犯罪與責任:戰爭、國家與日本社會

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亞太雜誌:日本焦點

犯罪與責任:戰爭、國家與日本社會

作者:
Crime And Responsibility: War, The State, And Japanese Society
BY: YUKI TANAKA

2006 年 8 月 14 日

犯罪與責任:戰爭、國家與日本社會

第 4 卷 |第8期

文章 ID 2200

犯罪與責任:戰爭、國家與日本社會

田中由紀

“忘記歷史,甚至弄錯歷史,是一個民族形成的重要因素,這就是為什麼歷史研究的進步往往對民族性構成威脅。”歐內斯特·雷南

2002年,日本政府在廣島和平公園內建造了「國立廣島原子彈死難者和平紀念館」。它距離廣島市議會運營的原子彈和平博物館不到兩百公尺。這座新的紀念館由日本政府資助和運營,其中一塊牆板上刻有以下資訊:

「20世紀的某個時刻,日本走上了戰爭的道路。隨後,1941 年 12 月 8 日,日本對美國、英國和其他國家發動敵對行動,陷入了後來的太平洋戰爭。這場戰爭主要在亞太地區其他地方進行,但當情況轉向日本時,美國戰機開始轟炸本土,沖繩變成了血腥的戰場。在這種戰爭背景下,1945 年 8 月 6 日,世界上第一枚原子武器,一顆具有空前破壞力的炸彈,被投在了廣島市。

其他小組發表以下聲明:

“廣島國立原子彈死難者和平紀念館是日本國家政府為紀念和哀悼原子彈死難者的神聖犧牲而做出的努力。”

「我們謹此哀悼在原子彈爆炸中喪生的人們。同時,我們非常悲痛地憶及因錯誤的國家政策而犧牲的許多生命。 (強調已添加)


1.原子彈爆炸後的廣島

這些正式聲明明確反映了日本政府的評估,但也表達了公眾對日本戰爭責任的普遍態度。換句話說,在沒有任何解釋的情況下,觀眾只能得出這樣的結論:日本只是莫名其妙地“走上了戰爭之路”,而“真正的”戰爭是從1941 年12 月8 日偷襲珍珠從港口開始的。提供了藉口。它也不是從1937年7月7日開始的,當時盧溝橋事件使日本陷入全面戰爭,並佔領了中國大片地區。在紀念館的描繪中,日本在亞太戰爭中的主要敵人是美國和英國,而不是中國,更不是日本其他在偷襲珍珠港後征服的亞洲人民。簡而言之,日本是被盎格魯撒克遜人打敗的,而不是被亞洲人打敗的。對十五年戰爭(1931-45)歷史的這種解釋自然會妨礙充分認識到日本對日本令人髮指的軍事行為及其亞洲鄰國因戰爭和殖民主義而遭受的戰爭損失的責任。它也從根本上扭曲了二十世紀上半葉殖民主義和戰爭領域的權力動態。

另一方面,據說原子彈是「投在廣島市」的,就像一場自然災害一樣,沒有明確的人類作用,其後果是許多人「因錯誤的國家政策而犧牲」。因此,美軍對殺害大量平民的責任並沒有受到嚴重質疑。相反,原子彈爆炸的受害者被簡單地描述為戰爭的“神聖犧牲品”,就像日本“錯誤的國策”的本質沒有被審視一樣。特別是,「神聖的犧牲」一詞消除了任何關於誰殺害了這麼多人或為什麼以及為什麼這些人必須「犧牲」的提及。部分原因是「神聖」一詞具有某種宗教功能,模糊了這些人成為戰爭受害者的歷史過程。 「神聖」一詞往往會反駁任何有關「神聖人物」背景的世俗質疑。換句話說,人們普遍認為,一旦一個人被神化並變得“神聖”,任何人都不應該追問他或她的過去。在這裡,我們可以找到與靖國神社供奉的士兵「神聖靈魂」的相似之處,那裡的日本戰爭罪行問題仍然不容置疑。

因為這種不解釋不僅是廣島國立和平紀念館的特點,也是大多數學校教科書和學校課程的特點,其結果是,大多數日本民眾不僅對日本的戰爭責任一無所知,而且對日本的戰爭責任一無所知。

人們常說,日本人民傾向於將自己視為戰爭的受害者,而不是攻擊者,這很大程度上是由於戰爭末期美國空中轟炸的經歷,最終導致廣島和長崎的原子彈轟炸。毫無疑問,這是造成這種普遍看法的眾多因素之一。

事實上,廣島市議會營運的原子彈和平博物館主要展出的展品主要強調廣島公民因使用原子彈進行狂轟濫炸而遭受的傷害。雖然對南京大屠殺有一個簡短的解釋,與原子彈爆炸前從廣島派遣到中國的帝國軍隊的活動有關,但博物館總是將這座城市的原子彈爆炸描述為歷史上前所未有的、無與倫比的日本公民受害。毫無疑問,該博物館傳達了強烈的反核訊息。然而有趣的是,博物館除了廣島原子彈爆炸的資訊之外幾乎沒有展示任何東西,甚至連長崎原子彈爆炸和其他核子歷史里程碑也幾乎沒有被提及。因此,博物館未能揭示原子彈爆炸、核試驗、狂轟濫炸和一般戰爭的所有受害者所共有的基本特徵。


2. 收集並分類最終將在和平紀念博物館展出的瓦礫

然而,即使是這種「戰爭受害者」的觀念也在迅速消失,年輕一代不再認識到他們國家的戰爭責任,甚至戰爭對他們自己的社會帶來的代價。確實,很少人對日本近現代史有足夠的了解,能夠對日本和戰爭持有看法。

對於為什麼許多日本人未能培養強烈的戰爭責任感這個問題,我們無法給出簡單的答案。在本文中,我探討了阻礙公眾培養日本戰爭責任的明確意識的一些重要因素。我將特別關注戰後15年(1945年至1960年),這是日本流行的「戰爭責任」概念的基本框架形成的時期。這是因為我堅信,年輕一代缺乏戰爭責任感不僅僅是因為缺乏教育,而是深深植根於日本後早期制定和植入的關於戰爭問題的流行思維結構。

GHQ(盟軍佔領軍總部)在佔領初期推出的新計畫之一是「對日本人的再教育」。 GHQ 的 CIE(公民資訊和教育部門)的任務是透過揭露日本的戰爭罪行並強調戰爭的毀滅性後果(包括日本的毀滅和戰敗)來向日本公民傳授戰爭的「真相」。 1945年12月8日至17日期間,CIE要求所有日本全國性報紙發表由CIE起草的一系列關於太平洋戰爭歷史的文章。同時,NHK(日本廣播委員會)播出了一個名為「這就是真相」的連續廣播節目。此系列由CIE設計製作,自1945年12月9日起,連續10週每週播出一次。

1)雖然他們把1931年的滿洲事變為戰爭的開端,承認日本侵華戰爭與中日戰爭、太平洋戰爭的連續性,但完全忽視了日本對台灣和朝鮮的殖民統治。

2)過度強調美軍對決定太平洋戰爭勝負的決定性作用,而忽略了中國軍隊十五年、東南亞各國軍隊四年來的抗日。唯一的例外是簡短提及與美國軍隊合作的菲律賓遊擊隊。

3)強調日本少數軍事領導人的責任,而裕仁天皇及其在宮廷內的親密夥伴以及商界和媒體領導人則被簡單地描述為與軍國主義者相對的「溫和派」。

4)強調日本軍方領導人隱瞞戰爭真實情況,造成日本民眾被軍方領導人欺騙的形象。因此,結果就是忽略了導致日本走上殖民主義和戰爭道路的結構性基礎。

1945 年 12 月 8 日,即該系列報紙開始發行的同一天,麥克阿瑟將軍發布命令,為 IMTFE(遠東國際軍事法庭,俗稱東京戰爭罪法庭)設立 IPS(國際起訴科) )並任命美國律師約瑟夫·基南(Joseph Keenan)為首席檢察官。 A級戰爭罪嫌疑犯已被逮捕,IMTFE計劃於1946年5月開業。對亞太戰爭的官方解釋。


3.東京戰犯法庭

東京戰爭罪法庭的法官是從參加太平洋戰爭的美國盟友中選出的。結果是,法官來自美國、英國、蘇聯、法國、澳洲、加拿大、中國、荷蘭、紐西蘭、印度和菲律賓等11個國家。共有三名亞洲法官,其中包括一名來自中國的中國,該國是迄今為止日本侵略戰爭中傷亡人數最多的國家(嚴格估計有 1000 至 2000 萬人死於戰爭),此外還有印度和菲律賓。然而,儘管數以百萬計的亞洲人在戰爭中喪生,而且亞洲首當其沖地受到日本殖民主義和戰爭死亡的影響,但馬來西亞、新加坡、印尼、緬甸、印度支那、韓國和台灣卻沒有選出法律代表。群島、馬來亞、新加坡、緬甸、菲律賓和印度支那。因此,法庭以戰爭暴行為重點而忽視殖民主義問題來界定日本對亞洲人民的責任也就不足為奇了。

此外,麥克阿瑟將軍和美國政府保護裕仁天皇免於戰犯起訴,讓他保住王位,甚至保護他出庭作證的必要性。他們的目標當然是利用天皇制度來順利佔領對日本的控制。為此,總司令部將裕仁描述為受到軍事領導人操縱,否認對帝國軍隊直接行使權力——換句話說,天皇也是戰爭的受害者。此外,裕仁被認為採取了結束戰爭的關鍵舉措,也就是說,他在佔領期間成為拯救日本免於毀滅的和平締造者。麥克阿瑟巧妙地塑造了裕仁天皇的和平締造者形象,以及「自願」領導日本政府制定放棄日本所有軍事力量的新民主憲法的關鍵人物形象。總之,美國在日本政府的大力支持下,宣傳了「民主君主」和「和平君主」的形象。

總之,CIE的“再教育計劃”,加上美國對戰爭罪法庭的陷害以及和平天皇神話的投射,對戰後日本自我形象的形成產生了巨大影響。也就是說,日本人就像他們仁慈的天皇一樣,是可憐的戰爭受害者,被以東條英機將軍為代表的軍事領導人所欺騙。結果是,使日本人民不必認真反思日本對台灣、朝鮮的殖民和壓迫統治,日本軍隊對亞洲各國人民犯下的南京大屠殺等戰爭罪行,以及天皇的罪行。最終責任。缺乏對亞洲鄰國責任的反思,對於理解為什麼許多日本人仍然無法克服對其他亞洲人的偏見至關重要。約翰·道爾(John Dower)在他的《擁抱失敗》一書中很好地闡述了這一點,如下:「佔領最有害的方面之一是,在日本帝國的掠奪中受害最深的亞洲人民— —中國人、朝鮮人、印尼人和菲律賓人-在戰敗的土地上沒有發揮任何重要作用,也沒有任何有影響力的存在。他們變得隱形了。亞洲對擊敗皇帝士兵和水手的貢獻被全神貫注地關注美國在太平洋戰爭中的勝利所取代。 (第 27 頁)

還應該指出的是,出生於 1920 年至 1922 年之間、佔日本帝國軍隊最大部分的日本年輕人中有三分之一在戰爭結束時死亡。因此,許多倖存的人對自己沒有死而抱持著深深的罪惡感。這很可能導致他們無法對亞洲戰爭受害者產生強烈的責任感。他們的典型態度是決心以堅定的決心,代表已故的朋友,即他們眼中的“真正的戰爭受害者”,努力幫助日本重建。

這種強調日本「受害者身分」並淡化其對亞洲戰爭責任的大眾自我認知,隨著 1951 年 9 月《舊金山和平條約》的簽署而進一步強化。了盟軍(主要是美國)對日本的佔領,同時恢復了日本的獨立,並締結了美日安保條約,規定美軍永久駐紮至今,並在弧線內對日本進行了堅決的打擊的美國軍事力量。儘管中國傷亡最慘重,但蘇聯、波蘭和捷克斯洛伐克拒絕簽署該條約,中華人民共和國(北京政府)和中華民國(台灣)均未受邀參加在對日戰爭中,該條約被明確揭露為美國的冷戰工具。認為這是一次“被操縱的事件”,因此只有菲律賓、印尼、錫蘭和巴基斯坦這四個亞洲國家參加了這次會議。但印尼從未批准該條約,而是在1958年與日本簽署了單獨的和平條約。就這樣,「亞洲的隱形」在舊金山和約會議上再次引人注目。


4. 日本首相吉田
茂簽署《舊金山
和平條約》

賠償問題對於從比較的角度來定位日本也同樣重要,特別是相對於德國的行為。在美國的壓力下,同盟國根據條約第14條放棄了所有賠償要求。後來,台灣、中國(北京和台北)、蘇聯和印度也同樣放棄了獲得賠償的權利。因此,日本最終只向緬甸、菲律賓、印尼和南越支付了少量戰爭賠款。此外,由於日本拒絕支付賠款的想法,泰國、馬來西亞、新加坡和韓國最終獲得了少量經濟援助和合作。

我們已經表明,《舊金山和平條約》與其說是一項和平條約,不如說是一項將日本與美國在亞太地區的目標捆綁在一起的協議。該條約與同日簽署的《AMPO安全條約》結合,強烈反映了美國的反共政策,以及透過保留美國的力量,利用日本遏制共產主義集團太平洋一側(即蘇聯、中國和北韓)的意圖。的軍事基地,特別是沖繩的軍事基地。因此,整個條約對於日本的戰爭責任是寬鬆的。日本政府確實敷衍地承認了第十一條所描述的戰爭責任:「日本接受遠東國際軍事法庭和日本國內外其他戰爭罪行法庭的判決,並將執行這些判決。」在日本被監禁的日本國民。 」不過,同一篇文章也提出了對以戰爭暴行等危害人類罪受審的日本B級、C級戰犯,構成戰犯絕大多數的,給予寬大處理、減刑或赦免的可能性。外國政府同意,可假釋。因此,1952年4月《舊金山和約》生效後不久,一場要求釋放B級和C級戰犯的運動就開始了,強調「戰爭罪行法庭的不公平」和「戰爭中的苦難和艱辛」。家屬。這樣一來,日本B級、C級戰犯就被日本民眾普遍視為「戰爭受害者」。 1958年底,日本甲級、乙級、丙級戰犯全數出獄並獲得政治平反。

結果,到了 20 世紀 50 年代初期,關於戰爭問題的大眾思維的基本框架已經在日本社會中根深蒂固,而自此以後,這種基本框架就阻礙了日本清晰而深刻的國家責任感的發展。就其本身而言,日本政府採取了一種雙重標準——一方面正式接受《舊金山和約》第十一條作為外交政策,包括東京戰罪法庭的判決,但又拒絕承認《舊金山和約》第十一條的規定。這一點在對東京審判以及 B 級和 C 級審判中被定罪的人進行大規模特赦,以及未能將戰爭後果的責任納入其公開聲明、教科書或對殖民主義和戰爭的受害者給予大量賠償。這種矛盾一直延續至今,成為日本與其他亞洲國家,特別是中韓之間摩擦的主要原因。有趣的是,即使是中曾根康弘這樣的鷹派政客,在擔任首相期間也無法公開否定《舊金山和約》第十一條的合法性。就連現任首相小泉純一郎也沒有公開反駁日本政府對東京戰罪法庭的官方解釋。

1950年左右,辻政信、草坂龍之介、服部拓代郎等原日本陸軍、海軍參謀所著的軍史開始出版,不少成為暢銷書。然而,以服部的《大東亞戰爭通史》為代表的這些通俗讀物,都是嚴格從解釋日本戰敗的角度出發的,無一例外地將其歸咎於自然資源和經濟實力的缺乏。沒有一篇涉及日本殖民主義、侵略或日本軍隊在整個亞太地區犯下的暴行問題。事實上,服部甚至沒有提及日本針對中國、菲律賓或其他地方遊擊隊的戰爭,因為他並不認為「遊擊隊」是真正的軍事力量。對他來說,「軍事史」是僅由正規軍隊進行的戰爭史,即日本帝國軍隊與盟軍的戰爭歷史。

然而,到了1940年代末和50年代初,一些含有感人故事、傳達強烈反戰情緒的書籍開始出版。其中一本頗具影響力的出版品是《聆聽大海的聲音》(Kike Wadatsumi no Koe),這是 1949 年年輕學生士兵(主要是神風特攻隊飛行員)的家書、日記和遺囑的合集。儘管這本書傳達了深刻的反戰訊息,並與在戰爭最後幾個月經歷了空襲的日本人民產生了深刻的共鳴,但它幾乎沒有提出日本對他們的死亡負有責任的問題。它有力地將戰爭期間死去的年輕學生描繪成不負責任的軍事領導人發動的戰爭的同情「受害者」。然而,它沒有任何地方表明日本對戰爭的亞洲受害者負有責任。同一時期出版的另外兩本著名書籍是半自傳小說——《風行記》(Furyoki)和《野火》(Nobi)——均由大岡翔平(Ooka Shohei)撰寫,他是一名前日本戰俘,在菲律賓人。 (《平原之火》於 1959 年被拍成電影。)在這些小說中,大岡巧妙地描述了一名病弱、瘦弱的日本士兵在叢林戰鬥中掙扎求存的痛苦身心問題。這些優秀的文學作品傳達了深刻的反戰情緒。然而,這兩部小說的焦點都是年輕的日本戰爭受害者,而很少關注成為日本殘暴軍事行為目標的菲律賓人。


5.聆聽
大海的聲音

這時期另一本非常受歡迎的書是竹山道夫的《Biruma no Tategoto》(《緬甸豎琴》)。這是一個關於一名在緬甸的年輕日本士兵拋棄部隊出家為僧的故事。即使戰爭結束後,他仍留在緬甸,以安撫死去戰友的靈魂。在這裡,緬甸人民的困境也被完全忽視。事實上,提交人從未訪問過緬甸。 (《緬甸豎琴》於 1956 年被拍成電影,並於 1985 年再次被拍成電影。)

從 20 世紀 50 年代中期開始,出版了許多退伍軍人的回憶錄。大多數是由低級軍官和士官撰寫的,講述了像他們這樣的普通日本人在戰爭期間是多麼艱苦和勇敢,以及他們如何光榮地履行了作為帝國士兵的職責。這些回憶錄的一個有趣的特點是,許多作者批評軍事領導人的戰爭行為,包括在戰爭的最後幾個月拋棄士兵。從這個意義上說,這與《聆聽大海的聲音》一書有著一定的相似之處。然而,這些出版物也助長了人們對日本人作為戰爭受害者的普遍看法,並且未能解決日本人對亞洲人所犯下的戰爭罪行的問題。

1950年代後半葉,部分由於日本反對美國在太平洋進行核試驗的民眾和平運動、日本重新軍事化以及美國在日本境內設立軍事基地,有關日本人民戰爭責任的熱烈討論發生在所謂進步知識分子之間。這種騷動的產物之一就是由三位著名馬克思主義歷史學家富山茂樹、今井誠一和藤原明合著的《昭和史》一書的出版。然而,本案中的「戰爭責任」問題集中在日本公民未能阻止對中國的入侵。也就是說,焦點在於公民未能製止軍國主義和法西斯主義。可以肯定的是,這是一個重要的問題。但很少提及日本人在中國的殺戮和暴行的性質,也沒有提及日本軍國主義對其他亞洲國家的影響。這時期出版的另一本重要著作是政治學家丸山正夫的《現代政治的思想與結構》。丸山結合明治時代天皇意識形態的強化,對日本法西斯主義和軍國主義的發展進行了理論解釋,但沒有談到日本人民的戰爭責任問題。簡而言之,所有這些作品都非常內向,而不是外向。此外,這些辯論是在有限的學術圈子以及與共產黨和社會黨有關的左翼圈子內進行的。結果是它們對公眾對戰爭的看法的影響有限。

1950年代製作的熱門長片也塑造了日本人作為戰爭受害者的流行形象,其中包括直接描寫B級和C級戰犯的長片。其中觀看次數最多的是 1958 年的電影《Watashi wa Kai ni Naritai》(我想成為一隻貝類)。這是一個關於一個無辜男人的故事,他在戰後幸福地回到妻子身邊,恢復了當地理髮師的正常生活,卻被當作戰犯逮捕並被判處死刑。他的罪行是處決了一名美國戰俘,這是一架在日本上空被擊落的 B-29 轟炸機上的倖存機組人員。影片將他描述為日本皇軍中最底層的一個極其不幸的人,他無法拒絕高級軍官下達的命令。結果,他不僅成為日本軍國主義的典型受害者,也成為戰爭罪行法庭反覆無常的受害者。 (這部電影於1994 年被翻拍成電視劇。)另一部電影《壁厚室》(Kabe Atsuki Heya)於1953 年製作,講述了關押在巢鴨監獄的B 級和C 級戰犯的故事,也將囚犯描繪成受害者戰爭,同時強調法庭的一些法律缺陷。

1950 年代還製作了另外兩類與戰爭相關的長片:關於廣島和長崎轟炸的電影,以及展示日本帝國陸軍普通士兵所經歷的暴行的電影。 1950年至1955年間,製作了幾部有關廣島和長崎的電影。其中包括《長崎之鐘》(長崎之鐘,1950年)、《長崎歌與樂寺》(1952年)、《原爆之子》(原爆之子,1952年)、《廣島》(1953年)和《黑澤明》 Akira 的《Ikimono no Kiroku》(《活人記錄》,1955 年)。最後三部電影從故事敘述和電影角度來看尤其令人印象深刻,並且不僅僅將原爆受害者(原子彈受害者)呈現為日本戰爭受害者。每一個都傳達了深刻而普遍的反核武訊息。然而,沒有人檢視日本戰爭對亞洲人民的影響,也沒有人對日本的戰爭責任提出嚴肅的問題。

第二組影片的代表作品有根據野間宏同名小說改編的《空虛地帶》(1952年)和根據後三川淳平長篇小說改編的《人間故事》(1960年)。這兩部電影都譴責了日本士兵的上級對他們的極端殘暴行為。儘管後一部電影簡短地觸及了日本軍隊對中國人所犯下的暴行,但這些電影的主題仍然是日本軍隊內部普遍存在的不人道行為,使日本男子成為受害者。當時,該類別中最受歡迎的作品是一系列名為“二兵平物語”的喜劇。 1955 年至 1961 年間,這個非常成功的系列電影總共製作了十部電影。在每部電影中,普通士兵都受到上級的嚴重虐待,而指揮官則總是腐敗和自私。此外,每部電影的結尾都是戰爭結束時普通士兵對軍官的反抗——對於同情士兵的觀眾來說,這是一個幸福的結局。在系列的一部電影中,日本士兵營救被無情的中國士兵俘虜的日本慰安婦,而一位與中國軍隊密切合作的中國商人則在黑暗的光線下呈現。然而,這個系列中沒有一部電影描述日本對佔領區當地人的暴行。

另一部深深塑造了日本戰爭受害者自我形象的熱門電影是《哥吉拉》,尤其是 1954 年的原版。正如我在之前的文章《哥吉拉與勇敢鏡頭:誰創造並殺死了怪物?在許多方面,哥吉拉象徵B-29轟炸機,多次攻擊從北海道到沖繩的城市,並在廣島和長崎投下原子彈。這部電影中的許多場景都讓人想起美國在戰爭最後幾個月的空襲,導致數十萬日本平民喪生。因此,儘管這部電影的效果是間接的,透過有趣的怪物電影來呈現,但它重申並強化了日本流行的「戰爭受害者而不是戰爭罪行的實施者」的觀念。總的來說,這些電影傳達了非常一致的訊息,因此它們在塑造公眾對亞太戰爭的理解方面產生了巨大的影響。

考慮到在當地電影院放映的長片是戰後日本公眾為數不多的娛樂來源之一,上述電影無疑在塑造亞太戰爭的廣泛共識方面發揮了重要作用在一般人群中。例如,1958年,日本電影吸引了全國超過11億觀眾。

1965年初,美軍開始對北越進行全面轟炸。接下來的十年裡,包括沖繩島在內的美國駐日軍事基地派遣了大量轟炸機、部隊和軍事物資。同年4月,為了反對美國的侵略、抵制日本支持美國在越南的戰爭,成立了「日本越南和平同盟」。人們對日本可能再次陷入戰爭的擔憂為相對強烈的反戰運動提供了重要基礎。領導這場運動的作家小田誠宣揚日本人民應該拒絕與美國合作轟炸和殺害越南,從而避免成為「戰爭肇事者」。他指出,關於日本自身的戰爭經歷,迄今為止,人們對日本自身受害方面給予了足夠的關注,但很少提及日本作為侵略者的責任。為了掌握日本成為越戰攻擊者的可能性,他強調必須清醒地認識日本人民在亞太戰爭中既是受害者又是攻擊者的歷史事實。在當時,不僅是普通民眾而且大多數知識分子都只關注自己戰爭經驗的一方面,即日本軍隊和美國轟炸的受害者,這是一個強大的吸引力。

除了Beheiren運動之外,自1970年代初開始的日中關係正常化的努力也引發了關於日本對中國人民的戰爭責任的爭論。在此背景下,本田勝一等記者發表了有關日本軍事暴行,特別是南京大屠殺中的中國受害者的詳細報道。一些學者也開始對日本軍隊在中國和其他亞洲被佔領土所犯下的戰爭罪行進行研究。從1970年代末期開始,家永三郎、藤原晃、江口敬一、大江忍等學者開始論述日本的戰爭責任,提出了嚴重的道德問題。在這些學者的工作的鼓勵下,常石敬一、吉見等歷史學家在20 世紀80 年代和90 年代對迄今未知的日本戰爭罪行——例如細菌戰、屠殺戰俘和剝削「慰安婦」——進行了詳細記錄。這些學術著作對知識界的影響是深遠的。

然而,Beheiren等進步政治運動和對日本戰爭罪行的學術研究對日本民眾態度的影響不足以克服對亞太戰爭的片面受害觀點。日本人作為戰爭受害者的自我形像在 20 世紀 50 年代和 60 年代透過官方和大眾文化管道深深滲透到全國許多日本人的心靈中。對於進步的政治或學術運動來說,克服這種既定觀點並不是一件容易的事。

自1990年代初以來,民族主義學者掀起了對上述進步學術著作的強烈抵制,他們否認南京大屠殺、慰安婦等日本戰時暴行的歷史記錄,並呼籲日本人為自己的罪行感到自豪。 。漫畫家小林吉德在向廣大大眾傳播自己的觀點方面尤其有影響力,並在削弱批評學者的可信度方面取得了一定的成功。日本教育部批准了與作會(新教科書製作協會)團體有關的民族主義學者製作的學校教科書,以及政府推出了一項全國範圍的學校計劃來灌輸愛國主義,這種強烈反對引起了強烈反響。此外,由於小泉首相嚴正拒絕鄰國對其參拜供奉著甲級戰犯的靖國神社的批評,以及外相麻生太郎公開敦促天皇參拜靖國神社,導致這一問題的發生。 。自民黨計畫修改日本和平憲法,將日本自衛隊轉變為完全合法的軍事力量,這項計畫應該從戰爭責任問題的角度來看。

要把握20世紀90年代日本新民族主義的興起,就必須了解其與「泡沫經濟破滅」、「金融危機」、「全球化」和「全球化」等當代社會經濟現象的密切關係。日益加劇。但我們也應該思考整個倫理框架,包括道德責任感。只有當日本人民充分承擔起殖民主義和戰爭給亞洲人民帶來的苦難的道義責任時,才有可能實現其憲法序言中所描述的「在爭取維護和平的國際社會中佔據光榮地位」的目標。和平,並從地球上永遠消除暴政和奴隸制、壓迫和不寬容。

參考

* 約翰·道爾 (John Dower),擁抱失敗:二戰後的日本 (WW Norton & Company/紐約出版社,紐約,1999)
* 阿瓦屋健太郎 (Awaya Kentaro),《東京法庭、戰爭責任與日本人民》 ,蒂莫西(Timothy) 翻譯阿莫斯。
* Oda Makoto, Nanshi no Shiso (Iwanami Shoten, 東京, 1991)
* Takahashi Tetsuya, Sengo Sekinin-Ron (講談社, 東京, 2005)
* Takahashi Tetsuya, Kokka to Gisei (Nippon Hosho Kyokai, 東京 2005)
* Yoshida Yutaka,日本人的淺草館(岩波商店,東京,1995)

田中由紀(Yuki Tanaka)是廣島和平研究所研究教授,《日本慰安婦》一書的作者。第二次世界大戰和美國佔領期間的性奴役和賣淫問題,以及日本焦點的協調員。他為日本焦點撰寫了這篇文章。發佈於 2006 年 8 月 20 日。

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Crime And Responsibility: War, The State, And Japanese Society
BY: YUKI TANAKA
August 14, 2006

Crime and Responsibility: War, the state, and Japanese society
Volume 4 | Issue 8

Article ID 2200

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Crime and Responsibility: War, the state, and Japanese society
By Yuki Tanaka

‘Forgetting, even getting history wrong, is an essential factor in the formation of a nation, which is why the progress of historical studies is often a danger to nationality.’ Ernest Renan

In 2002, the Japanese government built the “Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims” within the Hiroshima Peace Park. It is located less than two hundred meters from the A-Bomb Peace Museum operated by the Hiroshima City Council. This new Memorial Hall, funded and run by the Japanese government, includes the following message on one of the wall panels:

‘At one point in the 20th century, Japan walked the path of war. Then, on December 8, 1941, Japan initiated hostilities against the U.S., Great Britain and others, plunging into what came to be known as the Pacific War. This war was largely fought elsewhere in the Asia Pacific region, but when the tide turned against Japan, American warplanes began bombing the homeland, and Okinawa became a bloody battlefield. Within this context of war, on August 6, 1945, the world’s first atomic weapon, a bomb of unprecedented destructive power, was dropped on the city of Hiroshima.’

Other panels present the following statements:

‘The Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims is an effort by the Japanese national government to remember and mourn the sacred sacrifice of the atomic bomb victims.’

‘We hereby mourn those who perished in the atomic bombing. At the same time, we recall with great sorrow the many lives sacrificed to mistaken national policy.’ (emphases added)


1. Hiroshima following the atomic bombing

These formal statements clearly reflect the Japanese government’s assessment, but they also articulate widely held popular attitudes concerning Japan’s war responsibility. In other words, in the absence of explanation of any kind, the viewer is left to conclude that Japan simply, inexplicably, “walked the path of war” and the “real” war started with the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941. That “real” war, in other words, did not begin on September 18, 1931, the day that the Japanese Army detonated an explosion on the South Manchurian railway, providing the pretext for the seizure of Manchuria and the establishment of Manchukuo under Japanese aegis. Nor did it begin on July 7, 1937, when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident plunged Japan into full-scale war leading to the occupation of large areas of China. In the Memorial Hall’s rendering, Japan’s major enemies in the Asia-Pacific War were the U.S. and Great Britain, not China, still less the other Asian peoples that Japan conquered following the attack on Pearl Harbor. In short, Japan was defeated by Anglo-Saxons not by Asians. Such an interpretation of the history of the 15 year war (1931-45) naturally hinders full recognition of responsibility for Japan’s abhorrent military acts and the war losses that its Asian neighbors suffered as a result of war and colonialism. It also fundamentally distorts the dynamics of power played out on the fields of colonialism and war in the first half of the twentieth century.

On the other hand, the atomic bomb is said to have been “dropped on the city of Hiroshima” as if it were a natural calamity, without identified human agency, the consequence being that many people were “sacrificed to mistaken national policy.” Thus the responsibility of American forces for the killing of large numbers of civilians is not seriously questioned. Instead, the victims of atomic bombing are simply presented as the “sacred sacrifice” of war, just as the nature of Japan’s “mistaken national policies” is left unexamined. In particular, the words “sacred sacrifice” remove any reference to who killed so many people or why and for what these people had to be “sacrificed.” This is partly due to the fact that the word “sacred” possesses a kind of religious function that blurs the historical process whereby these people became victims of war. The word “sacred” tends to refute any mundane queries regarding the background of a “sacred person.” In other words, it is widely accepted that once a person is apotheosized and becomes “sacred,” no one should catechize about his or her past. Here we can find a similarity with the “sacred souls” of soldiers enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine, where the issue of Japanese war crimes remains unquestioned.

Because non-explanations of this kind are the characteristic not only of the Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall but of most school textbooks and the school curriculum generally, the result is that the majority of Japanese people remain ignorant not only of Japan’s war responsibility, but also of the history of the Asia-Pacific War in general.

It is often said that the Japanese people tend to see themselves as victims of war rather than as assailants, largely due to the experience of U.S. aerial bombing towards the end of the war, culminating in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Undoubtedly this was one of many factors that contributed to such a popular perception.

Indeed, the A-Bomb Peace Museum operated by the Hiroshima City Council is filled predominantly with exhibits highlighting the victimization of the citizens of Hiroshima as a result of indiscriminate bombing using the atomic bomb. Although there is a brief explanation of the Nanjing Massacre in relation to the activities of the Imperial Army dispatched from Hiroshima to China prior to the atomic bombing, the museum invariably presents the atomic bombing of the city as the historically unprecedented and unparalleled victimization of Japanese citizens. Indubitably the museum conveys a powerful anti-nuclear message. Yet it is interesting to note that the museum exhibits scarcely nothing except information on the bombing of Hiroshima, and even the bombing of Nagasaki and other landmarks of nuclear history are hardly mentioned. Hence the museum fails to bring to light fundamental features common to all victims of atomic bombings, nuclear tests, indiscriminate bombing, and war in general.



2. Collecting and classifying rubble that would
eventually be exhibited at the Peace Memorial
Museum.

Yet even this perception of “war victims” is rapidly fading, and younger generations no longer recognize their nation’s war responsibility or even the price that war exacted on their own society. Indeed, few have sufficient knowledge of Japan’s modern and contemporary history to hold opinions concerning Japan and war.

We cannot give a simple answer to the question of why many Japanese failed to nurture a strong sense of war responsibility. In this essay, I examine some important factors that have hindered the cultivation of a clear public sense of Japanese war responsibility. I will particularly concentrate on the 15 years after the war (1945 – 1960), the period in which the fundamental framework of the Japanese popular concept of “war responsibility” was molded. This is because of my strong belief that a lack of of war responsibility among younger generations is not simply due to a lack of education, but is deeply rooted in the very fabric of Japanese popular thinking on war issues formulated and implanted in the early post-war period.

One of the new programs that GHQ (General Headquarters of the Allied Occupation Forces) introduced in the early stages of the occupation was “the re-education of the Japanese.” The CIE (Civil Information and Education Section) of GHQ was given the task of teaching Japanese citizens “the truth” about the war by revealing Japanese war crimes and highlighting the devastating consequences of the war including Japan’s destruction and defeat. Between December 8 and 17, 1945, the CIE required all Japanese national newspapers to publish a series of articles drafted by CIE on the history of the Pacific War. At the same time, NHK (the Japan Broadcasting Commission) ran a serial radio program called “This is the Truth.” This series, designed and produced by CIE, was broadcast once a week over 10 weeks from December 9, 1945. The content of the two series of articles and broadcasts can be summarized in the following points.

1) Although they pinpoint the Manchurian Incident of 1931 as the start of the war and acknowledge the continuity between Japan’s invasion of China and the Sino-Japanese War as well as the Pacific War, Japan’s colonial rule of Taiwan and Korea is completely ignored.

2) The decisive role of U.S military forces in determining the outcome of the war in the Pacific is singularly emphasized, while the anti-Japanese resistance carried out by Chinese forces over fifteen years, and by various Southeast Asian forces over four years, are ignored. The single exception is brief mention of Filipino guerrillas who collaborated with American forces.

3) The responsibility of a handful of Japanese military leaders is emphasized, while Emperor Hirohito and his close associates within the Imperial Court as well as business and media leaders, are simply characterized as “moderate groups” in contrast to the militarists.

4) Emphasizing Japanese military leaders’ concealment of the actual circumstances of the war creates a popular image that the Japanese people were deceived by their military leaders. The result was therefore to ignore the structural foundations that led Japan on the road to colonialism and war.

On December 8, 1945, the same day that the newspaper series commenced, General MacArthur issued an order to set up the IPS (International Prosecution Section) for the IMTFE (International Military Tribunal for the Far East, popularly known as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal) and appointed an American lawyer, Joseph Keenan, as the chief prosecutor. A-class war crime suspects had already been arrested and the IMTFE was planned to open in May 1946. In short, one of the aims of the media exercises directed by CIE was to prepare the Japanese people to accept the legitimacy of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal on basis of the official American interpretation of the Asia-Pacific War.


3. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal

The judges of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal were chosen from U.S. allies who fought in the Pacific War. The result is that the justices were from 11 nations, namely the U.S., the U.K., the Soviet Union, France, Australia, Canada, China, Holland, New Zealand, India and the Philippines. There were three Asian judges including one from China, which sustained by far the largest casualties of Japanese invasion (serious estimates range between ten and twenty million war-related deaths), as well as India and the Philippines. However, despite that fact that millions of Asian died in the war and it was Asia that bore the brunt both of Japanese colonialism and war deaths, no legal representative was drawn from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, Indo-China, Korea or Taiwan, and the court was dominated by Western allies of the U.S. It should also be noted that the U.K., France and Holland as well as the United States were the colonial rulers of large areas of Asia, in which national independence movements were underway including the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, the Philippines and Indochina. Therefore, it is not surprising that Japanese responsibility toward Asian people was framed by the tribunal in ways that focused on war atrocities and elided issues of colonialism.

In addition, General MacArthur and the U.S. government protected Emperor Hirohito from indictment as a war criminal, kept him on the throne, and shielded him even the necessity to testify. Their goal was, of course, to exploit the emperor system in order to smooth occupation control of Japan. For this purpose, GHQ presented Hirohito as having been manipulated by the military leaders, denying all direct exercise of power over the Imperial Forces – in other words, the emperor, too, was a victim of the war. Further, Hirohito was credited with taking the crucial initiative to end the war, that is, he emerged during the occupation as the peacemaker who saved Japan from annihilation. MacArthur skillfully burnished the image of Hirohito of the peacemaker as well as the key figure who “voluntarily” led the Japanese government to formulate the new democratic Constitution renouncing all Japanese military forces. The U.S. in short, with the enthusiastic support of the Japanese government thus propagated an image of a “democratic monarch” and a “peace monarch.”

In short, CIE’s “re-education programs” together with the American framing of the War Crimes Tribunal and the projection of the myth of the peace emperor, had a huge impact upon the formation of the postwar Japanese self-image. That is, the Japanese were pitiable war-victims like their humane emperor, who were deceived by military leaders represented by General Tojo Hideki. The result was to relieve the Japanese people of the necessity to reflect seriously upon the colonization and oppressive rule of Taiwan and Korea by Japan, war crimes such as the Nanjing Massacre that their troops committed against the people of various nations in Asia, and the emperor’s ultimate responsibility for the sufferings of vast numbers of Asian people. This lack of reflection concerning responsibility towards their Asian neighbors is central to understanding why many Japanese still cannot overcome their prejudice toward other Asians. John Dower makes the point well in his book, Embracing Defeat, as follows: ‘One of the most pernicious aspects of the occupation was that the Asian peoples who had suffered most from imperial Japan’s depredation – the Chinese, Koreans, Indonesians and Filipinos – had no serious role, no influential presence at all in the defeated land. They became invisible. Asian contributions to defeating the emperor’s soldiers and sailors were displaced by an all-consuming focus on the American victory in the Pacific War.’ (p.27)

It should also be noted that one third of young Japanese men, who were born between 1920 and 1922, and who comprised the largest segment of the Japanese Imperial Forces, died by the end of the war. Consequently many surviving men came to hold a deep sense of guilt about not having died. This quite probably contributed to preventing them from engendering an acute sense of responsibility for the Asian victims of the war. Typical of their attitude, was the determination to adopt a strong resolve to work hard to help rebuild Japan on behalf of their deceased friends, i.e., “true war victims” in their eyes.

This popular self-perception, which highlighted Japanese “victim-hood” and downplayed their war responsibility to Asia, was further augmented with signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951. This treaty marked the formal cessation of the Asia-Pacific War, ended the occupation of Japan by the Allied (primarily American) forces, and simultaneously restored Japan’s independence, and consummated a US-Japan security treaty that provided for the permanent stationing of U.S. forces that continues to this day, and lashed Japan firmly within the arc of U.S. military power. With the refusal of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia to sign the treaty, and with neither the People’s Republic of China (Beijing government) nor the Republic of China (Taiwan) invited to attend, despite the fact that China had suffered the heaviest casualties in the war against Japan, the treaty was clearly revealed as a Cold War instrument of the U.S. In addition neither North Korea, fighting the U.S. in the Korean War, nor South Korea were invited to attend, on the dubious ground that Korea was not a state at the time of Japan’s surrender in 1945. India and Burma refused to participate in the conference, regarding it as a “rigged affair” so that only four Asian nations – the Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon and Pakistan – attended the conference. Yet Indonesia never ratified the treaty, but signed a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1958. The Philippines only ratified the treaty after it came into effect. In this way, the “invisibility of Asia” was again conspicuous at the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference.


4. Prime Minister Yoshida
Shigeru signing the San
Francisco Peace Treaty

The question of reparation is similarly important for locating Japan in comparative perspective, particularly vis-à-vis German behavior. Under U.S. pressure the Allied nations waived all reparation claims in accordance with Article 14 of the treaty. Later, Taiwan, China (both Beijing and Taipei), the Soviet Union and India likewise renounced the right to reparations. Thus, Japan eventually paid modest war reparations only to Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Vietnam. In addition, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea eventually received small amounts of economic aid and cooperation as Japan rejected the idea of paying reparations.

We have shown that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was less a peace treaty than an agreement to lash Japan to U.S. aims in the Asia Pacific. The combination of the Treaty and the AMPO Security Pact signed on the same day strongly reflected America’s anti-communist policy and intention to use Japan to contain the Pacific side of the communist bloc (namely the Soviet Union, China and North Korea) by retaining U.S. military bases in Japan, in particular, in Okinawa. Therefore the treaty as a whole was lenient with respect to Japan’s war responsibility. The Japanese government did perfunctorily acknowledge its war responsibility described in Article 11: “Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan.” However, the same article also opened the possibility that Japanese B- and C-class war criminals who were tried for crimes against humanity such as war atrocities, and who constituted the great majority of war criminals, would be granted clemency, reduction of sentences or parole if the foreign government that conducted the war crimes tribunal agreed. Therefore, shortly after the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in April 1952, a movement demanding the release of B- and C-class war criminals began, emphasizing the “unfairness of the war crimes tribunals” and the “misery and hardship of the families of war criminals.” In this way, Japanese B- and C-class war criminals came to be viewed as “victims of war” by Japanese people generally. By the end of 1958, all Japanese war criminals, including A-, B- and C-class were released from prison and politically rehabilitated.

As a result, by the early 1950s the basic framework of popular thinking on war issues, which has hamstrung the development of a clear and deep sense of Japan’s national responsibility ever since, was well implanted within Japanese society. For its part, the Japanese government had adopted a kind of double-standard ¬– on the one hand it officially accepted as a foreign policy Article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, including the judgment of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, while refusing to accept war responsibility as a domestic policy. This is evident both in the large-scale amnesty of those convicted by the Tokyo and the B- and C-class trials, and in the failure to embed responsibility for the consequences of the war in its public statements, in its textbooks, or in substantial reparations to the victims of colonialism and war. This contradiction, which continues today, has been the main cause of friction between Japan and other Asian nations, in particular China and Sout

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