約瑟夫·斯大林生氣時是怎麼做的?誰是唯一能夠激怒他而逃脫的人?

閱讀關於 Dreame 的小說:離婚前七天。
Rachid Masimov 的個人資料照片

憤怒的斯大林的最後警告。4個人的命運:3位局長+2位將軍。

“G”類電報。[頂部]政府[級別]。1941 年 12 月 23 日。緊急。確認收據。

從:莫斯科到:古比雪夫市[現俄羅斯薩馬拉]。

兩個地址:18號廠廠長Shenkman;致 1 號工廠廠長 Tretyakov:

“你們辜負了我們的國家,[和]我們的紅軍。

直到現在,你還敢不製造[適當數量的] IL-2 s [伊留申對地攻擊機]。我們的紅軍現在需要 IL-2 飛機,就像空氣[它呼吸]、麵包[牠吃]一樣。Shenkman 每天生產一架 IL-2,Tretyakov 每天生產一兩架 MiG-3。這是對我們國家,對紅軍的嘲弄。我們[目前]不需要MiG-3,但[我們需要] IL-2;如果[管理]工廠#18 [Matvey Shenkman 個人] 認為它可以擺脫*國家 [“你試圖用愚蠢的藉口逃脫”] 每天製造一個 IL-2,這是嚴重錯誤的將支付罰款。

我要求你們不要考驗政府的耐心,要求你們製造更多的離子液體。

這是我最後的警告。

斯大林”

*[“отбрехаться”,otbrehatsya ,俄語動詞;一個相當強烈/粗魯/口語化的表達:意思是“欺騙,說謊,字面意思是“吠叫” - “懶狗警覺地吠叫以向他的主人表明它正在警惕並完成工作,但實際上並沒有甚至移動一隻爪子”;“胡說八道,尤其是有欺騙或誤導的意圖”;本質上,斯大林是在告訴他們,他們都在胡說八道。]

複製:

https://aviaforum.ru/threads/pro-pismo-stalina-direktoram-zavodov-v-1941-g.44815/

薩馬拉(原古比雪夫 [二戰期間保留蘇聯首都])航空博物館:

那麼,M. Shenkman 和 A. Tretyakov 接下來發生了什麼?見下文(一和二)。

A )簡要歷史背景:正在進行的莫斯科戰役。斯大林是GKO(蘇聯國防委員會)的主席,該委員會是在該國擁有完全國家權力的非凡國家權力機構(1941年6月至1945年9月)。根據蘇聯法律/憲法,斯大林僅是四年的[合法]獨裁者。斯大林拒絕從莫斯科撤到後備首都古比雪夫(薩馬拉市)。

To stiffen the resolve of the Red Army and boost civilian morale, Stalin ordered the traditional military parade on 7 November (Revolution Day) to be staged in Red Square. Soviet troops paraded past the Kremlin and then marched directly to the front. By 27 November, the German 7th Panzer Division had seized a bridgehead across the Moscow-Volga Canal—the last major obstacle before Moscow—and stood less than 35 km (22 mi) from the Kremlin. Just northwest of Moscow, the Wehrmacht reached Krasnaya Polyana, little more than 29 km (18 mi) from the Kremlin in central Moscow; German officers were able to make out some of the major buildings of the Soviet capital through their field glasses.

Martial law during the years of the Great Patriotic War in 1941–1945 was successively declared, on the basis of Article 49 of paragraph "p" of the Constitution of the USSR, by decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and was not canceled until the end of the war with- June 22, 1941: in Moscow, Leningrad and most oblasts, territories, republics of the European part of the USSR.

State Defense Committee - Wikipedia
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Powerful body in the Soviet government during World War II State Defense Committee Государственный комитет обороны Soviet Union History Established 30 June 1941 Disbanded 4 September 1945 Preceded by None Succeeded by None Leadership Chairman Meeting place Moscow The State Defense Committee ( Russian : Государственный комитет обороны - ГКО , romanized : Gosudarstvennyĭ komitet oborony - GKO ) was an extraordinary organ of state power in the Soviet Union during the German-Soviet War , also called the Great Patriotic War, with complete state power in the country. General scope [ edit ] The Soviets set up the GKO on 30 June 1941, a week after Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, by a joint decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union , the Council of People's Commissars ( Sovnarkom ), and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union . The war situation at the front lines required a more centralized form of government. The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union , however, continued unsuspended. On 18 June 1942, over a thousand members attended the 9th session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow . [1] Geoffrey Roberts sees the GKO as "a sort of war cabinet ". [2] Composition [ edit ] The initial composition of the committee was such: On February 3, 1942, the chairman of the Gosplan , Nikolai Voznesensky , as well as Anastas Mikoyan were made members of the committee, and on February 20, 1942 Lazar Kaganovich ( Narkom of Transportation) was appointed as a member. On November 22, 1944, Nikolai Bulganin (Chairman of Gosbank ) replaced Voroshilov in the committee. See also [ edit ] References [ edit ] Bibliography [ edit ] Barber, John, and Harrison, Mark. (1991). The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II . London: Longman. ISBN 0-582-00964-2 , ISBN 0-582-00965-0 . Werth, Alexander. (1964). Russia at War 1941–1945 . New York: Carrol and Graf. Wikisource has original text related to this article: Further reading [ edit ] Glantz, David M. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army stopped Hitler . Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995. ISBN 978-0-7006-0899-7 Overview of Eastern Front from Soviet side. Roberts, Geoffrey. Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-300-11204-1 Post-revisionist study of Stalin's wartime and post-war leadership.

View of the Kremlin:

B) Semantic analysis: Stalin’s message is clear, consistent and logical. Arguably, the overall style could have been improved (by adding the missing words; which nonetheless are obvious from the context), but they all were under stress, pressure and had little time for such petty details. The message is absolutely clear and unequivocal.

He is in a fury. He is in deep despair. Vexed, distressed, losing temper, running out of his famous patience. Perhaps, even being so close to having a mental breakdown. My personal impression is that Stalin was actually begging them to do better. He’s reasoning with them and appealing to their conscience & sense of duty, honor, patriotism. Stalin in fact threatens them four times in a row, a bit too much for such a brief message. As it is his “final” warning, they must have been debated the grave situation already.

Stalin is asking them ["прошу", ‘pra-shu’: implore, beg for (something) earnestly, as a request in a sincere or urgent manner) “not to try the government's patience.” Surprisingly, he still addresses the partners (comrades, basically) in a polite manner. His colloquial terms are used for brevity purpose (it’s just shorter and conveys the same meaning in a compact & semantically stronger fashion, right? yo, dood). “Get out” instead of “will you please kindly leave the meeting” etc.

Stalin even gets sarcastic at a certain point, by using the old-school verb (of the Czarist time grand style term used by the royal court & nobility); “izvolite” (изволите); which sounds something like: “you take the liberty of not producing Il-2…”. Compare to V. Suvorov’s observation of the Soviet Army boot camp training: “will your Royal Highness be so kind as to clean this exquisite public toilet squat with your personal toothbrush, as quickly as Milord could, please?”

Stalin speaks on behalf of the Soviet government (which he headed), and addresses “factory 1 & 18”, meaning the factory leadership, managers. This was official communication. Even the dictator (with all his absolute power granted to him by the Soviet government) could not exceed certain limits; even though the Soviet Constitution (with its social and other rights guaranteed for each Soviet citizen) was temporarily frozen (replaced by Martial law).

Stalin never had the right of giving orders to anyone (to execute, imprison, send in exile etc.). There was always certain procedure to follow. If those directors were suspected of sabotaging the government tasks, they would be dealt by the state security agency. There was always legal procedure (with investigations, state prosecutor involvement & judicial trial). Even though in critical periods the process was facilitated (Gen. Pavlov who opened up the Western front to Hitler in late June 1941, was still tried and his sentence was passed out by the military tribunal).

Had Stalin been that much “paranoid, evil, revengeful, frightful monster” etc., he would rather pass a message [via Beria, OK]: “500 Il-2 planes per day”, something along the lines. That should suffice. Any regular absolute dictator would have. I would. Why bother to say a single word more?! Why would not he simply pick up a phone and say what he had to say, in just one phrase? “500 planes a day or you get vaporized, with your whole family”. By the way, Stalin & GKO did not push for unrealistic production volumes.

Hand-written draft, Page 1:

December 1941, 20 miles from Moscow:

“You have the nerve not to manufacture…”, Page 2:

Stalin first writes “we need”, then crosses out and writes “we do not need MiG planes”, they actually didn’t stop the production; at that time he thought Il-2 was the priority.

Il-2 (Ил-2) ground-attack plane:

“The Red Army now needs IL-2 aircraft like the air, like the bread”:

The same month, December:

The State Defense Committee, Dec-23, 1941 (the same day when the telegram was sent). Airplane production plan, Shenkman & Tretyakov are to produce 85 Il-2 planes a day in January 1942:

Moscow defenders:

March 1942, similar GKO decree, on various combat planes production planning (Pe-2, Lagg, Yak):

The Battle of Moscow:

November 7 Parade. Marching right into the trenches:

Wiki article, “Il-2”:

Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, made a statement in March 2023: “I have read Supreme Commander Stalin’s telegrams concerning the military defense industry. I would like to read them out to you [directors of Russian military plants], in order to energize [stimulate] you a bit.” Obviously, the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict greatly contributes to re-evaluation of Stalin’s role in the Russian history.

C) What happened. The Kuibyshev Aviation plant had been evacuated from the occupied territory. They started production right off the wheels, in the unfinished workshops. No heating, lack of electricity, meager food rations. 18 hour long exhaustive workday, with no weekends or holidays. Day and night.

It is impossible that Shenkman, Tretyakov and their teams were having a good time (were “lazy” or ignored their job tasks).

They did not chill out, relax, moved slowly, take long lunch breaks etc.; they weren’t lazy either. Quite on the contrary, these people [all Soviet engineers & workers] worked super hard, day in day out. They installed the evacuated equipment and launched production simultaneously. In cold workshops, often with no roof above their heads. In rain, in snow. There was only one possible reason for their deliberately “letting the Red Army down”: implicit Nazi collaboration (hoping for a “special status in life” afterwards; this was Mikhail Gorbachev’s case). However, if there were the slightest suspicions of this kind, Stalin would not have wasted time on talking to them. Like I said, they had special agents to deal with treason (NKVD).

January 1942:

March 1942 Air plane Production Plan (all over the unoccupied part of the USSR):

(signed by Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. Stalin)

https://aviaforum.ru/threads/pro-pismo-stalina-direktoram-zavodov-v-1941-g.44815/

D) Business Management 101. “Bonasera, I want you to use all your powers, and all your skills.”

“I got a business to run. I gotta kick asses sometimes to make it run right.”

So, in essence this was a managerial conflict. Every complex production entails thousands of big & small problems, with many more possible solutions, alternatives, production modes. Who was right? Who was wrong? it’s not easy to tell: Stalin (and GKO) had his reasons, the Directors had their issues (Stalin were not to find the right answers for them). Long story short, Stalin turned out to be right: within a month both plants greatly increased the output (without compromising the quality); in fact they exceeded the production plans within the following 3 months.

Brilliant Soviet managers, industrial leaders, organizers, engineers like Shenkman, Tretyakov, Petlyakov, Korolev etc. were on par with Henry Ford (Howard Hughes etc.), if not better: although Ford and other similar magnates never experienced that high level of stress, time constraints and in general, they never performed under the same conditions.

I. Major-General (1944) Anatoly T. Tretyakov. Ethnic Russian. 1897–1978.

Director of Aviation Plant # 1 (shoulder straps were introduced in the Red Army in Feb. 1943), Hero of Socialist Labour. Ethnic Russian. 1899–1978. He never was purged (arrested, interrogated, vaporized by Beria etc.), punished, executed by anyone. Long story short, nothing unfortunate happened to him.

Anatoly Tretyakov held prominent military-industrial complex positions, was a Soviet decorated (4 orders + several medals); Member of Parliament (1946–50) etc. Died peacefully, of natural causes.

Третьяков, Анатолий Тихонович — Википедия
Анато́лий Ти́хонович Третьяко́в ( 1899 , с. Сормово Балахнинского уезда Нижегородской губернии — 1978 ) — партийно-государственный деятель СССР , один из организаторов авиационной промышленности в СССР, генерал-майор инженерно-авиационной службы (19.08.1944), Герой Социалистического Труда (08.09. 1941 ). Родился в 1899 году в семье кузнеца Сормовского судостроительного завода. Закончил Нижегородский государственный университет . В 1924 году с дипломом техника переехал в Москву, поступил на Государственный авиационный завод № 1, где работал чертежником, технологом, конструктором, ведущим инженером, заместителем начальника цеха, начальником планового отдела, начальником производства, главным инженером завода. В феврале 1941 года А. Т. Третьяков был назначен директором авиационного завода N1. За освоение выпуска штурмовика «ИЛ-2» в сентябре 1941 Третьякову присвоено звание Героя Социалистического труда с формулировкой: «за выдающиеся достижения в области организации и осуществления серийного производства новых типов боевых самолётов» (вместе с Алексеем Ивановичем Шахуриным , Петром Васильевичем Дементьевым и Павлом Андреевичем Ворониным .) [1] . В 1941 — 1944 годах был директором Московского авиационного завода № 1, а в 1944 — 1946 годах — авиационного завода в Куйбышеве (ныне Самара ) [2] . Под его руководством в период Великой Отечественной войны было освоено производство штурмовиков Ил-2 , бомбардировщиков Ту-2 . После войны работал на различных должностях в авиационной промышленности СССР. Депутат Верховного Совета СССР ( 1946 — 1950 ). Умер в 1978 году . Герой Социалистического Труда (08.09.1941) Награждён двумя орденами Ленина, орденом Трудового Красного Знамени, орденом Красной Звезды и другими знаками отличия. Анатолий Тихонович Третьяков (рус.) . Сайт « Герои страны ».

Factory # 1 (later Kuybyshev Aviation factory named after Stalin) was safely evacuated to Kuybyshev in late autumn 1941, Tretyakov was appointed director in October (after his refusing the explode the plant; he broke the direct command and thus risked his life, had the plant been taken by the enemy); they started the production in December 1941 (only 3 planes were manufactured during the first month).

During WWII the factory manufactured 11, 863 Il-2 and 1,225 ground-attack planes.

II. Director Matvey B. Shenkman. Ethnic Jewish. 1899– May 1942. Died in a plane crash.

Shenkman never was purged (arrested, tried, sent to a Siberian all-inclusive resort etc.).

His factory was the first one to resume manufacturing Il-2s. In December 1941 it produced 29 planes. In January 1942 - 7 planes a day; in February the output increased tenfold; in March increased by 12 times, in May (when Shenkman was killed with the crew and other passengers in an air crash) the government planned output target was exceeded.

Шенкман Матвей (Мордух) Борисович
1899 - 1942 инженера-конструктор завода «Большевик»начальник цеха завода «Большевик»директором таганрогского авиационного завода 1936-1938директор воронежского авиационного завода 1938-1941директор Куйбышевского авиационного завода 1941-1942

Shenkman read out the Stalin’s telegram to the whole team at the factory meeting, saying that “This is a lesson for all of us, this is a demand. But it is also the help [support] we need”.

He responded to Stalin in early February 1942, by also sending a telegram:

“We had delivered your severe assessment of our poor quality work to the whole factory team. With reference to your telegraphic request we inform you that the factory reached the manufacturing volume of 3 planes per day by January 19, of 6 planes a day by Jan. 26; 7 planes as of today. The main cause for slow manufacturing was installation [of equipment] on the plant ground [building of which had not been finished; the initial construction phase was in progress] not finalized.” Furthermore, he mentions there were still serious problems (several workshop construction works not fully completed; lack of heating, “oxygen” [for industrial needs, I guess, pump system]; housing for the workers etc. Shenkman asked Stalin for help, to facilitate the process of construction, production supplies, worker/specialist “mobilization” (HR sourcing), to improve “food catering to workers” (they had very little to eat, like almost everyone in the USSR at that time).

“The factory team promises to liquidate its shameful lagging behind. Shenkman”

Obituaries were published in central (Moscow) and local (the Urals & Soviet Republic) newspapers.

“On behalf of the Council of People’s Commissars & the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).. with great sadness.. death caused by an airplane crash when he was on duty [on business trip]…the distinguished aviation industry associate [executive]..

The Soviet Government mandates to pay one time allowance of 25,000 rubles to Comrade M.B. Shenkman’s family; to his parents - one-time allowance of 5,000 rubles… Personal life-time pension to his wife Elizaveta L. Shenkman: 500 rubles a month… to daughter Nelly - 300 rubles a month due to her disability; to father Boris & mother Rakhil (Rachel) Shenkmans - 400 rubles per month each, for life. All funeral expenses at the state expense. At the plant.. install a bust (sculpture) in memory of Comrade Shenkman..”

These were hefty sums of money (otherwise they wouldn’t be mentioned in the press, to begin with). his family would keep luxurious & prestigious apartments in Moscow downtown (currently the estate would be evaluated in millions USD, I guess). 1941 (first Soviet small) car, KIM-10, listed price: 7K Rb:

The crashed plane was discovered in 2017:

Detailed eulogy, signed by Aviation Minister & other prominent comrades:

They did not spare the best possible expressions, to pay tribute to Matvey Borisovich. Shenkman lived a life full of glory, challenges and great achievements. He was born to a poor worker family, joined the Bolshevik movement & the Red Army at age 19 (in mid-1918), fought the Ukrainian nationalists (led by anti-Semite S. Petliura; whose ideological descendants these day chant “glory to Ukraine!”) and Russian White army; was among the leading “red directors”. His colleagues & subordinates respected & loved him, for a good reason. Shenkman was a great soul. That’s why he actually did not fear Stalin.

Now, some contemporary anti-Communist & Zionist sources claim that ..[yawning].. yeah, sure - that “Stalin ordered to kill Shenkman”. Because “Shenkman was Jewish” [& Stalin paranoid].

I won’t discuss this utter idiocy since.. well, I am sick and tired of it, quite frankly. Kill the leading director at the most critical war time; kill the crew, kill other passengers (Shenkman was not accompanied by idle average-Joe low-cost tourists, you know).. have the costly plane crashed… Stalin could not have the people killed like that (whether prominent specialists, the valuable human assets - per capitalist paradigm; or ordinary citizens); just because he felt like doing so (because of his personal feelings, dislikes etc.). No one could. Not in the Soviet Union, anyway. Never.

NB: Mikhail I. Koshkin, chief designer of T-34 tank, died from pneumonia he contracted during tank winter tests on September 26, 1940.

“We need Il-2s like the air, like the bread..” (M. Shenkman, L. Lvov, Crew Members):

Шенкман Матвей Борисович
При подготовке публикаций сайта использованы материалы Самарского областного историко-краеведческого музея имени П.В. Алабина, Центрального государственного архива Самарской области, Самарского областного государственного архива социально-политической истории, архива Самарского областного суда, частных архивов и коллекций.

III. Vladimir M. Petlyakov. 1891–1942. Decorated leading Soviet aeronautical engineer and aircraft designer. Ethnic Russian. Purged (worked at secret R&D lab, sharashka, OKB-Special Design Bureau - in1937–1940). Stalin Prize laureate, First Class. (1941). Died in an air crash near Arzamas city, on his way to Moscow, in January 1942 (flying in Pe-2 dive bomber; his main masterpiece).

Vladimir Petlyakov - Wikipedia
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Soviet aerospace engineer Vladimir Mikhailovich Petlyakov ( Russian : Влади́мир Миха́йлович Петляко́в ; 15 June 1891 – 12 January 1942) was a Soviet aeronautical engineer and aircraft designer. Petlyakov was born in 1891 in Sambek ( Don Host Oblast , Russian Empire ) (currently part of Neklinovsky District , Rostov Oblast ), where his father served as a local official. After graduating from the Technical College in Taganrog (today the "Taganrog Petlyakov Aviation College", Таганрогский авиационный колледж им. В. М. Петлякова ) in 1910. he travelled to Moscow , where he was accepted into the Moscow State Technical University ; however, due to financial difficulties he was unable to complete his studies. After the 1917 Russian Revolution he continued his education and was hired to work as a technician in the aerodynamics laboratory at Moscow State Technical University under the guidance of Nikolai Zhukovsky , while resuming his studies. He gained experience as a laboratory assistant on wind tunnels and on calculations for aircraft design. In 1922 he graduated from the same university. From 1921 to 1936 Petlyakov worked at the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) ( Russian : Центральный аэрогидродинамический институт (ЦАГИ) )under the guidance of Andrei Tupolev ; there he became involved in wing design and in the development of gliders . In 1936 he became a chief aircraft-designer at an aviation plant. Petlyakov was directly involved in the organization and development of Soviet metal aircraft construction. In particular, Petlyakov (together with the engineer Nikolai Belyaev ) elaborated methods of calculating durability of materials and theory on designing metal wings with multiple spars . Petlyakov assisted in designing the first Soviet heavy bombers TB-1 , TB-3 (1930–1935), and a long-range high-altitude four-engine bomber, the Pe-8 (1935–1937). On 21 October 1937, Petlyakov, together with Tupolev and the entire directorate of the TsAGI , was arrested on trumped-up charges of sabotage, espionage and of aiding the Russian Fascist Party . [1] Many of his colleagues were executed. In 1939 he was moved from a prison to an NKVD sharashka for aircraft designers near Moscow, where many ex-TsAGI people had already been sent to work. Petlyakov was given the task of designing a high-altitude fighter, which he successfully accomplished. Operational experience in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940 showed that this was not what the Soviet Air Force needed, and Lavrentiy Beria , head of the NKVD and of the sharashka system, ordered that the fighter be redesigned as a dive bomber , with the promise that Petlyakov and his colleagues would be released on its successful completion. The resulting aircraft, the Pe-2 , which went into serial production at the Kazan Aviation Plant, proved to be one of the most successful designs of World War II . [ citation needed ] Petlyakov was released in 1940, and was awarded a Stalin P
Petlyakov Pe-2 - Wikipedia
The Petlyakov Pe-2 ( Russian : Петляков Пе-2 ) was a Soviet twin-engine dive bomber used during World War II . One of the outstanding tactical attack aircraft of the war, [2] it also proved successful as a heavy fighter , as a night fighter ( Pe-3 variant) and as a reconnaissance aircraft . [3] The Pe-2 was, numerically, the most important Soviet bomber of World War II, at their peak comprising 75% of the Soviet twin-engine bomber force. [4] The Soviets manufactured Pe-2s in greater numbers (11,430 built) during the war than any other twin-engine combat aircraft except for the German Junkers Ju 88 and the British Vickers Wellington . [3] [5] Several communist air forces flew the type after the war, when it became known by the NATO reporting name Buck . Development [ edit ] In 1937, Vladimir Petlyakov was the leader of the Heavy Aircraft Brigade at the Tupolev OKB responsible for the development of the ANT-42 four-engined long-range bomber (which would eventually enter service as the TB-7/Pe-8 ). However, that same year saw the start of Stalin 's Great Purge , and none were spared suspicion; Andrei Tupolev , the head of the OKB, was coerced into signing a "confession" in October 1937 that he had formed an anti-Soviet group that included Petlyakov, and both men along with many others were arrested. [6] Too valuable to be simply executed, unlike many others arrested during the Great Purge, Petlyakov and other weapons designers were instead sent to sharashkas , special prisons run by the NKVD where such valuable prisoners could continue their work under close scrutiny. In 1938, Petlyakov was tasked with leading the first Special Technical Department (STO — SpetsTekhOd'yel ) for aviation that also included other future well-known designers such as Vladimir Myasishchev , a colleague of Petlyakov's at the Tupolev OKB. [6] Because the Russian word for "100" ( сотка — "sotka") sounds somewhat like the pronunciation of "STO", the STO was later renamed KB-100, and there Petlyakov proposed the development of a twin-engine interceptor against high-altitude long-range bombers, particularly those being developed in Germany such as the Junkers Ju 86 P and Henschel Hs 130 . His proposal was accepted in March 1938, with the requirement that the first prototype be ready for its first flight before the end of 1939. The project was initially given the name Samolyot 100 (lit. "Aircraft 100") and later called VI-100 ( Vysotnyi Istrebitel — "High-Altitude Fighter"). [7] The VI-100 project was an ambitious one for its time, with advanced features such as a pressurised cabin, all-metal construction, turbo-superchargers , and many electrically actuated systems. In addition, the performance requirements were also quite demanding: it was to be capable of reaching 630 km/h at an altitude of 10,000 m, a ceiling of 12,500 m, and a range of 1,400 km. The aircraft would also need a reinforced structure in order to withstand the Mach stresses of making diving attacks from high al

Similar obituary, with the same awesomely generous compensation plan (every kopeck counted in January 1942).

“Petlyakov’s family to keep permanently their apartment in Moscow city”:

Pe-2 dive bomber:

“One of the outstanding tactical attack aircraft of the war, it also proved successful as a heavy fighter, as a night fighter (Pe-3 variant) and as a reconnaissance aircraft. The Pe-2 was, numerically, the most important Soviet bomber of World War II, at their peak comprising 75% of the Soviet twin-engine bomber force. The Soviets manufactured Pe-2s in greater numbers (11,430 built) during the war than any other twin-engine combat aircraft except for the German Junkers Ju 88 and the British Vickers Wellington.” (Wikipedia)

Pe-3:

IV. Decorated Lt. General, Army Commander, S. Akimov. 1896–1941. Ethnic Russian. Never Purged. Died in a plane crash on October 29, 1941; near the village of Golodyaevka, Penza Region.

Stepan Akimov - Wikipedia
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

No one knows for sure what happened. If the plane was hit by an enemy fighter-bomber (blinded, damaged, etc.). In brief, the wounded General was evacuated from Moscow to Kuybyshev, consequently everyone was killed in a crash (crew members, Aviation Narkomat (Ministry) top executives and so on).

PS. Just one more example. Meet G. Voitinsky. Soviet Comintern (Communist International) official, Jew. Senior advisor to prominent Chinese Communists, greatly influenced the formation of the Communist Party of China in 1921. He closely interacted with the founding members of the CPC, including Mao Zedong. He officially represented the “Zinoviev-Bukharin-Trotsky political line” (of Global Communist Revolution, in early 1920s). One of the founders of Soviet Sinology. Was never purged. He died June 11, 1953 (aged 60) during an unsuccessful surgical operation. Three months after Stalin. Duh.

Grigori Voitinsky - Wikipedia
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Russian communist official (1893–1953) Grigori Naumovich Voitinsky , born Zarkhin ( Russian : Григорий Наумович Войтинский ; 17 April 1893 – 11 June 1953) was a Soviet Comintern official. He was sent to China in 1920 as a senior advisor to contact the top prominent Chinese communists such as Chen Duxiu , just before the formation of the Communist Party of China . The process of forming the Communist Party can be mostly attributed to his influence, although his successor advisors had more influence about the official party line itself, such as allying with the Kuomintang . He was born on 17 April 1893 in Nevel to a Russian Jewish family. In 1918, he joined the Bolshevik Party . He took an active part in the Far Eastern Front in the Russian Civil War . [1] Work in China [ edit ] In 1920, the Soviet Union established the Far Eastern Bureau in Siberia , a branch of the Third Communist International, or the Comintern . Thus he was directly responsible for managing the establishment of a Communist party in China and other far east countries. Soon after its establishment, the bureau's deputy manager Voitinsky arrived in Beijing and contacted the Communist vanguard Li Dazhao . Li arranged for Voitinsky to meet with another Communist leader, Chen Duxiu , in Shanghai . In August 1920, Voitinsky, Chen Duxiu , Li Hanjun , Shen Xuanlu , Yu Xiusong , Shi Cuntong , and others began to establish the Comintern China Branch. The Shanghai Chronicle (not to be confused with the Shanghai Jewish Chronicle ) was set up in 1919 in Shanghai by Shemeshko and other Russians with socialist leanings, and received financial aid from the Soviet Russian government in early 1920. In the spring of 1920, Voitinsky and his colleagues came to China on a mission to establish the Communist Party in China. They not only came to China in the guise of editors and reporters for the newspaper, but also set up the Comintern's East Asia Secretariat in the newspaper office. From then on, the Shanghai Chronicle became both a propaganda vehicle for the East Asia Secretariat and a cover for Bolshevik activity in China. Because the newspaper staff assisted Soviet Russian and Comintern personnel stationed under cover at the newspaper in activities to establish a communist organization in China, the newspaper as a whole played a special role in the early communist movement in China. Although the Shanghai Chronicle stopped publication at the end of 1922 because Russian aid came to an end, many staff members continued to work for Bolshevism. [2] Later career [ edit ] He worked as Comintern representative until 1926. Then worked in the Siberian government in Irkutsk until 1929, when he moved to Moscow, where he worked in various Orientalist institutions. In 1934 he became a professor in Moscow State University . [3] He is considered one of the founders of Soviet Sinology . He wrote several books about contemporary China politics. He died in 1953 during an unsuc

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