[15] Shinzo Abe, 安倍晋三回顧録 [Shinzo Abe Memoirs] (Tokyo: Chuokoronshinsha, 2023).
[16] “Trump Meets Widow of Ex-Japanese PM Abe in Florida,” Kyodo News, 16 December 2024.
[17] “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on February 27, 2025,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 27 February 2025.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.
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