2014 年 3 月 27 日,星期四,俄罗斯士兵守卫克里米亚辛菲罗波尔的中心。克里米亚政府决定解散自卫队,为自 2 月下旬以来一直占领的俄罗斯军队提供帮助。

2014 年 3 月 27 日,星期四,俄罗斯士兵守卫克里米亚辛菲罗波尔的中心。克里米亚政府决定解散自卫队,为自 2 月下旬以来一直占领的俄罗斯军队提供帮助。 美联社照片/MAX VETROV

俄罗斯正在完善镇压反独裁政权起义的艺术

一位俄罗斯军事领导人透露了使用雇佣军、民兵和特种作战部队支持从委内瑞拉到非洲的独裁者的蓝图。

2014 年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后,克里姆林宫利用混合战争破坏稳定并征服乌克兰,这一点引起了广泛关注。但从那以后的几年里,莫斯科采用了灰色地带的工具并创造了一些完全不同的东西:一种由独裁者雇佣以确保其统治安全的安全部队。

《俄罗斯军工信使》  2018 年 7 月一篇鲜为人知的文章中,俄罗斯南部军区指挥官讨论了成功使用不穿制服的雇佣军战士、当地政府支持的民兵和正规部队镇压反抗叙利亚叛乱分子阿萨德政权。在“未来战争的参谋部”中,Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov 上将认为,在叙利亚开创的技术可以出口到弗拉基米尔·普京总统认为适合干预民众起义的几乎任何环境。 

这篇文章没有引起大多数西方观察家的注意。但北约盟军陆军司令部前文化顾问马克沃伊格和当时的俄罗斯和欧亚事务前高级顾问马克沃伊格不是。Ben Hodges 将军,美国陆军欧洲司令。Voyger 说,这篇文章读起来就像是使用雇佣军、民兵和秘密战术的蓝图,“不是为了赢得与美国军队、欧洲或北约的战争,而是为了对抗民众的叛乱,比如叙利亚的叛乱。” 

Dvornikov 称赞他所谓的“综合部队编组”:特种作战部队、未穿制服的士兵(可能是雇佣军)和从地方分子或盟军中挑选出来的民兵的组合。他称之为“廉价的远征战争”。

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文章的标题和出版商的选择都很重要。2013 年,《军工信使》发表了俄罗斯总参谋长瓦列里·瓦西里耶维奇·格拉西莫夫 (Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov) 的开创性文章,描述了一组混合战争概念,这些概念后来被称为“格拉西莫夫主义”(Gerasimov Doctrine )。但正如创造该术语的研究员马克·加莱奥蒂 (Mark Galleoti ) 指出的那样,“学说”实际上并不是学说。格拉西莫夫表示,他相信混合战争和对敌对政治人物的战略黑客攻击以及泄露他们的信息是美国推翻或控制政府的一部分方式。他只是敦促俄罗斯军方效仿。 

同样,Dvornikov 证明美国在南斯拉夫和伊拉克开创了“整合集团”作为推翻政府的手段。 

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“我们在任何地方都目睹了几乎相同的场景,”他写道。“然而,与上个世纪的冲突相比,侵略者的地面部队群直接参与地面行动,重点是通过整齐伪装的综合编队实现目标”(阅读一篇Voyger 提供的文章的完整翻译。 )

Dvornikov 继续说道,“这些团体是根据反对派、民族和教派分裂的原则,在当地资源的基础上创建的,方法是组织非正规部队和民众民兵,这些部队能够在支持下合并成更大规模的编队并在特种作战部队和其他州的私营军事公司的领导下。”

他描述了自 2015 年以来俄罗斯如何利用综合力量支持阿萨德政权。

他写道:“在叙利亚使用的部队编组是以结构复杂的特殊行动的形式进行的。” 

Voyger 指出,Dvornikov 贬低叙利亚军方——这表明该文章并非(仅)旨在描绘该政权稳定的虚假图景。 

“这是一篇真正的分析文章,讨论弱点、问题等,而不仅仅是某种虚假信息,”。就成功而言,他可能到处都是夸大其词,但他仍然公开谈论他已经克服的许多问题,这是有道理的。”

用混合力量击败民众起义,一个方法

那么德沃尔尼科夫的综合部队是做什么的呢?他在要点中列出了几个具体角色,包括: 

  • “发动旨在削弱敌人经济潜力的罢工”,意思是摧毁可能帮助资助反政府分子的民间企业或企业。 
  • “武装分子的主动信息和心理目标,以影响他们的道德心理状态”,意思是有针对性的信息和错误信息行动。
  • “自主部队(部队)在各个方向进行的高机动作战活动。”

他接着概述了各种游击战策略,例如“广泛使用地下通道、隧道和通信以及建筑设备”来攻击城市街区的叛军据点;以及“使用搭载在‘Tachanka’型皮卡上的机动部队”——别处称为技术——进行快速伏击和撤退。 

这些支持更多的常规特种作战部队,通过各种活动保护政权资产,Dvornikov 写道,包括: 

  • “旨在摧毁恐怖组织最危险单位的战斗活动;
  • “保护重要基础设施站点和主要道路方向; 
  • “使……武装部队的战斗火力和手段能够使用情报数据的战斗活动; 
  • “保护国界。”

沃伊格说,德沃尔尼科夫的目标是将俄罗斯人在叙利亚的所作所为变成未来安全行动的典范。 

“当俄罗斯人出现在委内瑞拉时——这100 名军人由一名高级地面部队将军率领——他们试图复制类似的东西,”他说。 

沃伊纳说,德沃尔尼科夫打算向独裁者提供俄罗斯的综合部队,就像承包商向房主推销车库门开启器一样。安装后,机器应自动运行,只需最少的服务。

Voyner 想知道委内瑞拉“他们留下了什么”。“他们是否创建了某种可以在情况恶化时启动的结构?显然,那里还没有内战。也许不会有。这意味着,在这种情况下,只要出现在那里,通过创造这种模式,给政权某种混合的远征结构,向反对派表明没有获胜的机会,他们实际上是在先发制人[冲突],因此,通过避免内战获胜。”    

瓦格纳的雇佣兵

Dvornikov 没有直接提到俄罗斯雇佣军的名字,只提到“私营军事公司,但 Voyner 说他们“发挥着至关重要的作用”。

人们对神秘的瓦格纳集团知之甚少,只知道该雇佣军集团是以其创始人 GRU Lt. Col. Dmitry Utkin 的呼号命名的,并且至少部分由受到美国制裁的普京亲信 Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin 资助。雇佣军在俄罗斯 2014 年侵略乌克兰及其在叙利亚的活动中发挥了关键作用。

俄罗斯新闻媒体Fontanka报道称,该组织每月提供 250,000 卢布(约合 4,000 美元)的报酬来招募战士,远远超过一名年轻俄罗斯士兵的薪水。但危险是真实存在的。2018 年 2 月,数十名雇佣军被认为死于美军之手 ,当时他们袭击了美军所在的叙利亚叛军阵地。 

据 Fontanka报道,在某一时刻,叙利亚有多达 2,000 名瓦格纳雇佣兵。 

纳撒尼尔·雷诺兹 (Nathaniel Reynolds) 在卡内基基金会最近的一篇论文中写道,瓦格纳雇佣军在叙利亚扮演着两个主要角色。

“一方面,它专注于夺取和保卫石油和天然气资产,Prigozhin 现在在其中拥有财务股份。另一方面,瓦格纳仍然是克里姆林宫的工具,莫斯科用它来支持更广泛的军事目标,雇佣军在重大战役中与亲阿萨德的部队并肩作战,”雷诺兹写道。“据报道,Prigozhin 以在他的项目上大手大脚而闻名,他用低于标准的武器和很少的重型或精密设备武装雇佣军。据推测,战士的 薪水也会随着时间的推移而下降。”

Voyger 称他们为“炮灰”。 

“也许这就是为什么他们在 2018 年春天将他们留在沙漠中对抗我们的男孩,因为他们被认为是可以消耗的,所以几乎被摧毁了。或者有人猜测正规军和雇佣军之间存在某种紧张关系,甚至是竞争关系。这也是可能的,”他说。 

不管是不是炮灰,对于一个几乎不尊重人权、越来越渴望与其他有同样想法的独裁政权结盟的政权来说,它们可能会越来越有用。 

“在秘密战争的广泛范畴内,莫斯科可以通过多种方式利用瓦格纳——对邻国发动目标有限的入侵,训练代理人的力量来破坏亲西方政府的稳定,或者隐藏俄罗斯的秘密军队在场,” 

德沃尔尼科夫似乎在暗示,他们将在未来几年发挥另一个重要作用,镇压针对普京政权盟友的叛乱。

来自乌克兰海军 7 月 10 日 Facebook 的一张图片显示,一艘俄罗斯军舰驶入因美国和乌克兰领导的演习而关闭的水域

来自乌克兰海军 7 月 10 日 Facebook 的一张图片显示,一艘俄罗斯军舰进入因美国和乌克兰领导的演习而关闭的水域 ВМС ЗС УКРАЇНИ / NAVY OF UKRAINE

俄罗斯军舰进入乌克兰炮火演习区,制造“危险局面”

该地区在美国和乌克兰领导的黑海演习中被使用。

乌克兰称,一艘俄罗斯驱逐舰周三进入黑海海域,该海域为美国、乌克兰和其他国家的军舰进行海军炮击练习。 

The Ukrainian Navy said this created “a dangerous situation,” during the annual U.S.- and Ukranian-led Sea Breeze exercise. A U.S. Navy official confirmed only that the Russian ship was present and "had no impact to the exercise yesterday."

In a July 10 post on their Facebook page, the Ukrainian Navy reported that the Russian Kashin-class guided-missile destroyer Smetlivy spent about eight hours in an area designated for gunfire exercises during the annual U.S.- and Ukranian-led Sea Breeze exercise.

This “trigger[ed] a dangerous situation,” an “emergency,” the post said. “The Russian Federation once again showed its true identity and ignored the rules of international maritime law.” 

The post said that the crew of the Ukranian frigate Hetman Sahaydachniy attempted to make contact with the Smetlivy to ask about the Russian ship’s maneuvers, in accordance with international law. But the Ukranians report that the Russian sailors pretended that they were experiencing communication problems. 

The 19th annual edition of the Sea Breeze exercise brings together 33 ships, 26 aircraft, and more than 3,000 troops from 19 militaries. 

“The presence of the Russian ship had no impact to the exercise yesterday and all evolutions were conducted as scheduled,” said Lt. Bobby Dixon, a spokesman for the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet. “During exercises, to include Sea Breeze, we expect all vessels to operate safely and in accordance with international maritime law and norms like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It can be ill-advised to enter an area given the safety hazard identified in a Notice to Mariners.”

Aug. 20, 2017: Barbed wire and chain link fencing surrounds the complex that houses the National Security Agency outside Washington, D.C.

Aug. 20, 2017: Barbed wire and chain link fencing surrounds the complex that houses the National Security Agency outside Washington, D.C. DANIEL J. MACY / SHUTTERSTOCK

The NSA Is Behind Schedule on Surveillance-Abuse Controls

The NSA inspector general also criticized the spy agency's data-security plans.

The National Security Agency is behind on implementing internal data system controls aimed at assuring compliance with the domestic privacy protections in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, a watchdog found.

The NSA inspector general's office, in an unclassified version of its semiannual report released on Monday, summarized its study of the agency's system controls related to the law’s controversial Section 702, which allows counterterrorism programs to target certain non-U.S. individuals overseas under regulated conditions.

The IG “found that NSA did not have a necessary system control,” said the July 8 report covering October 2018 through March 2019. “The agency had previously identified this as a concern and has been working to implement a new system control. Until this system control is implemented, the agency will be at risk for performing queries that do not comply with” its authority under Section 702, which was the since-amended area of the law that former contractor Edward Snowden criticized in 2013 when he leaked highly classified information on NSA surveillance.

Though the original goal for implementing the new controls was December 2017, the NSA now plans to have a prototype ready by December 2020, the IG said.

Related: DEA Never Checked If Its Massive Surveillance Operations Are Legal, Watchdog Says

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The watchdog also criticized NSA’s data system security plans, which “are often inaccurate and/or incomplete,” the report said, citing data centers and equipment rooms not properly protected with two-person access controls and removable media that “are not properly scanned for viruses.” An eight-year-old effort to better monitor the authorization of software and hardware purchases by contractors still needs finalization, auditors found.

The inspector general “also found that some aspects of NSA programs it examined were working well, and it recognized a number of best practices that could be replicated across the agency,” the report said. The agency closed 69 out of 198 new recommendations to management during the six-month period, and closed out a total of 438 past outstanding recommendations.

The agency’s investigations division received 457 contacts on its hotline, resulting in 27 investigations and 64 inquiries, as well as 14 cases referred to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. Disciplinary actions were taken against eight employees during the reporting period, resulting in one employee’s termination and four employees resigning or retiring in lieu of removal. The NSA recouped approximately $53,000 for contractor misconduct and $11,400 for employee timecard fraud.

Examples of uncovered employee misconduct included a GS-15 civilian found to have committed reprisal against a subordinate by threatening to fire the subordinate, who had made three protected disclosures. The investigative findings were forwarded to Defense Department IG, the NSA Employee Relations office, the Office of Personnel Security and the subject’s supervisor.

In another case, a former Senior Executive, “who at the time of the investigation was a reemployed annuitant and employee of a private company, recommended that a Senior Agency Technical Director meet with his private employer,” the report said. “The former Senior Executive recommended his current private employer to the agency as capable of meeting an agency procurement requirement. The OIG substantiated that the employee had used his public office for private gain, a violation of 5 CFR § 2635.702.