東南亞可能如何應對台灣潛在軍事衝突 北京方面可能試圖限制台灣衝突向南海擴散的影響，並主動提出協助東南亞公民撤離的行動。

 

東南亞可能如何應對台灣潛在軍事衝突

北京方面可能試圖限制台灣衝突向南海擴散的影響，並主動提出協助東南亞公民撤離的行動。

• 東南亞撤僑引起的恐慌

How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over Taiwan

Beijing could seek to limit the spillover from a Taiwan conflict into the South China Sea and offer to assist in evacuation operations for Southeast Asian citizens.

by Ngeow Chow Bing

Published on June 17, 2024

過去幾年，台海局勢日益緊張，令本地區乃至全球許多國家感到擔憂。即使是向來對台灣問題保持謹慎態度的韓國，近期也 對台灣週邊可能爆發軍事衝突表示 不安和擔憂。在中華人民共和國和台灣的鄰國中，東南亞地區與台海和平息息相關。數十萬東南亞公民生活在台灣。這些國家的經濟與區域供應鏈緊密相連，而區域供應鏈又高度依賴經台海的穩定貿易。一旦發生台海軍事衝突，可能會加劇南海緊張局勢，並破壞東南亞地區的和平與穩定。鑑於東南亞各國在台灣問題上的立場存在分歧，台海危機甚至可能破壞東協的團結，甚至導致東協解體。因此，台海衝突對東南亞而言將是災難性的。

很難預測大多數東南亞國家政府將如何應對潛在的台灣危機。很大程度取決於危機的起因和發展過程。如果中華人民共和國對台灣發動無端全面進攻，無疑會加劇東南亞國家政府的威脅感，他們很可能會因此更加緊密地與美國及其盟友結盟。相反，如果危機被認為是台灣或美國挑起的，並且北京被認為是被逼入絕境或被迫對對手的挑釁行為做出反應，那麼東南亞國家對北京的同情度就會更高。

為了評估東南亞地區可能採取的行動，本文必然基於若干假設。這些假設和情境在實際的台灣危機中或許並不成立，但它們具有合理性，值得探討。本文假設，鑑於東南亞與台灣的地理位置接近，北京重視該地區的輿論，並希望確保東南亞的支持，或至少保持中立，以創造有利的外交環境和戰略成果。這個假設排除了北京發動全面突襲並使用最大武力的可能性。相反，本文假設北京會試圖避免被指責發動「無端」攻擊。正如 烏克蘭 和 加薩戰爭 所表明的那樣，東南亞和西方在評估衝突根源方面存在顯著分歧。台灣衝突也可能出現這種情況。北京會試圖建構一個有利於自身、關於危機起源的敘事，以期獲得東南亞政治領袖的某種程度的認可。

歸根結底，北京有明確的動機確保大多數（如果不是全部）東協成員國保持中立。威脅、施壓和誘導都可能被用來達到這個目的。特別是，北京可能會試圖限制台灣衝突蔓延至南海，並提出協助東南亞公民撤離行動。東南亞各國的反應將大相逕庭，這可能會進一步削弱東協的凝聚力。  

台灣局勢會與南海爭端產生交集嗎？

分析家和評論家經常指出，台灣衝突的爆發可能  與南海爭端 交織在一起，牽涉到東南亞國家的海洋利益和安全。有些人 認為，如果這種衝突蔓延發生，東南亞沿海國家，特別是那些與中國存在爭端的國家，可能會為了維護自身主權和國家利益而支持美國對抗中國。

南海極有可能成為台灣衝突的戰場。如果中國從位於西沙群島或南沙群島的基地發動軍事行動，或試圖奪取目前由台灣軍隊佔領的東沙群島或太平島，那麼南海很可能會爆發軍事衝突。美國及其盟友的行動也未必僅限於台灣及其周邊地區。

然而，如果北京在台海衝突情境下對東南亞最重要的目標是確保東南亞國家不捲入敵對行動，那麼北京就不應該將其在台灣的軍事行動與南海爭端混為一談。簡而言之，在台灣危機期間，北京動用武力在南海推進其主張是不理智的，這只會增加交戰方的數量。相反，中國會集中精力擊敗其主要對手：台灣、美國及其盟友的軍隊。

東南亞聲索國方面，很可能更傾向於置身事外。 民調 顯示，如果中國入侵台灣，大多數東南亞民眾不會支持切斷與中國的經濟聯繫。此外，除非中國對汶萊、印尼、馬來西亞或越南採取挑釁行動，否則它們幾乎沒有動機在南海單方面對中國採取升級行動。菲律賓或許是唯一的例外。

台灣  在南海 的軍事設施，包括東沙群島和伊圖阿巴島，可能會使局勢複雜化，促使中國在南海開闢新的戰線。中國或許能夠在不牽連東南亞聲索國的情況下攻擊東沙群島。東沙群島 靠近中國，遠離任何東南亞聲索國實際佔據的島礁。它也不是中國與東南亞聲索國之間的爭議島礁。然而，伊圖阿巴島卻被東南亞聲索國所佔據的島礁所包圍，尤其是越南和菲律賓。中國對伊圖阿巴島的軍事行動可能會無意中將這些國家捲入衝突，特別是如果中國在攻擊伊圖阿巴島的過程中驅逐這些國家的軍隊並控制這些島礁。屆時，中國將發現自己在行動中建立了新的敵人。中國為此付出的代價將十分高昂，甚至可能超過佔領伊圖阿巴島的軍事價值。因此，中國更有可能在對伊圖阿巴採取任何行動時都非常謹慎，並尋求不激怒這些國家，希望它們不要捲入衝突。

這些東南亞聲索國 或許也擔心， 如果它們不加入對抗中國的行列，而中國最終戰勝美國和台灣，它們將成為中國霸權的下一個受害者。正如亞洲安全專家德魯湯普森 所言，「這些國家若無視北京挑起的台海衝突所開創的先例，將是虛偽且自欺欺人的，因為它們最終也會因自身爭端而遭受中國的軍事脅迫。」 基於此邏輯，聲索國或許應該抓住台灣衝突帶來的契機，一勞永逸地在南海中國，並確保美國遏制美國的聯盟。這種觀點在菲律賓或許會受到歡迎，但在東南亞其他國家則會被視為一種冒險策略。

相反，聲索國或許會發現相反的論點同樣具有說服力。利用台灣危機試圖將中國逐出南海，可能造成與中國的長期敵對關係。無論中國最終在台灣問題上是勝是敗，它們都將不得不面對北京可能採取的報復行動。另一方面，選擇穩健的做法，不將自身爭端捲入台灣衝突，則更符合東南亞國家普遍規避風險的 戰略文化 。北京甚至可以透過調整策略、緩和自身在南海的立場來促成這種結果。正如南海問題專家安德魯·丘布 所指出的，矛盾的是，「台灣海峽緊張局勢的急劇升級也可能緩解南海的緊張局勢」。北京可以悄悄地向聲索國發出訊號：如果它們不介入台灣問題，北京願意做出默許讓步。反之，利用台灣問題對抗北京的國家也將面臨後果。這樣的訊號很可能足以讓這些國家三思而後行，避免利用台灣危機將中國趕回南海。

如前所述，在南海聲索國中，菲律賓可能是上述討論的一個 例外，這主要 是因為其與美國的聯盟關係、其地理位置、與中國的緊張關係，以及最重要的一點——菲律賓境內擁有美軍可以從中介入台灣衝突的軍事基地。根據 2014年簽署的《加強國防合作協議 》（EDCA），菲律賓授權美國輪流使用指定的「商定地點」（軍事基地）。美國可以利用這些基地進行訓練、加油、部署以及雙方商定的其他活動。 2023年2月， 根據EDCA，美國又獲得了四個新的軍事基地 的使用權，其中包括三個位於呂宋島的基地，呂宋島是菲律賓的一個島嶼，地理位置上靠近台灣。菲律賓總統小費迪南德·馬科斯曾表示，如果中國攻擊台灣，美國使用菲律賓軍事基地將「有用」。他也 承認 ，如果台灣衝突爆發，菲律賓不太可能保持中立。中國必然會對美軍使用菲律賓軍事基地感到擔憂，並可能採取軍事應對措施，從而實際上將菲律賓捲入與中國的直接武裝衝突。如果爆發直接衝突，中菲爭端可能與台灣危機直接交織在一起。      

中國在東南亞撤僑行動中的潛在作用

台灣政府提供的統計數據 顯示，截至2023年，超過78萬越南、印尼、菲律賓、泰國和馬來西亞公民在台灣生活和工作，佔島上約85萬外國公民總數的90%以上。其中，印尼公民有27.8萬人，越南公民有25.5萬人，菲律賓公民有15.3萬人。相較之下，日本公民只有約1.4萬人，美國公民約1萬人，而來自韓國、印度或歐洲的公民不足5,000人。對東南亞各國政府而言，一旦發生台灣危機，首要任務之一就是確保本國公民安全及時 返回家園 。印尼和菲律賓已經開始製定  應對此類突發事件的計畫。

對東南亞各國政府而言，進行涉及數十萬本國公民撤離台灣的非戰鬥撤離行動將是一項艱鉅而複雜的任務。東南亞各國政府是否擁有足夠的海空力量來執行此類行動？這些力量是否具備穿越東南亞海域所需航程的能力？撤離人員將被安置在哪裡？是否有安全可靠的往返台灣的路線？這些問題目前尚無令人滿意的答案。  

大多數關於 撤僑行動的討論 都沒有考慮到中國會如何回應此類非戰鬥人員撤離行動。如果北京在意其在台灣危機期間在東南亞的形象，那麼它必然會將東南亞公民的撤離視為自身外交姿態的關鍵所在。在這樣的衝突中，北京及其對手都會盡可能地尋求其他國家的支持。透過支持東南亞的撤僑行動，北京可以展現其對東南亞利益的重視。

潛在的台灣危機如何發展將影響撤離行動的可行性。如果台灣遭到突然的、傷亡慘重的全面攻擊，並無差別地殺害平民，那麼所有撤離方案都將失效。然而，如果局勢發展到能夠為撤離行動提供時間和空間，那麼在合適的條件下，北京宣佈在台灣海峽開闢一條安全通道或走廊，用於人道主義撤離，並非不可能。北京也可能將中國東部沿海的一個或多個區域劃定為非軍事化人道區。 

對東南亞而言，可行的方案寥寥無幾。除了菲律賓，台灣與大多數東南亞國家的地理距離都是一大挑戰。雖然它們可以在 美國 或 日本的 撤僑行動中尋求幫助，但撤僑人數可能過於龐大。如果北京主動提出協助撤僑，為運送撤僑人員的船隻或飛機提供一條連接台灣、其指定的人道主義區域和這些東南亞國家的安全航線，那麼對於其中一些國家來說，接受這一提議或許頗具吸引力。

中國直接參與東南亞平民撤離行動實屬罕見，因為撤離行動通常會將外國公民送往其本國、中立國或盟國。然而，撤離至戰亂國家並非史無前例。 2022年俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭後，烏克蘭境內約5,000名越南裔人士試圖逃離該國。雖然大多數人最終抵達了西部鄰國（尤其是波蘭），但也有少數人  在越南駐俄羅斯大使館和俄羅斯政府機構的協助下  逃往俄羅斯。

北京方面提出的類似提議，可以大幅降低東南亞各國政府在撤僑行動中所面臨的操作難度。從純粹的後勤角度來看，由中國協助的撤僑行動，尤其是名義上由東協或東南亞各國軍隊主導的撤僑行動，對東南亞各國政府可能頗具吸引力。區域各國政府很可能面臨國內民眾的焦慮，他們會敦促當局接受任何有助於保障本國人民免於直接危險的措施，無論援助來自中國、日本或美國。

當然，中國發起的人道走廊也可能使中國軍隊用於發動攻擊和補給部隊的空中或海上航線變得複雜且混亂。在武裝衝突的混亂局面中，事情往往不會照計畫進行。北京最終可能無法在人道主義撤離過程中有效保護平民生命，因此其旨在最大限度減少聲譽損害的努力可能徒勞無功。然而，如果北京能夠為人道主義撤離提供便利，這將使中國在外交領域獲得巨大的籌碼。

並非所有東南亞國家政府都會對北京的提議做出積極回應。菲律賓可能再次成為例外。由於其地理位置靠近台灣，它對中國援助的需求要少得多。而且，如前文所述，菲律賓更有可能直接捲入潛在的衝突。菲律賓也可以根據東協的《東協駐第三國使團在危機情況下向東協成員國國民提供緊急援助的指導方針》向其他東協國家提供援助。該方針敦促東協國家在危機時刻相互援助。從台灣撤僑行動規模龐大且複雜，因此對大多數東南亞國家政府而言，合乎邏輯的選擇是接受所有可行的撤僑安排，無論撤僑行動來自北京、馬尼拉，還是華盛頓或東京。  

東協會解體嗎？

新加坡尤索夫伊薩克東南亞研究所發布的《2024 年 東南亞狀況調查 報告》顯示，在台灣衝突的情況下，東南亞菁英更傾向於使用外交手段反對使用武力，其次是採取中立立場。

東協的集體力量表明，它或許能夠在台灣危機升級為不可逆轉的武裝衝突之前，透過談判找到解決方案。然而，一旦軍事行動爆發，東協就極有可能出現裂痕。區域內各方利益、優先事項和認知上的分歧將暴露無遺，東協解體的可能性並非不可想像。

關鍵變數在於北京能否迫使東南亞保持中立。如果北京能讓東南亞相信，中國是被迫採取軍事行動，無意將戰事擴大到南海的東南亞聲索國，並願意協助撤離行動，那麼中國幾乎肯定能夠確保東南亞保持中立，菲律賓可能除外。屆時，北京可以發表聲明，表示尊重東協的中立，並期望東協同樣尊重中國在台灣問題上的立場。  

一旦台灣危機爆發，美國在該地區的盟友和親密夥伴將面臨艱難抉擇。由於前文所述的原因，菲律賓直接捲入衝突的可能性遠高於其他鄰國。正如 威廉·鐘和黃氏霞所指出 的，「菲律賓若與美國建立更緊密的聯盟，將使東協難以就如何應對台灣危機達成共識。這個問題將在東協內部造成嚴重分歧。」如果菲律賓因其基地被美軍用於保衛台灣而遭受中國直接軍事打擊，其他東協國家是否會團結一致？

從目前的情況來看，事態發展很可能朝著相反的方向發展。東協其他議員國會試圖保持中立。儘管它們可能會發表一些旨在安撫菲律賓的外交聲明，但實際行動可能不多。一些成員國甚至可能私下指責菲律賓，認為它有可能將整個東協拖入一個難以維繫的局面。在遭受攻擊之際，菲律賓民眾很可能會對其他東協成員國缺乏支持而感到失望，這將進一步加劇菲律賓與美國、日本和其他盟友的關係。東協很可能無法發出統一的聲音。

除了菲律賓，泰國也是美國的盟友，但鑑於泰國對中國的威脅感知較低，泰國在台灣局勢緊張的情況下援引其與美國的聯盟承諾的可能性 不大。新加坡是另一個由於與美國有著牢固的安全夥伴關係而不得不做出艱難抉擇的國家  。例如，美軍有可能在台灣衝突中使用新加坡的海軍基地。如果中國不攻擊新加坡，新加坡保持中立的可能性很高。畢竟，如果像韓國這樣根深蒂固的美國盟友，在一個強烈親美的保守派政府領導下，都 公開表示 不會捲入潛在的台灣衝突，那麼其他國家很可能也會採取類似的做法，除非它們直接受到中國的攻擊。

另一方面，東協內部傳統上親華的國家，例如柬埔寨、緬甸，以及可能還有寮國，可能會在聲稱保持中立的同時，公開強烈支持中國（無論是在北京的敦促下還是出於自身意願）。然而，這些國家的親華立場未必能得到東協其他成員國的認同，後者仍傾向維持一定的空間與信譽，以包容各方。汶萊、印尼、馬來西亞、泰國、越南，可能還有新加坡，最終可能成為新東協的核心──一個規模顯著縮小、實力大減、影響力下降的東協。

結論

本文試圖分析一旦中國與台灣爆發衝突，東南亞地區可能採取的行動與因應措施。文中討論的所有情景（包括各國對衝突起源的認知、南海局勢以及中國在撤僑行動中的角色）都傾向於認為，中國能夠維持東南亞地區的中立，菲律賓除外，但這同時也可能導致東盟的分裂。然而，在台灣衝突爆發時，許多未知的背景因素和相互作用的因素將影響東南亞各國的行動和應對措施。除了中國和台灣之外，澳洲、日本和美國的行動也至關重要。戰爭迷霧將使局勢更加撲朔迷離，假訊息也將氾濫。儘管如此，本文仍試圖提供並概述一些可能的路徑。 

無論如何，圍繞台灣爆發的激烈衝突對東南亞來說將是災難性的。菲律賓很可能直接捲入戰亂，而其他國家的資源將因應對由此引發的人道危機而捉襟見肘。許多東南亞國民的生命將受到威脅。在經濟方面，台灣戰爭將 摧毀整個東南亞經濟體，其中大多數國家目前仍不夠富裕和穩健，難以承受可能進一步引發政治危機或動盪的劇烈經濟衰退。有些國家的社會結構可能會因此而瓦解。和平紅利的終結將在未來幾年產生深遠影響，因為區域各國可能會開始增加國防開支，減少福利和經濟發展的投入。東協中心地位的理念和願景將被邊緣化。東協本身也可能無法完整地存續下去。

令人遺憾的是，東南亞對台海局勢發展的影響力有限。但現在是東南亞就如何避免因 台灣爆發戰爭而展開更多討論的時候 了。東協各國應利用與北京、台北和華盛頓之間友好而長久的關係，敦促三方緩和各自的行為，避免一場對所有人來說都無法挽回的災難。    

Heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait in the past several years have alarmed many countries within the region and beyond. Even South Korea, traditionally very careful about expressing views on the Taiwan issue, has recently voiced unease and concern regarding the possibility of a militarized crisis around Taiwan. Among the neighbors of both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, Southeast Asia has the most at stake in peace across the Taiwan Strait. Hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian citizens live in Taiwan. These nations’ economies are deeply integrated in regional supply chains, which depend heavily on stable trade flows through the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan military conflict could threaten to escalate tensions in the South China Sea and undermine regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Given the differences between Southeast Asian countries’ positions on the Taiwan question, a crisis in the Taiwan Strait could potentially undermine Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) unity or even result in the breakup of ASEAN. For these reasons, a Taiwan conflict would be catastrophic for Southeast Asia.

It is difficult to predict how most Southeast Asian governments would react to a potential Taiwan crisis. Much would depend on how the crisis began and how it unfolded. An unprovoked, all-out PRC assault on Taiwan would certainly create a much stronger sense of threat among Southeast Asian governments, and they would likely align more closely with the United States and its allies in response. Conversely, there would be more sympathy in Southeast Asia with Beijing if the crisis were perceived to have been initiated by Taiwan or the United States, and if Beijing were perceived as being cornered or forced to react to provocative actions undertaken by its adversaries.

To gauge potential Southeast Asian actions, this article necessarily proceeds with several assumptions. This specific set of circumstances and assumptions might not hold true during an actual Taiwan contingency, but is plausible and worth examining. It assumes that Beijing cares about perceptions in Southeast Asia because of the region’s geographical proximity to Taiwan, and because Beijing will want to ensure Southeast Asia’s support, or at least neutrality, to secure a favorable diplomatic environment and strategic outcome. This assumption rules out a scenario in which Beijing initiates an all-out and sudden invasion with a maximum use of force. Instead, this article assumes that Beijing will try to avoid being accused of launching an “unprovoked” attack. As the wars in Ukraine and Gaza demonstrate, there is significant divergence between Southeast Asia and the West in assessing the root causes of the conflicts. This could also be the case in a conflict over Taiwan. Beijing will seek to formulate a favorable narrative on the origin of the crisis to find some degree of acceptance among political leaders in Southeast Asia.

Ultimately, Beijing has clear incentives to ensure that most, if not all, ASEAN members remain neutral. Threats, pressure, and inducement could be leveraged toward this outcome. In particular, Beijing could seek to limit the spillover from a Taiwan conflict into the South China Sea and offer to assist in evacuation operations for Southeast Asian citizens. Reactions from Southeast Asian countries will differ significantly, which could further weaken the cohesion of ASEAN.  

Will the Taiwan Scenario Intersect With the South China Sea Dispute?

Analysts and commentators often argue that the eruption of a Taiwan conflict could intersect with the South China Sea disputes, implicating the maritime interests and security of Southeast Asian countries. Some suggest that should such a spillover take place, maritime Southeast Asian countries, especially those that have ongoing disputes with China, could support the United States against China to protect their sovereignty and national interests.

The likelihood of the South China Sea becoming a theater of operations in a Taiwan conflict is high. Military actions could well take place in the South China Sea if China were to stage its operations from its bases in the Paracel Islands or Spratly Islands, or if it attempted to seize Pratas Island or Itu Aba (Taiping Island), currently occupied by Taiwan’s forces. The United States and its allies also might not confine their actions to Taiwan and the surrounding area.

Nonetheless, if Beijing’s most important objective vis-à-vis Southeast Asia during a Taiwan conflict scenario were to ensure that Southeast Asian countries stay out of hostilities, then it would be in Beijing’s interest not to conflate its military actions on Taiwan with disputes in the South China Sea. Simply put, it would not be rational for Beijing to use force to press its claims in the South China Sea during a Taiwan crisis, which would only multiply the number of belligerents. Instead, China would focus on defeating its main adversaries: the military forces of Taiwan, the United States, and their allies.

Southeast Asian claimant states, for their part, will likely prefer to stay out of the conflict. Public opinion surveys show that most Southeast Asians would not support cutting economic ties with China if it invaded Taiwan. Moreover, there would be little incentive for Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, or Vietnam to take escalatory action against China unilaterally in the South China Sea unless China took aggressive actions targeting them. The Philippines is likely the one major exception.

Taiwan’s military installations in the South China Sea, Pratas Island and Itu Aba, could complicate the picture and draw China to open a front in the South China Sea. China likely would be able to attack Pratas Island without embroiling Southeast Asian claimant states. Pratas Island is located near to China and far away from any of the features occupied by Southeast Asian claimant states. It is also not a disputed feature between China and Southeast Asian claimant states. Itu Aba, however, is surrounded by features occupied by Southeast Asian claimant states, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. Chinese military actions against Itu Aba could inadvertently pull these states into the conflict, especially if China were to evict their forces and take control of these features in the process of attacking Itu Aba. China would then find itself creating new enemies in the course of action. The cost would be high for China and could outweigh the military value of occupying Itu Aba. Hence, it is more likely that China will be very careful in any operation against Itu Aba and seek not to provoke these states in hopes that they stay out of the fight.

These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would be the next victims of Chinese hegemony. As Asian security expert Drew Thompson argues, “it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes.” Based on this logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all, and seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in the rest of Southeast Asia.

Instead, claimant states probably would find the contrarian argument equally persuasive. Taking advantage of the Taiwan crisis to attempt to expel China from the South China Sea could create long-term animosity with China. Whether China eventually emerged victorious or defeated in Taiwan, they would have to deal with the possible repercussions of a vengeful Beijing. The option to play it safe and not interject their own disputes into a Taiwan conflict, on the other hand, would find appeal to the generally risk-adverse strategic cultures of Southeast Asian states. Beijing could even encourage such an outcome by making tactical adjustments and softening its own posture in the South China Sea. As South China Sea expert Andrew Chubb notes, paradoxically, “greatly increased tensions in the Taiwan Strait could also ease tensions in the South China Sea.” Beijing could quietly signal to claimant states that it would be willing to offer tacit concessions should they stay out of the Taiwan situation. Conversely, states that take advantage of the Taiwan situation against Beijing would face repercussions. Signals like this would likely be enough to convince these states to think twice about taking advantage of a Taiwan crisis to push China back in the South China Sea.

As mentioned earlier, among the South China Sea claimant states, the Philippines is probably the exception to the above discussion because of its alliance relationship with the United States, its geographical location, its strained relations with China, and most importantly the presence of military bases from which U.S. forces could intervene in a Taiwan conflict. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2014, the Philippines authorized U.S. access to selected “Agreed Locations” (military bases) on a rotational basis. The United States can use those bases for the purposes of training, refueling, deployment, and other activities agreed on by both sides. In February 2023, four new bases were opened to U.S. access under EDCA—including three that are located on Luzon, a Philippine island geographically close to Taiwan. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines has stated that U.S. access to Philippine military bases would be “useful” if China attacked Taiwan. He also acknowledged that should a Taiwan conflict develop, it would be unlikely that the Philippines could maintain neutrality. China would inevitably be concerned about U.S. forces using the Philippine bases and would likely take military measures in response, effectively involving the Philippines in direct armed conflict with China. If a direct clash were to break out, China-Philippines disputes could directly intersect with a Taiwan crisis.      

China’s Potential Role in Southeast Asian Evacuation Operations

Statistics provided by Taiwan’s government show that as of 2023 more than 780,000 nationals of Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia live and work in Taiwan, accounting for more than 90 percent of the roughly 850,000 foreign citizens on the island. There are 278,000 Indonesians living on Taiwan, followed by Vietnam with 255,000, while Filipinos accounted for 153,000. By contrast, there were only about 14,000 Japanese, 10,000 Americans, and less than 5,000 nationals from Korea, India, or Europe. For Southeast Asian governments, among the first priorities in a Taiwan crisis would be to secure the safe and timely repatriation of their own nationals. Indonesia and the Philippines have already started drawing up plans for such a contingency.

For Southeast Asian governments, conducting non-combat evacuation operations involving hundreds of thousands of their nationals leaving Taiwan would be difficult and arduous. Do Southeast Asian governments have sufficient naval and air assets to conduct such operations? Do these assets have the capabilities to endure the distances necessary to traverse maritime Southeast Asia? Where will evacuees be sheltered? Will there be secure routes to and from Taiwan? These questions do not yet have good answers.  

Most discussions on evacuation operations have not taken into consideration how China would respond to such noncombatant evacuation operations. If Beijing cares how it is perceived in Southeast Asia during a Taiwan crisis, it follows that Beijing would view the evacuation of Southeast Asian citizens as crucial for its own diplomatic posture. In such a conflict, both Beijing and its adversaries would seek as much support from other countries as possible. By supporting Southeast Asian evacuation operations, Beijing could claim sensitivity to Southeast Asia’s interests.

How a potential Taiwan crisis unfolded would affect the feasibility of evacuations. A sudden, high-casualty, all-out attack on Taiwan that indiscriminately killed civilians would close off all options. However, if the scenario were to unfold in a way that allowed time and space for evacuations, it is not inconceivable that under the right conditions Beijing would announce the opening of a safe channel or corridor in the Taiwan Strait for the purpose of humanitarian evacuation. It could also designate one or multiple areas along China’s east coast as demilitarized humanitarian zones. 

For Southeast Asia, few good options exist. Apart from the Philippines, the geographical distance to Taiwan would be a challenge for most Southeast Asian states. While they could ask for help during American or Japanese evacuation operations, the number of evacuees could be too high. Should Beijing offer to help the evacuation, giving a safe route for vessels or planes carrying evacuees between Taiwan, its own designated humanitarian zones, and these Southeast Asian countries, it could be tempting for some of these countries to accept this offer.

A direct role for China in facilitating Southeast Asian civilian evacuations would be highly unusual, as evacuation operations generally transport foreign nationals to their own countries, neutral countries, or allied countries. Nevertheless, evacuation to a combatant country would not be without precedent. After Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the sizable Vietnamese community (numbering around 5,000) in Ukraine sought to flee the country. While most found their way to neighboring countries to the west (especially Poland), a small number fled to Russia under the assistance of the Vietnamese embassy in Russia and Russian government entities.  

A similar offer by Beijing could significantly reduce the operational difficulties faced by Southeast Asian governments in their evacuation operations. From a purely logistical point of view, a PRC-facilitated evacuation operation, especially one nominally led by ASEAN or Southeast Asian militaries, might be appealing to Southeast Asian governments. Regional governments would likely face anxious domestic publics pushing for authorities to accept any measures that could help secure their own people from immediate danger, whether the help comes from China, Japan, or the United States.

Of course, a China-initiated humanitarian corridor could also complicate and entangle the air or sea routes that the Chinese military would be using to launch attacks and resupply forces. And in the messiness of armed conflicts, things often do not go as planned. Beijing could end up being unable to effectively protect civilian lives during humanitarian evacuations, and hence its potential efforts to minimize reputational damage could be fruitless. If Beijing were able to facilitate humanitarian evacuations, however, it would afford China a great deal of leverage on the diplomatic front.

Not all Southeast Asian governments would respond favorably to Beijing’s offer. The Philippines again could be an exception. Its geographical proximity to Taiwan means that it needs far less assistance from China. It is also more likely to be directly embroiled in a possible conflict, as discussed earlier. The Philippines could also offer assistance to fellow ASEAN countries under ASEAN’s “Guidelines for the Provision of Emergency Assistance by ASEAN Missions in Third Countries to Nationals of ASEAN Member Countries in Crisis Situations,” which urges ASEAN countries assist one another in times of crisis. Evacuation operations from Taiwan would be such a huge and complex action that the logical choice for the majority of Southeast Asian governments would be to accept all feasible evacuation arrangements, whether from Beijing, Manila, or for that matter from Washington or Tokyo.  

Would ASEAN Break Up?

The 2024 State of Southeast Asia Survey report, published by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, shows that during a conflict situation in Taiwan, Southeast Asian elites would prefer the use of diplomatic measures to oppose the use of force, followed by the adoption of a neutral position.

The collective weight of ASEAN suggests that it might be able to play some role in negotiating a way out of a Taiwan crisis situation before it escalates into an irreversible armed conflict. However, if military actions commence, there is a real danger that ASEAN will start to crack. Diverging interests, priorities, and perceptions within the region would be so exposed that a potential breakup of ASEAN is not unimaginable.

The key variable would be Beijing’s level of ability to extract neutrality from Southeast Asia. If Beijing manages to convince Southeast Asia that it was forced to undertake military actions, had no intention of extending the fight to Southeast Asian claimant states in the South China Sea, and offered to help in evacuation operations, China would almost certainly secure Southeast Asian neutrality with the likely exception of the Philippines. Beijing could then publish a statement indicating that it would respect the neutrality of ASEAN and that, in return, it would expect the same respect from ASEAN for China’s position on Taiwan.  

In the event of a crisis around Taiwan, there would be agonizing choices to be made among allies and close partners of the United States in the region. The likelihood of the Philippines being directly involved in hostilities is much higher than that of other neighboring countries for reasons already stated. As noted by William Choong and Hoang Thi Ha, “the Philippines’ charging ahead into a tighter alliance with the U.S. would make it difficult for ASEAN to reach any consensus on how to respond collectively in a Taiwan contingency. This issue is going to be deeply divisive within ASEAN.” If the Philippines were to experience direct Chinese military attacks as a result of its bases being employed by U.S. forces in defense of Taiwan, would its fellow ASEAN countries rally in solidarity?

Judging from the prevailing state of affairs, the opposite development seems more likely. The rest of the ASEAN states would be keen to preserve neutrality. Though they might make diplomatic statements aimed at assuaging the Philippines, they probably would not do much to help. Some even might privately blame the Philippines for potentially dragging the whole of ASEAN into an untenable situation. Filipinos would likely feel justifiably disillusioned by the lack of support coming from fellow ASEAN member states at a time when they were under attack, which would further entrench the Philippines’ relationship with the United States, Japan, and other allies. ASEAN would likely not be able to speak with a unified voice.

Beyond the Philippines, Thailand is also a U.S. ally, but the likelihood that Thailand would invoke its alliance commitment with the United States in a Taiwan contingency is not high, given the low threat perception toward China in Thailand. Singapore is another country that would have to make excruciating decisions as a result of its strong security partnership with the United States. U.S. forces, for instance, could potentially use Singapore’s naval base in a Taiwan conflict. If China refrains from attacking Singapore, the likelihood that Singapore remains neutral will be high. After all, if a U.S. ally as established as South Korea, under a strongly pro–United States conservative government, stated publicly that it would not get involved in a potential Taiwan conflict, others are likely to act similarly unless they are directly targeted by China.

On the other hand, the traditionally pro-China states within ASEAN, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and possibly Laos, could come out strongly in support of China (either at Beijing’s urging or independently) while still professing neutrality. However, the pro-China position of these states is not necessarily shared by the rest of ASEAN, which would still prefer to maintain the space and credibility to accommodate different sides. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and probably Singapore could eventually become the core of a new ASEAN—a significantly shrunken, weakened, and diminished ASEAN.

Conclusion

This article attempts to analyze the potential courses of action and reaction in Southeast Asia should hostilities erupt between China and Taiwan. All the scenarios discussed here (regarding countries’ perceptions of the origins of the conflict, the situation in the South China Sea, and China’s role in evacuation operations) lean toward the likelihood that China would be able to keep Southeast Asia neutral with the exception of the Philippines, which also could lead to the possible breakup of ASEAN unity. However, there are many unknown contextual and interactive factors that would shape and influence the actions and responses of Southeast Asian countries in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. The actions undertaken by Australia, Japan, and the United States would be crucial in addition to those of China and Taiwan. The fog of war would be confusing and disinformation prevalent. Nevertheless, this article attempts to provide and outline some possible paths. 

Regardless, a hot conflict over Taiwan would be disastrous for Southeast Asia. The Philippines could well be a direct party to the hostilities, while other nations’ resources would be stressed to the limit in coping with the resulting humanitarian crisis. The lives of many Southeast Asian nationals would be at stake. Economically, a Taiwan war would ruin all Southeast Asian economies, most of which are still not rich and resilient enough to survive a drastic economic downturn that could further trigger political crises or instabilities. The social fabric of some countries could be torn apart. The end of the peace dividends would have ramifications in the years to come, as regional countries would likely begin to spend more on defense and less on welfare and economic development. The cherished ideas and aspirations of ASEAN centrality would be relegated to the margins of geopolitics. ASEAN itself probably would not survive intact.

Frustratingly, Southeast Asia’s ability to influence developments across the Taiwan Strait is limited. But it is time for Southeast Asia to initiate more discussions on the prevention of war over the Taiwan. ASEAN states should leverage their friendly and long-standing ties to Beijing, Taipei, and Washington to encourage all three to moderate their behavior and avoid an irreversible catastrophe for all.