以過程取勝：緬甸少數民族的狀態與中立化。

 

Winning by Process: The State and Neutralization of Ethnic Minorities in Myanmar.

以過程取勝：緬甸少數民族的狀態與中立化。

連結/頁面引用

 

以過程取勝：緬甸少數民族的狀態與中立化。作者：雅克‧貝特朗、亞歷山大‧佩爾蒂埃和阿德斯‧貌‧湯蒙。伊薩卡和倫敦：康奈爾大學出版社，2022 年。平裝本：247 頁。

2011 年，緬甸直接軍事統治的衰落重新點燃了結束自 1948 年獨立以來一直困擾該國的種​​族衝突的希望。一群退休將軍領導的具有改革思想的政府與緬甸政府發起了和平談判。眾多的少數民族和叛亂分子。然而十年後，軍方再次奪取政權，推翻了和平進程和所有其他和解努力，導致戰爭死灰復燃。

透過過程獲勝探討了那十年和平談判的動態（2011 20）。這本書試圖理解聯邦鞏固與發展黨 (USDP) 於 2011 年組建的半文職政府以及隨後的全國民主聯盟 (NLD) 政府在 2015 年選舉後宣誓就職期間發生的複雜談判過程。這是對文獻的及時補充，結合了民族研究和東南亞政治領域三位知名作家的專業知識。作者的目的是超越關於如何結束內戰的主流和經典解釋：既不是透過軍事手段，也不是透過達成政治解決方案，而是透過「透過過程獲勝」（第 11 頁）。

本書的主要貢獻較多的是概念性的而非實證性的。許多讀者已經熟悉有關緬甸政治格局極其複雜的種族結構、從殖民主義繼承下來的根深蒂固的種族政治化（第41頁）或身份的具體化（第59頁）的論點。儘管從2014 年至2020 年間進行的廣泛的、基於道德的實地調查（約174 次訪談，加上焦點小組和對和平談判的定性觀察）得出了可靠的發現，但緬甸觀察者不會發現任何關於備受爭議的新的或令人震驚的證據，如果不是的話由聯邦民主黨和全國民主聯盟共同主持的和平談判遭到嘲笑。相反，對於政治理論家和緬甸政治學生來說，這裡新穎且引人注目的是作者設計的原始理論模型。

他們認為，內戰中的強大參與者可以使用一系列工具、策略和方法來控制和操縱談判進程，並最終仍然獲得政治利益，盡量減少對對手的讓步，並避免使用致命武力。簡而言之，交戰各方——尤其是國家——仍然可以在陷入僵局的政治進程中「獲勝」。他們可以在三個主要的、相互關聯的談判舞台上做到這一點：國家與其對手之間的正式談判（聯邦民主黨領導下的被稱為聯邦和平會議的浮誇和平會議，以及全國民主聯盟領導下的21世紀彬龍會議）；國家機構結構（根據 2008 年憲法制定的立法機構，為要求種族代表權提供了新途徑）；和戰區。

正如作者所證明的，這三個領域都為軍方和緬甸政府機構提供了部署五種主要「制勝」戰略的空間，這些戰略將在第三章至第七章中討論。首先，鎖定，即由國家等主導行為者設定程序、議程和參與規則。其次，排序，或引入所有人應採取的步驟來推動進程（或在未達到基準時停止進程）。第三，層次化，即參與者和談判空間的多元化，透過增加種族間對話的層次，使這個過程變得更加複雜。第四，包抄，或者說國家努力繞過主要對手，直接與他們的支持者接觸，壓制他們的精英。最後，以武力壓製或對特定少數群體使用脅迫和有針對性的攻擊作為暴力施壓形式。

這個框架使讀者能夠更好地理解長期衝突中看似政治僵局的情況。在談判陷入僵局的情況下，一個進程仍然可以展開，國家繼續累積權力。這種模式對於挑戰人們普遍認為「分而治之」策略是緬甸軍方針對該國少數民族所採用的核心製勝策略的看法特別有用（第 179 頁）。相反，這套由五個核心戰略和談判方法組成的工具包使國家能夠在 2011 年後擴大其影響範圍，這是 1963 年和 1989-91 年早期停火政策所無法做到的。

作者恰當地將他們對過去十年政治開放和和平談判的分析置於緬甸較長的軍民關係和種族衝突歷史中。此外，透過將國家帶回來，作者也挑戰了緬甸是一個失敗或脆弱國家的觀點（第 178 頁），認為高度軍事化的緬甸國家透過利用談判在擴大其權力和控制方面非常成功。2010 年代的過程。透過這樣做，它削弱了其種族對手，減少了停火團體的自主權，並根據 2008 年憲法塑造了公共和政策機構。即使在民主選舉產生的全國民主聯盟政府的領導下，翁山蘇姬也不遺餘力地重新集權國家，同時越來越依賴緬族多數派的支持（頁73）。

這種模式一直持續到2021年2月政變。諷刺的是，正如作者指出的那樣，最近的軍事接管破壞了這一制勝戰略，並引發了另一輪暴力循環。現在沒有任何談判的空間，國家和軍事統治者又恢復了失敗的策略。武裝部隊不再能夠“以過程取勝”，而是陷入了少數民族武裝組織與緬族地區抵抗力量聯手的暴力衝突。

本書明智而具體地為理解緬甸過去和未來的和平談判嘗試，以及如何以真正的蒂利安式的方式發動戰爭和建設國家提供了富有洞察力的指導。它易於閱讀且沒有拼寫錯誤（除了第100 頁上尷尬的“Arakhine”），它提供了一個特別大膽和創新的概念框架，東南亞及其他地區的種族和內部衝突的學生可以將其用於他們的研究和教學。

RENAUD EGRETEAU 是香港城市大學公共及國際事務係比較政治學副教授。郵寄地址：香港特別行政區九龍塘達之路83號香港城市大學李達三葉耀珍樓LI-5308；電子郵件：r.egreteau@cityu.edu.hk 。

Winning by Process: The State and Neutralization of Ethnic Minorities in Myanmar.

Link/Page Citation

 

Winning by Process: The State and Neutralization of Ethnic Minorities in Myanmar. By Jacques Bertrand, Alexandre Pelletier and Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2022. Softcover: 247pp.

In 2011, the eclipse of direct military rule in Myanmar rekindled hopes for an end to the ethnic conflicts that have plagued the country since its independence in 1948. A reform-minded government, led by a cohort of retired generals, launched peace talks with a multitude of ethnic and rebel actors. Ten years later, however, the military seized power again, sweeping aside the peace process and all other attempts at reconciliation, which led to a resurgence of war.

Winning by Process probes into the dynamics of that decade of peace parleys (2011 20). The book seeks to make sense of the complex process of negotiation that took place during the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) semi-civilian administration formed in 2011 and the subsequent National League for Democracy (NLD) government sworn in after the 2015 elections. It is a timely addition to the literature that combines the expertise of three well-established authors in the fields of ethnic studies and Southeast Asian politics. The authors' aim is to move beyond dominant and classic explanations of how to end civil wars: neither by military means, nor by reaching a political solution, but, they argue, by "winning by process" (p. 11).

The main contribution of this book is more conceptual than empirical. Many readers will already be familiar with the arguments about the extraordinarily complex ethnic structure of Myanmar's political landscape, the entrenched politicization of ethnicity inherited from colonialism (p. 41) or the reification of identity (p. 59). Despite solid findings derived from extensive, ethically grounded fieldwork conducted between 2014 and 2020 (some 174 interviews, plus focus groups and the qualitative observation of peace talks), Myanmar-watchers will not find any new or startling evidence about the much disputed, if not derided, peace negotiations run by both the USDP and the NLD. Rather, what is novel and compelling here--for political theorists and students of Burmese politics alike--is the original theoretical model designed by the authors.

Powerful actors in civil wars, they contend, can use a range of tools, strategies and methods to control and manipulate the process of negotiation, and ultimately still make political gains, minimize concessions to their opponents and avoid the use of lethal force. In short, warring actors--especially the state--can still "win" in a stalled political process. They can do so in three major, interconnected arenas of negotiation: formal talks between the state and its opponents (the pompous peace meetings known as the Union Peace Conferences under the USDP, and the 21st Century Panglong Conferences under the NLD); state institutional structures (legislatures crafted by the 2008 Constitution which provided new avenues for claiming ethnic representation); and the theatre of war.

As the authors demonstrate, all three arenas offer spaces for both the military and Myanmar's governmental agencies to deploy five main "winning" strategies, which are discussed in Chapters Three through Seven. First, locking-in, or the setting of procedures, agenda and participation rules by the dominant actor, such as the state. Second, sequencing, or the introduction of steps to be taken by all to move the process forward (or stall it if benchmarks are not met). Third, layering, or the pluralization of actors and spaces of negotiation, making the process more complex by adding layers of inter-ethnic dialogues. Fourth, outflanking, or the state's efforts to bypass key opponents and engage directly with their supporters and neutralize their elites. Lastly, outgunning, or the use of coercion and targeted attacks against selected minority groups as a violent form of pressure.

This framework allows readers to better comprehend what appears to be political gridlock in long-standing conflicts. In a situation of stalled talks, a process can still unfold, whereby power continues to be accumulated by the state. This model is especially useful for challenging the popular belief that "divide and rule" tactics have been the core winning strategy employed by the Myanmar military against the country's ethnic minorities (p. 179). Instead, this tool kit of five core strategies and approaches to negotiation allowed the state to expand its reach after 2011 in ways it could not under earlier ceasefire policies in 1963 and 1989-91.

The authors have aptly situated their analysis of the last decade of political opening and peace talks within Myanmar's longer history of civil-military relations and ethnic conflicts. In addition, by bringing the state back in, the authors also challenge the idea of Myanmar as a failed or fragile state (p. 178), arguing the heavily militarized Myanmar state has been highly successful in extending its power and control by exploiting the negotiation process in the 2010s. In doing so, it has weakened its ethnic opponents, reduced the autonomy of ceasefire groups and shaped public and policy institutions in line with the 2008 Constitution. And it did so even under the democratically-elected NLD administration, when Aung San Suu Kyi spared no efforts to recentralize the state while increasingly relying on the support of the Bamar majority (p. 73).

This pattern lasted until the February 2021 coup. Ironically, as the authors point out, the latest military takeover has derailed this winning strategy and triggered another cycle of violence. Now without any space for negotiation, the state and military rulers have reverted to a losing strategy. The armed forces are no longer in position to "win by process", and are instead bogged down in a violent conflict where ethnic armed organizations have joined hands with resistance forces from the country's Bamar-dominated areas.

Wisely, and concretely, this book provides insightful guidance for understanding both past and future attempts to negotiate peace in Myanmar, as well as how to conduct war and build a state in true Tillyian terms. Easy to read and free of typos (except the awkward "Arakhine" on page 100), it offers a particularly bold and innovative conceptual framework that students of ethnic and civil conflicts in Southeast Asia and beyond can utilize for their research and teaching.

RENAUD EGRETEAU is Associate Professor in Comparative Politics at the Department of Public and International Affairs, City University of Hong Kong. Postal address: LI-5308, Li Dak Sum Yip Yio Chin Building, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, HKSAR; email: r.egreteau@cityu.edu.hk.