超越 "赫尔斯基症候群"-

结论：超越 "赫尔斯基症候群"--在目前的情况下落入过去的窠臼当一个地理术语被用来界定一种政治现象时，总是有一种扭曲的因素，也许有理由将它从我们的词汇中剔除。
但是，我们的字典的改变很难影响世界权力的性质（Laqueur, 1980: 3）：上述引文摘自Walter Laqueur的论战文章《欧洲：芬兰化的前景》，最初发表于1977年。对拉奎尔来说，除了有点误导性的地理方位之外，芬兰化的现象是权力政治的永恒现实的反映。即使我们同意这样的观点，即无法逃脱大国政治的铁律，我们应该为芬兰化这样的概念保留一个特殊的分析和概念地位的论点仍然是值得怀疑的。事实上，非常奇怪的是，拉奎尔似乎也承认，芬兰化的概念本身有点多余（当对照世界政治的一些更基本的 "现实 "观察时）。在这篇文章中，我认为，通过将这个概念历史化，我们有充分的理由反对这样的逻辑：芬兰化被理解为一个反复出现的偶发现象，源于国际无政府状态和权力政治的永恒运作。正如我所表明的，在乌克兰危机期间，芬兰化的复兴重新依赖于与拉奎尔所提出的类似逻辑。这种表述的根本问题在于，它忽略了芬兰化现象本身的历史复杂性、特殊性和敏感性。此外，对芬兰化的概念历史的简单考察表明，这个概念的含义并不固定。事实上，这个概念本身不可避免的历史性使其具有政治性和可塑性，并且具有潜在的后果，例如在芬兰的政治辩论中，这个概念仍然被用于贬义的含义。

此外，从历史的角度来看，我认为冷战期间芬兰化（在芬兰）的政治和环境前提是一个动荡和复杂的过程，从第二次世界大战结束到芬兰外交政策的 "开放"，即从1950年代中期开始的更积极的和平时期的中立，至少持续了十年。这里需要注意的是，芬兰化的过程，包括实际的 "芬兰化的黄金时代"--大约从60年代末到80年代初--并不是由国际无政府状态的决定性逻辑所决定的。相反，芬兰化是一个多变和不稳定的历史进程的结果，它与东西方对抗的潮流变化以及芬兰外交政策精英的有意决定有关。这个概念的起源的复杂性以及它在冷战期间对芬兰政治文化的影响也使芬兰化成为一个非常规的理论类比。当这个概念被认为是管理国际事务中不对称的权力关系的启发式工具时，它似乎只是重申了大国政治的规律。这就是芬兰化引起的 "赫尔辛基综合症 "的全部内容--一个处于屈服之下的弱国不仅开始与它的大邻国的利益相一致，而且还继承和加强了权力政治本质的悲剧性、非历史性和非进步性的图景，从而使它自己的--假定的--命运更加复杂。另一方面，正是这个教训结构中的这种 "笨拙 "及其过度概括的倾向，似乎增加了它的表演效力：它是一个带有多种解释和想象的概念，因此有大量的修辞潜力而没有明确的战略准确性。换句话说，对其 "真正 "意义和存在的矛盾性使得芬兰化的 "教训 "如此容易被重新使用和狭隘的神话。引用E.H.Carr的话，历史学家的任务是"[...]根据现在和由它产生的未来来分析过去，并将过去的光束投向主导现在和未来的问题"（Carr, 1951: 17-18）。那么，在乌克兰危机期间，芬兰化从冷战历史的垃圾箱中复活所代表的不正是这种情况吗--将过去作为 "现在和未来的光束"？也许，但卡尔也指出，这个过程应该是双向的："历史是过去和现在之间的对话，而不是死的过去和活的现在之间的对话"（同上：10）。换句话说，在提供 "历史的教训"（见Rasmussen, 2003）时，我们应该意识到 "历史理论过程的不完美"（Carr, 1951: 18）以及不加批判地应用这些教训的后果。

我们的想法并不是说我们应该对芬兰化或任何其他类似的复杂的历史现象寻求一个确定的真理，而是在重新使用它们的时候对其反响有批判性的认识；通过意识到在国际政治中介绍历史教训时对准时代的推理的倾向，我们可以更好地理解过去如何以及为什么被用来理解现在。最后，作为两个时间上相距甚远的历史背景之间的类比，芬兰化的复兴为国际关系的规范性解读提供了特权，因为它是一个稳定和固定的大国政治游戏，每一个突发事件和重大变化都被认为是一个人对国际事务真实性质的预先设定的范式的合理性的证据。

CONCLUSION: BEYOND ‘HELSINKI SYNDROME’ – FALLINGFOR THE PAST IN THE PRESENTThere is always an element of distortion when a geographical term is used to de-scribe a political phenomenon and a good case can perhaps be made to elimi-nate it from our vocabulary. But a change in our dictionary will hardly affect therealities of world power (Laqueur, 1980: 3).The above quotation is taken from Walter Laqueur’s polemic essay “Europe: TheSpecter of Finlandization”, originally published in 1977. For Laqueur, the phenome-non of Finlandization, aside from its somewhat misleading geographical bearings, isa reflection of the timeless realities of power politics. Even if we were to agree withthe notion that there is no escape from the iron logic of great power politics, the ar-gument that we should preserve a special analytical and conceptual status for con-cepts such as Finlandization remains questionable. Indeed, and quite curiously,Laqueur also seems to admit that the concept of Finlandization itself is somewhat re-dundant (when observed against some of the more elementary ‘realities’ of worldpolitics).In this article, I have argued that by historicising the concept we have a strongcase against the logic in which Finlandization is understood as a recurrent epiphe-nomenon stemming from the timeless workings of international anarchy and powerpolitics. As I have shown, the revival of Finlandization during the Ukraine crisis re-lies on a similar logic to that advanced by Laqueur. The fundamental problem in thisformulation is that it neglects the historically complex, particular and sensitive natureof the phenomena of Finlandization itself. Moreover, a brief look into the concep-tual history of Finlandization has shown that the meaning of the concept is anythingbut fixed. Indeed, the unavoidable historicity of the concept itself renders it politicallyloaded, malleable, and with potential consequences such as those in the way theconcept is still used with derogatory connotations in Finnish political debates.

Moreover, taking the historical perspective, I have suggested that the political andcontextual prerequisites of Finlandization (in Finland) during the Cold War accountedfor a volatile and complex process that lasted at least ten years from the end of theSecond World War to the ‘opening’ of Finnish foreign policy in the form of a moreactive peacetime neutrality from the mid-1950s onwards. What is important to dis-cern here is that the process of Finlandization, including the actual ‘golden age ofFinlandization’ – roughly from the late 1960s to the early 1980s – was not dictated by the deterministic logic of international anarchy. On the contrary, Finlandizationwas the result of a multifarious and volatile historical process that was linked to theshifting currents of the East-West confrontation as well as intentional decisions madeby the Finnish foreign policy elite.The complexity of the concept’s origins and the implications it had for Finnish po-litical culture during the Cold War also make Finlandization an unconventional his-torical analogy. When the concept is suggested as a heuristic tool for managingasymmetric power relations in international affairs, it merely seems to reaffirm theiron laws of great power politics. This is what the ‘Helsinki syndrome’ caused by Fin-landization is all about – a weaker state under submission not only starts to sympa-thise with the interests of its larger neighbour, but also inherits and reinforces thetragic, ahistorical and non-progressive picture of the nature of power politics, thuscompounding its own – supposed – fate.From here we can discern that Finlandization is a rather vague and obscure les-son to turn into a policy prescription. On the other hand, it is exactly this ‘clumsiness’in the structure of the lesson and its overgeneralising tendencies that seem to in-crease its performative efficacy: it is a concept that carries multiple interpretationsand imaginaries within it, thus having plenty of rhetorical potential without clearstrategic accuracy. In other words, the ambivalence over its ‘true’ meaning andessence makes the ‘lesson’ of Finlandization so open to re-appropriations andparochial mythologies.To quote E.H. Carr, the task of the historian is “[…] to analyse the past in the lightof the present and the future which is growing out of it, and to cast the beam of thepast over the issues which dominate present and future” (Carr, 1951: 17–18). Is it notthen exactly this – the use of the past as a “beam over the present and future” – thatthe resurrection of Finlandization from the dustbins of Cold War history during theUkraine crisis represents? Perhaps, but Carr also notes that this process should be atwo-way street: “History is a dialogue between past and present, not between deadpast and living present” (Ibid.: 10). In other words, when offering the “lessons of his-tory” (see Rasmussen, 2003) we should be aware of the “imperfections of the his-torical process” (Carr, 1951: 18) and the repercussions of their uncritical application.There is always the danger of using the “beam of the past” in a way that hides its owninconsistencies.

The idea is not to claim that we should aim for one definitive truth over Finlan-dization, or any other similarly complex historical phenomena, but to be criticallyaware of the repercussions when re-appropriating them; by being aware of the ten-dency towards parachronistic reasoning when presenting the lessons of history in in-ternational politics, we may grasp a better sense of how and why the past is used tomake sense of the present. As a ‘lesson’ on how to manage asymmetric power re-lations, the analogy of Finlandization is based on a mythological reading of the past.Finally, as an analogy between two temporally distant historical contexts, the ren-aissance of Finlandization privileges a normative reading of international relations asa stable and fixed game of great power politics where every conjuncture and majorchange is perceived as evidence of the soundness of one’s pre-given paradigm onthe true nature of international affairs.