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美元主導的最大威脅是美國功能失調
不要憤怒地用美元
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美元主導地位的最大威脅是美國在x上的功能失調（在新視窗中開啟）
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史蒂文·B·卡明和馬克·索貝爾JUNE 10 2024
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史蒂文‧卡明 (Steven B. Kamin) 是美國企業研究所的高級研究員、美國聯邦儲備委員會國際金融部前主任。馬克‧索貝爾 (Mark Sobel) 是官方貨幣和金融機構論壇美國主席，也是美國財政部負責國際貨幣和金融政策的前副助理部長。
1960年代，法國財政部長瓦萊裡·吉斯卡爾·德斯坦感嘆美元的“過高特權”，渴望建立一個不那麼依賴美元和美國經濟政策束縛的國際貨幣體系。 2009年，中國人民銀行行長周小川呼籲去美元化和人民幣國際化的多極政權。新興市場也加入了合唱，批評聯準會貨幣政策的外溢效應。
但世界各地似乎都在渴望非美元替代體系的出現，但他們沒有抓到重點。重點不應該是重新構想國際貨幣體系，而應該是強化全球經濟的潛在驅動力和動力。
從60年的批評中我們可以得到什麼結論？再加上改變，再加上我選擇了。
為什麼美元是世界主導貨幣？正如我們最近對此問題的評論中所討論的，答案並不新鮮。美國經濟規模龐大，約佔全球GDP的25%。與幾乎所有已開發經濟體相比，它也更具創新性、創業精神和成長速度。美國的金融市場是世界上最深、最流動、最開放的。法治很強大，投資者保障適用於居民和外國人。
美元網路是全球性的，這反過來又增強了其履行全球貨幣功能的能力——它是一種記帳單位、一種交換媒介和一種價值儲存手段，全球儲備中近 60% 是美元。其他貨幣競爭者只是冒充者。
歐元的影響更多是區域性的，而不是全球性的，自誕生以來其儲備份額一直徘徊在 20% 左右。歐洲經濟不如美國經濟充滿活力；但沒有泛歐安全資產；資本市場聯盟陷入困境。
大部分注意力都集中在人民幣上。中國也很大。它正在建立一個不依賴美元的國際支付基礎設施（CIPS），是創建數位央行貨幣的領導者，目前中國超過四分之一的貿易以人民幣結算。但更強的交換媒介功能並不能使人民幣成為適當的價值儲存手段。人民幣不可兌換；資本管制比比皆是；金融市場的發展還有很長的路要走；國家這只看得見的手無所不在，變化無常。
因此，人民幣僅佔全球儲備的3%。
有些人認為，加密資產可能有助於將國際貨幣體系從美元中解放出來。夢囈。主要穩定幣與美元掛鉤。觀察其他加密資產價格的波動會讓人感到眩暈，這與價值儲存相反。
其他人則認為，美國使用金融制裁——武器化——將導緻美元貶值。事實上，如果美國每次都單方面實施制裁，更不用說域外制裁，那肯定會加速美元的滅亡。但如果美國與我們的盟友一起實施多邊金融制裁——例如封鎖俄羅斯央行和寡頭資產——任何影響都應該很小。畢竟，外國政府持有的美國安全資產中約四分之三是由與美國有某種形式軍事聯繫的國家持有的。
順便說一句，過高的特權並不過高。如果是這樣，其他人就會尋求分一杯羹。是的，美國人在很大程度上免受匯率風險的影響，聯準會獲得了數十億美元的鑄幣稅，而且美國的利率可以說要低一些——儘管美國的實際收益率與其他國家幾乎沒有什麼不同。與主導地位相關的資本流入增加推高了美元，這在一定程度上有助於抑制通膨，但也損害了就業和出口，產生了當局長期以來一直在應對的保護主義勢力。
上面的分析還是比較標準的。但為什麼我們認為有關美元未來全球地位可能下降的爭論沒有抓到重點？因為關鍵問題不在於美元的全球地位是否下降，而是為何下降。
在良性的情況下，美國實行健全的金融、貿易和宏觀經濟政策，包括開始逐步整頓其財政秩序。德國和中國等主要順差經濟體促進了國內成長。歐洲和中國加強了各自的金融市場，提高了其深度和流動性。在全球成長穩健、風險降低和金融創新持續活躍的環境下，我們可能會看到支付和儲備貨幣的多元化，從美元轉向其他穩定經濟體的貨幣。但世界經濟和金融體系將更加平衡、更加穩健，美國的境況也會因此而變得更好。
惡性的情況更令人擔憂和更具破壞性。在保護主義大幅抬頭的背景下，世界分裂成不同的團體。美國政治失靈繼續失控。美國未能解決其不可持續的財政道路，政客損害了聯準會的獨立性和政策，使聯準會屈服於財政主導地位。美國加大單邊金融制裁的力道。它在海外的合作夥伴越來越不可靠。它有可能導緻美元貶值，讓人回想起 20 世紀 30 年代以鄰為壑的貨幣政策。它破壞了導緻美元主導地位的特性。美元的全球地位將大幅下降，市場混亂和波動將爆發。這種惡劣的情況將對包括美國在內的全球繁榮造成巨大損害。
關於美元主導地位未來的全球辯論沒有抓住要點，因為它沒有關注美元的未來將如何演變。爭論的焦點不是歐元、人民幣、CBDC、穩定幣、支付系統等作為替代方案，而是惡性的情景凸顯了真正的問題——美國需要照鏡子。如果美國不把國內秩序維持得更好，美元的主導地位將是我們最不用擔心的。
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Accessibility helpSkip to navigationSkip to contentSkip to footer OPEN SIDE NAVIGATION MENU My Account MENU Financial Times My Account Keep reading the FT for free Register now and enjoy any 3 articles for free every month. REGISTER FOR FREE FT Alphaville US DollarAdded The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction Don’t greenback in anger © REUTERS The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction on x (opens in a new window) The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction on facebook (opens in a new window) The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction on linkedin (opens in a new window) The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction on whatsapp (opens in a new window) Share Save Steven B Kamin and Mark SobelJUNE 10 2024 37 Print this page Keep up with the latest news on Asia's biggest economy.Explore the China Focus hub Steven B. Kamin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and former director of the International Finance Division at the Federal Reserve Board. Mark Sobel is US Chair, Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, and former deputy assistant secretary for International Monetary and Financial Policy at the US Treasury. In the 1960s, French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing lamented the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege”, longing for an international monetary system less reliant on the dollar and the shackles of US economic policy. In 2009, Governor Zhou Xiaochuan of the People’s Bank of China called for de-dollarisation and a multipolar regime with an internationalised renminbi. Emerging markets joined the chorus, criticising the spillovers from Fed monetary policy. But the wistful yearnings from seemingly every quarter of the world for the emergence of a non-dollar alternative system miss the point. Instead of reimagining the international monetary system, the focus should be on strengthening the underlying drivers and dynamics of the global economy. What can one conclude from the 60 years of critiques? Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. Why is the dollar the world’s dominant currency, and why will it likely remain so for the foreseeable future? As discussed in our recent review of this issue, the answer is hardly novel. The US economy is huge, some 25 per cent of global GDP. It is also more innovative, entrepreneurial, and faster-growing than nearly all its advanced-economy counterparts. America’s financial markets are the deepest, most liquid and open in the world. Rule of law is strong, with investor protections that apply to residents and foreigners alike. The dollar network is global, which in turn reinforces its ability to fulfil the functions of a global currency — it’s a unit of account, a medium of exchange and a store of value, with nearly 60 per cent of global reserves in dollars. Other currency contenders are mere pretenders. The euro’s impact is more regional than global with its reserve share hovering around 20 per cent since its inception. Europe’s economy isn’t as dynamic as America’s; but there is no pan-European safe asset; capital markets union flounders. Much attention focuses on the renminbi. China, too, is huge. It is building out an international payments infrastructure free of the dollar (CIPS), is a leader in creating a digital central bank currency, and over a quarter of China’s trade is now settled in RMB. But a stronger medium of exchange function won’t make the RMB a suitable store of value. The RMB isn’t convertible; capital controls abound; financial markets have far to go in their evolution; and the state’s visible hand is omnipresent and mercurial. In consequence, the RMB accounts for only 3 per cent of global reserves. Some argue that crypto assets may help free the international monetary system from the dollar. Balderdash. Key stablecoins are pegged to the dollar. Watching other crypto assets prices fluctuate gives one a case of vertigo, the antithesis of a store of value. Others argue that US use of financial sanctions — weaponisation — will tank the dollar. Indeed, if the US unilaterally deploys sanctions at every turn, let alone extraterritorially, that could certainly accelerate dollar demise. But if the US imposes financial sanctions multilaterally, in concert with our allies — for example, blocking Russian central bank and oligarch assets — any fallout should be small. After all, some three-quarters of foreign government holdings of US safe assets are held by countries with some form of military tie to the US. By the way, the exorbitant privilege isn’t exorbitant. If it were, others would seek a piece of the action. Yes, Americans are largely shielded from exchange risk, the Fed gets a few billion dollars of seignorage and US rates are arguably somewhat lower — though US real yields are little different than others. The heightened capital inflow associated with dominance bids the dollar higher, which helps a tad on inflation, but also hurts jobs and exports, generating protectionist forces authorities have long contended with. The above analysis is fairly standard. But why then do we argue that the debate about a possible future reduction in the dollar’s global role misses the point? Because the key issue is not whether the dollar’s global role declines, but why. In a benign scenario, the US runs sound financial, trade, and macroeconomic policies, including beginning the gradual process of bringing its fiscal house in order. Key surplus economies such as Germany and China boost domestic sources of growth. Europe and China strengthen their financial markets, enhancing their depth and liquidity. In an environment of solid global growth, reduced risk, and ongoing brisk financial innovation, we might see diversification away from the dollar for payments and reserves and into the currencies of other stable economies. But the world economy and financial system will be better balanced and more robust, and the US will be better off as a result. The malign scenario is far more worrisome and disruptive. The world fragments into blocs amid substantially rising protectionism. US political dysfunction continues to run amok. The US fails to tackle its unsustainable fiscal path and politicians compromise the Fed’s independence and policies, subordinating the central bank to fiscal dominance. America ratchets up the use of unilateral financial sanctions. It acts as an increasingly unreliable partner abroad. It threatens to devalue the dollar, raising the haunting memories of the beggar-thy-neighbour currency policies of the 1930s. It undermines the very properties that have led to dollar dominance. The dollar’s global role would plunge and market disorder and volatility would explode. The malign scenario would be enormously harmful to global prosperity, including America’s. The global debate on the future of dollar dominance misses the point because it doesn’t focus on how the dollar’s future will evolve. Instead of the debate focusing on the euro, RMB, CBDCs, stablecoins, payments systems etc as alternatives, the malign scenario highlights the real issue — the US needs to look into the mirror. If the US doesn’t keep its house in better order, dollar dominance will be the least of our worries. Event details and information The Global Boardroom: 8th Edition Online 04 December - 06 December 2024 FT journalists in conversation with leaders in business and government Register now Presented byFT Live Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2024. All rights reserved.Reuse this content(opens in new window)CommentsJump to comments section Latest on US Dollar Markets InsightBarry Eichengreen The fate of dollar rests on the US election Gold Rich countries plan to buy more gold despite record price LexDollar Tree Inc Dollar Tree needs to end its unhappy union with Family Dollar Premium content Katie Martin Dollar doomsters have got it all wrong Foreign exchange ECB flags euro risks from Russia as global forex reserves dip Central banks Global central banks plan to increase dollar reserves, survey suggests US Dollar Dollar rally falters as falling inflation raises hopes of rate cuts Follow the topics in this article Global Economy Add to myFT US Dollar Added US Add to myFT FT Alphaville Add to myFT Mark Sobel Add to myFT Comments Useful links Support Legal & Privacy Services Tools Community & Events More from the FT Group Markets data delayed by at least 15 minutes. © THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2024. FT and ‘Financial Times’ are trademarks of The Financial Times Ltd. The Financial Times and its journalism are subject to a self-regulation regime under the FT Editorial Code of Practice.
https://www.ft.com/content/293a7a58-3f14-426c-8b7f-fa0859054842?signupConfirmation=success
Accessibility helpSkip to navigationSkip to contentSkip to footer OPEN SIDE NAVIGATION MENU My Account MENU Financial Times My Account Keep reading the FT for free Register now and enjoy any 3 articles for free every month. REGISTER FOR FREE FT Alphaville US DollarAdded The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction Don’t greenback in anger © REUTERS The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction on x (opens in a new window) The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction on facebook (opens in a new window) The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction on linkedin (opens in a new window) The big threat to dollar dominance is American dysfunction on whatsapp (opens in a new window) Share Save Steven B Kamin and Mark SobelJUNE 10 2024 37 Print this page Keep up with the latest news on Asia's biggest economy.Explore the China Focus hub Steven B. Kamin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and former director of the International Finance Division at the Federal Reserve Board. Mark Sobel is US Chair, Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, and former deputy assistant secretary for International Monetary and Financial Policy at the US Treasury. In the 1960s, French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing lamented the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege”, longing for an international monetary system less reliant on the dollar and the shackles of US economic policy. In 2009, Governor Zhou Xiaochuan of the People’s Bank of China called for de-dollarisation and a multipolar regime with an internationalised renminbi. Emerging markets joined the chorus, criticising the spillovers from Fed monetary policy. But the wistful yearnings from seemingly every quarter of the world for the emergence of a non-dollar alternative system miss the point. Instead of reimagining the international monetary system, the focus should be on strengthening the underlying drivers and dynamics of the global economy. What can one conclude from the 60 years of critiques? Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. Why is the dollar the world’s dominant currency, and why will it likely remain so for the foreseeable future? As discussed in our recent review of this issue, the answer is hardly novel. The US economy is huge, some 25 per cent of global GDP. It is also more innovative, entrepreneurial, and faster-growing than nearly all its advanced-economy counterparts. America’s financial markets are the deepest, most liquid and open in the world. Rule of law is strong, with investor protections that apply to residents and foreigners alike. The dollar network is global, which in turn reinforces its ability to fulfil the functions of a global currency — it’s a unit of account, a medium of exchange and a store of value, with nearly 60 per cent of global reserves in dollars. Other currency contenders are mere pretenders. The euro’s impact is more regional than global with its reserve share hovering around 20 per cent since its inception. Europe’s economy isn’t as dynamic as America’s; but there is no pan-European safe asset; capital markets union flounders. Much attention focuses on the renminbi. China, too, is huge. It is building out an international payments infrastructure free of the dollar (CIPS), is a leader in creating a digital central bank currency, and over a quarter of China’s trade is now settled in RMB. But a stronger medium of exchange function won’t make the RMB a suitable store of value. The RMB isn’t convertible; capital controls abound; financial markets have far to go in their evolution; and the state’s visible hand is omnipresent and mercurial. In consequence, the RMB accounts for only 3 per cent of global reserves. Some argue that crypto assets may help free the international monetary system from the dollar. Balderdash. Key stablecoins are pegged to the dollar. Watching other crypto assets prices fluctuate gives one a case of vertigo, the antithesis of a store of value. Others argue that US use of financial sanctions — weaponisation — will tank the dollar. Indeed, if the US unilaterally deploys sanctions at every turn, let alone extraterritorially, that could certainly accelerate dollar demise. But if the US imposes financial sanctions multilaterally, in concert with our allies — for example, blocking Russian central bank and oligarch assets — any fallout should be small. After all, some three-quarters of foreign government holdings of US safe assets are held by countries with some form of military tie to the US. By the way, the exorbitant privilege isn’t exorbitant. If it were, others would seek a piece of the action. Yes, Americans are largely shielded from exchange risk, the Fed gets a few billion dollars of seignorage and US rates are arguably somewhat lower — though US real yields are little different than others. The heightened capital inflow associated with dominance bids the dollar higher, which helps a tad on inflation, but also hurts jobs and exports, generating protectionist forces authorities have long contended with. The above analysis is fairly standard. But why then do we argue that the debate about a possible future reduction in the dollar’s global role misses the point? Because the key issue is not whether the dollar’s global role declines, but why. In a benign scenario, the US runs sound financial, trade, and macroeconomic policies, including beginning the gradual process of bringing its fiscal house in order. Key surplus economies such as Germany and China boost domestic sources of growth. Europe and China strengthen their financial markets, enhancing their depth and liquidity. In an environment of solid global growth, reduced risk, and ongoing brisk financial innovation, we might see diversification away from the dollar for payments and reserves and into the currencies of other stable economies. But the world economy and financial system will be better balanced and more robust, and the US will be better off as a result. The malign scenario is far more worrisome and disruptive. The world fragments into blocs amid substantially rising protectionism. US political dysfunction continues to run amok. The US fails to tackle its unsustainable fiscal path and politicians compromise the Fed’s independence and policies, subordinating the central bank to fiscal dominance. America ratchets up the use of unilateral financial sanctions. It acts as an increasingly unreliable partner abroad. It threatens to devalue the dollar, raising the haunting memories of the beggar-thy-neighbour currency policies of the 1930s. It undermines the very properties that have led to dollar dominance. The dollar’s global role would plunge and market disorder and volatility would explode. The malign scenario would be enormously harmful to global prosperity, including America’s. The global debate on the future of dollar dominance misses the point because it doesn’t focus on how the dollar’s future will evolve. Instead of the debate focusing on the euro, RMB, CBDCs, stablecoins, payments systems etc as alternatives, the malign scenario highlights the real issue — the US needs to look into the mirror. If the US doesn’t keep its house in better order, dollar dominance will be the least of our worries. Event details and information The Global Boardroom: 8th Edition Online 04 December - 06 December 2024 FT journalists in conversation with leaders in business and government Register now Presented byFT Live Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2024. All rights reserved.Reuse this content(opens in new window)CommentsJump to comments section Latest on US Dollar Markets InsightBarry Eichengreen The fate of dollar rests on the US election Gold Rich countries plan to buy more gold despite record price LexDollar Tree Inc Dollar Tree needs to end its unhappy union with Family Dollar Premium content Katie Martin Dollar doomsters have got it all wrong Foreign exchange ECB flags euro risks from Russia as global forex reserves dip Central banks Global central banks plan to increase dollar reserves, survey suggests US Dollar Dollar rally falters as falling inflation raises hopes of rate cuts Follow the topics in this article Global Economy Add to myFT US Dollar Added US Add to myFT FT Alphaville Add to myFT Mark Sobel Add to myFT Comments Useful links Support Legal & Privacy Services Tools Community & Events More from the FT Group Markets data delayed by at least 15 minutes. © THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2024. FT and ‘Financial Times’ are trademarks of The Financial Times Ltd. The Financial Times and its journalism are subject to a self-regulation regime under the FT Editorial Code of Practice.
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