"根据对所有事实的详细调查，并在相关幸存日本领导人证词的支持下，调查组认为，在 1945 年 12 月 31 日之前，甚至很可能在 1945 年 11 月 1 日之前，即使没有投下原子弹，即使俄国没有参战，即使没有计划或考虑入侵，日本也会投降"。
美国战略轰炸调查，《日本结束战争的斗争》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1946 年），第 13 页。
"例如，与[美国战略]轰炸调查局 1946 年两份主要报告中的结论相反，近卫文麿亲王在战后接受调查局审讯时表示，如果没有向日本投放原子弹，战争很可能会持续到 1945 年。 在自己的战后审讯中，铃木总理也曾表示原子弹爆炸对结束战争起到了重要作用，而只有在调查局提问者的哄骗下，枢密院木户幸一才提供了暗示原子弹没有必要的证词"。
巴顿-J-贝姆斯坦因，《介绍 1945 年日本投降的解释问题》，第 30 页。
"从某种意义上说，原子弹和苏联参战是上天的恩赐。 这样，我们就不必说我们是因为国内情况而退出战争的"。
日本海军大臣米内光政 1945 年 8 月 12 日致海军大将高木惣吉。
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."
US Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), 13.
"Contrary to the conclusions in the [US Strategic] Bombing Survey's two major 1946 reports, for example, Prince Konoe Fumimaro had stated in his postwar interrogation with the Survey that the war would probably have gone on throughout 1945 if the atomic bomb had not been dropped on Japan. In his own postwar interrogation, Premier Suzuki had also indicated that the atomic bombing made an important difference in ending the war, and only after some coaxing by Survey questioners had Privy Seal Kido Koichi given the testimony suggesting that the atomic bomb was unnecessary."
Barton J. Bemstein, "Introducing the Interpretive Problems of Japan's 1945 Surrender," 30.
"[T]he atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods. This way we don't have to say that we quit the war because of domestic circumstances."
Japanese Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa to Admiral Takagi Sokichi, August 12, 1945.
"天皇陛下对目前这场战争中各交战国人民所面临的灾难和牺牲与日俱增深感忧虑，天皇陛下衷心希望看到战争迅速结束。 然而，在大东亚战争中，只要美国和英国坚持无条件投降，我国就别无选择，只能为了生存和祖国的荣誉，全力以赴地坚持到底。"
1945年7月12日，日本外务大臣东乡重典致日本驻苏大使佐藤直武，7月13日被美国截获并破译，并与包括哈里-杜鲁门总统在内的高级官员共享。
"斯大林将于 8 月 15 日参加日本战争。 到那时，日本人就完蛋了"。
哈里-S-杜鲁门总统，日记，1945 年 7 月 17 日。
"（原子弹）避免了日本海滩上数十万人的伤亡。 原子弹也按时投放，因此在战争结束时没有必要对俄国做出任何让步。 之所以说它及时，是因为战后我们拥有了主要的威慑力量，防止俄罗斯在我们解散后横扫欧洲。 在任何发展史上，及时拥有这样的东西都是最壮丽的表演之一"。
科学研究与发展办公室战时主任范内瓦-布什（Vannevar Bush），引自美国原子能委员会，《关于罗伯特-奥本海默：人事安全委员会听证会记录，华盛顿特区，1954 年 4 月 12 日至 1954 年 5 月 6 日》（政府印刷局，1954 年；麻省理工学院出版社重印，1971 年），第 561 页。
"His Majesty the Emperor is greatly concerned over the daily increasing calamities and sacrifices faced by the citizens of the various belligerent countries in this present war, and it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war. In the Greater East Asia War, however, as long as America and England insist on unconditional surrender, our country has no alternative but to see it through in an all-out effort for the sake of survival and the honor of the homeland."
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigenori Togo to Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union Naotake Sato, July 12, 1945, intercepted and decoded by the United States on July 13 and shared with top officials, including President Harry S. Truman.
"[Stalin]'ll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about."
President Harry S. Truman, diary entry, July 17, 1945.
"[The atomic bomb) saved hundreds of thousands of casualties on the beaches of Japan. It was also delivered on time so that there was no necessity for any concessions to Russia at the end of the war. It was on time in the sense that after the war we had the principal deterrent that prevented Russia from sweeping over Europe after we demobilized. It is one of the most magnificent performances of history in any development to have that thing on time."
Vannevar Bush, wartime director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, quoted in US Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing Before Personnel Security Board, Washington, D.C., April 12, 1954 through May 6, 1954 (Government Printing Office, 1954; reprinted by MIT Press, 1971), 561.
"那些坚持认为不使用原子弹也能促使日本投降的人，无法从实际控制日本命运的八个人（即最高战争指挥委员会的六名成员、木户枢密大臣和天皇）那里找到任何可信的佐证。 他们不仅没有找到战时的任何相关文件，而且即使在战争罪审判中面临可能的死刑判决时，也没有一个人作证说，如果有人提出修改条件，再加上苏联的干预或其他一些事件的组合（不包括使用原子弹），日本会更早投降"。
Richard B. Frank, Downfall： 大日本帝国的灭亡》（纽约：兰登书屋，1999 年），第 343 页。
"历史学家长谷川刚对 8 月 6 日至 8 月 17 日期间的日本记录进行了仔细分析，发现只有两份声明（共 12 份）仅提及原子弹的影响；其余声明都同时强调了原子弹和苏联的进入，或仅强调了苏联的行动。 根据长谷川本人的估计，苏联的加入而非原子弹才是迫使日本出手的决定性因素"。
John W. Dower，《战争文化：珍珠港、广岛、9-11、伊拉克》（纽约：W.W. Norton/The New Press，2010 年），第 243 页。
"如果使用毒气可以减少美国士兵的伤亡人数，您赞成还是反对对日本人使用毒气？
收藏....
40%
反对
49%
11%
无意见。
"大多数年轻人赞成使用毒气，而 50 岁及以上的人则强烈反对使用毒气。 男性比女性更反对使用毒气，受过大学教育的人比没有受过小学教育的人更反对使用毒气。
"Those insisting that Japan's surrender could have been procured without recourse to atomic bombs cannot point to any credible supporting evidence from the eight men who effectively controlled Japan's destiny: the six members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido, and the Emperor. Not only has no relevant document been recovered from the wartime period, but none of them, even as they faced potential death sentences in war-crimes trials, testified that Japan would have surrendered earlier upon an offer of modified terms, coupled to Soviet intervention or some other combination of events, excluding the use of atomic bombs."
Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999), 343.
"In a careful analysis of Japanese records between August 6 and August 17, the historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa found only two statements (out of twelve) referring to the impact of the bombs alone; the rest emphasized both the bombs and Soviet entry, or Soviet action alone. In Hasegawa's own estimation, the Soviet entry rather than atomic bombs was the determining factor forcing Japan's hand."
John W. Dower, Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Irag (New York: W.W. Norton/The New Press, 2010), 243
"Would you favor or oppose using poison gas against the Japanese if doing so would reduce the number of American soldiers who are killed and wounded?"
Favor....
40%
Oppose.
49%
11%
No opinion.
"A majority of young people favor the use of poison gas, while persons 50 years and older are substantially opposed to the idea. Men oppose the idea of using gas to a greater extent than women, and college-trained people are more opposed than people with no more than an elementary school education.'
"我们认为，考虑到这些因素，使用核弹对日本进行早期突击是不可取的。 如果美国率先向人类释放这种新的滥杀滥伤手段，就会牺牲全世界公众的支持，引发军备竞赛，影响就未来控制这种武器达成国际协议的可能性。
"如果首先在适当选择的无人居住地区进行演示，向全世界展示核弹，就能为最终达成这样的协议创造有利得多的条件"。
1945 年 6 月 11 日，詹姆斯-弗兰克和其他六位负责研究核弹的社会和政治影响的曼哈顿项目科学家向战争部长亨利-史汀生提交了《弗兰克报告》。
"我们的科学同行对最初使用这些武器的意见并不一致：从纯粹的技术演示建议到最能诱使投降的军事应用建议......不一而足。 我们发现自己更接近于后一种观点；我们无法提出任何可能结束战争的技术演示；我们认为除了直接军事使用外，没有其他可接受的替代办法。
"关于立即使用核武器的建议"，1945 年 6 月 16 日，罗伯特-奥本海默和其他四位曼哈顿项目科学家提交给临时委员会，该委员会就原子武器问题向杜鲁门总统提供建议。
"麦克阿瑟将军从 1944 年 3 月 1 日到 1945 年 5 月 1 日的作战记录显示，美军阵亡 13 742 人，日军阵亡 320 165 人，比例为 22:1。
"有理由相信，在九州的头30天，我们所付出的代价不应超过吕宋岛（31,000人阵亡、受伤或失踪]"。
1945 年 6 月 18 日，乔治-C-马歇尔将军在杜鲁门总统、战争部长亨利-史汀生、海军部长詹姆斯-福雷斯塔尔、约翰-J-麦克罗伊和参谋长联席会议上的发言。
"We believe that these considerations make the use of nuclear bombs for an early unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable. If the United States were to be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race for armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.
"Much more favorable conditions for the eventual achievement of such an agreement could be created if nuclear bombs were first revealed to the world by a demonstration in an appropriately selected uninhabited area."
The Franck Report, submitted to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, June 11, 1945, by James Franck and six other Manhattan Project scientists tasked with examining the bomb's social and political implications.
"The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender... We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use."
"Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Arms, June 16, 1945, submitted by Robert Oppenheimer and four other Manhattan Project scientists to the interim Committee, which advised President Truman on atomic weapons.
"The record of General MacArthur's operation from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 US killed compared to 320,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22:1.
"There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon (31,000 killed, wounded, or missing]."
Statement of General George C. Marshall to meeting of President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, John J. McCloy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 18, 1945.
"到[1945年]8月2日，[军事情报局]报告说，日本在九州有三个军、十一个师、一个旅和一个团。 估计日军总兵力为 545 000 人，包括 445 000 名地面作战部队......"。 到 8 月 10 日，参谋长联席会议的联合情报委员会（JIC）估计，到 10 月 15 日，本土群岛将驻扎 56 个野战师团（包括 3 个装甲师）、14 个仓库师团以及总兵力达 260 万人的陆军部队。 其中九州岛将驻扎十三个野战师共六十万人。 在 8 月 20 日对这一估计进行的最后修订中，九州的总兵力达到 62.5 万人和 14 个野战师。 (就野战师团而言，这一总数完全正确，但九州的实际日军人数要多得多：90 万人）。 其中至少有九个师在九州南部，是最初估计的三倍，守军总人数远远超过了马歇尔6月18日向杜鲁门提供的35万人的数字"。
Richard B. Frank，Downfall： 大日本帝国的灭亡》（纽约：兰登书屋，1999 年），第 202-203 页。
"马歇尔将军告诉我，要想在日本本土迫使其投降，可能要付出50万美国人的生命"。
哈里-S-杜鲁门，《回忆录》（1955 年）。
"我们估计，主要战斗最早要到1946年下半年才能结束。 我被告知，预计此类行动仅美军的伤亡人数就可能超过一百万"。
前战争部长亨利-史汀生，《使用原子弹的决定》，《哈珀杂志》，1947 年 2 月。
"By August 2, [1945] the [Military Intelligence Service] reported three Japanese armies, eleven divisions, one brigade and one regiment on Kyushu. Total estimated Japanese strength stood at 545,000, including 445,000 ground-combat troops... By August 10, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that by October 15, the Home Islands would house fifty-six field divisions (including three armored), fourteen depot divisions, and army troops with a combined strength of 2.6 million men. Of these Kyushu would be packed with 600,000 men in thirteen field divisions. In the final revision of this estimate on August 20, the total on Kyushu reached 625,000 men and fourteen field divisions. (This total was exactly correct as to field divisions, but the actual number of Japanese servicemen on Kyushu was much greater: 900,000.) At least nine of these divisions were in southern Kyushu, triple the original estimate, and the aggregate total of defenders far exceeded the 350,000 figure Marshall provided to Truman on June 18."
Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999), 202-203
"General Marshall told me that it might cost half a million American lives to force the enerny's surrender on his home grounds."
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (1955).
"We estimated that the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946 at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to the American forces alone."
Former Secretary of War Henry Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, Harper's, February 1947.
"任何真正了解那段历史的人都会得出这样的结论：总的来说，它拯救了生命。 现在，如果你当时生活在广岛市或长崎市，你很难接受你为了国家的利益献出了你的生命、你父亲的生命、你父母的生命或其他什么东西。 但这就是每个士兵都在做的事情，无论他是死于步枪子弹还是原子弹....。 有很多人在那里被杀，但他们是为了整体利益而被杀，因为会有成千上万的人被杀。 其中大多数是日本人。 我说的还不是入侵的情况"
采访 "伊诺拉-盖伊 "号领航员荷兰-范-柯克，2008 年，美国国家二战博物馆，OH 2672。
"杜鲁门及其下属决定在封锁和轰炸行动中加入核武器，这导致广岛和长崎有 10 万至 20 万日本人丧生，此外还有数万人死于燃烧弹空袭或封锁的最终影响。 然而，这些日本非战斗人员不被屠杀的权利并不比在封锁的最后痛苦中死于饥饿和疾病的大量中国人和其他亚洲非战斗人员、日本非战斗人员（更不用说盟军战俘和被拘禁的平民）的权利更强。 因此，原子弹的替代品并不能保证它们会结束战争或减少人类的死亡和痛苦"。
Richard B. Frank，Downfall，The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire（纽约：兰登书屋，1999 年），360、
"然而，一个非常粗略的计算表明，考虑到软数据，没有比'表明'更有力的动词可以接受，8 月下旬的投降，如果没有原子弹轰炸，但继续进行常规轰炸和封锁，以及在亚洲大陆的斗争和大规模营养不良问题，很可能总体上挽救了生命。 相比之下，如果在 10 月很晚的时候才投降，没有原子弹轰炸，但有常规轰炸和封锁，以及亚洲大陆上的斗争和大规模营养不良问题，即使只计算亚洲人的生命，而不计算美国和苏联人的生命，似乎也很可能会付出更多的生命代价。
巴顿-伯恩斯坦，《介绍 1945 年日本投降的解释问题》，第 15 页。
"Anybody who really understands the history of that period has to conclude that it saved lives overall. Now, if you were living within the city of Hiroshima or the city of Nagasaki at that particular time, it is tough for you to accept that you gave your life or your father's life or your parent's life or whatever for the good of your country. But that's what every soldier was doing-out fighting it whether he was killed by a rifle bullet or an atomic blast.... There were a lot of people killed there, but they were killed for the overall good because many, many, many thousands of additional people would have been killed. Most of them would have been Japanese. And I'm not even talking in the event of an invasion."
Interview with Enola Gay navigator Dutch Van Kirk, 2008, The National WWII Museum, OH 2672.
"The decisions made by Truman and his subordinates to add nuclear weapons to the campaign of blockade and bombardment cost the lives of between 100,000 and 200,000 Japanese at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on top of the many tens of thousands of others who died in the incendiary raids or due to the ultimate effects of the blockade. Those Japanese noncombatants, however, held no stronger right not to be slaughtered than did the vast numbers of Chinese and other Asian noncombatants, the Japanese noncombatants (not to mention Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees) who would have perished of starvation and disease in the final agony of the blockade. Thus, alternatives to the atomic bombs carried no guarantee that they would end the war or reduce the amount of human death and suffering."
Richard B. Frank, Downfall, The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999), 360,
"Yet a very rough calculation suggests given the soft data, no stronger verb than 'suggest' is acceptable that a late August surrender, if achieved without the atomic bombings but with continued conventional bombings and the blockade, as well as the struggle on the Asian mainland and massive problems of malnutrition, might well have saved lives overall. In contrast, it seems quite likely that a very late October surrender, without the atomic bombings but with the conventional bombings and the blockade, as well as the struggle on the Asian mainland and massive problems of malnutrition, would have cost more lives, even if only Asian and not American and Soviet lives are counted.
Barton Bernstein, "Introducing the Interpretive Problems of Japan's 1945 Surrender," 15.
"暴力工具的技术发展现已达到这样一个地步，即任何政治目标都不可能与它们的破坏潜力相匹配，也没有理由在武装冲突中实际使用它们。
汉娜-阿伦特，《暴力反思》，《纽约书评》，1969 年 2 月 27 日
"......以下是我们的条款。 我们不会偏离它们。 没有其他选择。 我们不会容忍任何拖延......我们呼吁日本政府现在就宣布所有日本武装部队无条件投降，并提供适当和充分的保证，表明他们对这一行动的诚意。 日本的选择是立即彻底毁灭。
1945 年 7 月 26 日美国、中国和英国政府首脑批准的《要求日本投降的波茨坦公告》。
"我谈到，如果我们对日本人实施'无条件投降'，美国人将付出巨大的生命代价，英国人也将付出较小的生命代价。 杜鲁门总统]应该考虑是否可以用其他方式来表达，这样我们就可以得到未来和平与安全的所有基本要素，同时在他们遵守征服者所需的所有保障措施之后，还能给他们留下一些挽救其军事荣誉的表现和一些国家生存的保证。 总统痛苦地回答说，他不认为日本人在珍珠港事件之后还有什么军事荣誉可言。 我只好说，不管怎么说，他们也有一些东西，为了这些东西，他们愿意面对大量的死亡，而这些东西对我们来说可能并不那么重要，但对他们来说却很重要。 于是，他变得相当同情，并像[美国战争部长]史汀生一样，谈到了他对美国人无限制地流血所承担的可怕责任"。
温斯顿-丘吉尔在《胜利与悲剧》（波士顿：霍顿-米夫林公司，1953 年）中讲述了他 1945 年 7 月 18 日与哈里-杜鲁门总统的会面，第 642 页。
"The technical development of implements of violence has now reached the point where no political goal could conceivably correspond to their destructive potential or justify their actual use in armed conflict."
Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," New York Review of Books, February 27, 1969
"...Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay...We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
Potsdam Declaration Calling for the Surrender of Japan, Approved by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and Great Britain, July 26, 1945.
"I dwelt upon the tremendous cost in American life and to a smaller extent in British life if we enforced 'unconditional surrender' upon the Japanese. It was for [President Truman] to consider whether this might not be expressed in some other way, so that we got all the essentials for future peace and security, and yet left them some show of saving their military honour and some assurance of their national existence, after they had complied with all safeguards necessary for the conqueror. The President replied bitterly that he did not think the Japanese had any military honour after Pearl Harbour. I contented myself with saying that at any rate they had something for which they were ready to face certain death in very large numbers, and this might not be so important to us as it was to them. He then became quite sympathetic, and spoke, as had [US Secretary of War] Stimson, of the terrible responsibilities that rested upon him for the unlimited effusion of American blood."
Winston Churchill, recounting his July 18, 1945, meeting with President Harry S. Truman in Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), 642.
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