保卫缅甸，保护缅甸

 保卫缅甸，保护缅甸

作者：David I Steinberg 2006年5月 - 第14卷第5期

https://deepltranschinese.blogspot.com/2023/05/blog-post_389.html

• 仰光的 "激进 "政权促使泰国边境的缅甸异见民族获得支持，建立了虚拟的缓冲国，但对缅甸人来说，泰国似乎不是什么大问题。
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• 20世纪50年代，缅甸军方的主要成员制定了一份《保卫缅甸》政策文件。问题是：哪个国家可以威胁到这个新独立的国家？
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• 印度不被认为是一个外部威胁
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• 中国是唯一的潜在危险。中国曾经干预过朝鲜战争，而且在历史上似乎有扩张主义。
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• 缅甸人认识到他们在军事上的劣势，想争取时间。三个缅甸步兵师和一个装甲师将被装备起来以抵御中国人的进攻。
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• 在目前的缅甸军政府统治下，这一政策被推翻了。 现在，和以前一样，印度仍然不被认为是一个威胁，而泰国也只是一个边缘化的威胁
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• 中国是一个强大的盟友，而真正被认为对该政权构成威胁的是美国。
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• 缅甸的男性不得不参加准军事演习。
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• 这位军官回答说，这些民间力量将成为对抗美国人的 "牵制行动"，直到中国来援助他们。
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• 将首都迁往平马纳是这一战略的一部分吗？
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• 目前还不清楚这一举动在多大程度上是由于仰光暴露在海岸和外部力量（美国海军力量）之下，还是由于占星术的计算，丹瑞将军希望像缅甸国王经常做的那样用新的首都创造历史记录，或者是为了保护政权免受仰光的潜在动乱。
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• 最好是和中国交朋友。从那时起，这就是所有缅甸政府的殷勤政策
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• 12世纪，有一位缅甸国王被称为 "逃离中国的国王"。
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• 现任政府深陷于中国的债务之中。 通过供应武器、建设基础设施、培训项目、经济援助、非法移民、合法和非法贸易，以及新计划的从孟加拉湾到云南的天然气管道，缅甸处于中国的轨道和控制之下。 它已经成为一个虚拟的 "巴加-云南"。

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半个多世纪以来，缅甸的战略观点发生了深刻的变化，关心该地区稳定的人们应该了解这些变化。

20世纪50年代，缅甸军方的主要成员制定了一份《保卫缅甸》政策文件。问题是：哪个国家可以威胁到这个新独立的国家？当时，印度不被认为是一个外部威胁。尽管泰国对缅甸的看法比缅甸对泰国的看法更加关注，而且仰光的 "激进 "政权促使泰国边境的缅甸异见民族获得支持，建立了虚拟的缓冲国，但对缅甸人来说，泰国似乎不是什么大问题。毕竟，缅甸人曾在1767年摧毁了泰国首都大城，而且缅甸军队被认为比其邻国的军队强悍得多。

人们认为，中国是唯一的潜在危险。中国曾经干预过朝鲜战争，而且在历史上似乎有扩张主义。也许蒙古人在13世纪摧毁巴格达王朝的历史记忆促成了这种恐惧。中华人民共和国对缅甸的政策并不明确，只是其庞大的人口似乎淹没了缅甸，而国民党（中国的反共力量）已经撤退到缅甸，就像1644年明朝军队逃离新中国一样。中共干预消灭他们，从而占领该州部分地区的可能性一直存在。不同政府统治下的许多现代中国地图都将缅甸北部列为中国领土。

缅甸人认识到他们在军事上的劣势，想争取时间。三个缅甸步兵师和一个装甲师将被装备起来以抵御中国人的进攻。由于认识到这只能是暂时的防御，正式的抵抗在三个月内是可能的，之后联合国将对该国进行援助（就像联合国部队在美国指挥下的朝鲜一样）。据了解，这样的小部队不可能在庞大的中国军队面前坚持太久，因此计划利用分裂的缅甸军队，分成小股部队，在当地武装人员的帮助下，对中国进行游击战。

尽可能远离中国边境的仰光将成为指挥部。

 

在目前的缅甸军政府统治下，这一政策被推翻了。 现在，和以前一样，印度仍然不被认为是一个威胁，而泰国也只是一个边缘化的威胁，尽管2001年发生的边境事件和缅甸购买俄罗斯米格机以抵消美国提供的泰国航空能力的夸张说法。中国是一个强大的盟友，而真正被认为对该政权构成威胁的是美国。无论这在美国人看来多么可笑，美国官员使用的好战词汇和 "政权更迭 "政策都强调了这种印象，甚至可能创造了这种印象。 缅甸官员经常引用美国对其他国家的一系列入侵事件来支持他们的担忧。

 

作为这一防御战略的一部分，缅甸的男性不得不参加准军事演习。 当一位军官被正在接受这种训练的缅甸男子问及为什么要这样做时，这位军官回答说，这些民间力量将成为对抗美国人的 "牵制行动"，直到中国来援助他们。将首都迁往平马纳是这一战略的一部分吗？目前还不清楚这一举动在多大程度上是由于仰光暴露在海岸和外部力量（美国海军力量）之下，还是由于占星术的计算，丹瑞将军希望像缅甸国王经常做的那样用新的首都创造历史记录，或者是为了保护政权免受仰光的潜在动乱。

 

结果，当当时的总理吴努被要求授权为这四个师提供资金时，据说他退出了会议，说在如此短的有效期内，费用太高了，最好是和中国交朋友。从那时起，这就是所有缅甸政府的殷勤政策，尽管缅甸的中立主义几乎是传奇性的，使吴丹成为联合国的秘书长。

 

在12世纪，有一位缅甸国王被称为 "逃离中国的国王"。 无论这个故事是多么荒诞不经，它仍然激起了缅甸人的回忆。 现任政府深陷于中国的债务之中。 通过供应武器、建设基础设施、培训项目、经济援助、非法移民、合法和非法贸易，以及新计划的从孟加拉湾到云南的天然气管道，缅甸处于中国的轨道和控制之下。 它已经成为一个虚拟的 "巴加-云南"。 也许有一天，就像缅甸人现在嘲笑逃离中国的统治者一样，本届政府可能会被称为与中国拥抱得太近的统治者，受到同样的嘲笑。

David I Steinberg是华盛顿乔治敦大学外交学院的杰出教授和亚洲研究主任。

Defending Burma, Protecting Myanmar

By David I Steinberg MAY, 2006 - VOLUME 14 NO.5

Over half a century has wrought profound changes in Burmese strategic perspectives that should be understood by those concerned about stability in the region

 

In the 1950s, key members of the Burmese military developed a Defense of Burma policy paper. The question was: which country could threaten the newly independent state? India at that time was not considered an external threat. Although Thailand viewed Burma with greater concern than Burma did Thailand, and a “radical” regime in Rangoon prompted support to dissident Burmese ethnic peoples along the Thai border to create virtual buffer states, Thailand seemed no major problem to the Burmese. After all, the Burmese had destroyed the Thai capital at Ayutthaya in 1767, and the Burmese army was considered far tougher than its neighbor’s.

 

The belief was that China presented the only potential danger. China had intervened in the Korean War and seemed historically expansionist. Perhaps the historical memory of the Mongol destruction of the Pagan Dynasty in the 13th century contributed to this fear. The policies of the People’s Republic towards Burma were obscure, except that its massive population seemed to drown Burma, and the Kuomintang (Chinese anti-communist forces) had retreated into Burma much like the Ming armies escaping from the new Ch’ing Dynasty in 1644. The possibility of a PRC intervention to destroy them, and thus occupy parts of the state, was always present. Many modern Chinese maps under various governments listed northern Burma as Chinese territory.

 

Recognizing their military inferiority, the Burmese wanted to buy time. Three Burmese infantry divisions and one armored division were to be equipped to fend off the Chinese. Recognizing that this could only be a temporary defense, formal resistance was calculated to be possible for a three month period, after which the UN was to come to the aid of the country (as UN forces under US command did in Korea). It was understood that such small forces could not hold out long against the massive Chinese military, so the plan was to use the splintered Burmese army, broken into small units, to conduct a guerilla war against China with the aid of an armed local population.

Rangoon, as far from the China border as possible, was to be the command headquarters.

 

That policy has been stood on its head under the present Burmese military junta.  Now, as before, India is still not considered a threat, and Thailand is only a marginal one despite hyperbole about a border incident in 2001 and the Burmese purchase of Russian MiGs to offset Thai air capacity supplied by the US. China is a strong ally, and the real perceived menace to the regime is seen to be the US. However ludicrous this may seem to Americans, the belligerent vocabulary used by US officials and the policy of “regime change” underscores this impression, and perhaps even created it.  Burmese officials often cite a series of US invasions of other states to support their concerns.

 

As part of this defense strategy, Burmese males have had to participate in para-military exercises.  When a military officer was asked by Burmese men who were undergoing such training why this was necessary, the officer replied that these civilian forces were to be the “holding operation” against the Americans until China came to their aid. Was the movement of the capital to Pyinmana part of this strategy? It’s not clear how much this move was prompted by the exposure of Rangoon to the coast and outside forces (US naval strength) or by astrological calculations, Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s wish to create a historical record with a new capital as Burmese kings often did, or to protect the regime from potential unrest in Rangoon.

 

As it turned out, when then-prime minister U Nu was asked to authorize funding for these four divisions, he is said to have walked out of the meeting, saying that it was too expensive for such a short effective period, and that it was better to make friends with China. This has been the assiduous policy of all Burmese governments since that time, despite almost legendary Burmese neutralism that enabled U Thant to become secretary-general of the UN.

 

In the 12th century, there was a Burmese king who became known literally as the king who ran away from the Chinese.  However apocryphal that tale may be, it still stirs Burmese memories.  The present government is deeply in China’s debt.  Through the supply of arms, the building of infrastructure, training programs, economic assistance, illegal immigration, legal and illegal trade, and the newly planned gas pipeline from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan, Burma is in China’s orbit and thrall.  It has become a virtual “baja-Yunnan.”  Some day, perhaps as Burmese now deride the ruler who fled from the Chinese, the present administration may be known with equal derision as the rulers who embraced the Chinese too closely.

David I Steinberg is Distinguished Professor and Director of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University in Washington