台灣與中國大陸開戰時面臨的最大問題是文化

2025年4月16日

Taiwan’s Biggest Problem in Steeling Itself for War with China is Cultural

April 16, 2025
台灣1

習近平總書記顯然希望中國能做好台灣戰爭的準備。他為人民經濟法律體系特別是 軍隊 採取的措施是眾所周知的。阻止他真正擲出鐵骰子的​​最好方法是華盛頓和台北共同合作,因為任何一方都無法獨自阻止北京。台灣若沒有主要支持者和保護者,抵抗中國大陸的軍事攻擊將是愚蠢的行為。美國需要台灣堅守並堅持足夠長的時間,以便美國軍隊能夠採取決定性力量。

不幸的是,這說來容易做來難。許多台灣民眾質疑美國是否真的會保護他們。華盛頓長期以來的戰略模糊姿態顯然是人們懷疑的一個根源。但即使對台北採取戰略明確的態度也無法解決問題。事實上,華盛頓和台北的關係長期而複雜。台灣選民知道美國長期以來總是他們需要的時候背棄他們。

因此,毫無疑問,美國應該採取措施解決台灣對美國承諾缺乏信心的問題。正如兩名國民黨立法工作人員最近在本版上所指出的那樣,明智的第一步是解決對台武器交付積壓問題。華盛頓還可以採取一系列其他措施來表明對台灣問題的認真態度。

但增強台灣人對美國信譽的信任只是解決方案的一部分。台灣人民也必須相信,他們有能力抵禦中國的猛烈攻擊。無論是更快的武器交付還是更高的國防開支都無法建立這種急需的自信。

那麼,會怎樣呢?改變台灣武裝部隊,特別是軍官團的文化。作為一名曾訓練過台灣部隊的海軍陸戰隊員和一名在美國接受教育的退役台灣海軍軍官,我們非常清楚,台灣軍隊仍然是一個非常 不嚴肅的組織。它還沒有準備好發動戰爭。台灣民眾也知道這一點。

因此,任何增強兩岸威懾力的努力都必須從軍官隊伍的文化開始。台灣需要願意麵對殘酷現實、擁抱創新、將策略思維置於狹隘利益、遺留體系和官僚便利之上的軍人領導人。為了實現這一目標,台灣總統賴清德應該精簡臃腫的將領和將官隊伍,並堅持要求軍方最終制定出一個連貫的藍圖,以建立真正的、非對稱的、全社會參與的台灣防禦體系。黎智英政府應該堅持建立制度機制,加強文官對軍隊的控制,國民黨主導的立法院也需要支持這項做法。華盛頓可以而且應該透過解決武器積壓問題來提供幫助,即使只是為了防止台灣國防部以此為藉口;降低公眾對大幅增加國防開支的要求

 

 

波將金部隊

台灣軍隊正在努力解決一系列長期存在的問題,其中大多數問題只要有人(在華盛頓、台北……和北京)留意,就很容易發現。最嚴峻的挑戰之一是台灣軍人人數不足。台灣陸軍是台灣武裝部隊中規模最大的部隊,也是戰爭中的最後一道防線,但卻面臨嚴重的人員短缺問題。前線步兵、裝甲兵、砲兵和海軍作戰部隊的兵力短缺問題尤其嚴重,兵力缺口往往高達40%。這不僅僅是一個招募問題。它揭示了軍隊在組織和優先安排資源方面存在根本性的錯位。作戰單位人員配置水準與總人員水準之間的差異高達 80% 左右,這凸顯了台灣軍方重視行政人員配備而非作戰準備的程度。多年來,蔡英文政府(2016年至2024年)一直試圖透過提高志願軍的薪資和福利來解決這個問題。當這項努力被證明成本太高時,蔡英文總統最終讓步並將徵兵期從四個月延長至十二個月。 2024 年 1 月,軍隊招募了第一批服役 12 個月的義務兵。不幸的是,該計劃至少需要五年時間才能全面啟動和運行。即便如此,該計畫仍將把大多數一年期義務兵派往負責後方安全的部隊。志願軍仍將是大多數前線作戰部隊的主體,這意味著第一道防線仍將兵力不足。更糟糕的是,軍隊尚未想出如何訓練所有這些應徵入伍者,正如我們下面所討論的。因此,該計劃完全有可能只是將未經訓練的應徵士兵「轉變」為訓練不足的應徵士兵。

諷刺的是,台灣唯一有足夠的將軍和海軍上將:確切地說是308名。將軍和將官與現役軍人的比例大約是美國軍隊的 2.5 倍(美國國防部長甚至批評其頭重腳輕

即使國防部奇蹟般地解決了人員短缺問題,它仍然會難以訓練因此而湧入的新部隊。部分問題與基礎設施有關。在空間已經不足的地方購買和建造營房和射擊場需要時間(和金錢)。更大的問題是,武裝部隊缺乏現實而嚴格的訓練文化。大多數的演習都是按照預先設定的結果進行。儘管如今的政治領袖喜歡宣揚自發性的策略,但這聽起來卻像是「這位女士抗議過度」的例子。相反,大多數引人注目的演習對媒體和美國旁觀者來說仍然只是“花招”,而不是測試和提高作戰能力的認真嘗試。幾個世代以來,台灣一直採用這種訓練方式,因此沒有足夠的士官和初級軍官精通分散的現代作戰戰術、技術和程序,無法每年訓練數萬名新兵。

這樣的例子不勝枚舉:各軍種仍然缺乏連貫的、總體性的條令和相關的作戰概念來指導從採購到訓練到作戰的一切工作(最新的四年防務評估報告並沒有填補這一空白)。後備訓練仍顯不足。儘管黎智英政府和「前進聯盟」「美國精神」等民間社會組織做出了努力,但台灣社會為戰爭做好準備的努力仍未完成。當然,民用防備的一大障礙是國防部拒絕將民防作為核心任務。

最糟糕的是,台灣軍隊與其宣誓保衛的社會之間存在著巨大的差距。許多老一輩的台灣人——尤其是那些與黎智英領導的民進黨結盟的人——對軍隊抱持懷疑態度,因為許多軍官認同反對黨國民黨,而且軍隊是蔣介石獨裁政權的執行機構。同時,只要與台灣年輕人交談就會發現,許多人認為服兵役是浪費時間。部分原因是他們知道,即使經過 12 個月的培訓,他們的訓練也不會很嚴肅;部分原因是他們理性地選擇追求薪水更高的工作,這樣他們就可以搬出父母的家。

玩忽職守

腐爛怎麼會變得這麼嚴重?台灣軍官團應負全部責任。毋庸置疑,軍官領導軍隊,因此要對他們任期內發生或未發生的一切負責。但在這種情況下,失敗代表根本的失職。軍官團的職責是追蹤兩岸軍事平衡的變化,並相應地調整其態勢和準備。這項基本任務要求警覺、積極主動、創造力、好奇心和靈活性。台灣軍官團並沒有表現出這些特質。因此,中國現在才剛開始應對一系列深刻但緩慢發展的政治技術人口趨勢。

以台灣將軍和海軍上將對台灣出生率下降的「反應」為例。雖然他們現在經常將這個問題視為人員短缺的根本原因,但他們早在二十多年前就已經意識到了這種趨勢。然而,儘管有充足的時間去適應,軍官團還是默許了政治上誘人的決定——比如過渡到全志願部隊縮短徵兵期——而沒有費心去製定和提出保持戰備狀態的嚴肅的替代計劃。更令人不安的是,軍官團在大幅縮減警隊規模的同時,卻沒有做出任何有意義的嘗試來精簡內部組織結構。台灣軍隊目前指揮層級數與當時的50 萬名軍人數量大致相同,指揮層級負責管理 16 萬名軍人。

台灣的軍事理論、軍隊結構和軍事態勢也是如此。大量證據表明,中國大陸的軍事現代化已經使其長期以來對少量昂貴、常規、高調的美國製造的艦船和噴氣機的偏好發生了改變,台灣軍官團非但沒有做出反應,反而堅持要繼續保持原樣。即使是現在,國防部的高級官員仍在繼續推動購買更多的固定翼戰鬥機、兩棲攻擊艦以及昂貴且不確定的國產潛艇。同時,他們放棄了更俱生存力的替代方案,如機動飛彈系統、從民用港口運作的小型快艇以及領土防禦

功能障礙的根源

要治癒感染,醫生必須先找到感染的源頭。同樣,如果華盛頓和台北真的希望台灣軍隊做好戰爭準備,他們就需要找出並解決台灣軍隊運作失調的根本原因。我們相信這一切都始於組織文化。

關於軍事變革效能的學術 文獻明確指出了這一點:文化很重要。健康的軍事文化——能夠適應和平時期戰爭時期的文化——培養靈活性、好奇心和誠實的內部辯論。下屬必須感到有權挑戰假設。高階領導必須重視(或至少不懲罰)異議和回饋,同時也要對自上而下的政治意見保持敏感。

台灣的軍事文化幾乎沒有展現出這些特質。它僵化、等級森嚴、厭惡風險、對外界影響過敏。也許這種功能障礙最明顯的症狀是,越來越多的退休將軍現在出現在電視上,診斷系統性缺陷——而當他們掌握權力時,他們並沒有努力解決這些問題。這種模式反映了一種更深層的文化弊病:一種偏轉、惰性和製度自我保護的弊病。

與所有文化一樣,這種文化是多種因素複雜相互作用的產物。其中有三點值得詳細研究:以軍事學院為中心建立的身份和以蘇聯軍隊為藍本的精神;與台灣社會其他部分長期隔絕;並且,1979 年之後,缺乏與夥伴軍隊的接觸。

以黃埔為中心的機構認同

要了解台灣軍官團如何認識和定義自己,必須從黃埔軍校說起。黃埔軍校於 1924 年在中國成立,國民黨仿照蘇聯紅軍建立了黃埔軍校(莫斯科甚至派出了自己的一名軍人巴維爾·巴甫洛夫擔任該校首任首席顧問)。

近一個世紀過去了,黃埔文化的基因依然貫穿在台灣的軍事體系中,台灣軍事文化依然保留著濃厚的黃埔文化中心色彩。為了強化這種共同的認同,每個軍事院校的學員都必須參加黃埔軍校(遷至高雄後更名為中華民國軍事學院)的新兵訓練營。每年,各軍事院校還會參加“黃埔光榮演習”,以紀念院校成立週年。去年,賴聲川甚至也參加了慶祝活動。這種象徵性的集中化強化了以軍隊為中心的價值觀和思想的主導地位,往往不利於聯合部隊的發展和創新。這種「黃埔崇拜」讓台灣軍隊付出了高昂的代價,因為它強化了這樣的規範和價值觀:任人唯賢高於能力,政治關係高於功績,忠誠高於一切。

國內孤立與文化固著

從內部來看,軍方與台灣社會的文化隔離加深了對改革的抵制。幾個世代以來,服兵役一直背負著負面的社會恥辱,正如一句老話所概括的那樣:「好男不做兵,好鐵不做釘子」。近四十年的戒嚴只會加強這種疏離感,因為蔣介石和他的兒子將軍隊用作政治壓迫和獨裁控制的工具

在國民黨一黨專政下,蔣介石向軍隊灌輸「三位一體敵人」的思想:中國共產黨、台獨支持者和國內陰謀分子。當然,後兩者最終都演化成了民進黨,並透過民主程序獲得了政權。無論民進黨在台灣選民眼中多麼合法,其在政府中的領導地位在軍官隊伍中造成了深深的認知失調,因為他們的歷史「敵人」現在掌權了。

文化隔離除了使台灣高級將領反對民進黨領導人之外,還產生了另一個有害影響:它使軍官團保留了蔣介石時代的過時傳統。那些持有不同想法或挑戰「現狀」的官員往往會被邊緣化,甚至被迫下台。這種不受社會廣泛尊重和誤解的感覺,只會讓軍官隊伍進一步陷入防禦性、內向性的姿態,抵制外部審查和改革。

國際孤立與停滯

我們也不能忽視國際孤立在保護軍官隊伍免受文化變革壓力方面所扮演的角色。在美國與中華民國正式斷絕外交關係之前,台灣防衛司令部的美國軍事人員提供了寶貴的互動和訓練機會。不幸的是,由於這些交流發生在威權統治的陰影下,而且基本上未能挑戰根深蒂固的規範,因此對文化的影響微乎其微。

1979年後,國際軍事交流幾乎在一夜之間停止。除偶爾(且純粹是交易性的)武器銷售外,台灣軍官與外國同行的聯繫被切斷。直到1990年代末期第三次台海危機爆發後,美國才開始重新評估自身軍隊和台灣軍隊的戰備狀態。1990 年代末到 21 世紀初,庫爾特·坎貝爾 (Kurt Campbell) 和蘭迪·薛瑞福 (Randy Schriver) 等美國重要官員再次透過軍事訓練和諮詢計畫與台灣進行接觸。然而,先前二十年的孤立已經鞏固了保守、封閉的領導文化。

當今的高級軍事領導人正是在那些失落的幾十年中成長起來的。在儒家社會中,資歷通常等同於智慧(等級越高,知識就越豐富),挑戰權威不僅不被鼓勵,而且常常被視為不服從。對於許多高層官員來說,初級軍官——或者更糟的是,外來者——可能有更好的想法,這是不可想像的。這種文化僵化持續阻礙著現代戰爭所必需的創新戰術、不對稱策略和改革的採用。

改變軍隊

事實證明,這種文化具有極強的彈性和抗拒改變的能力。它依然深植於傳統,受等級制度的約束,並防範外界影響,即使在美台軍事安全合作恢復的情況下,它依然存在。嚴酷的現實是,即使到了2025年,台灣軍隊與蘇聯模式的共同點仍然多於與現代西方武裝力量的共同點。

文化變革很難。值得慶幸的是,它可以發生,而且確實發生了。但台北和華盛頓不應該坐等台灣軍隊自行改變。以下是黎智英和川普政府可以著手解決其中部分挑戰的三種方式。

首先,賴昌星需要清楚闡明他對軍官隊伍運作方式的期望。在此之前,他和他的高級顧問需要深入了解現代戰爭的細節和台灣軍事官僚機構的細微差別——長期以來,台灣兩黨政客都非常樂意迴避這些話題。儘管軍事改革學者在許多事情上存在分歧,但人們普遍認為,適應性 軍事 組織應該擁有一種培養創新主動性和自省的文化。高階軍官需要積極鼓勵質疑、容忍異議、授權下屬,並吸取歷史教訓和現實訓練演習的教訓。他們必須表現出謙遜的態度,去設想新的方法,並邀請和獎勵來自下層的意見。

第二,賴清德應該精簡台灣的將領和旗官隊伍。長期以來,變革的最大阻力一直來自於最高層。不管怎樣,將軍和海軍上將的數量實在太多了。由於每500名士兵就配備一名司令部,這種頭重腳輕的機構自然加劇了臃腫且過於集中的指揮結構以及根深蒂固的官僚主義慣性。賴清德當然應該用手術刀而不是大刀來砍他的將領和旗官團,因為那裡有人支持改革。

相反,賴昌星需要採取精準的行動,讓那些明顯「退出現役」的將軍和海軍上將以及那些積極破壞不對稱國防轉型的人(他知道他們是誰)退役。黎智英不應該用更高級別的官員來取代他們,而應該願意物色並提拔支持改革的領導人到最高指揮層,無論他們目前的級別如何。

為了監督實施,賴清德和立法院需要共同努力,建立體制機制,幫助未來的總統更有效地監督和指導軍隊。儘管賴總統邁出了任命職業文職人員掌管軍隊的重要一步,但顧維鈞部長仍然缺乏一個相當於國防部長辦公室的機構來有效地監督國防部。結果是,民間監督受到影響。

第三,儘管美國在促進夥伴軍隊文化變革方面的記錄很糟糕,但它仍然可以從旁協助。例如,華盛頓應該明確表示,我們在本文中呼籲的文化變革需要先於其他改革努力,否則它們無法紮根。當然,美國應該採取合理措施減少現有的武器銷售積壓,即使只是為了阻止國防部以延遲交付妨礙其履行職責為由進行「藉口」。

除此之外,華盛頓應該暫時擱置對台軍售計劃,同時淡化要求台灣大幅增加國防開支的呼聲。我們體認到,推動台北增加國防開支對華盛頓來說是件好事,而這筆開支很重要。但值得重複的是:世界上所有的武器和金錢都無法解決根本的文化問題。如果沒有更深層的文化改革,即使是軍隊之間的訓練也不太可能奏效。從約瑟夫·史迪威到美國軍事援助顧問小組官員以及今天的美國陸軍和海軍陸戰隊教官,幾代外國顧問進行的戰術和作戰改革嘗試都屢屢失敗,主要是因為文化本身不利於變革。

更糟的是,如果不改變文化,更多的武器和更多的開支實際上可能會適得其反。許多台灣人已經將美國武器銷售視為一種腐敗的保護費。因此,美國向台灣出售的武器越多,台灣人民自衛的動力就越小,因為他們認為美國現在將「承擔起」保衛他們的責任。毋庸置疑,向一個低效且功能失調的系統投入更多資金是浪費的藍圖,只會進一步疏遠台灣納稅人與其監護人的關係。

華盛頓還可以幫助支持變革的平民和官員制定明確的改革路線圖。國防轉型是一項複雜的任務,必然涉及無數的政府機構、私人企業和非政府組織。一份包含商定里程碑的整體藍圖將有助於雙方協調各自的努力。這將使華盛頓能夠衡量進展並調整其支持措施,同時也為台灣文官提供維持監督的工具。該計畫中最重要的里程碑——下一屆政府應該堅持的里程碑——是傳播不對稱保衛台灣的軍事理論。自從拒絕了李錫民上將的「整體防禦構想」之後,台灣武裝部隊還沒有製定過如此全面的不對稱計劃來協調作戰、訓練和採購。

形勢雖然嚴峻,但並非毫無希望。如果軍事文化沒有發生根本性的轉變,即使是最好的戰略、預算和技術也可能無法轉化為真正的戰備。隨著台灣面臨海峽對岸日益強勢和強大的對手,彌合文化差距的時間已經不多了。

 

 

Yuster Yu 是 Octon International 的高級執行顧問和 iScann Group 的高級顧問。他是一名退役的台灣海軍軍官,曾擔任台灣國家安全委員會委員和駐美國海軍武官。他畢業於維吉尼亞軍事學院、美國太平洋艦隊反潛戰軍官課程和約翰霍普金斯大學高級國際研究學院。

亨澤克(Michael A. Hunzeker)(@MichaelHunzeker)是喬治梅森大學沙爾政策與政府學院的副教授,同時也擔任該校《台灣安全監測》主任。他於 2000 年至 2006 年在海軍陸戰隊服役。

圖:台灣總統府,來自Wikimedia Commons

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Taiwan’s Biggest Problem in Steeling Itself for War with China is Cultural

April 16, 2025
taiwan1

General Secretary Xi Jinping clearly wants to prepare China for a war over Taiwan. The measures he is taking to ready its peopleeconomylegal system, and especially its military are clear for everyone to see. The best way to dissuade him from actually rolling the iron dice is for Washington and Taipei to work together, because neither can stop Beijing on their own. It would be a fool’s errand for Taiwan to resist a Chinese military onslaught without its chief patron and protector. And the United States needs Taiwan to hold on and hold out long enough for the U.S. military to arrive in decisive force.

Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. Many Taiwanese citizens question whether America will actually defend them. Washington’s long standing posture of strategic ambiguity is obviously one source of skepticism. But even strategic clarity toward Taipei will not solve the problem. The fact is that Washington and Taipei have a long and complicated relationship. Taiwanese voters know the United States has a long history of turning its back on them in their moment of need.

Thus, there is no question that the United States should take steps to address Taiwan’s understandable lack of faith in America’s commitment. A sensible first step is to address the backlog in arms deliveries to Taiwan, as two Kuomintang legislative staffers recently argued in these pages. And there are a range of other things Washington can do to demonstrate that it is serious about Taiwan.

But increasing Taiwanese faith in American credibility is only part of the solution. The Taiwanese people must also believe that they have what it takes to withstand a Chinese onslaught. Neither faster arms deliveries nor higher defense spending will instill this much needed self-confidence.

So, what will? Transforming the culture of the Taiwanese armed forces, especially its officer corps. As a former marine who trained Taiwanese units and a retired Taiwanese naval officer educated in the United States, we understood all too well that Taiwan’s military remains a profoundly unserious organization. It is not ready to wage war. And the Taiwanese people know it.

Therefore, any effort to enhance cross-Strait deterrence must start with the culture of its officer corps. Taiwan needs uniformed leaders who are willing to address hard truths, embrace innovation, and place strategic thinking above parochial interest, legacy systems, and bureaucratic convenience. To get from here to there, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te ought to trim the bloated ranks of his general and flag officer corps and insist that the military finally produce a coherent blueprint for mounting a genuine, asymmetric, whole-of-society defense of Taiwan. The Lai administration should insist on — and the Kuomintang-dominated Legislative Yuan will need to support — the creation of institutional mechanisms to enhance civilian control over the military. Washington can and should help by addressing the arms backlog, if only to prevent Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense from using it as an excuse; toning down public demands for dramatically higher defense spending; making it clear that other forms of support are conditional on efforts to address these cultural problems; and helping the Lai administration develop a coherent blueprint for asymmetric defense.

 

 

A Potemkin Force

Taiwan’s military is grappling with a range of persistent problems, most of which are easy to spot by anyone (in Washington, Taipei … and Beijing) who have bothered looking. One of the most pernicious challenges is that Taiwan’s military does not have enough people. Its army — the largest of Taiwan’s armed forces and its last line of defense in a war — suffers from an endemic personnel shortage. Shortfalls are particularly acute in frontline infantry, armor, artillery, and marine combat units, which are often up to 40 percent understrength. This is not merely a recruiting issue. It reveals a fundamental misalignment in how the military organizes and prioritizes its resources. The discrepancy between combat unit manning levels and total personnel levels, which hover around 80 percent, is telling in that it underscores the degree to which Taiwan’s military prioritizes administrative staffing over operational readiness. For years, the Tsai administration (2016 to 2024) tried to address the problem by improving pay and benefits for the volunteer force. When that effort proved too expensive, President Tsai Ing-wen finally relented and (re)extended conscription from four to 12 months. The army inducted the first batch of 12-month conscripts in January 2024. Unfortunately, it will take at least five years for this scheme to get fully up and running. Even then, the plan is to send most one-year conscripts to units tasked with providing rear area security. Volunteer troops will still comprise the bulk of most frontline combat units, which means the first line of defense will remain understrength. Worse yet, the army has yet to figure out how to train all of these conscripts, as we discuss below. It is therefore entirely possible that the scheme will merely “transform” untrained conscripts into undertrained ones.

Ironically, the only thing Taiwan has enough of are generals and admirals: 308 to be exact. The ratio of general and flag officers to servicemembers is approximately 2.5 times higher than that found in the U.S. military (which is criticized by its own secretary of defense for being too top heavy.)

Even if the Ministry of National Defense magically solves its personnel shortfalls, it will still struggle to train the resulting influx of new troops. Part of the problem has to do with infrastructure. It will take time (and money) to buy and build barracks and firing ranges in a place already short on space. The bigger issue is that the armed forces do not have a culture of realistic and rigorous training. Most exercises are scripted with preordained outcomes. Although political leaders now like to tout spontaneous maneuvers, it comes across as a case of “the lady doth protest too much.” Instead, most high-profile maneuvers remain more “dog and pony show” for the media and American onlookers than a serious attempt to test and improve warfighting capabilities. Having trained this way for generations means that Taiwan does not have enough non-commissioned officers and junior officers who are themselves sufficiently well-versed in decentralized modern combat tactics, techniques, and procedures to train tens of thousands of new troops each year.

The list goes on: The services still lack a coherent, overarching doctrine and associated operational concepts to guide everything from procurement to training to warfighting (and no, the newest Quadrennial Defense Review does not fill this gap). Reserve training is still inadequate. And despite efforts by the Lai administration and civil society organizations like Forward Alliance and Spirit of America, attempts to prepare Taiwanese society for war remain incomplete. Of course, a big impediment to civil readiness is the fact that the Ministry of National Defense refuses to embrace civil defense as a core mission.

Worst of all, there is a profound gap between the Taiwanese military and the society it is sworn to defend. Many older Taiwanese — especially those aligned with Lai’s  Democratic Progressive Party — view the military with suspicion because many officers identify with the opposition Kuomintang Party and because of the military’s legacy as the enforcement arm of Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, one need only strike up a conversation with younger Taiwanese to find that many consider military service a waste of time. This is in part because they know how unserious their training will be, even at 12 months, and in part because they rationally prefer to pursue a higher paying job that will allow them to move out of their parents’ home.

A Dereliction of Duty

How did the rot get so bad? Culpability rests squarely on the shoulders of Taiwan’s officer corps. It goes without saying that officers lead the military and are therefore responsible for everything that happens — or fails to happen — on their watch. But in this case, the failures represent a fundamental dereliction of duty. It was the officer corps’ responsibility to track the shifting cross-Strait military balance and to adjust its posture and preparations accordingly. This basic mandate demanded vigilance, proactivity, creativity, curiosity, and flexibility. The Taiwanese officer corps demonstrated none of these things. As a result, it is just now coming to grips with a range of profound, but slow moving, politicaltechnological, and demographic trends.

Take, for example, the way Taiwanese generals and admirals “responded” to Taiwan’s declining birthrate. While they now routinely point to this issue as the root cause of their personnel shortages, they have been aware of this trend for more than two decades. Yet despite having ample time to adapt, the officer corps acquiesced to politically enticing decisions — such as the transition to an all-volunteer force and the shortening of conscription — without bothering to develop and offer a serious alternative plan for maintaining readiness. Even more troubling, the officer corps managed a dramatic downsizing of the force without making any meaningful attempt to also streamline its internal organizational structure. Taiwan’s military now has roughly the same number of command layers supervising 160,000 uniformed servicemembers as it did when it was half a million strong.

The same goes for Taiwanese doctrine, force structure, and force posture. Instead of responding to overwhelming evidence that Chinese military modernization had rendered their long-standing preference for small numbers of expensive, conventional, and high-profile American made ships and jets by seeking change, Taiwan’s officer corps insisted on more of the same. Even now, senior officers within the Ministry of National Defense continue to push for more fixed-wing fighters, amphibious assault ships, and costly and uncertain indigenous submarines. Meanwhile, they sideline more survivable alternatives like mobile missile systems, small and fast boats operating from civilian harbors, and territorial defense.

The Roots of Dysfunction

To cure an infection, a doctor must first find its source. Similarly, if Washington and Taipei are serious about preparing Taiwan’s military for war, they need to identify and deal with the underlying cause of its dysfunction. We believe that it all starts with organizational culture.

The scholarly literature on military change and effectiveness is clear on this point: culture matters. A healthy military culture — one capable of adapting in peacetime and in wartime — cultivates flexibility, curiosity, and honest internal debate. Subordinates must feel empowered to challenge assumptions. Senior leaders must value — or at least not punish — dissent and feedback while also remaining sensitive to top-down, political input.

Taiwan’s military culture exhibits virtually none of these attributes. It is rigid, hierarchical, risk-averse, and allergic to outside influence. Perhaps the most telling symptom of this dysfunction is the growing number of retired generals who now appear on television to diagnose systemic flaws — problems they made no effort to fix when they held the power to do so. This pattern reflects a deeper cultural malaise: one of deflection, inertia, and institutional self-preservation.

Like all cultures, this one is the product of a complex interplay of factors. Three are worth examining in detail: an identity built around a military academy and ethos modeled after the Soviet military; enduring isolation from the rest of Taiwanese society; and, after 1979, a lack of exposure to partner militaries.

Whampoa-Centric Institutional Identity

To understand how the Taiwanese officer corps understands and defines itself, one must start with the Whampoa Military Academy. Established in China in 1924, the Nationalists modeled the Whampoa Military Academy after the Soviet Red Army (Moscow even sent one of its own, Pavel Pavlov, to serve as the academy’s first chief advisor).

Nearly a century later, Whampoa’s cultural genetic material persists throughout Taiwan’s military institutions such that Taiwanese military culture also remains deeply Whampoa-centric. To reinforce this shared identity, every cadet from every service academy must attend boot camp at Whampoa (renamed the Republic of China Military Academy after it relocated to Kaohsiung). Every year, the service academies also participate in the Pu Guang Yan Xi (“Glory of Whampoa Exercise”) to commemorate the academy’s anniversary. Last year, Lai even joined in on the festivities. This symbolic centralization reinforces the dominance of army-centric values and thinking, often to the detriment of joint force development and innovation. This “cult of the Whampoa” has come at a high price for Taiwan’s military by reinforcing norms and values that privilege patronage over competence, political connections over merit, and loyalty above all else.

Domestic Isolation and Cultural Entrenchment

Internally, the military’s aforementioned cultural isolation from Taiwanese society has deepened its resistance to reform. For generations, military service has carried a negative social stigma, encapsulated by the old saying: “Good men don’t become soldiers; good iron doesn’t become nails.” Nearly four decades of martial law only served to reinforce this alienation given that Chiang and his son used the military as a tool of political repression and authoritarian control.

Under the Kuomintang’s one-party rule, Chiang indoctrinated the military in the idea of the “trinity of enemies”: Chinese Communists, Taiwanese independence supporters, and domestic conspirators. Of course, these latter two groups eventually evolved into the Democratic Progressive Party, which rose to political power through the democratic process. However legitimate the Democratic Progressive Party may have been in the eyes of Taiwanese voters, its position atop the government created a deep sense of cognitive dissonance within the officer corps, because their historical “enemies” were now in charge.

Beyond orienting Taiwan’s senior uniformed generals and admirals against their Democratic Progressive Party leaders, cultural isolation had another insidious effect: it allowed the officer corps to preserve outdated traditions from the Chiang era. Officers who think differently or challenge the “status quo” are often marginalized, if not forced out altogether. This sense of being disrespected and misunderstood by broader society has only entrenched the officer corps further into a defensive, inward-looking posture that resists external scrutiny and reform.

International Isolation and Stagnation

Nor can we ignore the role that international isolation played in terms of shielding the officer corps from the pressure to embrace cultural change. Before the United States severed formal diplomatic ties with the Republic of China, U.S. military personnel in the Taiwan Defense Command provided valuable interaction and training opportunities. Unfortunately, those exchanges had minimal cultural impact given that they occurred under the shadow of authoritarian rule and largely failed to challenge entrenched norms.

After 1979, international military exchanges virtually ceased overnight. Aside from occasional (and purely transactional) arms sales, Taiwanese officers were cut off from their foreign peers. It was not until the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in the late 1990s that the United States began to reassess the readiness of both its own forces and those of Taiwan. Key U.S. officials such as Kurt Campbell and Randy Schriver launched renewed efforts to reengage Taiwan through military training and advisory programs in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Nevertheless, the two decades of isolation prior to that had already solidified a conservative, insular leadership culture.

Today’s senior military leaders came of age during those lost decades. In a Confucian society where seniority is often equated with wisdom (the higher the rank, the greater the presumed knowledge), challenging authority is not only discouraged but often viewed as insubordination. The notion that a junior officer — or worse, an outsider — might have a better idea is inconceivable to many within the upper ranks. This cultural rigidity continues to obstruct the adoption of innovative tactics, asymmetric strategies, and reforms necessary for modern warfare.

To Change an Army

This culture has proven remarkably resilient and resistant to change. It remains steeped in tradition, constrained by hierarchy, and guarded against outside influence and persists even in the face of renewed U.S.-Taiwanese military-to-military security cooperation. The harsh reality is that even in 2025, Taiwan’s military still has more in common with a Soviet model than it does modern, Western armed forces.

Cultural change is hard. Thankfully, it can and does happen. But Taipei and Washington should not wait around for Taiwan’s military to change itself. Here are three ways the Lai and Trump administrations can begin to address some of these challenges.

First, Lai needs to articulate a clear vision for how he expects his officer corps to operate. Before doing so, he and his top advisors will need to immerse themselves in the details of modern warfare and the nuances of the Taiwanese military bureaucracy — topics Taiwanese politicians in both parties have long been far too happy to elide. Although scholars of military reform disagree about a lot of things, there is a clear consensus that adaptive military organizations should possess a culture that nurtures innovationinitiative, and introspection. Senior officers need to actively encourage questioning, tolerate dissent, empower subordinates, and embrace lessons from history and realistic training exercises. And they must demonstrate the humility to imagine new approaches and to invite and reward input from below.

Second, Lai should cull the herd of Taiwanese general and flag officers. The biggest source of resistance to change has long emanated from the senior-most ranks. In any case, there are simply too many generals and admirals. With nearly one for every 500 troops, this top-heavy apparatus naturally exacerbates a bloated and overly centralized command structure and deeply ingrained bureaucratic inertia. Lai should of course cut his general and flag officer corps with a scalpel, not a broadsword, because there are those who support reform.

Instead, Lai will need to act with precision, sending generals and admirals who are clearly “retired on active duty” as well as those who actively subvert asymmetric defense transformation (he knows who they are), out to pasture. Instead of replacing them with the next highest-ranking officer in line, Lai should be willing to identify and promote pro-reform leaders to the top echelons of command, regardless of their current rank.

To oversee implementation, Lai and the Legislative Yuan will need to work together to create institutional mechanisms to help future presidents more effectively monitor and steer the military. Even though President Lai took the important step of putting a career civilian in charge of the military, Minister Wellington Koo still lacks an institutional equivalent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense through which he can effectively monitor the Ministry of National Defense. Civilian oversight suffers as a result.

Third, while the United States has a terrible track record of facilitating cultural change in partner militaries, there are still ways it can assist from the sidelines. For example, Washington should make it clear that cultural change of the sort we call for in this article needs to precede other reform efforts lest they fail to take root. The United States should, of course, take reasonable steps to reduce the existing arms sales backlog, if only to preempt the Ministry of National Defense’s “go to” excuse that late deliveries are preventing it from doing its job.

Beyond that, Washington should put new arms sales on the backburner while downplaying calls for Taiwan to dramatically increase its defense spending. We recognize that pushing Taipei to spend more on defense plays well in Washington and that spending is important. But it bears repeating: All the arms and all the money in the world cannot solve a fundamentally cultural problem. Even military-to-military training is unlikely to work absent a deeper, cultural reform. Generations of tactical and operational reform attempts by foreign advisors — ranging from Joseph Stilwell to U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group officers and today’s U.S. Army and Marine Corps trainers — have repeatedly failed to take root, largely because the culture itself has not been conducive to change.

Worse yet, without a change in culture, more arms and more spending might actually backfire. Many Taiwanese already consider U.S. arms sales as a corrupt form of protection money. As a result, the more weapons the United States sells to Taiwan, the less incentive the Taiwanese people have to provide for their own defense, because they assume the United States will now be “on the hook” to defend them. It should go without saying that pouring more money into an inefficient and dysfunctional system is a blueprint for waste that will only serve to further alienate Taiwanese taxpayers from their guardians.

Washington can also help pro-change civilians and officers prepare a clear roadmap for reform. Defense transformation is a complex undertaking that necessarily involves countless government agencies, private companies, and nongovernmental organizations. An overarching blueprint, with agreed-upon milestones, will help both sides orchestrate their efforts. It will allow Washington to measure progress and tailor its support, while giving Taiwanese civilian officials a tool for maintaining oversight. The single most important milestone in this plan — one on which the next administration should insist — is the dissemination of a military doctrine for defending Taiwan asymmetrically. Taiwan’s armed forces have not had such an overarching asymmetric plan to coordinate operations, training, and acquisitions since rejecting Adm. Lee Hsi-min’s Overall Defense Concept.

The situation is dire, not hopeless. Absent a fundamental shift in military culture, even the best strategies, budgets, and technologies may fail to translate into real readiness. As Taiwan faces an increasingly assertive and capable adversary across the Strait, time is running short to close this cultural gap.

 

 

Yuster Yu is the senior executive advisor of Octon International and a senior advisor of the iScann Group. A retired Taiwanese naval officer, he served on Taiwan’s National Security Council and as a naval attaché to the United States. He is a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, the U.S. Pacific Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer Course, and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Michael A. Hunzeker (@MichaelHunzeker) is an associate professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, where he also directs the Taiwan Security Monitor. He served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006.

Image: Taiwan Presidential Office via Wikimedia Commons

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