赫尔辛基综合症：
国际政治中芬兰化的超时代复兴
TAPIO JUNTUNEN
坦佩雷大学
摘要：乌克兰的持续冲突产生了许多评论，它们试图通过历史类比的安慰性镜头来把握危机。其中最复杂的是 "芬兰化 "的复兴，或者将 "芬兰模式 "作为解决乌克兰危机的可能方案。在这篇文章中，我首先通过对冷战时期芬兰化的原始过程进行历史性的分析，对这些论点进行了质疑。其次，我认为芬兰化的复兴是建立在比喻性的推理之上的。换句话说，芬兰化的比喻被应用于现代的乌克兰，用昆廷-斯金纳的话说，过去背景下的外来因素在目前对这一概念及其背景前提的重新使用中 "被溶解为一种明显但令人误解的熟悉"。事实上，在乌克兰危机的背景下，芬兰化的重新出现加强了这样的想法，即国际事务的真正驱动力可以归结为从国际无政府状态的跨历史逻辑和大国政治的铁律中得出的公理。因此，本文对关于国际关系中类比和神话的作用的理论讨论做出了新的贡献。
关键词： 芬兰化，超现实主义，神话；类比，概念史，芬兰外交政策史
简介1
在与苏联保持友好关系的外衣下，一个国家的主权被削弱的过程或状态[...]（Laqueur，1980：7）。
一个国家[遵循]中立，作为一个大国的邻居，代表着不同的社会秩序，使用傲慢的政治方法。这意味着该国决定其外交政策的权力是有限的，但其内部权力几乎已经完成（V. I. Punasalo[化名]在Singleton, 1981: 270）。
一个弱小的邻国被一个极权主义超级大国的强大和政治上的无情所震慑，对其主权自由做出了无耻和尴尬的让步，这是一种令人遗憾的状态（Jutila, 1983: 2）。
芬兰化的概念和想法是冷战时期许多激烈辩论的焦点，在乌克兰危机的背景下再次出现在国际政治的话语中。知名政治人物，如亨利-基辛格和兹比格涅夫-布热津斯基，提出了 "芬兰模式 "作为解决乌克兰危机的方案，这既是为了乌克兰国内，也是为了解决更广泛的东西方关系的混乱。虽然基辛格和布热津斯基没有明确使用 "芬兰化 "一词--他们使用了 "与芬兰相媲美的姿态"（基辛格，2014）和 "芬兰模式"（布热津斯基，2014）等更笼统的概念--但他们的处方几乎立即被解释为恢复芬兰化概念的隐含尝试（例如，见Atlas，2014；Gaddy，2014；Kirchick，2014）。芬兰化的复兴招致了大量的批评。这些批评的声音大多提出了一个规范性的观点，认为芬兰化意味着事实上的中立化和被西方 "抛弃的乌克兰"（Lagon and Moreland, 2014）。此外，芬兰化被认为是 "乌克兰的一个乌托邦式的目标。
[......]这将是一个漫长的、痛苦的过程"（Gaddy，2014）。
尽管基辛格和布热津斯基将现代乌克兰与芬兰的 "姿态 "或 "模式 "进行了比较，但他们的主张在芬兰和乌克兰都受到了冷淡的怀疑（例如，见Nyberg, 2014; Iloniemi, 2014; Bugriy, 2015）。芬兰的评论家们并不完全依赖直接的规范性论据，而是将批评的重点放在他们认为布热津斯基和基辛格的论点缺乏历史合理性的地方。换句话说，他们将芬兰化的复兴解释为在冷战时期的芬兰和现代的乌克兰之间进行误导性比较。这种比较被拒绝了，因为评论家们强调了芬兰冷战经历的独特性，以及理解芬兰在整个历史上如何设法安排其与更大的邻国的关系的严重背景依赖性，在这篇文章的背景下，就是冷战期间的苏联以及后来的俄罗斯。
事实上，这些回答似乎揭示了在强调芬兰冷战经验的特殊性的他律主义概念与作为历史概括或作为管理不对称权力关系的规定性模式的芬兰化概念之间的深刻矛盾。在这篇文章中，我将阐明在乌克兰危机中重新出现的芬兰化思想背后的历史推理和逻辑。此外，我还将关注这种类比推理对我们理解世界政治的本质、其驱动力以及我们对他律知识在其中的作用的评价所产生的广泛影响。我将论证，这种类比是基于一个过度概括的历史教训，它依赖于对冷战期间芬兰化的原始过程的神话式的再利用。更重要的是，芬兰化的 "教训 "维持并促进了对世界政治的理解，将其视为由反复出现的模式和非历史性机制驱动的稳定和固定的大国政治游戏，而不是强调历史特殊性、偶然性和背景知识的作用（参见Lawson, 2012: 206-210; Leira and de Carvalho, 2016： 101-104；另见Ashley, 1984: 235-236；Kratochwil, 1993）。
因此，我将把讨论从关于芬兰化的 "真正 "含义的辩论引向关于国际政治中历史类比和神话的逻辑和后果的理论问题。更具体地说，我将通过使用昆廷-斯金纳的不合时宜的类型学来把握芬兰化类比中的神话因素。斯金纳的方法为我们提供了一种新的方式来把握芬兰化的类比，将其作为一个具有自身历史的表演性神话的例子，套用拉斯穆森（2003）的 "历史的教训 "和 "教训的历史 "之间的区别。
我将论证，芬兰化重现背后的历史推理呈现了一个反向的不合时宜的逻辑，也就是parachronism（斯金纳，1969；另见Syrjämäki，2011）的典型案例研究。斯金纳关注的是不合时宜在思想史和政治思想研究中的作用，而我则运用斯金纳的概念化来研究历史类比和政治神话在当下是如何被重新使用的。我将论证，复兴芬兰化背后的悖论逻辑--特别是当被建议作为不对称权力关系的规定性模式和安排时，如在乌克兰危机的情况下
- 是基于 "狭隘主义的神话"。换句话说，二战后的芬兰和冷战后的乌克兰之间的类比是以这样一种方式来使用的，即这两个案例之间的外来因素被 "溶解为一种明显但误导性的陌生性"（Skinner, 1969: 27），这一概念也呼应了罗兰-巴特（1973）对神话作为二阶符号学系统的构想。
此外，为了从概念上加强我的论点，我将把 "芬兰化 "这一概念或术语从其在最近的讨论中占主导地位的较为含糊的隐喻性使用中拉回来进行分析研究。我声称，虽然芬兰化在本质上是一个模糊的概念，但它已经（而且仍然）被用于多重的、部分相互矛盾的含义，这些含义在当前都有特殊的作用或效果。我将通过提供一个初步的芬兰化分类法来阐述这种 "模糊性"，该分类法追溯了这个概念的四种含义--有些是历史性的，有些仍然在使用：
1）一种理想的类型和/或对小国外交政策学说的中立描述；
2）一种贬义的修辞工具，旨在说服国际（通常是盟国）或国内受众相信一些潜在的、危险的、正在出现的政治影响和进程的后果；
3）"历史政治 "的修正主义概念（特别是在芬兰国内政治辩论的背景下）；
4）国内改革和外交政策变革的解放模式。
我将首先介绍分析框架。我将提出，parachronism的概念为研究国际政治中如何使用历史类比提供了一种新的方法。虽然我的方法主要源于昆廷-斯金纳关于不合时宜的神话的工作，但我也将把我的方法置于国际关系文献中关于神话、类比和历史教训的作用的更广泛讨论中。在文章的第二部分，我将通过介绍冷战期间两波芬兰化辩论的主要特点来探讨芬兰化本身的历史。在这一历史基础上，我将对芬兰化的不同变体或含义进行初步分类，包括过去和现在。最后，在文章的结尾部分，我将审视在乌克兰危机期间恢复芬兰化概念的尝试，以及这些努力所依赖的比喻性推理方式。
近代化、类比和神话
当代国际上围绕芬兰化的类比或 "教训 "的讨论大多停滞不前，变成了关于假设的 "芬兰模式 "对乌克兰的未来和西方与俄罗斯之间的关系是好是坏的规范性辩论。我在这篇文章中的目的是通过批判性地评估该类比背后的历史预设来避免这种僵局，并分析其使用所产生的反响；我认为，当作为 "儿子 "使用时，芬兰化的类比加强了对由大国政治的铁律所支配的国际关系的解读。此外，"芬兰化 "这一比喻中固有的比喻逻辑和神话色彩使它成为一个过度概括的教训--为了理解现在，原始历史进程的关键因素被遗忘了。因此，这个类比也改变了我们对原始冷战时期芬兰化进程的复杂性的理解。下面关于比喻性推理以及神话和类比在国际关系中的作用的讨论，介绍了我的论点背后的理论前提。
思想史中的不合时宜的作用
在他1969年的文章《思想史中的意义和理解》中，昆廷-斯金纳想解决他认为在思想史和政治思想研究中的一些关键困境。尽管斯金纳主要关注的是思想史和哲学思想研究中的前提条件和局限性，但他关于 "范式的优先性 "的言论也与关于历史知识的性质的更广泛的方法论和认识论问题产生了共鸣：
[我们不可避免地组织和调整我们的感知和思想的模式和先入之见，本身就会成为我们思考或感知的决定因素。我们必须进行分类才能理解，而我们只能在熟悉的事物中对不熟悉的事物进行分类（Skinner, 1969: 6；另见Skinner, 1972: 406）。
根据Sami Syrjämäki (2011: 23)，他详细研究了Quentin Skinner的作品，不合时宜的现象通常出现在"[......]当历史的不连续性不被认可，通常的方向是从当代世界到过去"。这一表述呼应了这一概念的通常含义，即把不合时宜描述为（无意或有意的）时间顺序上的错误，即把人工制品、观念、思想或社会习惯放在它们尚未发明的历史背景和时期，或者放在它们不习惯的地方。历史概念词典》提供的定义表明，当以不恰当的方式用 "现在的价值、假设或解释类别 "来理解过去的现象时，就会形成不合时宜的现象（见Ritter, 1986: 9-12）。
从历史知识和学术研究的角度来看，反语一般被认为是需要避免的。另一方面，按照斯金纳关于历史知识作用的观点，Syrjämäki认为，完全避免不合时宜是不可能的。简而言之，不合时宜的逻辑是历史学家的 "原罪"--我们无法摆脱先入为主的范式。2 相反，我们对历史的解读 "必然是有选择性的"，引用E.H.Carr(1963: 10)的话，也就是说，"[......]由那些自觉或不自觉地接受[某种]特定观点并认为支持这种观点的事实值得保留的人为我们预设和确定的"（同上：12）。根据Syrjämäki (2011: 10)的说法，斯金纳与本议题有关的主要理论见解是，他认为不合时宜是 "在从现代角度理解过去时不可避免的，甚至是必要的。"3 在这个意义上，可以将 "纯粹的不合时宜 "和时间顺序上的故意错误与无法完全避免不合时宜的逻辑这一存在条件分开。
斯金纳将不合时宜的问题分为四种不同的 "神话"：教条主义、一致性、原生性和狭隘性。前两种类型解决的是在解释任何特定作者的生活作品和政治思想时的一般困境。4后两种类型解决的是在解释过去的文本、作品或事件时更普遍的不合时宜的漏洞，这使得在这里集中讨论后两种类型是很恰当的。
Prolepsis神话指的是当对特定文本或历史事件的解释更多的是基于"[......]特定历史工作或行动的回顾性意义，而不是其对代理人本身的意义"（同上，22-24）时产生的混乱。当适用于像芬兰化这样的历史政治现象时，这可能只是指一种过度的解读，它混淆了对政治进程后果的回顾性评价和把进程或现象当作一个有意识的和有意的项目的目的论解释（参见Rasmussen, 2003: 50）。
狭隘主义的神话有两个不同的子类别。第一个，"错误的参考/影响"，与"[......]把两个作者之间的因果相似性解释为参考的危险"（Syrjämäki, 2011: 106）有关。这通常表现为X明显受到Y的影响，因为他们在X主题上的观点明显相似（Skinner, 1969: 25-27）。第二种，也是与本文主题有关的更重要的狭隘主义解释形式是Syrjämäki（2011: 106-107）所描述的 "概念化为误导性的熟悉"。在这里，历史学家在描述她所研究的事物的意义时，不自觉地滥用了她的现代观点： "历史学家可能以这样的方式将一个论点概念化，使其外来的元素被溶解为一种明显的但误导性的熟悉"（Skinner, 1969: 27-28）。例如，当人们将现代的概念，如福利国家应用于前现代社会，或将被称为现实主义的思想流派应用于诸如修昔底德的历史人物的意图时，就会发生这种情况。
类比和历史教训中的旁证逻辑 旁证是不合时宜的反转版本。牛津英语词典》将parachronism定义为"[......]年代学上的错误，尤其是指定太晚的日期"，并将其词源追溯到17世纪中叶，"也许是由不合时宜的说法提出的。 "5 Rancière (1996: 54)将parachro- nism的发明追溯到19世纪（法国）的字典，在那里，这个概念被引入作为一个词汇的合理化，以描述一个与不合时宜的错误对称的错误，但一个事实被放置的太晚而不是太早。
说到流行的定义，在维基百科中，parachronism被描述为"[......]一种物体、一种成语表达、一种技术、一种哲学思想、一种音乐风格、一种材料、一种习俗，或其他任何与某一特定时期紧密相连的东西，以至于在后来的时代遇到时显得很奇怪"（维基百科，2016年，斜体字加）。当不合时宜的东西被用来（通常是在无意识的情况下）解决过去的反常现象时，旁观者可以在现在做同样的伎俩，将一些历史上的政治进程或社会现象从其历史背景中置换出来。换句话说，就像在狭义的神话中一样，过去政治进程背景中的异己因素在现在被消解为一种 "表面上的但令人误解的熟悉"。
理解历史类比作用的一个常见方法是将其视为认知方案，利用过去决策和事件中的一些关键记忆或形成性经验来帮助现在的决策。正如Khong (1992: 6-7)所解释的，"历史类比一词意味着一种推论，如果两个或更多的事件在时间上相隔甚远，那么它们在另一个方面也可能是一致的。" 对于Jervis（1976年：217）来说，类比是重新确定世界政治中的因果过程和联系的感觉装置： "以往的国际事件为政治家提供了一系列可以想象的情况，使他能够发现模式和因果联系，从而帮助他理解他的世界"，或者如Bränd-ström等人所说，"处理当前的情况和问题"（2004：193）。
在这些例子中，类比首先被理解为现在和过去的情况（或事件）之间的比较，其次，被理解为在继承的背景知识基础上帮助决策过程的认知装置。在这个意义上、
[类比通过使人们能够获得来自以前事件的洞察力，提供了一条通往理性的有用捷径。但它们也掩盖了与过去不同的预设案例的各个方面。由于这个原因，一个戏剧性的重要经验往往会阻碍后来的决策，因为它提供的分析方法会被过快、轻易和广泛地应用（Jervis, 1976: 220）。
这类文献的分支，通常受到认知心理学理论的启发，源于这样的假设：从过去的事件和决策中获得的形成性经验提供了决策者在处理当前复杂的信息流时必然需要的认知模式（Snyder, 1991: 13-14）。这在Jervis（1976: 222）的概率公式中得到了体现，该公式描述了从感知到行为的因果联系：事件->教训->未来行为。
认知主义的历史类比方法通常被理解为将目前的决策环境与过去的一些孤立事件进行比较，就像著名的慕尼黑1938年的类比（Rasmussen, 2003: 501）。值得注意的是，尽管芬兰的冷战经验和乌克兰危机之间的比较不是基于一个孤立的事件或单一的决定，但它似乎仍然依赖于某种更广泛的类比推理逻辑。换句话说，在使用类比作为过去和现在的事件或决定之间的比较的传统方式中，因果关系的感觉似乎更加清晰。当把芬兰化的 "教训 "这样一个较长的政治过程与不同时间背景下的其他国家进行比较时，类比中的因果关系感就会松动，从而产生对原始过程的再利用的空间。
在这个意义上，乌克兰危机期间芬兰化的重新出现可能为我们提供了Jervis（1976: 228）所描述的过度概括的教训的例子：
[......]决策者通常不能从过去的事件中剥离出那些高度具体和受情况限制的方面，以获得更普遍的特征，因为他们认为结果最突出的方面是由之前情况最突出的方面造成的。人们更关注已经发生的事情，而不是它为什么发生。因此，学习是肤浅的、过度概括的，并且是基于事后推理的。结果是，学到的经验会被应用到各种各样的情况中，而没有仔细确定这些案例在关键方面是否相似。
这里的问题不在于是否要评估最初的冷战时期的芬兰化进程与目前围绕乌克兰危机的背景有多大的 "契合度"。站在他的立场上6，更重要的是要掌握类比是如何使用的，在什么逻辑下使用，以及其后果是什么。芬兰化类比中的神话倾向呼应了Jervis的观点，即当依赖过度概括的教训时，"人们会把世界看成比它更不变[...]"（同上）。换句话说，过度概括的教训是由关于世界政治的基本机制和驱动力的（本体论）背景假设促成的。对历史事实的归纳收集及其背景被认为是次要的，充其量是次要的。与其强调国际政治的动荡和变化，过去往往被当作"[......]采石场来挖掘国际政治（无政府）结构的普遍和永恒的工作原理"（Leira and de Carvalho, 2016: 101）。正如Kenneth Waltz（1979：66，70）所描述的这种结构性停滞，"国际政治的结构保持高度恒定，模式反复出现，事件无休止地重复"，而 "结构的恒定性解释了国际政治生活的反复模式和特征"（也见Hollis和Smith，1991：104-110）。
此外，当把广泛的、过度概括的教训的 "有利因素 "放在一边，转向 "教训的历史 "时--正如Rasmussen（2003）所描述的他的建构主义方法--同样重要的是考虑过度概括的类比中固有的旁证逻辑如何影响和修改我们对世界政治和大国政治如何运作的感觉。建构主义的解读，集中于 "教训的历史"，并不试图在因果意义上把握领导人的看法的作用，而是集中于 "戏剧性的[......]如何吸取教训以及如何将其用于政治"（同上：50）。
斯金纳式的不合时宜的神话思想也呼应了罗兰-巴特（1973：123）的神话作为二阶符号学系统的概念。对巴特来说，第一个系统中的原始符号在第二个已经存在的系统中变异为 "单纯的符号"，从而将"[......]神话概念中包含的知识[......][变成]混乱的东西，由屈服的、没有形状的联想组成"（同上：129）。"在这个意义上"，巴特（同上）继续说，"我们可以说，神话概念的基本特征是被占有的"。换句话说，"[......]神话概念没有固定性：它们可以产生、改变、瓦解，完全不出现。而正是因为它们是历史性的，所以历史可以非常容易地压制它们"（同上：130）。
最后，神话在国际关系理论方面也有表演功能；神话掩盖了其真理诉求的内在政治意识形态和历史性质，并以普遍化的建构取代了历史的特殊性（Weber, 2005: 2, 6-7）。7 历史类比和过度概括的教训的力量在于其重新引导政治想象的工具性潜力，特别是在涉及未来相当不确定的情况下。Fin- landization的类比及其在当今乌克兰的神话应用，鼓励人们将国际关系解读为大国政治的固定游戏，当通过权力平衡安排来管理国际秩序时，小国被视为纯粹的对象（见Little, 2007: 12）。在这篇文章中，我将使用斯金纳式的不合时宜的神话类型学作为分析工具，对芬兰化的类比或者说Les-son中的神话元素进行去自然化。
历史的教训：芬兰化的历史化和分类法
虽然 "芬兰化 "的概念通常是由德国教授理查德-罗文塔尔（Richard Löwenthal）提出的，并声称他在1966年发明了这一概念，但 "芬兰化 "的概念早在20世纪50年代初就出现在奥地利外交部长卡尔-格鲁伯的著作中。1953年，格鲁伯将芬兰对苏联的立场描述为对奥地利的一个警告信号。格鲁伯的信息是针对国内日益激烈的辩论，即如果四国占领结束，奥地利的国家主权和领土统一得到恢复，那么奥地利的外交政策方向如何。格鲁伯的观点被雷尼奥-涅米描述为在意识形态上亲西方，他将中立与芬兰的不稳定状况及其面临的苏越压力联系起来。格鲁伯认为，"芬兰政治 "的例子将使奥地利的未来面临成为欧洲又一个人民民主共和国的危险（Rainio-Niemi，2014: 53-57）。
芬兰化辩论的第二波--或者说是哈科维尔塔所说的 "复兴"--出现于1960年代末。芬兰化的概念成为了一个流行的口号，特别是在关于威利-勃兰特的东方政策的影响的辩论中（Hakovirta, 1975: 24-25）。围绕这一概念的更广泛的欧洲辩论涉及到中立在新兴的欧洲政治和安全秩序中的作用，以及正在进行的军备控制谈判和共产主义和资本主义阵营之间的政治缓和可能带来的影响。20世纪60年代和70年代出现的关于芬兰化的辩论也恰好与人们对小国在关于欧洲安全秩序的未来的讨论中的作用越来越感兴趣相吻合。从这个意义上说，芬兰化问题的影响比与芬兰本身的国际地位有关的问题更广泛。对芬兰来说，最根本的问题是，引用Maude（1982年：4）的话，不仅是芬兰的外交政策是否"[......]在寻求避免与苏联对立的过程中，变得屈从于苏联的政策指令"，而且是 "他们国内政治的活力和诚实性是否由于这种影响国家间关系的结果而被削弱"。
正是在这个意义上，许多西方评论家和学者在20世纪60年代和70年代把芬兰化作为一个警告性的例子。他们把芬兰化理解为一个动态的过程，如果美国的军事承诺被正在进行的欧洲缓和和军备控制进程所破坏，那么任何受苏联影响的国家都会有这样的命运（Best等，2004: 276, 309; Hakovirta, 1975: 27-35）。这种对芬兰化的动态（因此，已经有些类比）解读受到了历史敏感解读的挑战，这种解读强调了芬兰经验和芬兰-苏联关系的特殊性。大多数基于这种历史主义立场的解释，就像乔治-肯南（1974）和马克斯-雅各布森（1980）等杰出的外交家在20世纪70年代和80年代所做的那样，也对芬兰的芬兰化本身提出了质疑（另见Singleton, 1981; Maude, 1982; 参阅Mansala, 2015: 215-218; Laqueur, 1980: 12；
Hakovirta, 1975: 35-40）。
对于2014年乌克兰危机中芬兰化的第二次 "复兴"，有价值的理解是，冷战期间芬兰化的必要先决条件是在1940年代中期到1950年代中期通过一个长达十年的多方面的过程形成的。在国内，这一过程需要逐步调整外交政策理论，从极其被动和极端谨慎的小国现实主义转向更积极地考虑基于芬兰武装部队独立地位的有限和平时期的中立性。同时，芬兰保持并加强了其与苏联截然不同的国内政治模式和国家文化（以西方征服主义民主为导向）。这为苏联对芬兰国内政治和文化的压力的不安特征创造了政治和视频逻辑 "空间"，从而将芬兰化的概念与文化同化或宗主国的概念分开。另一方面，从外部来说，芬兰化的过程需要超级大国关系的重大转变，比如1950年代中期的日内瓦精神9和斯大林死后苏联外交政策的重新定位（特别见伦托拉，2010）。
历史主义的解读认为，与 "附庸国"、"宗主国"、"卫星国 "或 "保护国 "等更为抽象和笼统的概念相比，"芬兰化 "是一个更为复杂和对环境敏感的概念。10 此外，"ap-peasement "的概念描述的是通过对其他国家的外部行动做出让步而避免冲突的外交政策姿态，也缺乏芬兰化的过程性意义。芬兰和苏联之间的关系过于不对称，芬兰无法制定严肃的让步政策。
芬兰化的多面性
自Richard Lowenthal、Walter Laqueur等人在1960年代末开始推广芬兰化概念以来，芬兰化的历史性也体现在对这个概念的多种解释和应用上（见Laqueur, 1980: 7）。为了给考察其目前的使用提供一个进一步的概念背景，我接下来将介绍一个分类法，对芬兰化概念的四种含义和使用进行剖析：
(1）一种描述或理想类型；（2）一种国际贬义；（3）一种芬兰本土的贬义；（4）一种解放性甚至进步性的模式。其中有些是部分重叠的；其他的则更明显地彼此不一致。
1. 描述/理想的类型。在这个词的最 "中立 "意义上，芬兰化被用来描述一种自愿的外交政策战略，或者在较小的意义上，一种外交政策工具，旨在通过双边政治或其他手段，如通过中立主义的外交政策姿态加强区域稳定，使一个更强大的国家（通常是邻国）感到安心。例如，Vinayaraj（2011: 272）认为，"[芬兰化]既证实了一个弱国面对强邻的威胁和干涉的战略，也验证了[作为平衡的手段]的联合战略"。这一定义与描述中小国家外交政策姿态的其他术语产生了共鸣，如 "包容"。一些学者，如Hans Mouritzen（1988年），将芬兰化的概念应用于重新构建关于政治适应的一般理论。这些理论野心主要不是对描述芬兰化的历史现象感兴趣，而是对制定 "关于适应性默许的动态的一般命题的经验测试场"（Underdal, 1991）感兴趣。从分析清晰度的角度来看，这里的问题是，芬兰化的概念在某种程度上变成了多余的。例如，考虑到猪口（2003：113）对芬兰化的描述："[......]一个国家的安全政策，为了确保其生存，通过部分重组其内部和外部政策来维持和/或增强其安全。" 如果我们遵循芬兰化的这一定义，就很难想到那些至少在某些方面不符合这一解释范围的外交政策状况，从而使这一概念的分析（或历史）价值变得有些可疑。
正如Forsberg和Pesu（2016: 474）所表明的那样，芬兰化往往被理解为一种抽象的理想类型，而没有具体提及芬兰。受韦伯主义启发的理想类型化的逻辑是创造出刻意简化和概括的概念化。因此，考虑到芬兰化作为一个过程的历史性，它可能应该被理解为一种个性化的理想类型，或者是国际政治中某种历史趋势的理想化（关于与历史学有关的理想类型的讨论，见Ritter, 1998: 201-206）。然而，即使这样做也是有问题的。如果我们把芬兰化理解为国家间关系中一个经常性现象的概括，或者理解为一个历史化的、个性化的理想类型，那么它对 "绥靖 "或 "迁就 "等概念的分析价值就不清楚了。在这个意义上，我们可以认为芬兰化的理想类型应该被看作是一种 "偶然的概括"，尽管我们必须记住，即使在这种形式下，芬兰化仍然保持着它的争议性和高度政治化的性质，这一点在以下三种理解中都很鲜明。
2. 2. 贬义（国际）。从描述性的提法出发，芬兰化的概念或想法至少有三种不同的历史含义和背景。在第一个历史性的含义中，也就是上文提到的，芬兰化被用作一个过程的同义词，通过这个过程，一个更强大的国家--在历史意义上是苏联--旨在通过干预一个国家的国内政治来控制或服从其外交政策。正如James Kirchick（2014）所描述的那样，其野心是创造一种 "胁迫性中立的条件"（见上文注10）。这种解释具有不可磨灭的贬义，可以进一步定义为 "来自国外的被迫芬兰化"，在芬兰语中通常被翻译为suomettaminen。这种对芬兰化的解释在一些西方国家对冷战期间苏联 "和平攻势 "的真实性质的（更）鹰派评论中很明显。其中一些评论家认为缓和的精神"[......]是苏联通过其他手段取得的进步"（Maude，1982：3）。同样，1972年，西德的一位保守派政治家Franz-Josef Strauss声称，苏联对芬兰国内事务的干预清楚地表明了苏联对欧洲事务和整个欧安会进程的意图（Miklóssy, 2011: 141-142）。换句话说，这些西方行动者以贬义的方式提及芬兰化，以确定暴露在苏联影响下可能导致的不利的政治联系，最终点燃一个从 "模糊的中立 "到苏联在一个国家的内部事务中彻底的霸权的过程（Laqueur, 1980）。
3. 贬义词（国内）。除了 "来自国外的强行芬兰化"（suomettaminen）的想法之外，在芬兰国内的辩论中，这个概念的贬义也略有不同。
在芬兰国内的辩论中，除了 "来自国外的强制芬兰化"（suomettaminen）的概念外，这个概念还有一个略微不同的贬义词。这个意思基本上是指成为芬兰化的过程（在芬兰语中，suomettuminen），也就是说，由于对本国领土附近的一个大国的外交政策纬度的极端现实和环境解读而产生了不利的国内政治文化。13 在这种情况下，芬兰化的过程已经发展到弱国开始对主导国家产生习惯性的同情，甚至积极捍卫其 "合法的安全利益"，类似于广泛描述的 "斯德哥尔摩综合症 "现象中的俘虏和俘虏之间的情况。
国内的贬义词可以进一步分为至少三个子类别，这取决于所观察到的过程是在过去还是在现在，以及参考点是在自己的政治文化中还是在国外：
芬兰化的过程是一个警告信号。这就是卡尔-格鲁伯在1950年代的奥地利辩论中所想到的想法（见上文）。格鲁伯将芬兰化的概念作为一个警戒性的概念，暗示如果其想象中的对立面--在上述奥地利的案例中，即无条件地融入西方政治军事集团--被拒绝的话，可能会出现不利的、但却是推测的政治轨迹。
政治污名化。芬兰化也被作为一种贬义词来批评国内政治对手的机会主义政治取向。例如，芬兰绿党领导人维勒-尼尼斯托（Ville Niinistö）在2014年就使用了这种 "技巧"，他批评芬兰政府决定与俄罗斯国有原子能公司合作在芬兰建造第三座核电站，认为这是芬兰化的明显标志（金融时报，2014）。
历史修正主义。芬兰化作为国内贬义词的最后一种形式对芬兰观众来说更为熟悉。在这里，"芬兰化 "被认为是一种尚未解决的历史创伤，即使冷战在大约25年前就已经结束，但它仍然困扰着芬兰的政治决策文化。在这个意义上，芬兰化的经验被积极和有意地用于当代的政治和文化斗争中，通过身份政治重新占有国家记忆。这个过程指的是Jorma Kalela（2012）所描述的 "历史政治"，也就是引用Matti Jutila（2015: 931）的话，"为了特定的[当前]目的而故意使用历史"，包括 "挑战[主导]的历史表述"。此外，克里斯托弗-布朗宁（2002: 48）注意到，在20世纪90年代初，芬兰的 "芬兰化"（Finlandization-as-a-trauma）意识已经在充满政治色彩的 "西方化 "叙事中发挥了影响作用（另见莫伊西奥，2008: 81-85）。关于芬兰冷战后外交政策方向的辩论也涉及到芬兰冷战经验的 "真实 "性质的表现。根据布朗宁（2002: 48）的说法、
[对芬兰化和凯科宁时代（1956-1981年的芬兰总统）的修正主义西化批评，试图通过揭露过去的 "真面目"，将芬兰人从被认为令人讨厌的 "过去的遗产 "中 "解放 "出来。
4. 4. 解放/进步的模式。尽管自1970年代末以来，芬兰努力为这个词创造一个积极的转折，但芬兰化的内涵主要还是负面的，尤其是在芬兰（见Forsberg and Pesu, 2016: 476）。因此，值得注意的是，在冷战后期，这个概念在一些东欧国家被重新塑造为具有解放性的用途。如果从芬兰的角度来看，芬兰化被看作是一个痛苦的、限制性的政治过程，那么对于那些已经被压制了很久的国家来说，也许它可以被重新制定为一个自愿的、解放的工具，以至于芬兰化的过程对他们来说看起来就像上天。波兰和匈牙利等国的一些民主反对派运动将 "芬兰模式"，甚至是芬兰化，作为冷战时期的灵感来源和抵抗模式（Autio-Sarasmo and Miklossy, 2011; Hakovirta, 1988: 70-71; 也见Quester 1990）。Echikson(1989)巧妙地总结了这一想法和这一术语意义背后的隐性辩论：
不幸的是，似乎很少有人能理解 "芬兰化 "这个概念的实际含义。在芬兰化下，外围苏联帝国的俘虏国将被解放出来，享受西方式的民主和繁荣，以换取对其重要安全利益的铁的保证。
逆向芬兰化 "的观点将芬兰模式的解放潜力推得更远：由于芬兰与苏联建立了密切的联系（由于冷战期间两国之间的流动和旅游日益频繁，普通公民之间的联系也越来越密切），他们也可以在苏联人民的眼中促进民主和进步的变革（Jutila, 1983: 53-57）。这种 "逆转的芬兰化 "的想法也与冷战时期东西方关系的互动主义解读产生了共鸣。Sari Autio- Sarasmo和Katalin Miklóssy（2011: 4）认为，"[......]在两极并列的浅层表面下，存在着生动互动的广阔空间"，这对冷战时期典型的对抗性高级政治学解读提出了挑战。事实上，从几个中欧和东欧华沙条约国的角度来看，正是芬兰的有限和平时期中立模式（与瑞士、奥地利和瑞典的更正统的法律和政治中立模式分开），与东方和西方都有贸易联系，是一个诱人的模式。因此，芬兰化是一个进步的想法，其目的是在不向苏联压力投降的情况下中和苏联压力。引用Miklóssy (2011: 144)的话说，这与基辛格和布雷津斯基的处方有明显的呼应、
[从一个东欧集团国家的角度来看，芬兰是一个在与苏联的关系上实现了非凡平衡的国家的例子。芬兰的政治策略表明，与西方国家保持灵活的关系而不引起苏联的严厉制裁是可能的。
最后，在20世纪80年代后期，在苏联的 "和平攻势 "和勃列日涅夫理论被戈尔巴乔夫的改革和他的 "新的外国政治思想 "所取代之后，芬兰的地位甚至被苏联人自己定义为一个参考点。1989年10月，戈尔巴乔夫对芬兰进行了第一次正式国事访问，在柏林墙开始拆除前的几个星期，戈尔巴乔夫正式承认了芬兰的中立地位，并指定芬兰为大小邻国之间关系安排的典范（见Blomberg, 2011: 129-133）。
一段历史的教训： 芬兰化的过去和现在，这里和那里
芬兰模式 "和乌克兰危机之间的第一个类比是由兹比格涅夫-布热津斯基于2014年2月23日提出的，当时距离总统亚努科维奇（Vik- tor Yanukovych）出逃仅一天，距离亲俄罗斯的武装团体逐渐吞并克里米亚仅几天。前美国国家安全顾问布热津斯基（2014）指责俄罗斯 "在恐吓和胁迫的基础上 "建立欧亚联盟，这与20世纪70年代末第二次冷战前苏联的 "和平攻势 "的方式不太一样。布热津斯基还建议，在东西方关系的大框架内处理乌克兰国内政治和乌克兰的国家间取向时，西方应该发挥 "建设性作用"。布热津斯基还说，这种建设性政策的工具是 "芬兰模式"，这不仅是 "乌克兰的理想"，也是 "欧盟和俄罗斯在任何更大的东西方战略交流中的理想"。 16 此外，布热津斯基建议，美国应明确表示，它的目标是支持 "一个真正独立和领土不分割的乌克兰"，其对俄罗斯的政策将 "类似于芬兰所有效实施的政策"（同上）。
两个月后，在克里米亚被吞并后，布热津斯基重申了他的观点，即美国应该倡导 "芬兰模式 "作为解决乌克兰问题的办法：
[除了对乌克兰和俄罗斯采取强硬态度外，我们还应该同时愿意认真谈判，以达成他们和我们都能接受的结果。这就是为什么芬兰的模式，我认为在这里非常有意义（Bloomberg, 2014）。
另一位著名的冷战人物亨利-基辛格（2014）重复了布热津斯基的观点，他也建议乌克兰应该采取与芬兰类似的姿态，"这个国家[对其激烈的独立性没有任何怀疑，并在大多数领域与西方合作，但小心地避免对俄罗斯的制度性敌意。" 布热津斯基和基辛格还认为，乌克兰不应成为北约成员（另见伊格内修斯，2014）。
值得注意的是，布热津斯基和基辛格并没有明确提到芬兰化的概念，尽管 "芬兰模式 "暗示了对芬兰冷战姿态的比喻。然后，我们也可以说，基辛格实际上是重新提到了冷战后的芬兰。事实上，他们对 "芬兰化 "的重新应用似乎涉及到了现在（芬兰拥有大量的政治和经济联系，并与西欧结成联盟，但在军事上不结盟）和过去（在与俄罗斯的双边关系中以默许为主要目标）的元素。有趣的是，布热津斯基还提到了 "芬兰模式 "的解放潜力：如果首先应用于乌克兰，理论上它可以渗透到俄罗斯，并在那里点燃一个渐进的转变。这种设想类似于1970年代末使用的 "反向芬兰化 "的想法。
即使布热津斯基和基辛格意在提及芬兰在冷战后的地位，许多评论家也将他们的处方解释为对冷战时期芬兰和现代乌克兰的历史分析或比较（尤其见Ignatius, 2014; Taubert, 2014; Inboden, 2014; Kirchick, 2014; Gaddy, 2014）。因此，尽管基辛格和布热津斯基似乎暗示了积极的内涵，但芬兰的直接接收明显是冷淡的，这一点也不奇怪。芬兰前驻德国和俄罗斯大使René Nyberg（2014）回应说，芬兰化并不像布热津斯基似乎暗示的那样。尼伯格对布热津斯基将这一概念作为一种可以从外部分配给乌克兰的模式提出质疑："芬兰化不是投降的同义词"。与其把芬兰化作为一个直接的模式或处方，尼伯格建议，芬兰的冷战经验应该仅仅被理解为 "灵感的源泉"，表明小国如何在一般的不对称权力关系管理中实践主体性。
另一位前芬兰大使（驻美国）亚科-伊洛涅米（Jaakko Iloniemi）（2014年）在《金融时报》上对基辛格和布热津斯基的回应中也提到了 "芬兰经验 "的独特性，因此，很难将芬兰的冷战政治文化复制为乌克兰的模式。此外，在芬兰的学术辩论中，与乌克兰危机有关的芬兰化概念也受到了一些怀疑，这可以用Anni Kangas（2014）提出的比喻来巧妙地概括： "芬兰化的概念就像一个怪异的盒中之物，不时地跳出盒子。"18
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Helsinki Syndrome: The Parachronistic Renaissance of Finlandization in International Politics
Article in New Perspectives · May 2017
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New Perspectives
Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations
Vol. 25, No. 1/2017
Helsinki Syndrome:
The Parachronistic Renaissance of Finlandization in International Politics
TAPIO JUNTUNEN
University of Tampere
Abstract: The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has produced a number of commentaries that have tried to grasp the crisis through the comforting lens of historical analogies. One of the most per- plexing of these has been the revival of Finlandization, or the idea of the “Finnish model” as a possible solution to the Ukraine crisis. In this article I interrogate these arguments, firstly, by historicising the original process of Finlandization during the Cold War. Secondly, I argue that the renaissance of Finlandization is based on parachronistic reasoning. In other words, the Finlandization analogy has been applied to modern-day Ukraine in such a way that the alien elements of the past context are, to paraphrase Quentin Skinner, “dissolved into an apparent but misleading familiarity” in the present re-appropriation of the idea and its contextual prerequisites. Indeed, the reappearance of Finlandization in the context of the Ukraine crisis reinforces the idea that the real drivers of international affairs can be reduced to the axioms derived from the transhistorical logic of international anarchy and the iron laws of great power politics. Thus, this article makes a novel contribution to the theoreti- cal discussion on the role of analogies and myths in International Relations.
Keywords: Finlandization, Parachronism, Myth; Analogy, Conceptual History, History of Finnish For- eign Policy
INTRODUCTION1
A process or state of affairs in which, under the cloak of maintaining friendly re- lations with the Soviet Union, the sovereignty of a country becomes reduced […] (Laqueur, 1980: 7).
A country [that follows] neutrality as a neighbor of a Great Power which repre- sents a different social order and uses arrogant political methods. This means that the country’s authority to decide its foreign policy is limited, but that its in-
New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017
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ternal authority is almost completed (V. I. Punasalo [a pseudonym] in Singleton, 1981: 270).
A deplorable state of affairs in which a small and weak neighbor, awed by the might and political ruthlessness of a totalitarian superpower, makes a shameless and embarrassing concessions of its sovereign liberties (Jutila, 1983: 2).
The concept and idea of Finlandization, the focus of much heated debate during the Cold War, has once again appeared in the discourse of international politics in the context of the Ukraine crisis. Eminent political figures, such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, offered ‘the Finnish model’ as a solution to the Ukraine crisis, both for Ukraine domestically and in the sense of solving disruptions in East-West re- lations more generally. Although Kissinger and Brzezinski did not explicitly use the term Finlandization – they used more general notions such as a “posture comparable to that of Finland” (Kissinger, 2014) and “the Finnish model” (Brzezinski, 2014) – their prescriptions were almost immediately interpreted as an implicit attempt to revive the notion of Finlandization (see, for example, Atlas, 2014; Gaddy, 2014; Kirchick 2014). The revival of Finlandization has invoked plenty of criticism. Most of these critical voices made a normative point by arguing that Finlandization would mean a de facto neutralisation and “abandonment of Ukraine” by the West (Lagon and Moreland, 2014). Moreover, Finlandization has been regarded as “a utopian goal for Ukraine
[…] that would be a lengthy, painful process” (Gaddy, 2014).
Despite the seemingly positive connotations in Kissinger and Brzezinski’s com- parison between modern Ukraine and the Finnish ‘posture’ or ‘model’, their propo- sition was greeted with lukewarm scepticism in Finland as well as in Ukraine (see, for example, Nyberg, 2014; Iloniemi, 2014; Bugriy, 2015). Instead of relying solely on outright normative arguments, Finnish commentators also focused their criticism on what they interpreted as a lack of historical soundness in the argument made by Brzezinski and Kissinger. In other words, they interpreted the revival of Finlandiza- tion as a misleading comparison between Cold War Finland and modern day Ukraine. This comparison was rejected, as the commentators emphasised the uniqueness of the Finnish Cold War experience and the heavily context-dependent nature of understanding how Finland has managed to arrange its relations with its bigger neighbours throughout history and, in the context of this piece, the Soviet Union during the Cold War and, subsequently, Russia.
Indeed, these responses seem to disclose the profound tension between the his- toricist notion emphasising the sui generis nature of the Finnish Cold War experi- ence, and, on the other hand, the idea of Finlandization either as a historical generalisation or as a prescriptive model in managing asymmetric power relations. In this article I will shed light on the historical reasoning and logic behind the reap-
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pearance of the idea of Finlandization amidst the Ukraine crisis. Moreover, I will focus on the wider repercussions of such analogical reasoning on our understand- ing of the very nature of world politics, its drivers and our valuation of the role of his- torical knowledge therein. I will argue that the analogy is based on an overgeneralised historical lesson that relies on a mythological re-appropriation of the original process of Finlandization during the Cold War. More importantly, the ‘lesson’ of Finlandiza- tion maintains and promotes an understanding of world politics as a stable and fixed game of great power politics driven by recurrent patterns and ahistorical mecha- nisms instead of underscoring the role of historical particularities, contingencies and contextual knowledge (cf. Lawson, 2012: 206–210; Leira and de Carvalho, 2016: 101–104; see also Ashley, 1984: 235–236; Kratochwil, 1993).
I will thus steer the discussion away from the debate over the ‘true’ meaning of Fin- landization towards theoretical questions on the logic and consequences of histor- ical analogies and myths in international politics. More specifically, I will grasp the mythological elements in the analogy of Finlandization by using Quentin Skinner’s typology of anachronisms. Skinner’s approach gives us a novel way to grasp the analogy of Finlandization as an example of a performative myth with its own history, to paraphrase Rasmussen’s (2003) distinction between “lessons of history” and “the history of lessons”.
I will argue that the historical reasoning behind the reappearance of Finlandization presents a model case study of a reversed anachronistic logic, that is, parachronism (Skinner, 1969; see also Syrjämäki, 2011). Whereas Skinner was concerned with the role of anachronisms in the study of history of ideas and political thought, I apply Skinner’s conceptualisation to study how historical analogies and political myths are being re-appropriated in the present. I will argue that the parachronistic logic behind the revival of Finlandization – especially when suggested as a prescriptive model and arrangement of asymmetric power relations as in the case of the Ukraine crisis
– is based on “the mythology of parochialism”. In other words, the analogy between post-WWII Finland and post-Cold War Ukraine is used in such a way that the alien elements between the two cases are “dissolved into an apparent but misleading fa- miliarity” (Skinner, 1969: 27), a notion that also echoes Roland Barthes’s (1973) con- ception of myths as second-order semiological systems.
Moreover, to reinforce my argument conceptually, I will bring the idea or term of Finlandization back to analytical scrutiny from its more vaguely metaphorical uses that have dominated the recent discourse. I claim that while Finlandization is nec- essarily a fuzzy concept, it has been (and still is) used in multiple, partly contradic- tory meanings, which each do particular work or have particular effects in the present. I will elaborate this ‘fuzziness’ by offering a preliminary taxonomy of Fin- landization that traces down four meanings for the concept – some historical, some still in use:
New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017 57
1) an ideal type and/or a neutral description of a foreign policy doctrine of small states;
2) a pejorative rhetorical tool aimed at convincing international (usually allies) or do- mestic audiences of the consequences of some potentially perilous, yet emerg- ing political influences and processes;
3) a revisionist concept of ‘history politics’ (especially in the context of the Finnish domestic political debate);
4) an emancipatory model for domestic reforms and foreign policy change.
I will begin by introducing the analytical framework. I will suggest that the concept of parachronism offers a novel approach to the study of how historical analogies are used in international politics. Although my approach stems predominantly from Quentin Skinner’s work on anachronistic mythologies, I will also situate my approach within the wider discussion of the role of myths, analogies, and historical lessons in International Relations literature. In the second part of the article I will explore the history of Finlandization itself by introducing the main features of the two waves of Finlandization debates during the Cold War. On the basis of this historical ground- ing, I will then compile a preliminary taxonomy on the different variants or meanings of Finlandization, both past and present. Finally, before the concluding section of my article, I will interrogate the attempts to revive the notion of Finlandization dur- ing the Ukraine crisis and the way these efforts rely on parachronistic reasoning.
PARACHRONISMS, ANALOGIES AND MYTHS
The contemporary international discussion around the analogy or ‘lesson’ of Finlan- dization has mostly stagnated into a normative debate on whether the assumed ‘Finnish model’ would be a good or bad prescription both for the future of Ukraine and for re- lations between the West and Russia more generally. My aim in this article is to avoid this impasse by critically evaluating the historical presuppositions behind the analogy and to analyse the repercussions stemming from its use; I argue that when used as a ‘les- son’, the analogy of Finlandization reinforces a reading of international relations dom- inated by the iron laws of great power politics. Moreover, the parachronistic logic and the mythological undertones inherent in the analogy of Finlandization make it an over- generalised lesson – crucial elements of the original historical process are forgotten to make sense of the present. Thus, the analogy also alters our understanding of the com- plex nature of the original Cold War process of Finlandization. The following discus- sion on parachronistic reasoning and on the role of myths and analogies in international relations introduces the theoretical premises behind my argument.
The Role of Anachronisms in the History of Ideas
In his 1969 essay “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” Quentin Skinner wanted to address some of what he saw as crucial dilemmas in the study of
58 New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017
history of ideas and political thought. Although Skinner was mostly concerned with the prerequisites and limitations in the study of Intellectual History and philosophi- cal thought, his remarks on “the priority of paradigms” also resonate with the wider methodological and epistemological questions on the nature of historical knowl- edge:
[M]odels and preconceptions in terms of which we unavoidably organize and adjust our perceptions and thoughts will themselves tend to act as determinants of what we think or perceive. We must classify in order to understand, and we can only classify the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar (Skinner, 1969: 6; see also Skinner, 1972: 406).
According to Sami Syrjämäki (2011: 23), who has studied Quentin Skinner’s work in detail, anachronisms usually appear “[…] when a discontinuity in history is not ac- knowledged and the usual direction is from the contemporary world to the past.” This formulation echoes the usual meaning of the concept that depicts anachronisms as (unintentional or intentional) errors in chronological order by placing artefacts, ideas, thoughts or social habits in historical contexts and periods where they were not yet invented or otherwise to which they were not accustomed. A definition offered by the Dictionary of Concepts in History suggests that anachronisms are formed when past phenomena are understood in the terms of “present values, assumptions, or in- terpretative categories” in an inappropriate manner (see Ritter, 1986: 9–12).
From the perspective of historical knowledge and academic research, anachro- nisms are generally perceived as something to avoid. On the other hand, following Skinner’s view on the role of historical knowledge, Syrjämäki argues that it is not pos- sible to avoid anachronisms entirely. Anachronistic logic is, quite simply, historians’ “original sin” – there is no escape from our preconceived paradigms. The process of making sense never starts from a historical and social void.2 Instead, our reading of history is “necessarily selective”, to quote E.H. Carr (1963: 10), that is, “[…] pre-se- lected and predetermined for us […] by people who were consciously or uncon- sciously imbued with [a] particular view and thought the facts which supported that view worth preserving” (Ibid.: 12). According to Syrjämäki (2011: 10), Skinner’s main theoretical insight in relation to the topic at hand is that he regarded anachronisms as “unavoidable, and even necessary, to any understanding of the past when ap- proached from a modern perspective.”3 In this sense, it is possible to separate ‘sheer anachronisms’ and intentional errors in chronological ordering from the existential condition of not being able to avoid the logic of anachronisms altogether.
Skinner addresses the problem of anachronisms by categorising them into four dif- ferent ‘mythologies’: doctrines, coherence, prolepsis and parochialism. The first two types address general dilemmas in interpreting the life-works and political thought
New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017 59
of any given author.4 The latter two address the anachronistic potholes in interpret- ing past texts, works or events more generally, which makes it pertinent to concen- trate on these latter two types here.
Mythology of prolepsis refers to the confusion that arises when the interpreta- tion of a specific text or historical event is based more on the sense of “[…] the ret- rospective significance of [the] given historical work or action than in its meaning for the agent himself” (Ibid., 22–24). When applied to a historical-political phenomenon such as Finlandization, this might simply refer to an over-determined reading that confuses the retrospective evaluation of the consequences of the political processes with the teleological explanation that treats the process or phenomenon as a con- scious and intentional project (cf. Rasmussen, 2003: 50).
Mythology of parochialism has two distinct subcategories. The first, “false refer- ence/influence”, is related to the “[…] danger of interpreting causal similarities be- tween two authors as references” (Syrjämäki, 2011: 106). This usually takes the mode of X being clearly influenced by Y because of the obvious resemblances between their ideas on topic X (Skinner, 1969: 25–27). The second, and more important form of parochialist interpretation in relation to the topic of this article is what Syrjämäki (2011: 106–107) describes as “conceptualizing into misleading familiarity”. Here the historian unconsciously misuses her modern point of view when describing the sense of what she is studying: “the historian may conceptualize an argument in such a way that its alien elements are dissolved into an apparent but misleading familiar- ity” (Skinner, 1969: 27–28). This would happen, for example, when one applies mod- ern concepts such as the welfare state to pre-modern societies, or the school of thought known as Realism to the intentions of historical figures such as Thucydides.
Parachronistic Logic in Analogies and Historical Lessons Parachronism is a reversed version of anachronism. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines parachronism as “[…] an error in chronology, especially by assigning too late a date” and traces its etymological origins back to the mid-17th century, “perhaps suggested by anachronism.”5 Rancière (1996: 54) traces the invention of parachro- nism back to 19th-century (French) dictionaries, where the concept was introduced as a lexical rationalisation to describe a symmetrical mistake to that of anachronism, but one where a fact is placed too late instead of too early.
When it comes to popular definitions, in Wikipedia parachronism is described as “[…] an object, an idiomatic expression, a technology, a philosophical idea, a musi- cal style, a material, a custom, or anything else sufficiently closely bound to a partic- ular time period as to seem strange when encountered in a later era” (Wikipedia, 2016, italics added). When anachronisms are used (usually in an unconscious fash- ion) to resolve antinomies in the past, parachronism can do the same trick in the present by displacing some historical political process or social phenomena from its
60 New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017
historical context. In other words, as in the mythology of parochialism, the alien el- ements of the past context of the political process are dissolved into an “apparent but misleading familiarity” in the present.
A common method of understanding the role of historical analogies is to con- sider them as cognitive schemes that utilise some key memories or formative expe- riences from past decisions and events to aid decision-making in the present. As Khong (1992: 6–7) explains, “[t]he term historical analogy signifies an inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another.” For Jervis (1976: 217) analogies are sense-making devices that re- veal causal processes and connections in world politics: “[p]revious international events provide the statesman with a range of imaginable situations and allow him to detect patterns and causal links that can help him understand his world” or, as Bränd- ström et al. put it, “to deal with current situations and problems” (2004: 193).
In these examples analogies are understood, firstly, as comparisons between the present and past situations (or events) and, secondly, as cognitive devices to aid the decision-making process based on inherited background knowledge. In this sense,
[b]y making accessible insights derived from previous events, analogies pro- vide a useful shortcut to rationality. But they also obscure aspects of the pres- ent case that are different from the past one. For this reason, a dramatic and important experience often hinders later decision-making by providing an anal- ogy that will be applied too quickly, easily, and widely (Jervis, 1976: 220).
This branch of literature, usually inspired by theories of cognitive psychology, stems from the assumption that formative experiences derived from past events and deci- sions provide cognitive schemas that decision-makers necessarily need to process the complex flow of information in the present (Snyder, 1991: 13–14). This is exem- plified in Jervis’s (1976: 222) probabilistic formula depicting the causal link from per- ceptions towards behavior: events -> lessons -> future behavior.
The cognitivist approach to historical analogies is usually understood as a com- parison between a present decision-making setting and some isolated event in the past, like in the (in)famous Munich 1938 analogy (Rasmussen, 2003: 501). It is in- teresting to note, then, that although the comparison between the Finnish experi- ence of the Cold War and the Ukraine crisis is not based on an isolated event or a single decision, it still seems to rely on some wider logic of analogical reasoning. In other words, the sense of causality seems to be more lucid in the traditional way of using analogy as a comparison between past and present events or decisions. When comparing a longer political process like the ‘lesson’ of Finlandization to other states in different temporal contexts, the sense of causality in the analogy loosens, thus generating space for the re-appropriation of the original process.
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In this sense the reappearance of Finlandization during the Ukraine crisis might offer us an example of what Jervis (1976: 228) describes as an overgeneralised lesson:
[…] Decision-makers usually fail to strip away from the past events those facets that are highly specific and situation-bound for more general characteristics be- cause they assume that the most salient aspects of the results were caused by the most salient aspects of the preceding situation. People pay more attention to what has happened than to why it has happened. Thus learning is superficial, overgeneralized, and based on post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning. As a re- sult, the lessons learned will be applied to a wide variety of situations without careful effort to determine whether the cases are similar in crucial dimensions.
The question here is not whether to evaluate how well the original Cold War process of Finlandization ‘fits’ with the present context around the Ukraine crisis. From a his- toricist6 position, it is more important to grasp how analogies are used, under what logic and what their consequences are. The mythological tendencies in the analogy of Finlandization echo Jervis’s notion that when relying on overgeneralised lessons “[t]he person will see the world as more unchanging than it is […]” (ibid.). In other words, overgeneralised lessons are enabled by (ontological) background assump- tions about the fundamental mechanisms and drivers of world politics. The inductive collection of historical facts and their contextualisation are seen as being of sec- ondary importance at best. Instead of emphasising the volatility and change of in- ternational politics, the past is too often used “[…] as a quarry to be mined for insights [that confirm] the universal and timeless workings of the (anarchical) structure of international politics” (Leira and de Carvalho, 2016: 101). As Kenneth Waltz (1979: 66, 70) describes this structural stasis, “[t]he texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly”, and the “constancy of structure explains the recurrent patterns and features of international- political life” (see also Hollis and Smith, 1991: 104–110).
Moreover, when putting the ‘enabling factors’ of broad, overgeneralised lessons aside, and turning to the ‘history of lessons’ – as Rasmussen (2003) describes his constructivist approach – it is equally important to consider how the parachronistic logic inherent in the overgeneralised analogies affects and modifies our sense of how world politics and great power politics work. The constructivist reading, con- centrating on the ‘history of lessons’, is not trying to grasp the role of leaders’ per- ceptions in a causal sense, but instead concentrates on the “drama […] on how lessons are learned and how they are put to political use” (Ibid.: 50).
The Skinnerian idea of anachronistic mythologies also echoes Roland Barthes’s (1973: 123) notion of myths as second-order semiological systems. For Barthes the original sign in the first system mutates into “a mere signifier” in a second, already
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existing system, thus transforming “[…] the knowledge contained in a mythical con- cept […] [into something] confused, made of yielding, shapeless associations” (Ibid.: 129). “In this sense”, Barthes (Ibid.) continues, “we can say that the fundamental character of the mythical concept is to be appropriated.” In other words, “[…] there is no fixity in mythical concepts: they can come into being, alter, disintegrate, dis- appear completely. And it is precisely because they are historical that history can very easily suppress them” (Ibid.: 130).
Finally, myths also have a performative function in relation to IR theory; myths hide the inherently political-ideological and historical nature of their truth-claims and replace the sense of historical particularities with universalised constructs (Weber, 2005: 2, 6–7).7 The power of historical analogies and overgeneralised lessons lies in their instrumental potential for redirecting the political imagination, especially amidst situations involving considerable uncertainty over the future. The analogy of Fin- landization and its mythical application to present-day Ukraine encourage a reading of international relations as a fixed game of great power politics where the lesser powers are treated as mere objects when the management of the international order through the associational balance of power arrangements is at stake (see Little, 2007: 12). In this article I will use the Skinnerian typology of anachronistic mythologies as an analytical tool to de-naturalise the mythological elements in the analogy or les- son of Finlandization.
LESSONS OF HISTORY: HISTORICISING AND TAXONOMISING FINLANDIZATION
Although the concept of Finlandization is usually credited to the German professor Richard Löwenthal, who is claimed to have invented it in in 1966, the idea of Finlan- disierung was already present in the Austrian foreign minister Karl Gruber’s writings in the early 1950s. In 1953 Gruber described the Finnish position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as a warning sign for Austria. Gruber’s message was directed towards the growing domestic debate on the direction of Austria’s foreign policy should the four- power occupation end and the state sovereignty and territorial unity of Austria be restored. Gruber, whose views Rainio-Niemi describes as ideologically pro-West- ern, associated neutrality with Finland’s precarious situation and its exposure to So- viet pressure. The example of “finnische Politik”, Gruber argued, would predispose the future of Austria to the dangers of becoming yet another People’s Democratic Republic in Europe (Rainio-Niemi, 2014: 53–57).
The second wave of the Finlandization debate – or its “renaissance”, as Hakovirta suggests – emerged from the late 1960s onwards. The notion of Finlandization be- came a popular catchword especially in relation to the debate on the effects of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (Hakovirta, 1975: 24–25). The more general European debate around the concept concerned both the role of neutrality within the emerging Eu-
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ropean political and security order and the possible repercussions of the ongoing arms control negotiations and political détente between the communist and capi- talist camps. The emergence of the Finlandization debate in the 1960s and 70s also coincided with a rising interest towards the role of small states in discussions over the future of the European security order. In this sense the question of Finlandization had wider implications than just those related to the international status of Finland itself. For Finland, the fundamental question was, to quote Maude (1982: 4), not just whether the Finnish foreign policy “[…] had, in seeking to avoid antagonizing the So- viet Union, become subservient to Soviet policy dictates”, but also whether “the vigor and honesty of their internal politics were being sapped as a result of this im- posing inter-state relation.”
It was in this sense that many Western commentators and scholars used Finlan- dization as a cautionary example during the 1960s and 1970s. They understood Fin- landization as a dynamic process that could be the fate of any country under Soviet influence should the U.S. military commitment become undermined by the ongo- ing European détente and arms control process (Best et al., 2004: 276, 309; Hakovirta, 1975: 27–35). This dynamic (and, thus, already somewhat analogical) reading of Finlandization was challenged by the historically sensitive interpretation that emphasised the sui generis nature of the Finnish experience and Finno-Soviet re- lations. Most interpretations based on this historicist stance, like those made by em- inent diplomats such as George Kennan (1974) and Max Jakobson (1980) during the 1970s and 1980s, also problematised the Finlandization of Finland itself (see also Singleton, 1981; Maude, 1982; cf. Mansala, 2015: 215–218; Laqueur, 1980: 12;
Hakovirta, 1975: 35–40).
What is valuable to understand in relation to the second ‘renaissance’ of Finlan- dization amidst the Ukraine crisis in 2014 is that the necessary preconditions for the Finlandization of Finland during the Cold War developed through a decade-long multifarious process from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s.8 Internally, this process required an incremental reorientation of foreign policy doctrine away from an ex- tremely passive and ultra-prudent small-state realism towards a more active con- ception of limited peacetime neutrality based on the independent status of Finland’s armed forces. At the same time, Finland maintained and reinforced its substantially dissimilar domestic political model and state culture (oriented towards Western con- sumerist democracy) vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This created the political and ideo- logical ‘space’ for the uneasy features of Soviet pressure towards the Finnish domestic politics and culture, thus separating the concept of Finlandization from cultural assimilation or suzerainty. Externally, on the other hand, the process of Fin- landization required major shifts in superpower relations, like that of the Geneva spirit in the mid-1950s9 and the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy after Stalin’s death (see especially Rentola, 2010).
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The historicist reading regards Finlandization as a more complex and contextually sensitive concept than more abstract and general concepts such as a ‘vassal state’, ‘suzerainty’, a ‘satellite state’ or a ‘protectorate’.10 Moreover, the concept of ‘ap- peasement’, describing the foreign policy posture of avoiding conflicts by making concessions in relation to the external actions of some other state, also lacks the his- torical-processual sense of Finlandization. The relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union was too asymmetrical for Finland to develop a serious policy of ap- peasement.
The Many Faces of Finlandization
The historicity of Finlandization is also evident in the multiple interpretations and applications of the concept since Richard Lowenthal, Walter Laqueur and others popularised it from the late 1960s onwards (see Laqueur, 1980: 7). To give a further conceptual backdrop to the examination of its present uses, I will next introduce a taxonomy that will dissect four meanings and uses for the concept of Finlandization:
(1) a description or ideal type; (2) an international pejorative; (3) a Finnish domes- tic pejorative; (4) an emancipatory or even progressive model. Some of them partly overlap; others more clearly discord with one another.
1. Description/ideal type. In the most ‘neutral’ sense of the word, Finlandization is used to describe a voluntary foreign policy strategy or, in a lesser sense, a foreign pol- icy instrument that aims to reassure a more powerful state, usually a neighbour, either through bilateral politics or other means such as reinforcing regional stability through a neutralist foreign policy posture.11 For example, Vinayaraj (2011: 272) suggests that “[Finlandization] confirms both the strategy of a weak state facing threats and inter- ference from a strong neighbor and validates the strategy of bandwagoning [as op- posed to balancing].” This definition resonates with other terms describing small- and medium-sized states’ foreign policy postures, like ‘accommodation’. Some scholars, such as Hans Mouritzen (1988), have applied the idea of Finlandization to the re- construction of general theories on political adaptation. These theoretical ambitions are not primarily interested in describing the historical phenomena of Finlandization as much as they are interested in formulating an “empirical testing ground for gen- eral propositions about the dynamics of adaptive acquiescence” (Underdal, 1991). From the perspective of analytical clarity, the problem here is that the concept of Fin- landization turns out to be somewhat redundant. Consider, for example, Inoguchi’s (2003: 113) depiction of Finlandization as “[…] the security policy of a state which at- tempts to maintain and/or augment its security by the partial restructuring of its in- ternal and external policies for the sake of securing its survival.” If we were to follow this definition of Finlandization, it would be difficult to think about foreign policy pos- tures that would not at least in some ways fit into this explanatory scope, thus mak- ing the analytical (or historical) value of the concept somewhat questionable.
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As Forsberg and Pesu (2016: 474) have shown, Finlandization is often understood as an abstract ideal-type without referring to Finland concretely. The logic of Weber- ian-inspired ideal typification is to create deliberately simplifying and generalising conceptualisations. Thus, remembering the historicity of Finlandization-as-a-process, it should probably be understood as an individualised ideal type, or an idealisation of a certain historical tendency in international politics (for a discussion on ideal types in relation to historiography, see Ritter, 1998: 201–206). However, even this would be problematic. If we understand Finlandization either as a generalisation of a recurrent phenomenon in interstate relations or as a historicised, individualised ideal type, it re- mains unclear what the analytical value it adds to concepts such as ‘appeasement’ or ‘accommodation’ is. In this sense, it may be suggested that an ideal type of Finlan- dization should instead be regarded as a ‘contingent generalisation’, although it has to be remembered that even in this form, Finlandization maintains its controversial and highly politicised nature, something that is vividly present in the following three understandings.
2. Pejorative (international). Moving away from the descriptive formulations, there are at least three different historical meanings and contexts for the concept or idea of Finlandization. In the first historically derived meaning, which was al- ready presented above, Finlandization is used as a synonym for a process through which a more powerful state – in the historical sense, the Soviet Union – aims to control or subordinate a state’s foreign policy by intervening in its domestic poli- tics. The ambition is to create, as James Kirchick (2014) describes it, a “condition of coerced neutrality” (see note 10 above). With its indelibly pejorative connota- tions, this interpretation can further be defined as a “forced Finlandization from abroad”, usually translated as suomettaminen in Finnish. This interpretation of Fin- landization was evident in some of the (more) hawkish Western comments on the true nature of the Soviet ‘peace offensive’ during the Cold War. Some of these commentators perceived the ethos of détente “[…] as Soviet advancement by other means” (Maude, 1982: 3). Similarly, in 1972 Franz-Josef Strauss, a West Ger- man conservative politician, claimed that the interventions of the Soviet Union in Finnish domestic affairs offered a clear sign of what the Soviet intentions were in relation to the European affairs and the CSCE process in general (Miklóssy, 2011: 141–142). In other words, these Western actors referred to Finlandization in a derogatory sense to pinpoint unfavourable political liaisons that the exposure to Soviet influence might cause, eventually igniting a process that would lead from “vague neutrality” to outright Soviet hegemony in one’s internal affairs (Laqueur, 1980).
3. Pejorative (domestic). In addition to the idea of a ‘forced Finlandization from
abroad’ (suomettaminen), the concept has had a slightly different pejorative con- notation in the Finnish domestic debate. This meaning basically translates to the
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process of becoming Finlandized (in Finnish, suomettuminen), that is, the un- favourable domestic political culture stemming from an ultra-realistic and circum- spect reading of one’s foreign policy latitude in relation to a major power in the proximity of one’s territory.12 This meaning translates to the tacit but deeply in- grained policy of acquiescence that can cut through multiple sectors of one’s so- ciety and cultural life, something that might be described as ‘Helsinki syndrome’.13 In this variant, the process of becoming Finlandized has evolved so far that the weaker state starts to feel a habitual sympathy towards the dominating state, even actively defending its ‘legitimate security interests’, similarly to the case between the captive and the captor in the widely described phenomena of ‘Stockholm syn- drome’.14
The domestic pejoratives can be further divided into at least three sub-categories depending on whether the observed process is in the past or in the present and whether the point of reference is within one’s own political culture or abroad:
The process of Finlandization as a warning sign. This was the idea Karl Gruber had in mind with the Austrian debate during the 1950s (see above). Gruber used the idea of Finlandization as an alarmist notion to imply unfavourable, yet speculative po- litical trajectories that might appear if its imagined antithesis – in the aforementioned Austrian case, an unconditional integration into the Western political-military bloc – was rejected.
Political stigmatisation. Finlandization has also been used as a pejorative utterance to criticise the opportunistic political orientation of one’s domestic political oppo- nents. This ‘technique’ was utilised, for example, by the leader of the Finnish Green Party, Ville Niinistö, in 2014, when he criticised the Finnish government’s decision to proceed with building the third nuclear power plant in Finland in cooperation with the Russian state-owned Atomic Energy Corporation as a clear sign of Finlan- dization (Financial Times, 2014).
Historical revisionism. The last form of Finlandization as a domestic pejorative is more familiar to the Finnish audience. Here, Finlandization is presented as an unre- solved historical trauma that haunts the Finnish political decision-making culture even though the Cold War ended some 25 years ago. In this sense, the experience of Finlandization is actively and intentionally used in contemporary political and cul- tural struggles by reappropriating national memory through identity politics. This process refers to what Jorma Kalela (2012) describes as ‘history politics’, that is, to quote Matti Jutila (2015: 931), “the deliberate use of history for specific [present] pur- poses”, including the “challenge of [dominant] representations of history”. Moreover, Christopher Browning (2002: 48) has observed that the sense of Finlandization-as- a-trauma had already taken on an influential role in the politically loaded “Western- izing” narrative in Finland in the beginning of the 1990s (see also Moisio, 2008: 81–85). The debate on the orientation of Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy also
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involved manifestations of the ‘true’ nature of the Finnish Cold War experience. Ac- cording to Browning (2002: 48),
[…] revisionist Westernizing critiques of Finlandization and the Kekkonen era [the Finnish president in 1956–1981] are attempting to ‘liberate’ the Finns from the perceived distasteful ‘legacy of the past’ by exposing the past for ‘what it re- ally was’.
4. The emancipatory/progressive model. Despite Finnish efforts to create a posi- tive spin for the term since the late 1970s, the connotation of Finlandization has mainly remained negative, especially in Finland (see Forsberg and Pesu, 2016: 476). It is therefore interesting to note that during the latter stages of the Cold War, the concept was refashioned into one with an emancipatory use in some Eastern European countries. If Finlandization was seen as a painful, constraining political process from the Finnish perspective, maybe it could be reformulated into a voluntary and liberating tool for countries that have been down so long that the process of Finlandization looks like up to them. Some of the democratic opposi- tion movements in countries like Poland and Hungary used the ‘Finnish model’, even Finlandization, as a source of inspiration and a model of resistance during the Cold War (Autio-Sarasmo and Miklossy, 2011; Hakovirta, 1988: 70–71; see also Quester 1990). Echikson (1989) neatly sums up this idea and the implicit debate behind the meaning of the term:
Unfortunately, too few people seem to understand what the idea of ‘Finlan- dization’ actually means. Under Finlandization, the captive nations of the outer Soviet empire would be freed to enjoy Western-style democracy and prosper- ity in return for cast-iron guarantees of its vital security interests.
The idea of ‘reversed Finlandization’ took the emancipatory potential of the Finnish model even further: since Finland had created close contacts with the Soviets (in- creasingly between ordinary citizens due to the growing mobility and tourism be- tween the nations during the Cold War as well) they could also promote democratic and progressive change in the eyes of the Soviet people themselves (Jutila, 1983: 53–57). This idea of ‘reversed Finlandization’ also resonates with the interactionist reading of East-West relations during the Cold War. Sari Autio- Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (2011: 4) suggest that “[…] under the shallow sur- face of bipolar juxtaposition, there was a wide space of vivid interaction”, something that challenges the paradigmatic confrontational high-politics reading of the Cold War era. Indeed, it was the Finnish model of limited peacetime neu- trality (separated from the more orthodox modes of legal and political neutrality
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in Switzerland, Austria and Sweden) with trade ties to both the East and the West that appeared as a tempting model from the perspective of several Central and Eastern European Warsaw Pact countries. Thus, Finlandization served as a pro- gressive idea that was aimed at neutralising Soviet pressure without surrendering to it. To quote Miklóssy (2011: 144), and with clear reverberations of Kissinger and Brezinski’s prescriptions,
[l]ooked at from the angle of an Eastern bloc country, Finland represented an example of a state that had achieved an extraordinary balance as far as its re- lations with the Soviet Union were concerned. The Finnish political maneuver- ing showed that it was possible to maintain flexible relations with the West without provoking harsh Soviet sanctions.15
Finally, during the latter stages of the 1980s, after the Soviet ‘peace offensive’ and the Brezhnev doctrine were replaced by Gorbachev’s perestroika and his ‘new for- eign political thinking’, Finland’s position was even ulitised as a reference point by the Soviets themselves. During his first official state visit to Finland in October 1989, only a few weeks before the demolition of the Berlin Wall began, Gorbachev fi- nally recognised the Finnish neutrality, and designated Finland as a model for how relations between small and big neighbours should be arranged (see Blomberg, 2011: 129–133).
A HISTORY OF LESSONS: FINLANDIZATION THEN AND NOW, HERE AND THERE
The first analogy between the ‘Finnish model’ and the Ukrainian crisis was made by Zbigniew Brzezinski on February 23, 2014, only a day after the flight of President Vik- tor Yanukovych and a few days before the gradual annexation of Crimea by pro- Russian armed groups. Brzezinski (2014), a former U.S. national security advisor, accused Russia of establishing the Eurasian Union “based on intimidation and co- ercion” not too dissimilar from how the Soviet Union’s “peace offensive” was per- ceived ahead of the Second Cold War in the late 1970s. Brzezinski moreover suggested that when dealing with Ukrainian domestic politics and Ukraine’s inter- national orientation mostly within the broader framework of East-West relations, the West should take “a constructive role”. Brzezinski added that the tool for such a constructive policy would be “the Finnish model”, and that this would not just be “ideal for Ukraine”, but for “the EU and Russia in any larger east-west strategic ac- commodation.”16 In addition, Brzezinski recommended that the U.S. should thus make it clear that it aims to support “a truly independent and territorially undivided Ukraine” whose policies towards Russia would be “similar to those effectively prac- ticed by Finland” (Ibid.).
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Two months later, after the annexation of Crimea, Brzezinski repeated his idea that the U.S. should advocate the “Finnish model” as a solution to the Ukraine cri- sis:
[I]n addition to being tough-minded on Ukraine and Russia, we ought to at the same time, be willing to negotiate seriously an outcome that they and we can live with. And this is why the Finnish model, I think, is very relevant here (Bloomberg, 2014).
Brzezinski’s ideas were repeated by another eminent Cold War figure, Henry Kissinger (2014), who also proposed that Ukraine should pursue a posture compa- rable to that of Finland as a “nation [that] leaves no doubt about its fierce inde- pendence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.” Both Brzezinski and Kissinger also opined that Ukraine should not become a NATO-member (see also Ignatius, 2014).17
It is notable that Brzezinski and Kissinger did not explicitly refer to the concept of Finlandization, although the “Finnish model” hinted at an analogy to the Cold War posture of Finland. Then again, we could also argue that Kissinger was actually re- ferring to post-Cold War Finland. Indeed, their re-appropriation of Finlandization seemed to involve elements from both the present (Finland possessing substantial political and economic connections and alliances with Western Europe but being militarily non-aligned) and the past (acquiescence as the primary aim in the bilateral relations with Russia). Interestingly, Brzezinski also referred to the emancipatory po- tential of the ‘Finnish model’: when applied first to Ukraine, it could theoretically trickle down towards Russia and ignite a progressive transformation there. This en- visioned scenario is akin to the idea of ‘Finlandization in reverse’ used in the late 1970s.
Even if Brzezinski and Kissinger intended to refer to the post-Cold War position of Finland, many commentators interpreted their prescriptions as a historical anal- ogy or comparison between Cold War Finland and modern-day Ukraine (see es- pecially Ignatius, 2014; Taubert, 2014; Inboden, 2014; Kirchick, 2014; Gaddy, 2014). It should be no surprise, then, that despite the positive connotations that Kissinger and Brzezinski seemingly implied, the immediate reception in Finland was noticeably lukewarm. René Nyberg (2014), a former ambassador of Finland to Germany and Russia, responded that Finlandization does not work in the way Brzezinski seems to suggest. Nyberg challenged Brzezinski’s use of the concept as a model that could be assigned to Ukraine from the outside: “Finlandization isn’t a synonym for capitulation”. Instead of using Finlandization as an outright model or prescription, Nyberg suggests that the Finnish Cold War experience should be understood merely as “a source of inspiration”, demonstrating how small powers
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can practice subjectivity vis-à-vis the management of asymmetric power relation- ships in general.
Similar remarks about the uniqueness of “the Finnish experience” and, hence, the difficulty of copying Finnish Cold War political culture as a model for Ukraine was made by another former Finnish ambassador (to the U.S.), Jaakko Iloniemi (2014), in his response to Kissinger and Brzezinski in the Financial Times. Moreover, in the Finnish scholarly debate, the notion of Finlandization in relation to the Ukraine crisis was also greeted with some scepticism, which can be neatly summed up in the metaphor coined by Anni Kangas (2014): “the concept of Fin- landization is like a grotesque Jack-in-the-box that from time to time jumps out of its box.”18
Since bouncing out of its box once again, the idea of Finlandization has been frequently employed in Western debates surrounding the Ukraine crisis. Many com- mentators have suggested that the prescription and analogy should indeed be re- jected. It is important to note, though, that most of these critiques have not been made on the basis of an incoherent historical logic behind the analogy, or criticism towards the mythological elements in the ‘lesson’, but on normative grounds, that is, on the basis of the potentially negative consequences the process of Finlan- dization might have domestically for Ukraine (Taubert, 2014; Lagon and Moreland, 2014). The consequences and legitimacy of the analogy itself have rarely been questioned.
There appears to be something curious about the way Finlandization has been re-appropriated as a rather straightforward normative concept. It is in this context that the intended connection between Finlandization and concepts such as ‘sphere of influence’, ‘appeasement’, ‘acquiescence’ and ‘suzerainty’ becomes intelligible. The problem here is that the analogy is lacking historical sensitivity and thus natu- ralises the notion of Finlandization in a way that reinforces the underlying narrative of the primacy of great power politics and its ahistorical structural stasis.
The Parachronistic Logic of the Finlandization Analogy When the Finnish model or Finlandization is applied to the Ukrainian situation after the annexation of Crimea, segments of the historical memory in the analogy dissolve.
Something essential of the past is forgotten to make sense of the present.
For example, the situation in Ukraine during the spring of 2014 was characterised by some serious violations of basic international norms, including respect for terri- torial integrity and the principle of non-interference. In contrast the necessary pre- requisites for the process of Finlandization of Finland were based mostly upon positive conjunctures in the external security environment during the mid-1950s.19 Thus, the analogy of Finlandization, or the Finnish model, does not primarily refer to
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the historical experience of Finland. Instead, when the concept of Finlandization is applied to the West-Ukraine-Russia triangle in 2014, the historical experience and les- sons of Finlandization become simplified.
From a Barthesian perspective, the Finnish Cold War experience, paired with the historical narrative of ‘surviving’ under an imposing neighbour, can be seen as a sign that is removed from its original symbolic structure when applied to the second order system constructed around the Ukraine crisis. This re-appropriation becomes possible exactly because of the looseness in the underlying structure of the (origi- nal) myth, that of Finlandization, which is so vague and open to competing inter- pretations. Historical particularities and details are deformed, torn from their historical context to make sense of the present, thus also affecting the way we un- derstand the history or lesson of Finlandization. This turns the use of the analogy into a historically significant event: it implicitly promotes a simplified meaning of the concept which is intrinsically tied to the primacy of the iron laws and recurrent events in international politics over historical details, which leads to the danger of reducing the complex historical process of Finlandization and the multifarious meanings it has been given to a myth or a displaced metaphor.20
As an analogy between Cold War Finland and modern Ukraine, the idea of Fin- landization and the ‘Finnish model’ clearly simplifies the complexities and intrica- cies of the past to turn it into an implicitly causal proposition. In Skinnerian terms, the parachronistic logic and the mythology of prolepsis hidden in the Finlandization analogy render it understandable with its own history of how it might have and not have been used as a lesson. It affects both the way we understand the past as a les- son and the way we understand the timeless and repetitive features of international politics in the present. This leads to a misleading sense of familiarity between the past and the present as in the parochialist version of parachronistic mythologies; the an- tinomies in the present context are resolved by amalgamating them into a re-ap- propriated historical process, thus turning the analogy into a sense-making device to grasp the present context at hand in a way that is synchronised with the precon- ceptions of the interpreter.
Of course, the danger here is that the discrepancies between past and present contexts which are so inherent to politicised historical analogies can create “[…] an unfortunate frame of mind, which dwells in the past, limits the present, analyzes and does not see political chances in the future” (Nyyssönen, 2006: 44, 65). The parachronism of Finlandization, removed from its historical context to make sense of what is happening in the present, already frames Ukraine’s future choices by sug- gesting their inherently limited and constricted nature. The cognitivist approach usu- ally understands the role of analogies as that of devices for overcoming the pervasive feeling of uncertainty and complexity that decision-makers face. In this light it is in- teresting to note that the use of Finlandization as an analogy or lesson indicates that
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the person invoking it is fairly perceptive of the constants of power politics and asym- metric power relations in international politics.
To conclude, in parachronism, as an ‘upside-down’ version of anachronistic logic, the alien elements from the past are forgotten to make sense of the present: recorded history becomes a history of abstractions, a history of repetition, timeless iron laws and a level of ahistorical coherence and determination which no event or process ever maintained (Skinner, 1969: 17). Thus, as an act of historical re-appro- priation, the parachronistic revival of Finlandization during the Ukraine crisis can be reconstructed, following the ‘upside-down’ reading of Skinner’s typology of anachro- nisms, in three steps:
1) General aim: Creating coherence in the present context by using analogical reasoning that is based on the reconstructed and oversimplified political process of the past.
2) Application: Familiarisation or parochialism, that is, the reliance on a mis- guided resemblance between past processes and the present context by im- plicitly dissolving the alien elements of the past into “an apparent but misleading familiarity” in the present. The concept is, to paraphrase Skinner, used “in an apparently explanatory way without any consideration of whether the conditions [are] sufficient, or at least necessary, for the proper application of the concept [to] have been met” in its present re-reading (Ibid.: 25, 27).
3) Consequences for historiography and ‘history politics’: The familiarisation of the past ‘model’ and the ‘lesson’ it offers for the present context (uninten- tionally) evoke a sense of historical revisionism by resolving the historical complexities, controversies and antinomies of the past.
Finally, instead of underlining the importance of the idiographic study of historical events and processes, the reappearance of Finlandization (along with the loose dis- cussion on ‘the Finnish model’) in the context of the Ukraine crisis seems to reinforce the idea that the real drivers of international politics can be reduced to the axioms derived from the transhistorical logic of (structural) international anarchy and the iron laws of great power politics. The temptation to apply Finlandization as a crude metaphor or analogy only makes sense if we imagine Finlandization as an ahistori- cal instrument used to restructure asymmetric power relations between states. The flip side of the coin is that the application of Finlandization vis-à-vis modern-day Ukraine undermines both the role of contextual interpretation and the general idea of transformative or progressive forces in international politics. Instead of appreci- ating domestic factors and national political cultures in the shaping of the interna- tional order and (small state) foreign policy especially, the reappearance of
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Finlandization promotes the idea of international politics as a stable and fixed game of great power politics which is impervious to geography and socio-political partic- ularity, as well as history.
CONCLUSION: BEYOND ‘HELSINKI SYNDROME’ – FALLING FOR THE PAST IN THE PRESENT
There is always an element of distortion when a geographical term is used to de- scribe a political phenomenon and a good case can perhaps be made to elimi- nate it from our vocabulary. But a change in our dictionary will hardly affect the realities of world power (Laqueur, 1980: 3).
The above quotation is taken from Walter Laqueur’s polemic essay “Europe: The Specter of Finlandization”, originally published in 1977. For Laqueur, the phenome- non of Finlandization, aside from its somewhat misleading geographical bearings, is a reflection of the timeless realities of power politics. Even if we were to agree with the notion that there is no escape from the iron logic of great power politics, the ar- gument that we should preserve a special analytical and conceptual status for con- cepts such as Finlandization remains questionable. Indeed, and quite curiously, Laqueur also seems to admit that the concept of Finlandization itself is somewhat re- dundant (when observed against some of the more elementary ‘realities’ of world politics).
In this article, I have argued that by historicising the concept we have a strong case against the logic in which Finlandization is understood as a recurrent epiphe- nomenon stemming from the timeless workings of international anarchy and power politics. As I have shown, the revival of Finlandization during the Ukraine crisis re- lies on a similar logic to that advanced by Laqueur. The fundamental problem in this formulation is that it neglects the historically complex, particular and sensitive nature of the phenomena of Finlandization itself. Moreover, a brief look into the concep- tual history of Finlandization has shown that the meaning of the concept is anything but fixed. Indeed, the unavoidable historicity of the concept itself renders it politically loaded, malleable, and with potential consequences such as those in the way the concept is still used with derogatory connotations in Finnish political debates.
Moreover, taking the historical perspective, I have suggested that the political and contextual prerequisites of Finlandization (in Finland) during the Cold War accounted for a volatile and complex process that lasted at least ten years from the end of the Second World War to the ‘opening’ of Finnish foreign policy in the form of a more active peacetime neutrality from the mid-1950s onwards. What is important to dis- cern here is that the process of Finlandization, including the actual ‘golden age of Finlandization’ – roughly from the late 1960s to the early 1980s – was not dictated
74 New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017
by the deterministic logic of international anarchy. On the contrary, Finlandization was the result of a multifarious and volatile historical process that was linked to the shifting currents of the East-West confrontation as well as intentional decisions made by the Finnish foreign policy elite.
The complexity of the concept’s origins and the implications it had for Finnish po- litical culture during the Cold War also make Finlandization an unconventional his- torical analogy. When the concept is suggested as a heuristic tool for managing asymmetric power relations in international affairs, it merely seems to reaffirm the iron laws of great power politics. This is what the ‘Helsinki syndrome’ caused by Fin- landization is all about – a weaker state under submission not only starts to sympa- thise with the interests of its larger neighbour, but also inherits and reinforces the tragic, ahistorical and non-progressive picture of the nature of power politics, thus compounding its own – supposed – fate.
From here we can discern that Finlandization is a rather vague and obscure les- son to turn into a policy prescription. On the other hand, it is exactly this ‘clumsiness’ in the structure of the lesson and its overgeneralising tendencies that seem to in- crease its performative efficacy: it is a concept that carries multiple interpretations and imaginaries within it, thus having plenty of rhetorical potential without clear strategic accuracy. In other words, the ambivalence over its ‘true’ meaning and essence makes the ‘lesson’ of Finlandization so open to re-appropriations and parochial mythologies.
To quote E.H. Carr, the task of the historian is “[…] to analyse the past in the light of the present and the future which is growing out of it, and to cast the beam of the past over the issues which dominate present and future” (Carr, 1951: 17–18). Is it not then exactly this – the use of the past as a “beam over the present and future” – that the resurrection of Finlandization from the dustbins of Cold War history during the Ukraine crisis represents? Perhaps, but Carr also notes that this process should be a two-way street: “History is a dialogue between past and present, not between dead past and living present” (Ibid.: 10). In other words, when offering the “lessons of his- tory” (see Rasmussen, 2003) we should be aware of the “imperfections of the his- torical process” (Carr, 1951: 18) and the repercussions of their uncritical application. There is always the danger of using the “beam of the past” in a way that hides its own inconsistencies.
The idea is not to claim that we should aim for one definitive truth over Finlan- dization, or any other similarly complex historical phenomena, but to be critically aware of the repercussions when re-appropriating them; by being aware of the ten- dency towards parachronistic reasoning when presenting the lessons of history in in- ternational politics, we may grasp a better sense of how and why the past is used to make sense of the present. As a ‘lesson’ on how to manage asymmetric power re- lations, the analogy of Finlandization is based on a mythological reading of the past.
New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017 75
Finally, as an analogy between two temporally distant historical contexts, the ren- aissance of Finlandization privileges a normative reading of international relations as a stable and fixed game of great power politics where every conjuncture and major change is perceived as evidence of the soundness of one’s pre-given paradigm on the true nature of international affairs.
ENDNOTES
1 This article was written as a part of the research project ”Reimagining Futures in the European North at the End of the Cold War”, which was funded by the Academy of Finland (SA268669). I would like to thank the following people for their comments to the previous versions of this text that I have presented at the European International Studies Association conference in Sicily in 2015 and at the Finnish Inter- national Studies Association conference in Aulanko in 2016: George Lawson, Tuomas Forsberg, Jo- hanna Rainio-Niemi, Kari Möttölä, Heino Nyyssönen, Anni Kangas, Tapani Turkka and Matti Pesu. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers as well as the Editor-In-Chief Benjamin Tallis for their thorough comments and constructive criticism that have really helped me to improve the piece. As usual, the responsibility for the arguments remains solely with the author.
2 This Skinnerian formulation has similarities with R.G. Collingwood’s re-enactment theory on critical his-
torical inquiry (Collingwood, 1946/1986). The same can be said about Hans-Georg Gadamer’s term “history of effect” and the idea that all knowledge formation is historically situated. When we are try- ing to grasp the meaning of past events and texts, for example, our interpretation has already been af- fected by the previous interpretations of the subject matter that we have been given via the effect of the tradition (Gadamer, 1960/2004: 299–306). Indeed, for Gadamer (ibid.: 354) the effect of our present horizon is not (necessarily) limiting, but a prerequisite for historical understanding in the first place.
3 Skinner is an integral member in the so-called ‘revisionist’ or ‘Cambridge’ school of intellectual history that supports the idea of a historicist approach and the importance of detailed contextualisation when interpreting past linguistic artefacts. For a critical take on the ‘Cambridge School’ and Skinner’s work, see Femia, 1981; Tully, 1988. For the influence of the ‘Cambridge School’ on the study of IR see Bell, 2003; Reus-Smit, 2008; Hobson and Lawson, 2008: 428.
4 Mythology of doctrines appears when “[…] the historian is set by the expectation that each classical
writer […] will be found to enunciate some doctrine on each of the topics regarded as constitutive to his subject” (Skinner, 1969: 7–16). The mythology of coherence, on the other hand, closely related to the mythology of doctrines and its “scripturalist tendency”, is popular in works that try to reveal the cor- pus of the author’s work as a single and coherent body of thought (Ibid., 16–22).
5 The origins of the concept are in Greek and can be divided into two main elements: para- = “beyond” +
khronos = “time”, whereas the ana- prefix in anachronism refers to a movement from rear toward front. 6 By following Jackson (2006: 497–498) I understand historicity through the “irreducibly historical char- acter” of events, and instead of dealing with them “as presumptively stable entities” we should treat
historical events as dynamic processes of production and reproduction.
7 In this sense the focus here is not that much on how myths can be used as consciously reconstructed sto- ries, plots or ‘necessary fictions’ (like nation-building narratives) striving for chronological cohesion. Instead
76 New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017
it is important to focus on the ‘elasticity’ that myths offer as “[…] structuring elements of broader discourses which construct political problems and legitimate policy solutions” (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2016: 18).
8 Singleton (1981) emphasised the need to understand the evolution of Finno-Soviet relations all the way from the late 19th century as the basis of understanding Finlandization as a historical phenomenon.
9 ‘The spirit of Geneva’ refers to a short period of time in the mid-1950s when the two superpowers and their ideological camps, for the first time during the Cold War, took serious steps away from the strict mutual hostility. This process included a series of agreements (the Korean Armistice in 1953, the Aus- trian State Treaty in 1955) and unilateral reassuring moves, such as the Soviet decision to withdraw troops from bases in China (Port Arthur) and Finland (Porkkala). The process culminated around the Geneva Conference in 1954, where the accords to end the French involvement and wars in Indochina were put together (see Best et al., 2004: 228–229).
10 Finlandization has a strong family resemblance to the concepts of Ottomanisation, Austrianisation and Lebanonisation (see Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994: 235–241). Quite interestingly, John Mearsheimer (2015) has suggested the ‘Austrian model’ as a solution to the Ukraine crisis, as “the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO. It should look like Austria during the Cold War”. Also, some commentators have suggested that external powers should start a negotiation process on Ukraine’s ‘permanent neutrality’ in a similar vein as that in which Austria’s neutrality was agreed on in the mid-1950s (see Gady, 2014; O’Hanlon, 2017). O’Hanlon (2017) even goes on to sug- gest that the annexation of Crimea could be “finessed” in such an arrangement simply by “putting the matter to the side” on behalf of Ukraine by the greater powers, thus only falling just short of suggest- ing what could be understood as the condition of coerced neutrality (see Kirchick, 2014).
11 Finlandization has been recently applied also as a loose prescription to a variety of contexts other than that of Ukraine, both within and outside of Europe, like in the case of Taiwan-China relations (see es- pecially Mouritzen, 2017 and Gilley, 2010; for a succinct critical take on the analytical poverty and his- torical inaccuracy of these kinds of applications see Kallio, 2010).
12 During the 1970s, this pejorative sense was still rather marginal within domestic political debates in Finland, and very few Finnish politicians, with the exception of the few leaning towards the right end of the political spectrum, used it (Hakovirta, 1975: 40–41).
13 I am especially indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting the ‘Helsinki syndrome’ metaphor to describe this process. According to the Finnish historian Jukka Tarkka (2012: 277), a jux- taposition between the political culture of Finlandization and ‘Stockholm syndrome’ was first made by the Finnish author Anja Snellman (as confirmed by the author herself to the writer of this article, Snell- man introduced the analogy during a Finnish morning television show titled Mediakokki [MTV], which she partly hosted, somewhere in between 2010 and 2014).
14 For a critical review on the use of ‘Stockholm syndrome’, that is, “[…] the positive emotional bond a kid- nap victim may develop towards their captor”, in the psychiatric literature see Namnyak et al. (2007).
15 In her article, Miklóssy concentrates on the Hungarian-Finnish bilateral relations during the CSCE process from 1969 onwards.
16 On the wider context and longer historical process of the East-West confrontation in and around the Ukraine crisis see Haukkala, 2015.
New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017 77
17 It has to be noted here that as opposed to what Brzezinski and Kissinger seem to suggest, Finland has made no commitments that could be interpreted as a declared abstention from the possibility of ap- plying for NATO membership or joining or forming a military alliance more generally. Quite to the con- trary, Finland has often been described as having a ‘special relationship’ with NATO through its enhanced participation in the Partnership for Peace programme.
18 The reappearance of Finlandization also raised a discussion in Finland that has involved a new wave of his- torical revisionism. For example, the national traumas and Cold War experiences of Finland were being called back to scrutiny by the influential author Sofi Oksanen (2015; 2017). By referring to yet another pair of metaphors, this time those coined by the Finnish scholar Mika Aaltola (2016: 60–61), Oksanen has com- pared Finlandized Finland to “a rat in a Skinner’s cage [a tool used in a laboratory environment for sub- ordination]” and to “a lion in a zoo [that] on the surface [looked] prosperous, but its living space was very problematic.” Thus, according to Oksanen, Finlandization was a success story only to the Soviet Union, but not to Finland herself, and Oksanen argues that Russia is trying to repeat the same practice in the pres- ent. Oksanen suggested that Finland should address the trauma of the Cold War experience of Finlan- dization through the use of national memory politics. (See also Kirchick, 2014; Juntunen, 2016: 71.)
19 The idea of a false sequence in Brzezinski and Kissinger’s analogies was also noticed by Portnikov
(2015). Also, see note 9 above.
20 On the uneasy relationship between (neo)realistic theory and historical approaches to the study of in- ternational politics see Kennedy-Pipe (2000); Ashley (1984: 235–236, 257); Kratochwil (1993); Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994); and Leira and de Carvalho (2016): 100–104; see also Hobson and Lawson (2008: 418–423), who propose that the neo-realistic understanding of the role of history is based on the idea of ‘history without historicism’ (see also Leira, 2015). For a good take on the role of myths in the self-understanding of the discipline of IR see de Carvalho et al. (2011).
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• Taubert, Krista (2014), ‘Finlandization Is Not a Perfect Recipe for Ukraine’, Time.com, 21/03/2014. Avail- able at http://time.com/33797/Finlandization-is-not-a-perfect-recipe-for-ukraine/ (Accessed 18/09/2015).
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• Weber, Cynthia (2005), International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, London: Routledge.
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Notes on Contributors
IAN BRUFF is Lecturer in European Politics at the University of Manchester, UK. He has published widely on capitalist diversity, neoliberalism, and social theory. He is currently researching the foundations of neoliberal ideology and the political econ- omy of authoritarian neoliberalism in Europe, and is the Managing Editor of the Transforming Capitalism book series published by Rowman & Littlefield International. Correspondence email: ian.bruff@manchester.ac.uk
MATTHIAS EBENAU is a Union Lecturer at the Lohr-Bad Orb training centre of IG Metall, the German metal workers’ union. He has published widely on different top- ics within Global and Comparative Political Economy, with a particular focus on cap- italist diversity and North-South relations, as well as labour and other social movements.
Correspondence email: matthias.ebenau@igmetall.de
[Together, Ian and Matt recently completed a large cross-country project on the di- versity of contemporary capitalism(s), with Christian May and Andreas Nölke (both of Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany). This produced two German-language collections in 2013 (with Westfälisches Dampfboot and the journal Peripherie) plus an English-language special issue in 2014 (the journal Capital & Class) and an Eng- lish-language volume in 2015 (with Palgrave Macmillan).]
STEPHAN DELBOS is a New England-born writer living in Prague. His poetry, es- says, and translations have been published internationally. He is the editor of From a Terrace in Prague: A Prague Poetry Anthology (2011) and the author of a poetry chapbook, In Memory of Fire (2017). His collection of visual poems, Bagatelles for Typewriter, was exhibited at Prague’s ArtSpace Gallery in 2012. His play Chetty’s Lullaby, about trumpeter Chet Baker, was produced in San Francisco in 2014. A second play, Deaf Empire, about Czech composer Bedřich Smetana, was produced by Prague Shakespeare Company in 2017. A Founding Editor of the literary jour- nal B O D Y, he teaches at Charles University and Anglo-American University in Prague.
Correspondence email: sdelbos@hotmail.com
IMEMO – PRIMAKOV NATIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECON- OMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
was established in 1956 and it is the successor to the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs, which existed from 1925 to 1948. Soon after the estab- lishment, the Institute gained the reputation of an important centre of integrated fundamental and applied socio-economic, political and policy-oriented research
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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
on the analysis of the main trends of world development; and the Institute is unique in this way in Russia. The mission of the Institute is the elaboration of a reliable an- alytical basis for political decision-making. The Institute cooperates with federal and regional government bodies, mass media, major public and private companies. In its research, IMEMO takes an independent and uncommitted position. Since 2015, IMEMO’s annual ‘Russia and the World’ Forecasts have been published in abridged English versions in New Perspectives, bringing the work of the institute to a wider audience and sparking considerable and much needed debate.
TAPIO JUNTUNEN is a researcher and a PhD candidate at the School of Manage- ment, the University of Tampere. His research interests include the history of Finnish foreign and security policy, critical security studies and the politics of resilience, nuclear weapons politics and nuclear disarmament as well as the interconnections between the study of international history and the practice turn. Juntunen is currently working in the research project ‘Reimagining Futures in the European North at the End of the Cold War’, funded by the Academy of Finland. His dissertation focuses on the effects of the Cold War nuclear policies in the Finnish foreign policy and the wider Northern Europe roughly between 1975 and 1991. He has recently published articles on re- silience politics and Finnish foreign policy in journals such as Resilience, Kosmopolis and Politiikka. He is a board member in the Finnish International Studies Association and the Finnish Peace Research Association.
Correspondence email: tapio.juntunen@uta.fi
VÍTĚZSLAV NEZVAL (1900–1958) was the leading Czech avant-garde writer of the first half of the 20th century. A founding member of both Devětsil (in 1920) and the Surrealist Group of Czechoslovakia (in 1934, the first such group outside of France), his output consists of numerous poetry collections, experimental plays and novels, memoirs, essays, and translations. In addition to The Absolute Gravedigger, his most important work includes Alphabet, Prague with Fingers of Rain, Valerie and Her Week of Wonders, and A Prague Flâneur. Along with Karel Teige, Jindřich Štyrský, and Toyen, Nezval frequently visited Paris, engaging with the French Surrealists and forg- ing a friendship with André Breton and Paul Éluard. He served as editor of the Prague group’s journal Surrealismus.
A native of San Francisco, TEREZA NOVICKÁ moved to the Czech Republic in 2000. Currently a student in the American Literature graduate program at Charles Uni- versity in Prague, she has translated a number of Czech and Slovak poets into Eng- lish, including Ondřej Buddeus, Jan Těsnohlídek, Sylva Fischerová, Lenka Daňhelová, Pavel Novotný, Nóra Ružičková, and Ondřej Škrabal.
172 New Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1/2017
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
DANIEL ŠITERA is a doctoral student at the Department of Political Science (ÚPOL) of Charles University in Prague and the Graduate School Global and Area Studies (GSGAS) of the University of Leipzig. He holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Wroclaw. His research interests include the study of post-so- cialist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, theories of European integration, and comparative and international political economy. He has also been a visiting student and researcher in London (UCL) and Manchester (UoM).
Correspondence email: daniel.sitera@uni-leipzig.de
RICHARD WESTRA is Designated Professor in the Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University, Japan. He is author or editor of 15 books and scores of articles and chap- ters. Among his most recent single authored books are Unleashing Usury: How Fi- nance Opened the Door to Capitalism Then Swallowed It Whole (Clarity Press, 2016) and Exit from Globalization (Routledge Paperback, 2015). He is coeditor of the Jour- nal of Contemporary Asia. He received his PhD from Queen’s University, Canada in 2001.
Correspondence email: westrarj@law.nagoya-u.ac.jp
RADE ZINAIĆ teaches in the Department of Communication Studies at Wilfrid Lau- rier University in Waterloo, Ontario and is a member of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) and the Canadian Sociological Asso- ciation (CSA). His research interests include modern European intellectual history, Marxism, revolutionary movements, decolonization, and South Slavic folklore. He has published in Slavonic and East European Review and East Central Europe and is currently pursuing a project exploring the way South Slavic epic lore informs the Marxist political outlook of the Yugoslav revolutionary and dissident Milovan Djilas. Correspondence email: zinaicrade@gmail.com
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