就二戰歐洲戰區而言，這個話題一直爭論不休，因為最終雙方的軍隊都必須解決這個問題。另一方面，太平洋戰區涉及廣闊的海洋，必須由龐大的空軍和海軍力量進行爭奪。日本是一個島國。空軍和海軍承擔了戰鬥的重任，在原子彈問世之前，殘酷的陸戰僅次於海戰和空戰。戰爭就是這樣進行的，直到日本投降，或者一支龐大的軍隊可以登陸日本本土島嶼，使用一支由數千艘船隻組成的艦隊，直到戰爭開始三年後才出現。
控制海洋並通過海上將資源轉移到日本對於維持日本的實力是絕對必要的。阻止日本從海上給自己補給是摧毀其力量的關鍵。太平洋戰爭中的大型陸戰在特定戰區可能具有決定性意義，但主要僅在它們如何影響空中和海上力量平衡方面才具有重要意義。在這些戰鬥中：
- 日本在第二次甲午戰爭中陷入僵局，導致日本考慮進攻蘇聯以獲取資源。日本隨後決定向南進攻，與美國人、英國人、荷蘭人、菲律賓人和澳大利亞人交戰，並控制東南亞的資源。
- 英國在馬來亞戰役中的慘敗和新加坡的淪陷是聯合國聯盟在太平洋戰爭中遭受的最具毀滅性的打擊。它把英國人趕出了太平洋，摧毀了歐洲人在亞洲人中的霸權神話。它還使日本在未來三年內可以在沒有來自西方威脅的情況下，在充足的供應條件下向南部和東部征戰。
- 1942 年 5 月美國海軍在珊瑚海海戰中的勝利阻止了日本繞過新幾內亞。日本隨後決定發起一場陸戰以保衛這塊大陸。澳大利亞人在美國人的支持下贏得了科科達小道戰役，阻止了日本人在新幾內亞的進攻。1942 年 7 月至 11 月期間，澳大利亞人阻止了他們在陸地上向巴布亞莫爾茲比港推進，這是珊瑚海北岸唯一像樣的港口和空軍基地所在地。這場戰鬥阻止了日本進攻澳大利亞，此後澳大利亞成為 1942 年至 1944 年新幾內亞戰役的盟軍基地。
- 1942 年 8 月至 1943 年 1 月的瓜達爾卡納爾島戰役使美國人從日本人手中奪取了南太平洋的主動權，並間接地奪取了中太平洋和北太平洋的主動權。這是一場殘酷的陸海空消耗戰，但瓜達爾卡納爾島地面戰鬥的損失遠不及日本在軍艦、運輸工具、陸基和艦載轟炸機和戰鬥機方面的損失，沒有一個是它可以迅速取代的。美國人在這場戰役中每個月都變得更強大，此後戰爭的每個月都會繼續變得更強大，而日本則在慢慢變弱。
- 1943 年和 1944 年澳美在新幾內亞和所羅門群島的戰役繼續消耗日本的空軍、海軍和地面部隊，但沒有一場單獨的戰鬥可以被認為是決定性的。再加上瓜達爾卡納爾島戰役，他們迫使日本從中國和緬甸調遣其陸軍和陸軍空軍的精銳力量，以加強日本的太平洋防禦。無論是中國軍隊還是東亞的英印軍隊都不足以利用這一戰略轉變。
- 1944 年 11 月至 1945 年 6 月的美國中太平洋戰役摧毀了日本的大部分空軍和海軍力量，並將日本自身置於盟軍轟炸機和海軍力量的射程之內。這場戰役中的許多殘酷的陸戰本身都不是決定性的。
- 從 1943 年到 1945 年，美國對日本的潛艇戰役削弱了日本補給和保衛自己及其帝國領土的能力，但當然沒有涉及地面戰鬥。
- 由於太平洋行動的失敗，日本陸軍指揮官於 1944 年決定入侵印度，以尋求某種針對英國和中國的戰略優勢。史詩般的英帕爾和科希馬戰役由英國指揮官率領，由美國後勤支持，由英印軍隊參與，是太平洋戰爭中除中國之外規模最大的亞洲陸戰。他們結束了日本在該戰區的任何未來威脅，並為解放緬甸開闢了道路，但距離日本太遠，無法阻止其為戰爭的最後一場大戰進行集結，日本認為這場戰爭將在其領土上進行家鄉島嶼。
美國人和英國人正在為 1945 年 8 月太平洋戰爭的最後一場決定性陸戰做準備，澳大利亞和蘇聯預計會提供支持。雙方在“垮台行動”中的傷亡預計將超過西方盟國在 1944 年和 1945 年的西北歐戰役中的傷亡，但由於使用原子武器導致日本投降，這從未發生。每個盟國的士兵都為他們不必忍受最後那場可怕的戰鬥而歡欣鼓舞。
The Japanese couldn’t admit, even to themselves, they were on the short end of the production stick and would never regain the upper hand. Thus, they hunted for a way to conceptually make us sick of it.
Some of that, a lot, really, goes back to the Great War. At massive human and economic cost, the Japanese had, up to that point, carved out for themselves a little sphere of influence they could call an “Empire,” and had built an army and navy that they thought would be sufficient to keep them from being abused and effectively partitioned as China had been. Once they saw the Great War - they had
Depends on the historian, but I would say the Battle Of Guadalcanal, & the struggle to retain it by both sides, the Guadalcanal campaign, along with the naval battle at Midway, checked Japanese expansion in the Pacific & helped secure the security of & supply lines to Australia. It’s establishment as an Allied land & sea base, would threaten-thwart future Japanese operations in the SW Pacific. Guadalcanal would present Japan with one of it’s first strategic losses in the Pacific War.
There is no Stalingrad equivalent in the Pacific War. I could make an argument for Tarawa because it showed the Japanese strategy of fortifying islands so they’d be too costly to take would not work. Much of the Japanese defensive strategy was based on resistance to the last as a deterrent. Think of Churchill’s we will fight 5hem on the beaches speech; you signal you will inflict such great damage that attacking would be a bad choice. Tarawa is just a speck of land. The main island, Betio, was heavily defended, but the Marines took it despite the cost, despite having to wade to shore under fir
There are several very important land battles fought by the Allies against Japan that had long-lasting effects.
(1) The Chinese bled the Japanese army for 8 years in lots of land battles. The Japanese won all of these battles but lost the war because China would not capitulate and the fighting was draining Japan of resources and men.
(2) The U.S.S.R. and the Japanese fought several battles in an undeclared war in 1939. The Japanese lost decisively and decided to not try invading Siberia. This played a decisive role in the U.S.S.R. defending Moscow in December of 1941. Russia may have won the war
The Japanese probably did about as well as they could reasonably have been expected to do, and it could be argued that they actually overperformed to a moderate degree.
The more sober-minded among Japan’s war planners in the years leading up to the Pacific clash realized that they would have to count on gaining qualitative superiority over their opponents—especially the United States—because there was simply no way that Japanese industry could outproduce its enemies in any kind of extended, war of attrition scenario. It was decided that Japan would attempt to overwhelm her opponents with a seri
Why did you ask this? I’m genuinely curios. Everyone that has opened a book or watched either of the 2 Midway movies they made knows the answer. For one, we broke the Japanese code and knew exactly when and where they would attack so we could prepare and spring a trap on them even though they had more carriers then we did. Number 2, it came down to good luck also….The fact that Nagumo had to stop arming his planes that had just struck Midway Island and were rearming the land weapons with ship weapons once the American Carrier was spotted along with the fact that he had to wait to do that until
The US Navy’s submarine force.
From 1943 onward, they were doing most of the damage to Japanese shipping and the Japanese war production.
Submarines did far more damage than carriers and, with hindsight, a larger submarine force could have ended the War sooner.
As it turned out, Midway was completely irrelevant.
Had the Japanese won, the carriers would have been withdrawn as the Japanese had no fuel to keep on operating them.
The US losing its carriers would not have been important either as carrier operations in 1942 could easily have been replaced by land-based operations. The US had plenty of av
The Japanese had overextended themselves, even before the concurrent attacks on Malaya and Pearl Harbour.
Their expensive war in China had been dragging on for years, and there were also many troops tied down in Manchuria and up against the Soviet border.
The reason they moved on Malaya was that they desperately needed oil, rubber and resources. They had one of the largest fleets in the world, but very little oil to fuel them for a war.
The famous fall of Singapore was far from a guaranteed victory. When British General Percival surrendered to the Japanese, they fell for a Japanese bluff. Because
None. The Japanese had almost NO victories in the Pacific after 1942. They lost in New Guinea, lost at Midway, lost at Gualalcanal, lost at the Battle of the Philippines≤ had the Gilbert and Marshals occupied, had Saipan and Tinian and Guam occupied. Lost in the Philippines, The Battle of Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. It ws basically one defeat after another for the Japanese in the Pacific
The Japanese did have victories in China and Burma, but later were defeated in India and Burma
The Rzhev Meat Grinder.
This little known but astonishingly bloody battle - or rather a campaign - answers to the question what happens when irresistible force encounters an immovable object? Rzhev happens.
The Rzhev ridge dominates access to Moscow, and it was captured in 1941 by the Germans. While the Moscow counteroffensive had driven the Germans off the vicinity of Moscow, the Rzhev salient was still on German hands, and Stalin wanted to drive the Germans off - at any price.
The price was to be an astonishing 2,300,000 Soviet soldiers and 700,000 Germans.
The offensive began in 8 January 1942,
好吧，他們對中國使用了化學和生物武器，所以阻止他們的不是道德或無能。
據推測，他們害怕美國的報復。日本過去和現在的人口密度都比美國高。生化武器對日本的破壞力要大得多。
根據維基百科，日本計劃至少對美國發動 3 次襲擊，但全部失敗或被取消。
- 在塞班島對海軍陸戰隊使用生物武器。攜帶武器的潛艇沉沒時失敗。
- 通過氣球攻擊使用生物武器。類似的煽動性攻擊失敗導致取消
- 對聖地亞哥使用生物武器
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